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CHAPTER 1 
 
The Problem  
 
1.  Defining The Problem  
 
“It is regrettable that moral theology has neglected the role that emotions play in the 
moral life” says William Spohn, S.J. (1991, p. 85).  In his view, this seems to emerge 
from the influence of a rationalist natural law tradition which, unlike Aquinas, “did 
not pay as much critical attention to this dimension” (Spohn, 1991, p. 69).  He points 
to the place of the emotions in the virtue-centred ethics of Thomas Aquinas and to 
contemporary philosophy’s rediscovery of character and virtue in which “it pays 
more attention to the affective side of the agent” (Spohn, 1991, p. 69).  Aquinas, with 
other contemporary moral philosophers, recognised that “well-ordered affectivity 
guides moral decision-making through discerning perceptions and virtuous 
dispositions” (Spohn, 1991, p. 69).  Such is the summary of one respected 
commentator’s survey of Catholic Moral Theology at the start of this decade.   
 
These observations also have implications for various understandings of the human 
person within Moral Theology.  This is particularly true in the light of the phrase 
used in the official Vatican commentary on No. 51 of Gaudium et Spes, that “human 
activity must be judged in so far as it refers to the human person integrally and 
adequately considered.”  The final phrase “integrally and adequately considered” is, 
arguably, the dominant motif in the past thirty years of Moral Theology.      
 
Spohn’s comments together with their inference have been an important catalyst for 
this researcher.  The correlation of these two elements (emotions and the human 
person “integrally and adequately considered”) provides the springboard for this 
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study.  Its aim is to examine the moral significance of the emotions firstly in 
Aquinas, secondly, within and beyond recent Catholic Moral Theology (1960-1990), 
to compare and contrast them, then, finally, to evaluate these sources in the light of 
some contemporary views of emotions and of the human person.  The problem 
generated by the convergence of these elements can be expressed in a statement: 
 
There appears, until recently, to be an incomplete, and possibly inadequate, 
understanding and treatment of the emotions in the Christian moral life when 
measured against Aquinas, against some contemporary authors, and against the 
recent criterion of the human person “integrally and adequately considered.”  
These assertions indicate a possible need to explore whether and to what extent 
this first impression is true.  It also involves making some preliminary soundings 
so as to establish some contemporary benchmarks against which the 
understanding of emotions, morality and the human person in Aquinas and 
recent Moral Theology can be measured.  
 
The brief statement of the problem now needs to be explained. 
(i)  The first dimension of the problem can be stated thus: 
 
There is an extended treatment of the emotions (The Treatise on the Passions) in the 
Summa Theologiae of Aquinas that could provide an historical benchmark for the 
understanding of the emotions.   
 
The past twenty years have seen a re-examination of the writings of Aquinas, 
particularly in view of the renewed interest in character, virtue and moral 
development.  There is evidence of recent research on emotions and morality in 
Aquinas (Jordan, 1986; Pinckaers, 1990; Barad, 1991; Harak, 1993).  Emotions and 
the affective virtues are part of broader discussions on virtue and the moral life in 
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Aquinas ( Wadell, 1985, 1989; Porter, 1990; Cessario, 1991; Nelson, 1992; Keenan, 
1996; O’Connell, 1998).  These works are supplemented and expanded in a recent 
synthesis on the Christian moral life where emotions have a central role (Vacek, 
1994).  These studies provide access to a rich, though neglected, resource within the 
Catholic tradition.   
 
(ii)  The second dimension of the problem can now be stated: 
 
Catholic Moral Theology, immediately prior to and since Vatican II, seems, until 
recent times, to reflect an inadequate understanding and treatment of the emotions 
and of their significance in the Christian moral life. 
 
The principal vehicle for the teaching and writing of Moral Theology until around 
1960 was the theological Manual.  Written predominantly, though not exclusively, in 
Latin, the Manuals and the Manualist tradition emerged as a “genre” during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries-just after the Council of Trent.  The immediate 
aim of the Manuals was the formation and education of priests.  Consequently, their 
origin and intellectual context was the seminary, not the university.  The wider goal 
of the Manuals was the "cura animarum"-the care of souls but seen within a juridical 
context.  Moral Theology, increasingly seen outside a theological context, became 
more closely allied with Law and especially Canon Law.  Finally, the Manuals had a 
strong pastoral thrust and a well-developed strand of casuistry.  All in all, their goal 
was to provide a priest with the knowledge and practical skills to be a wise minister 
of the sacrament of penance (Gallagher, 1990, p. 30; O’Connell, 1990, p. 20). 
 
Moral Theology, just prior to Vatican II, in the 1940s and 1950s, was the “step-
child” of the moral Manualists, among them Genicot, Noldin, Prümmer, Merklebach, 
Aertnys-Damen (McCormick, 1989, p. 3).  Formation, theological opinions and 
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loyalties tended to follow the main theological “schools,” be they Dominican, Jesuit 
or Redemptorist.  Overall, it was an approach oriented to sin, the confessional, and 
under the strong influence of the Magisterium, Canon law and the seminary 
(McCormick,1989, p. 3).  
 
This provides the first and immediate context for the understanding and treatment of 
the emotions in the Christian moral life.  They are habitually given a relatively brief 
space in the Manuals (somewhere between 5-10 pages).  In these texts, the emotions 
are viewed predominantly, if not solely, as “Passions,” or as “Concupiscence.”  
Special consideration is given to the emotion of fear.  The moral significance of the 
emotions is seen by the Manualists in the context of the human act.  The emotions or 
“passions” are portrayed as factors or influences (whether actual or habitual) 
affecting deliberation or freedom of choice.  Their primary focus is on the levels of 
moral imputability, namely, the subjective factors influencing virtue or guilt.  Such a 
focus is appropriate, even necessary, in any discussion of morality and moral action. 
 
For all that, a brief perusal of the context and content of the treatment of the 
emotions in the Manuals raises possible questions, even at this stage.  There may be 
prima facie grounds for asking whether the understanding and treatment of the 
emotions and of their moral significance in the Christian life is undeveloped, even 
inadequate, in these authors.  Further, this raises questions about the nature and 
adequacy of the Theological Anthropology and the view of the human person 
underlying the understanding and treatment of the emotions by the Manualists. 
 
This raises the other consideration of the second aspect of the problem, the period 
since Vatican II.  Spohn’s regret at the neglect of the emotions within Moral 
Theology covered the period until 1990.  Ironically, this comment is made within the 
only extended discussion of the emotions (passions) in the “Notes on Moral 
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Theology” in Theological Studies over a span of fifty years.  
 
The “Notes” are both an excellent resource and barometer in three ways.  Firstly, 
they provided, during the 1940s and 1950s, a tempering influence on the 
characteristics of the Manualist tradition noted above by McCormick.  This was 
particularly due to the influence of two Jesuits, Gerald Kelly and John Ford.  They 
seemed to dominate the field of Catholic Moral Theology, certainly in the English-
speaking world.  They brought an approach that was well-informed, realistic, 
compassionate, prudent and extremely pastoral (McCormick, 1989, p. 4).  
 
Secondly, the “Notes,” particularly from 1965 under Richard McCormick’s 
authorship, encapsulated the main areas and lines of discussion on ethical issues in 
an international, ecumenical and multi-disciplinary setting.  Their catchment area 
embraced the main European languages, Protestant and Catholic theologians and, 
increasingly, other disciplines such as Moral Philosophy, Law, Political & Economic 
Philosophy, Business, Biotechnology and Medicine. 
 
Thirdly, the debates reflected in the “Notes” ranged from those in Fundamental 
Moral (Norms, Conscience, Proportionalism) to specific areas, for example, Nuclear 
War, Sexual Morality, Autonomous v Faith Ethics, Liberation Theology, Feminist 
Ethics and, increasingly, questions in Bioethics and Social Ethics.  
 
In reviewing the “Notes,” if little or no attention is given to the emotions in their 
annual surveys, it does not appear to be due to myopia on the part of the author or 
authors.  The “Notes” are no more or less a mirror of the state and preoccupations of 
Moral Theology at any given time. They seem to indicate that the  moral significance 
of the emotions in the Christian moral life was, until recently, a marginal concern.  
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This impression appears to be confirmed in an initial review of theological texts and 
writing since Vatican II.  For instance, authors of recent foundational texts, for 
instance, O’Connell (1990), Gascoigne (1993), and Kennedy (1996) give little 
attention to the emotions beyond the standard treatment as factors that affect 
freedom.  Lobo (1989) approaches the emotions from the same perspective but with 
some positive comments.  Other authors, e.g., Häring (1963, 1965, 1967) and 
Peschke (1979, 1978) attempt to revise and renew their approach to Moral Theology 
using the framework of the Manualist tradition.  Häring devotes ten or so pages to a 
“phenomenology” of the emotions, and discusses the various dimensions of emotions 
and their connection with values.  Peschke’s discussion of the emotions appears to be 
confined to those factors that impede or enhance freedom, with a few additional 
comments about their necessity and positive function in personal growth.  In their 
later work, Häring (1978, 1979, 1981) and Peschke (1986, 1993) appear to show no 
development in their view of the emotions.  As has already been noted, it is only 
since 1990 that there appear to be renewed signs of interest in, and extended 
discussion of, emotions in contemporary Moral Theology. 
 
To sum up: In this second aspect in articulating the problem, the discussion has 
addressed briefly the immediate context of Moral Theology and its view of the 
emotions in the Christian moral life.  Both in the Manualist tradition just prior to Vat. 
II., and in renewing Moral Theology from 1965-1990, the moral significance of the 
emotions in the Christian life appears, overall, to be undeveloped and inadequate. 
 
This raises the third dimension of the problem: 
 
(iii)  In contrast with Catholic Moral Theology, studies since the 1980s within Moral 
Philosophy, Psychology and Developmental Psychology throw further light on the 
relationship between the emotions and morality. This involves the moral significance 
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of emotions, the dynamics of moral reasoning, self-esteem, empathy, moral 
development and affective Conversion.  
 
Spohn’s reviews of the literature on the Passions (1991) and on the Virtues (1992) 
are indicators of the range and depth of the writing that has been done on the 
emotions.  This is true, firstly, within Moral Philosophy. There has been much 
research and discussion on the nature of the emotions, especially on their rationality, 
i.e., their cognitive and intentional structure, their moral significance, and their 
relationship to virtue and character.  Among those representative of such work are 
von Hildebrand (1958, 1972), MacMurray (1962), Solomon (1983), Nussbaum 
(1986, 1990, 1994) and Oakley (1992).  The quantity of writing is further 
documented by Oakley (1992) in his 18 page bibliography with at least 22 books and 
120 articles on the topic of the emotions and morality.  
 
Secondly, within Psychology, one finds an extensive discussion on the psychological 
dynamics of moral reasoning in Callahan (1988, 1991).  Dominian is representative 
of extensive work on self-esteem (1975, 1998).  The correlation of psychological 
trust with religious faith is explored by McDargh (1983).  There are important 
studies in Education and Developmental Psychology on moral development.  A 
landmark is the work of Gilligan (1982) and the debate following her critique of 
Kohlberg and its implications for moral reasoning (Philibert, 1987; Hepburn, 1993).  
Writing and research on moral development have brought with them a focus on the 
emotions both in moral agency and in the formation of character (Baillie, 1988; 
French, Uehling and Wettstein, 1988; Carr, 1991; Flanagan, 1991; Flanagan and 
Rorty, 1990).  Shelton (1984, 1990) explores the emotion of empathy in developing a 
psychology of the Christian moral life.  Gelpi (1988, 1998) uses some of advances in 
Psychology to expand the model on Conversion designed by Lonergan.   
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The research and writing in these three fields have developed the understanding of 
the nature of the emotions and of their significance in the moral life. This is true 
particularly in four areas.  Firstly, there is the question of emotional rationality, that 
emotions are not mindless surges of affect that lack purpose or direction.  They have 
a cognitive and intentional dimension.  Secondly, the sense of the self is built on an 
affective foundation known as self-esteem. Thirdly, there is the moral significance of 
the emotions.  They are not merely psychological facts.  Carefully understood, the 
emotions have moral significance in themselves together with a role in moral 
decision-making in collaboration with the intellect. Finally, there is the matter of 
moral character and integration in relation to the emotions.  The emotional 
configuration of a person’s life is an integral component of moral responsibility, 
personal growth and maturity. 
 
To sum up: The prima facie evidence concerning the undeveloped, even inadequate, 
view of the emotions in Catholic Moral Theology in the period 1960-1990 contrasts 
sharply with the lively debate and fertile resources evident in other disciplines.  
 
Finally, there is the fourth dimension of the problem. 
 
(iv)  The three facets of the problem can now to be correlated.  The first and primary 
bearing of the compass for this project is Aquinas.  He provides an historical 
benchmark against which the second bearing (the Manualists and authors within 
Moral Theology 1960-1990) can be measured.  The third compass point consists of 
some significant insights from contemporary Moral Philosophy, Psychology and 
Developmental Psychology and, to a lesser extent, from within the Catholic tradition. 
These offer a contemporary benchmark against which Aquinas, the Manualists and 
treatments of the emotions in Moral Theology between 1960-1990 can be evaluated.   
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Hence, there will be an examination of authors (Aquinas, Manualists and Moral 
Theologians since Vatican II), comparison and contrast between them and, 
simultaneously, an evaluation of these authors in themselves, then, finally, in relation 
to key insights from sources beyond the Catholic tradition.  The latter can provide an  
initial resource from which Moral Theology can enrich its content and broaden its 
perspective.  This process should provide a more adequate view of the significance 
of the emotions in the Christian moral life.  It will also provide a means for Moral 
Theologians to develop and use a Theological Anthropology more consistent with 
contemporary understandings of the human person in the Church. 
 
The outline of the problem now requires further clarification.  This will involve a 
brief survey of the broader historical context.  The explication of the first two aspects 
of the problem (Aquinas, Manualists and recent Moral Theology) centre on their 
immediate setting.  The third dimension (other sources from which one could 
evaluate, enrich and expand the understanding of the emotions and of the person) can 
only be explained in the wider context of the Church.  This is the setting where 
emotions, the human person and Moral Theology itself find their place and meaning.   
 
This study’s aim is to explore the problem as it has been defined and explained.  The 
next step is to examine the historical context noted above.  This will clarify the need 
to explore the problem and some of the relevant criteria required in the process. 
 
2:  Historical Context 
 
Central to any discussion of the historical context for this study is the concern of 
Vatican Council II that the various theological disciplines be renewed 
 
by a livelier contact with the mystery of Christ and the history of 
salvation.  Special attention needs to be given to the development of 
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Moral Theology.  Its scientific exposition should be more thoroughly 
nourished by scriptural teaching  (Optatum Totius (OT), 1965, no. 16).  
 
The Council further encouraged Moral Theology to reclaim its connections with 
Systematic Theology and the Fathers of the Church.  
This summons did not occur in a vacuum.  It has already been noted that moral 
teaching had gradually been distanced from the comprehensive theological 
framework that characterised a work such as the Summa Theologiae of Aquinas.  
The context for Moral Theology was reduced to the juridical, centred on God’s Law, 
Canon Law and divorced moral life and teaching from Scripture, Theology and faith.  
 
One principal characteristic of the Council’s vision for Moral Theology was that it be 
Christocentric.  Morality is seen here as the response to God’s invitation made out of 
love.  It is in and through Christ that God invites us.  It is in and through Christ that 
we can respond to the divine call.  The indwelling Spirit is at the heart of that process 
and of the Church.  As a consequence, this understanding of morality brings into 
sharper focus the communitarian, ecclesial, sacramental and social dimensions of 
moral living (Lobo, 1989, p. 18ff; O’Connell, 1990, pp. 23ff).  From this perspective, 
the moral life is not about observing rules or following commands.  It is a way of 
loving that begins with Jesus Christ as the embodiment of  God’s love.  It is a 
response expressed in the personal relationship of discipleship. 
 
The biblical renewal that forms the other characteristic of a renewed Moral Theology 
is a re-aligning with a long tradition.  The word of God was central to the perspective 
of the Fathers, Augustine and Aquinas.  The priority given to faith that opens a 
person’s mind and heart to God’s word has a profound importance for Moral 
Theology.  As a discipline, it will be in a better position to emphasise what is 
uniquely, specifically Christian.  With the life of Jesus as the model, moral teaching 
will find its primary content and take its thrust from the Gospel, the Sermon on the 
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Mount, the Beatitudes, the action of the Holy Spirit through grace, the theological 
virtues and the Gifts. 
 
The Vatican Council’s summons to ground Moral Theology in Scripture has, in 
retrospect, proven to be more difficult than was appreciated at the time.  The more  
scholarly appreciation by Scripture scholars of the range of literary forms and 
historical contexts in the Bible had repercussions for Moral Theology.  For instance, 
it raised questions about moral teaching that was based in Scripture and claimed to 
be normative and universal.  In the intervening thirty years, the relationship between 
Scripture and Ethics has generated both vigorous discussion and defended positions, 
reflected in Curran and McCormick (1984).  
 
In the final analysis, Moral Theology is a science whose goal is to bring people to 
“live the faith in a more thorough and mature way” (Gaudium et Spes (GS), 1965, 
no. 62).  It should, then, enable the Holy Spirit active in the word of God, in the 
Christian person and at the heart of Christian morality to produce the integrated 
vision and judgement that is wisdom.  Surveying the scene in Moral Theology since 
1965, one author sums it up thus: “In my opinion the chief task of today’s moral 
theologians is to reopen the lines of communication between Christian Ethics and the 
Word of God” (Pinckaers, 1995, p. xviii).  
 
The importance of the Scriptures as the basic diet for Moral Theology is germane to 
this study in two ways. Firstly, it places the person of Jesus Christ in his humanity in 
central position.  He models authentic humanness that mediates the face of God.  
This is particularly evident in his emotional responses to situations and people.  His 
anger at deliberate “blindness”, his tears over Jerusalem, his fear in Gethsemane 
betray his deepest attitudes and values.  In fact, his affective life seems to have its 
centre in his empathy and compassion-where he is most human and divine.  
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Secondly, the Scriptures have a formative role.  Personal growth in the likeness of 
Christ is closely related to the role of images, stories, parables and metaphors in 
shaping a person’s emotions.  It is especially the life of Jesus that Christians use as 
the central image to organise and interpret the affections (Spohn, 1983, pp.107ff). 
 
The second topic that stands out is the human person, the focus of Theological 
Anthropology.  Since the second Vatican Council, there have been significant 
developments in the understanding of the human person. This is particularly evident 
in the growing appreciation of the role and importance of personal conscience and of 
the personal dimension of the moral law.  Mention has already been made of the 
model of the person “integrally and adequately considered.”  The wording of the 
answer is found in the official Vatican commentary on Gaudium et Spes.  In No. 51, 
in the context of marriage and sexuality, the Council document states: “...the moral 
aspect of any procedure ... must be determined by objective  standards ... based on 
the nature of the human person and his (sic) acts” (GS, 1965, No. 51). 
 
McCormick (1984, p. 49) notes that the 1965 official commentary on this passage 
made two points: 
i) The expression formulates a general principle that applies to all human actions (not 
just to marriage and sexuality which was the original context). 
ii) This expression is chosen to signify that “human activity must be judged in so far 
as it refers to the human person integrally and adequately considered” (personam 
humanam integre et adequate considerandam). 
 
What does it mean to use the human person “integrally and adequately considered” 
as a criterion of moral methodology?  This phrase is a formal description that 
requires material content.  It needs to be expanded, given flesh, so that one has a 
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more detailed, specific picture of the integral human person which is both coherent 
and adequate.  Such an account should incorporate the essential components of the 
nature of the human person (“Who I am”) and of the goal of personhood (“Who I am 
called to be”).  It should also indicate the sorts of actions that promote or impede that 
process of integration and fulfilment.   
 
In the Church’s view, then, it is whatever enhances or diminishes the human person 
that is the criterion of rightness and wrongness in the moral life.  The thirty years 
since the above official clarification have stimulated much discussion amongst Moral 
Theologians.  In trying to interpret and understand the original phrase, to make it 
more specific, debate has tended to concentrate on questions arising from Sexual 
Morality and from Bioethics.  A significant issue has been the relationship between 
the human person’s use of intelligence, on the one hand, and natural processes 
(especially biological), on the other.  In the exercise of “right reason,” when is nature 
to be followed, or when should it be improved, corrected or even transcended by the 
person for the subject’s good?  More precisely, what is the relationship between the 
physical end of an act and the end (s) sought by, and for the good of, the person?   
 
The purpose of this study is not to be part of that particular debate but to highlight 
that, in this model, the emphasis is on the person, not so much as a moral agent, but 
as the measure of morality.  As noted above, such an understanding places more 
stress on the human person rather than on nature or human nature as the criterion of 
moral norms.  This view of the person continues to provide the grounds for a 
renewed understanding of Natural Law and for the methodological shift evident in 
Catholic Social Teaching. 
 
This personalist thrust also embraces the total person.  Hence, it gives greater 
prominence to the relational and social dimension of personhood.  The Council says 
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“(the) subject and goal of all social institutions is and must be the human person” 
(GS, 1965, no. 25).  Morality is intimately connected with what promotes or  
undermines relationships.  Lobo points out that  
 
The social is not something added to man.  The human person is 
essentially social.  Today, especially, there is need for emphasizing the 
social aspects of morality, since the person finds his fulfillment in society 
and is impeded from attaining perfection through adverse social factors 
(1989, p.21).  
 
An evolving construal of the human person as a social being is contained in the 
Social Encyclicals of Pope John Paul II beginning with Laborem Exercens (1982). 
The descriptive account, with its normative implications, revolves around three key 
concepts, namely Solidarity, Interdependence (between humans and with the natural 
environment) and, significantly, the reality of Structural Sin. 
 
The human person is portrayed as in God’s image (Gen. 1:27) in Conciliar 
documents.  There, and particularly in post-conciliar documents, one finds a concern 
for an holistic understanding of the human person.  The human person is created 
through love to be God’s image and to develop in God’s likeness, to be in intimate 
union with God (GS, 1965, nos. 8, 19).  Integral to this is the capacity to know 
oneself, to choose good and reject evil consciously and freely “as moved and drawn 
in a personal way from within”(GS, 1965, no.17).  
 
Each human person, then, is endowed with a physical body, with emotions, intellect, 
will and human spirit (GS, 1965, nos. 14, 15, 29). The Theological Anthropology of 
the person “integrally and adequately considered” embraces the corporeal, 
intellectual, affective, social, psychological, and spiritual.  Each of these facets of 
human personhood needs cultivation if a person is to reach integration.  One author 
sees it as a rediscovery of the Hebrew notion of the person (Lobo, 1989, p. 86).  It is 
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embodied in Jesus Christ who is the Image of God, revealing in his humanity the 
mature and complete human being. 
 
One can find in other local official Church resources an evolving picture of these 
various aspects of personhood, particularly touching on the need to identify, accept 
and direct the emotions.  For instance, the Perth Archdiocesan Guidelines for 
Religious Educators (PAGRE 1987) indicate in a brief fashion how the physical, 
emotional, intellectual, volitional and spiritual dimensions of the body/spirit reality 
of the person can become authentically human and hence more like God (PAGRE, 
1987, G1-5).  
 
A recent benchmark is the Catechism of the Catholic Church (1994).  The human 
person and the moral life are seen under the heading of Life in Christ and as a 
vocation to life in the Holy Spirit.  This is the context in which the dignity of the 
human person, human community, the need for salvation and grace are explored.  
The morality of the “passions” is treated briefly but positively (Nos. 1762-1770).  
Passions or feelings are “natural components of the human psyche...(that)...form the 
passageway and ensure the connection between the life of the senses and the life of 
the mind.”  They can “dispose” a person to beatitude “and contribute to it.”  In Christ 
human feelings “are able to reach their consummation in charity and divine 
beatitude.”     
 
The historical context reveals, then, an expanding understanding of the human person 
as the image of God.  Integral to this is the possession, development and integration 
of the emotions.  Emotions are an important aspect of the human person “integrally 
and adequately considered.”  Such a Theological Anthropology provides another 
benchmark against which one can examine and evaluate the moral significance of the 
emotions in the Christian moral life.   
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The third concern from Conciliar and post-conciliar documents and developments is 
the crucial link between Moral Theology and other disciplines, cf., Spirituality, 
Philosophy, pastoral practice and the secular sciences, especially Psychology and 
Sociology (GS, 1965, no.62; Sacred Congregation for Catholic Education: Formation 
of Future Priests, 1976).  The methodologies differ; scientific observation in the life 
sciences, self-awareness, reflection and interiority in Christian Ethics; but they are 
ways of knowing and understanding that complement each other.  They are important 
resources for Moral Theology.  
 
Social sciences can provide data that can be useful and, at times, essential in 
understanding and explaining moral behaviour.  Yet they have limits in that, from 
statistical data alone, one cannot arrive at moral norms.  Psychology has provided 
invaluable insights into the makeup of the person and those factors that facilitate or 
inhibit personal growth or moral responsibility.  It has deepened our appreciation of 
the psychological structure of the human person.  This is particularly true of the 
dynamic relationship between the conscious and the unconscious.  The role of the 
emotions is central in the various mechanisms used by the psyche in developing self-
awareness and in the integration of the self.  The emotions, especially the negative 
ones, can be indicators of health or of pathology.  Dealing with them constructively 
is essential to physical and psychological well-being (Gaylin, 1979, pp. 1ff). 
 
The use of these resources from other disciplines, then, helps to broaden one’s view 
of the human person and of the process of human growth and integration.  Such 
considerations can assist in providing a suitable and adequate framework within 
which this study can examine the moral significance of the emotions. 
 
The fourth aspect in this survey of the historical context concerns Spirituality.  
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Naturally, authors are indebted to the seminal works of Jonathan Edwards’ Religious 
Affections (1959), James’ Varieties of Religious Experience (1963), and Otto’s The 
Idea of the Holy (1977) for their probing of the nature of religious emotions.  Over 
the past two decades there has been a virtual explosion of literature in this field.  For 
the purposes of this study, one noteworthy aspect of this has been the research done 
on the Ignatian Exercises and discernment.  Central to this is the notion of desires 
and the role of emotions, feelings and affect in prayer.  Desires and affections, 
properly understood and used, can mediate God’s love and can be the indicators of 
the state of a person’s relationship with God (Moore, 1989; Barry, 1990, 1993). 
 
Again, there is evidence of a growing body of research and discussion on the 
relationship between Psychology and Spirituality (Lonsdale et al., 1990). Some have 
attempted to explore an integrated vision of personal maturity (Au, 1989; Au and 
Cannon, 1995).  There has also been writing on the spirituality of the negative 
emotions (Whitehead and Whitehead, 1994).   
 
Some work has been done on Spirituality and Morality by Bastianel (1986), Duffey 
(1988), O’Keefe (1995), Billy & Orsuto (1996) and Spohn (1997).  Lonergan had 
earlier seen Spirituality and Ethics as integrally related, as expressing two distinct 
levels of consciousness within the intending subject- “the desire to attain the truly 
valuable and the impulse to respond to the holy” (Willumsen, 1993, p. 673).  It must 
also be acknowledged that the shift from the grace-nature dualism and the growing 
politicisation in Christian Anthropology have suggested possibilities for the 
integration of Spirituality and Ethics.  These go beyond the extrinsicism of the 
Manualist tradition that “reciprocally instrumentalized prayer for moral attainment 
and ethical behaviour for spiritual progress” (Willumsen, 1993, p. 672).  The roots of 
this were principally in the separation (rather than distinction) of Systematic, Moral, 
Ascetical and Mystical theology.  These studies mentioned above indicate the 
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retrieval of a more integrated approach to spirituality, morality and theology in the 
first order sense (lived experience) as in Spirituality, Ethics and Theology in the 
second order sense (academic and systematic reflection) (Spohn, 1997, p. 111f).     
 
It is interesting that there appears to be little written that explores the relationship 
between Psychology and Moral Theology apart from the work of Kiely (1980), or 
between these two fields and Spirituality.  One wonders whether, more by default 
than by design, Spirituality as a discipline has taken up issues such as emotions and 
affectivity neglected by Catholic Moral Theologians.  It may be symptomatic of a 
more integrated vision of the Christian life in which the old divisions between  
disciplines are breaking down.  One must also be aware of a trend noted by one 
author that “holistic, creation-centered spiritualities and some narrative-based ethics 
risk the danger of losing the distinction between the spiritual and the ethical” 
(Willumsen, 1993, p. 673).  
 
Finally, examining the historical setting leads to the fifth consideration, the 
phenomenon referred to as the “feminising of consciousness.”  This has emerged 
from  the wider cultural context that surrounds the Church.  This “paradigm” or 
“sensibility” shift has many sources, especially in the feminist movement, 
environmentalism, the need for, and interest in, spirituality, the reaction to 
consumerism and to the scientific mentality in the Western world.  It is perhaps best 
summed by Tarnas as being a move from a “dualistic epistemology” (with its roots in 
Descartes and Kant) to a “participative epistemology” (1991, pp. 430ff).  A person’s 
relationship with the world is that of both observer and participant.  Knowledge and 
truth are attained not just by the detached process of scientific observation or by 
analysis but also (and just as validly) by synthesis, intuition and engagement.  
Knowing can also be non-discursive, relational and by way of union (which has 
parallels in the Biblical understanding of “knowing”).    
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These considerations indicate some of the central influences at work that raise 
serious questions for the rationalistic and, at times, Kantian approach to the moral 
life which still seems to lurk in Catholic Moral Theology (Spohn, 1991, p. 85).  They 
also point to the need to explore or perhaps to rediscover a fuller notion of 
“rationality.”  The rational does not just entail intellect and will, but embraces, in 
various ways and degrees, our emotions, affectivity, psyche, body and senses.  The 
human person, as a rational being, cannot function or develop to maturity without 
these facets of the personality working in harmony with each other.  Such ideas have 
been raised in the 1930s by the Scottish philosopher John MacMurray (1962) and, as 
had already been noted, more recently, by Callahan (1988, 1991), Oakley (1992) 
Nussbaum (1986, 1990, 1994) and others. 
 
This has been a brief examination of five aspects of the historical context, both past 
and present, that provide landmarks in this project.  The five issues are: the 
importance of the Scriptures and of the person of Christ; an integral Theological 
Anthropology; the use of other sciences and disciplines; the role of Spirituality and 
finally one cultural phenomenon that influences our perceptions and our sensibility.  
These factors help explain how the understanding of the human person has deepened 
and expanded over the past thirty years.  Such a process has implications for this 
project as it explores the moral significance of the emotions in the Christian life. 
 
How does Catholic Moral Theology measure up?  Is it sufficient that spontaneous 
desires and emotions be seen merely as factors that can inhibit freedom, or, more 
often, as hindrances or dangers to the Christian moral life?  If not, in what sense are 
they good?  In what sense are they moral and enhance freedom?  In what sense are 
they integral to, even indispensable in, helping human beings to act morally, grow in 
virtue and become morally integrated?  How do emotions contribute to answering the 
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question “Who am I called to be?” which is the goal of personhood, of Theological 
Anthropology ? 
 
So far, then, this study has attempted to define and to explain the problem.  Next, 
there has been an examination of the historical context so as to further clarify the 
problem, to establish the appropriateness of the project and to indicate some 
benchmarks for the process.  This provides a better appreciation that this study does 
meet a need and that the five aspects of the historical context provide both resources 
and criteria for the task.  The next step is to survey the related research. 
 
3.  Related Research  
 
A literature search revealed that, so far, no extended studies have been done on the 
emotions as they are treated in Catholic Moral Theology 1960-1990 (Manualists and 
others).  Studies have been done on Aquinas but not by way of comparison and 
contrast with the Manualists and other writings since 1960.  Nor does there appear to 
be any evaluation of these sources in the light of contemporary studies in Moral 
Philosophy, Psychology and Developmental Psychology.  Particular aspects of the 
topic of this project such as, emotional rationality, the moral significance of the 
emotions, their role in moral integration, Aquinas on the emotions, have been the 
subject of a number of scholarly studies in the past thirty years or more.  Specific 
reference to these books or articles has already been made either as background to, or 
as resources for, this study. 
 
Other studies either in books, journals or dissertations have been done on topics 
related to this study.  These can be discussed under three headings. 
 
3.1:  Emotions, Religious and Moral Life 
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Beyond the standard works on religious emotions already mentioned, there are 
studies by Saliers (1980) and Spohn (1983, 1995).  Lauritzen (1985, 1988) rejects the 
dichotomy between reason and emotion.  He develops a “constructivist” theory of the 
emotions.  Such, in his view, places one in a better position to explain how a 
religious vision of life can facilitate significant moral changes in the believer.  
Christian faith, then, has the capacity to transform dispositions, intentions, and 
especially the emotions, particularly that of anger.  Roberts (1992), from another 
vantage point, examines how different classes of virtue disclose their structural 
dependency on the Christian emotions.   
 
Aquinas’ account of the need for well-formed affective and intentional habits is the 
focus of the dissertation of Calogero (1994).  Drawing on Aquinas and Jonathan 
Edwards, the work of Lewis (1991, 1994) presents a critique and modification of 
Lauritzen’s work.  The alternative perspectives from the Catholic and Protestant 
traditions converge to reveal a fuller anthropology in which humans are seen as the 
“embodied possessors of a rich repertoire of powers which interact in complex ways” 
(Lewis, 1991).  Both Aquinas and Edwards assume a teleological world-view.  This 
influences their understanding of the moral life, the Christian transformation of these 
innate, human powers and enables these two writers to hold “a more finely-textured 
understanding of the emotions” (Lewis 1991).    
 
A broader religious spotlight is used by Gilman (1994).  He pursues Nussbaum’s 
notion of “narrative emotions” and the interdependence of narratives and emotions.  
He sees this as a means of overcoming the dilemma of modern theism, of being 
caught between being irrelevant to the modern world or unfaithful to the Christian 
tradition.  Emotions can mediate a practical kind of universal truth and narratives can 
mediate those meanings that are distinctively Christian.   
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The specifically and uniquely Christian account of character and community, central   
for Hauerwas, is the object of a critical study by Jung (1983).  She tries to address the 
limits of an ethics of character and to expand Hauerwas’ interpretation of the moral 
meaning of sanctification.  Jung argues that an adequate vision of holiness and 
maturity must incorporate embodiment and embrace the body/spirit scope of human 
existence.  In her view, sanctification involves more than a transformation of one’s  
perceptions.  It also entails “an affective change in the agent’s value orientation, the 
competent retraining  of the agent’s emotions, and the gracious triggering of an 
adoptive disposition towards the agent’s incarnate situation” (1983, p, 75f).   
 
 
3.2:  Moral Development-Education, Moral Philosophy, Developmental Psychology 
 
The emotional basis of moral attitudes is the concern of Mailloux (1985).   
In her dissertation on Aristotle’s theory of moral education, Sherman (1982) argues 
that a theory of the development of character requires an analysis of the emotions 
and desires that constitute a person’s character.  In her interpretation of Aristotle, 
moral training is not just a matter of habituation and of the practice of certain skills.  
It also involves the training (especially within the family) of the emotions-in the 
cognitive dimension (beliefs and perceptions) and in the desiderative aspect 
(attachments to certain ends and objects of value).  Such moral training (paedia) also 
encompasses the communal and the cultural.  A common core of values is mediated 
through music and tragedy (drama and art) which reinforces attachment to certain 
characters and values through the process of identification.  
 
Critical evaluation of the role and influence of the Kantian view of moral agency has 
already been noted (Oakley, 1992) and others.  Four dissertations take up this issue.  
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Naukhoff (1994) argues that Kant’s mature moral theory actually considers that it is 
one’s ability to cultivate feelings which helps a person to form a virtuous disposition.  
Jones (1994) examines how emotions reveal a person’s ways of seeing the world, 
and help a person arrive at the right view of a situation.  O’Hagan (1994), relying on 
de Sousa’s account of an emotion, argues that emotions can be “assessed as 
objective, appropriate responses to morally relevant situations.”  Finally, moral 
growth is discussed by Kavanagh (1990).  Building on Charles Taylor’s notion of 
strong evaluation second-order desires, she argues that moral education is essentially 
the broadening and refining of these desires and the propensity for them already 
present in a child.  Moral education, then, is an unfolding from within rather than an 
imposition of principles external to the child.  
 
3.3:  Compassion and Empathy 
 
Radcliffe (1994) addresses the Kantian position that since emotions are not under a 
person’s direct voluntary control, they cannot be at the will’s bidding in any morally 
meaningful way.  Through an analysis of compassion, the author argues that a 
construal of this emotion as subject to a person’s will means that it provides an 
instance where an emotion is the possible object of a moral imperative.     
 
McCarthy (1993) suggests that the question of empathy is basically one of 
epistemology, a way of knowing.  The processes and dynamic that distinguish an 
empathetic response are the same as those that enable a person to engage in and enter 
diversity (especially in another culture).  Empathy is a spiritual discipline, a call to 
being-in-relationship, to a continual and expanding openness to others, to diversity, 
and entails the capacity to tolerate uncertainty.  The Incarnation with its self-
emptying and not clinging to the divinity (Phil. 2:6-7) is a central metaphor for 
empathy and its demands. 
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Davis (1993) reflects on McCarthy’s view and offers a more qualified interpretation 
of the role of empathy, especially in women’s experience.  Empathy, in her view, 
requires a higher level of emotional functioning and is expected (unfairly) more of 
women than of men in Western culture.  From these ideas emerge a less optimistic 
view of the possibilities of empathy, a need to reconsider expectations of women 
with regard to empathy, and particularly the need for women to find a better balance 
between self-care and care of others.  This has implications for how one interprets 
Jesus’ self-emptying and how one sees Christian self-giving in relation to nurturing 
and caring for others.   
 
In brief, all the studies in this literature search or noted earlier in this project  relate in 
some way to emotional rationality, to the emotions and their role in the Christian 
religious or moral life, to personal integration or to growth in empathy and 
compassion.  None sought to examine and critically assess the treatment of the 
emotions in the Christian moral life within Catholic Moral Theology prior to or since 
the second Vatican Council nor to appraise the categories mentioned above in the 
light of that topic.  
 
Having defined the problem, examined its historical context then surveyed the 
relevant research, the next task is to indicate the method to be used in pursuing this 
study.   
 
4.  Methodology 
 
The primary methods employed in this study will be document analysis and 
historical research. This will entail an examination and critical evaluation of the 
context and content of selected texts by a form of qualitative research (Bogdan & 
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Biklen, 1992; Miles & Huberman, 1984).  This method, inductive rather than 
deductive, seeks to identify the presence of particular content, both manifest or 
inferred, within selected texts or documents.  The presence or absence of certain 
content is an indicator from which an hypothesis can be inferred or certain 
interpretations can be made.  Such an instrument will enable this study to gain access 
to commonly held perspectives amongst Moral Theologians with regard to the moral 
significance of the emotions and of the human person. 
 
The nature of this project, then, requires the use of document analysis for it is 
through the texts analysed that the researcher “can get access to the official 
perspective” (Bogdan & Biklen, 1992, p. 136).  In this study, particularly in those 
sections dealing with Catholic Moral Theology prior to or since Vatican II, the 
“official perspective” is not synonymous with “official” Church teaching.  Amongst 
the primary sources is a selection of Moral manuals used in the education of priests.   
Hence, “official perspective” refers, rather, to the theological perspective “in 
possession,” the received tradition of Moral Theology taught in seminaries 
principally until the 1960s and, to a lesser extent, since that time.   
 
The second aspect of the methodology will involve the use of comparison and 
contrast.  This will principally be between Aquinas and authors from the Manualist 
tradition, i.e., Davis (1935), Prümmer (1935, 1963), Aertnys-Damen (1956),  Noldin-
Schmitt (1956). The same process will be used with authors whose provenance is the 
Manualist tradition and who attempt to renew it, cf. Häring’s Law of Christ (1963, 
1965, 1967) and Free and Faithful in Christ (1978, 1979, 1981), Peschke’s two 
editions of Christian Ethics (1979, 1978; 1986, 1993) and, to a lesser extent, Grisez 
(1983) and Maguire (1978, 1986).  Comparison and contrast will be applied to the 
treatments of the moral significance of emotions and to the Theological 
Anthropologies. 
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The third facet of the methodology is evaluation of the above sources from within 
Moral Theology in themselves, then in relation to a contemporary benchmark, i.e., 
insights from contemporary Moral Philosophy, Psychology, Developmental 
Psychology and some writing from Theology.  
 
The use of comparison and contrast in this study will further require a sensitivity to 
discrepancies which may emerge between “espoused theory” and “theory in use” in 
the selected texts.  As noted by Lenihan (1995, pp.2, 34), the primary context for the 
use of these two categories is the comparison and contrast between sets of 
documents, where one is “official” or “normative” and others are applications to a 
particular or local situation, for instance, programmes, courses, guidelines.  The 
“official” position on a particular topic may embrace a certain content.  The 
document applying that perspective, while claiming to “espouse” the “official” 
position or “theory”, may, in reality, be “using” another position or theory.  This may  
arise from interpreting or applying the “espoused theory” in a way that departs from 
or contradicts the original content or intention of the authors.    
 
These two categories of theory will be helpful tools in probing the selected texts in 
this study.  A particular author, for instance a Manualist, may ostensibly adopt a 
certain Theological Anthropology.  In fact, the same author may employ it in a 
manner that is either inconsistent or in conflict with that “espoused” position, for 
example, when treating the emotions and the moral life.   
 
The focus of this analysis and critical appraisal will be  
1. Aquinas’ treatment of the emotions (Passions);  
2. Selected texts and writing in Catholic Moral Theology from c. 1960-1990, namely,    
    Manualists and their successors;  
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3.  Selected authors from  recent literature in Moral Philosophy, Psychology,   
     Developmental Psychology and relevant Theological writing.  
 
The use of selected texts is dictated, firstly, by the parameters of time and the size of 
the study.  Secondly, the nature of some key sources indicates that a selection of texts 
be the target of this study, for instance, the Manuals of Moral Theology.  As a 
specific theological genre, the Manuals developed a distinctive structure and content.  
In other words, one Manual was much the same as another.  While recognising the 
neo-Thomist revival initiated by Leo XIII in Aeterni Patris (1879), the moral 
Manuals emerging from that period were “basically in continuity with the morality of 
earlier centuries” (McNamara, 1985, p. 9).  These Manuals became the received 
tradition, the theology taught in Catholic seminaries until the 1960s (Gallagher, 
1990, pp. 29ff).   
 
Because of this similarity in structure and content, this study will concentrate on 
authors writing in Latin (Prümmer, Noldin-Schmitt, Aertnys-Damen) and one author 
writing in English (Davis) as representative of the Manualist tradition.  They also 
represent different schools-Dominican (Prümmer), Redemptorist (Aertnys-Damen), 
Jesuit (Davis and Noldin-Schmitt). One can find a precedent for this in Gallagher’s 
study of the development of Moral Theology (1990).  He uses a representative group 
of authors (including Manualists) to provide a reliable sample from which he can 
draw certain conclusions.   
 
Thirdly, in examining the period since the second Vatican Council until 1990, this 
study will review the literature within Catholic Moral Theology in so far as it deals 
with the emotions and the Christian moral life.  The study will pay particular 
attention to two authors, Häring and Peschke and, to a lesser extent, to Grisez and 
Maguire.  The format and content of their texts indicate that they have their roots in 
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the Manualist tradition while attempting a renewed approach to Moral Theology.  In 
Häring’s case, the three volumes of The Law of Christ (1963, 1965, 1967) are first 
published in German just prior to then during the Second Vatican Council and, 
twenty years later, Free and Faithful in Christ (1978, 1979, 1981).  Peschke’s work in 
developing a moral synthesis in the light of the summons from the Vatican Council, 
is published in 1979, 1978, then, in revised form, in 1986 and 1993.  Grisez’ first 
volume is published in 1983.  Maguire’s work is from the same period (1978, 1986). 
These four authors, two of whom having written two sets of texts in different 
periods, give some insight into the state of mainstream Catholic Moral Theology and 
some of its key developments.   
  
Fourthly, this researcher has formed the initial opinion that Aquinas’ Treatise on the 
Passions could be a major point of reference in this project.  It is a standard  
against which one could evaluate the past (Manualists) and the present ( recent Moral 
Theology) and can itself be measured against insights from Moral Philosophy 
Psychology, Developmental Psychology and recent Catholic scholarship. Given this, 
an extended examination, analysis and critical evaluation of Aquinas’ work on the 
moral significance of the emotions (passions) is crucial to this study. 
 
Fifthly, when this study comes to examine recent writing in Moral Philosophy, one 
particular author has been selected.  Oakley (1992) is a comprehensive study of 
morality and the emotions which draws on many sources.  He approaches the task 
within an Aristotelian framework of virtue and character.  Such an approach is 
consonant both with the thrust of this study and with one of its key facets, the work 
of Aquinas on the emotions.  Oakley’s work also provides a coherent account of the 
moral significance of the emotions that could enrich Moral Theology.   
 
Again, Psychology throws light on the place of self-esteem in the moral life, 
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particularly in relation to the capacity for empathy (Dominian, 1975, 1998; Jackson, 
1989; McDargh, 1983). From this field there is also the work of Callahan (1988, 
1991) on the role of emotions in moral decision-making.  From Developmental 
Psychology there are the studies of Gilligan (1982) on moral reasoning and moral 
development in women.  Shelton (1990) investigates the role of empathy as the 
psychological foundation of the Christian moral life.  Shelton’s focus on empathy has 
a bearing on this study.  It underlines the importance of one particular emotion in 
three ways, in having inherent moral meaning, in being a factor in moral integration, 
and in playing a crucial role in the Christian moral life. This could lead to a more  
adequate view of the human person and of the moral significance of the emotions.   
 
The aim of this project is to probe the texts mentioned above and to respond to the 
focal question of this study, namely:  
 
How adequate is the treatment of the moral significance of the emotions in 
Catholic Moral Theology 1960-1990 when measured against the work of  
Aquinas and some contemporary authors? 
 
In this process, the following three research questions will be used: 
1.  How do these authors portray the moral significance of the emotions in the 
Christian moral life in relation to human acts, virtue and character? 
2.  What is the vision of the human person manifest or inferred in these authors? 
3.  What is the significance of the different understandings and treatments of the 
emotions and of the human person in these authors?  
The study will contain the following substantive considerations (Chapter 1): 
1)  an explication of the problem, 
2)  a description of the context with which the study is concerned, 
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3)  an identification of the texts to be examined and analysed and their relevance to   
the problem being studied, 
4)  an explanation of other literature that is pertinent to the problem being studied, 
5)  a description of the methodology used in this study, 
6)  a definition of terms,  
7)  a discussion of the limits of the study, its significance and possible implications  
for Moral Theology. 
 
An attempt will be made to formulate a working definition or “understanding” of an 
emotion (Chapter 2). 
 
The process of examination (analysis, historical research), comparison and contrast 
within and between texts, evaluation of texts with regard to the moral significance of 
the emotions in the Christian moral life will entail the following steps (Chapters 3-7): 
1.  Employ the three research questions formulated above to investigate the focal 
question for this study; 
2.  Examination of the documents using the first two research questions.  The 
pertinent documents are:  
  2.1:  Aquinas’ Treatise on the Passions in the Summa Theologiae  I.II. qq. 22-48 
and his discussion of the Affective Virtues in I.II. qq. 55-61 (Chapters 3 and 4);   
  2.2:  The first volume in each of the courses in Moral Theology of the selected 
Manualists, Prümmer (1935, also 1963), Davis (1935), Noldin-Schmitt (1956), 
Aertnys-Damen (1956) ( Chapter 5); 
  2.3:  The two editions of courses in Moral Theology of Häring (1963, 1965, 1967) 
and 1978, 1979, 1981), of Peschke (1979, 1978 and 1986, 1993), plus Grisez (1983), 
and some recourse to Maguire (1978, 1986). There will also be a brief survey and 
examination of writing in Catholic Moral Theology 1960-1990 (Chapter 6);   
  2.4:  The texts of Oakley (1992), Gilligan (1982), Callahan (1988, 1991), and  
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Shelton (1990) will involve the highlighting of a significant aspect of each author’s 
work in relation to the moral significance of emotions, moral virtue and character.  
Other authors will also be used as resources, e.g., Jackson, McDargh, Dominian, 
Lonergan, Gelpi (Chapter 7). 
 
This study will investigate, in these authors (especially in Aquinas, Manualists and 
post-Manualists), structure, context, content and form-for instance, formulations of 
questions, forms of argument, phrases, words and imagery.  By this method, it is 
hoped there will emerge answers to the first two research questions: 
i)  “How do these authors (Aquinas, Selected Manualists, Häring, Peschke, Grisez, 
Maguire and other post-Manualists, then Oakley, Gilligan, Callahan, Shelton etc. 
portray the moral significance of the emotions in the Christian moral life in relation 
to human acts, virtue and character?” 
ii)  “What is the vision of the human person manifest or inferred in these authors?” 
3.  Comparison and contrast will be done between 
  3.1:  Aquinas and selected Manualists in their understandings of the moral 
significance of emotions and of Theological Anthropology (the person) (Chapter 5); 
  3.2:  Aquinas, Manualists and Catholic Moral Theology (1960-1990) especially 
Häring, Peschke, Grisez and Maguire (Chapter 6);   
  3.3:  Aquinas, Manualists and Catholic Moral Theology (1960-1990) with Oakley, 
Gilligan, Callahan, Shelton and others (Jackson, McDargh, Dominian, Gelpi) 
(Chapter 7);   
4.  Cumulative evaluation is the other aspect of the process.  This will involve an on-
going appraisal of Aquinas, Manualists, Catholic Moral Theology 1960-1990 among 
themselves and, finally, in relation to the contemporary authors examined in Chapter 
7.    
By the use of comparison, contrast, evaluation, it is hoped that the answer to the third 
research question will surface: 
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“What is the significance of the different understandings and treatments of the 
emotions and of the human person in these authors?” 
 
4.  Recording and presentation of the findings, with conclusions, implications of the 
study and recommendations for Catholic Moral Theology (Chapter 8). 
 
5. Definition of Terms 
 
Church  
The Roman Catholic Church, specifically the People of God, which includes the 
hierarchical leadership and teaching authority, the Magisterium. 
 
 
Manualists  
The authors of theological textbooks (Manuals), in this instance, textbooks of Moral 
Theology, written predominantly in Latin, for use in seminaries from the sixteenth 
century until the 1960s.  
 
Moral Theology  
A term used almost exclusively within the Roman Catholic tradition in contrast with 
Christian Ethics which, until recent times, has been used predominantly amongst 
Protestant theologians.  Currently, the term Christian Ethics is increasingly found in 
course descriptions at Catholic Theological Institutes and in the work of Catholic 
authors.  Symptomatic of this is the use of the term Christian Ethics in the title of the 
book and in the definition of Moral Theology of Pinckaers when he says “Christian 
Ethics is a branch of Theology which studies human acts to direct them to a loving 
vision of God, seen as our true, complete happiness and our final end, in the light of 
revelation and reason” (1995, pp. 8ff)  
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Practical Reason 
 
The process by which a person judges actions as right or wrong according to  
 
objective criteria.  It is conscience acting in a concrete situation.  Aquinas, following  
 
Aristotle, saw the virtue of phronesis (Prudence, practical wisdom) as necessary for a  
 
person “to judge an ethical situation correctly and to form his conscience  
 
accordingly” (Stoeckle, 1979, p. 211).   
 
 
 
Value 
Like “good,” value can be understood in a non-moral (pre-moral) or moral sense.  
Something can be “good” or “have value” in a range of non-moral senses-as useful, 
instrumentally (as a means to an end), inherently (an experience of something that is 
rewarding), intrinsically (worthwhile in itself) etc. (Frankena, 1973, p. 81f).  Moral 
“good” or value denotes something that is good on moral grounds.  Namely, it is an 
activity or state of affairs (e.g., being just, honest, faithful) that is worthwhile in 
relation to “persons, groups of persons, traits of character, dispositions, emotions, 
motives, intentions” (Frankena, 1973, p. 62).  To realise such values by embracing 
and promoting such values is praiseworthy, right, or fitting, hence a person is 
morally “good.”  To neglect or reject such values is blameworthy, wrong, not fitting, 
hence a person is morally “bad.”  The difference of judgements between moral and 
non-moral value is partly a question of the objects called “good” or “bad” and partly 
the difference in “the grounds on or the reasons for which they are made” (Frankena, 
1973, p. 62).  In other words, what counts as a moral or non-moral value is 
significantly influenced by the descriptive and normative accounts of the person.    
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Voluntarium 
One needs to explain the Latin term voluntarium since the English words 
“voluntary,” “voluntarily,” “volunteer” do not have the same connotations.  
Voluntarium is a formal term in Moral Theology that describes an act, omission or 
effect that proceeds from an internal principle, for instance, the will, with knowledge 
of an end or object (Prümmer, 1935, p. 40).  An act is perfectly a voluntarium (in the 
full sense) when it is done with full advertence and full consent (i.e., freely).  It is 
imperfectly a voluntarium (in a limited sense) if advertence and/or consent is partial 
(Davis, 1935, p. 12).  The English equivalent of voluntarium  would be “a human act 
done with deliberation and consent.”   
 
The voluntarium or human act in the proper sense involves freedom.  This is not just 
immunity from external coercion but also protection from internal pressures.  The 
will, in order to be free in its consent, requires a certain indifference (indifferentia) or 
impartiality with regard to possible objects of choice.  It is a condition of not being 
weighted more in one direction, to one object, than to another.  When this weighting 
exists, from external or internal sources, the freedom of the will’s consent is 
diminished or removed.   
 
For instance, intense anger can make someone so intent on a course of action, that 
the capacity to choose otherwise is lessened or removed.  In this instance, there may 
be neither deliberation nor freedom.  Again, a person may know and consent to an 
act, for instance, robbing a bank teller.  But a third party may have a gun in the 
person’s back.  Here, the action is deliberate and intended but the consent is not free.  
So, as Prümmer (1935, p. 41) points, out every free act is a voluntarium but not every 
voluntarium is a free act. 
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6.  Significance of the Study 
 
The proposed study is significant for a number of reasons.  Principal among these is 
that, until now, there appears to be no substantial examination of the emotions in the 
Christian moral life as they are treated in Aquinas in relation to recent Catholic 
Moral Theology, particularly in relation to the neo-Thomistic Manualist tradition just 
prior to Vatican II.  A project such as this in which there is an attempt to explore 
what is, as yet, unexplored, has merit in itself. 
 
Secondly, one needs to recall Spohn’s concern that in Catholic Moral Theology, until 
recently, there has been a neglect of the emotions and a correlative influence of a 
Kantian model of moral reasoning.  This study could help redress the imbalance in 
two ways.  One is by investigating how humans are more fully rational if they have 
emotional involvement in seeking, doing and achieving what is good through desires, 
love and delight.  Further, this study could help counteract the view that with 
negative emotions (for instance, hate, fear, and anger), emotional discomfort is 
tantamount to moral discomfort, that to feel bad is to be guilty.  In others words, it is 
helpful to explore how negative emotions can have a constructive psychological and 
moral significance.   
 
Thirdly, the understanding of the human person in theological disciplines and in 
Church documents has expanded and deepened in the past thirty years.  The 
behavioural sciences, Sociology, Anthropology and especially Psychology, have 
made a considerable contribution to our understanding of the human person.  This is 
true, in particular, with regard to the emotions and their role in human life and 
growth.  There is a need to examine whether the views of the person and of the moral 
significance of the emotions in Moral Theology is consistent with such 
developments.  This raises issues to do with the adequate treatment of an area within 
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a discipline and of its presentation in various forms of education. 
 
Fourthly, there appears to a dearth of studies within Catholic Moral Theology that 
draw on, or engage in, a mutual critical evaluation with work done in Moral 
Philosophy, Psychology and Developmental  Psychology.  This provides another 
positive reason for engaging in this study.   
 
Finally, this study brings a point of view that is part of a larger setting.  That setting 
is the retrieval of classical and medieval authors, (for instance, Aristotle, the Stoics, 
Aquinas) by reputable scholars, amongst them Nussbaum, MacIntyre, Sherman, 
Rorty, Westberg, Lisska, Torrell, Pinckaers.  To harness some of these resources, 
particularly with regard to Aquinas and, specifically, studies on his Treatise on the 
Passions, to compare and contrast them with the Manualists and subsequent 
treatments of the emotions, could contribute to the field of Moral Theology. 
 
7.  Limitations of the Study 
 
The particular parameters of this study are fourfold: 
7.1:  Its perspective is limited to Moral Theology in the Catholic tradition as distinct 
from the Reformed tradition or the traditions of Moral Philosophy, Psychology or 
Developmental Psychology; 
7.2:  It has a limited time-frame. The possibilities for such a study in this field could 
embrace hundreds of years.  This study has as its main focus the period immediately 
prior to and after Vatican II (1962-1965). Hence it covers the period c. 1960-1990; 
7.3:  It is limited in terms of authors (Chapters 5-6).  The primary sources are 
selected Manualists and writers whose provenance is mainly the Manualist tradition.  
These are indicators of the state of Moral Theology.  Secondary authors are used 
only by way of overview since 1965 to assess developments; 
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7.4:  It is limited in having a specific focus as far as the emotions are concerned.  The 
discussion of Aquinas (Chapter 3 and 4) will focus on the moral significance of the 
emotions and the Affective virtues in his work as also in the Manualists and post-
Manualists (Chapters 5 and 6).  In Chapter 7, key aspects are discussed with special 
reference to representative authors in Moral Philosophy (moral dimension of 
emotions and moral reasoning in Oakley), in Psychology (dynamics of the emotions 
in moral reasoning in Callahan) and in Developmental Psychology (moral reasoning 
and development in women in Gilligan; empathy and moral character in Shelton).  
Self-esteem and affective Conversion will also be explored using the work of 
Dominian, Jackson, McDargh and Gelpi. These are sources against which Aquinas, 
the Manualists and Catholic Moral Theology 1960-1990 can be critically assessed.   
 
8.  Format of the Study 
 
The study will be presented in eight chapters as follows: 
1.  Definition of the problem, including historical context, related research,  
     methodology, definition of terms, significance, limitations and format of the     
     study;  
2.  Emotion: a working definition; 
3.  Benchmarks for emotions and morality in Aquinas I: Foundations; 
4.  Benchmarks for emotions and morality in Aquinas II: Specific issues; 
5.  Emotions and the Moral Life in the Manualist Tradition c. 1960; 
6.  Emotions and the Moral Life in Renewing Catholic Moral Theology 1960-1990; 
7.  Contemporary Soundings and Benchmarks;  
8.  Summary of findings, conclusions, implications, recommendations, postscript.  
 
Chapter one will articulate the problem in the form of a statement about an aspect of 
Catholic Moral Theology that needs to be addressed at this time.  It will provide an 
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historical overview of the context from which the focus of the study emerges.  It will 
summarise the related research, focussing on the emotions and affectivity in relation 
to rationality, religious or moral experience.  The chapter will explain the 
methodology to be used together with the research questions to be employed in 
probing the problem.  It will provide a brief working definition of relevant terms, 
note the significance of the study, identify the reasons for pursuing it, point out its 
limitations and outline its format. 
 
Chapter two will offer, in a more developed form, a working definition or 
“understanding” of an emotion. 
 
The following five chapters will be the focus of the three research questions.  The 
aim will be to uncover in an author or authors the view of the moral significance of 
the emotions in the Christian moral life, the manifest or inferred Theological 
Anthropology and, finally, the significance of different understandings and 
treatments of the emotions and of the human person (points of comparison and 
contrast).  In Chapters three and four, these questions will be used in Aquinas’ 
Treatise on the Passions.  In Chapter five, the focus will be selected Manualists and, 
in Chapter six, writings within Catholic Moral Theology 1960-1990, particularly 
Häring, Peschke, Grisez and Maguire.  In Chapter seven, the spotlight shifts to 
establishing some contemporary benchmarks from within Moral Philosophy 
(Oakley), Psychology (Callahan, Dominian, Jackson, McDargh) and Developmental 
Psychology (Gilligan, Shelton) and using them in critical evaluation.    
 
In Chapter eight, the researcher will attempt to present a summary of the study, its 
findings, its conclusions, its implications for Catholic Moral Theology, suggest any 
recommendations that may emerge from the implications and conclusions and will 
close the project with a postscript. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Emotion: A Working Definition 
 
1. Clarifying Language 
 
Humans all experience themselves as “being moved,” as affected in some way.  It 
may be when one is gripped by fear, burning with anger, surprised by joy, teary from 
compassion.  Yet, attempting to define these and other emotions is to join company 
with those who almost despair of finding any rational common definition.  Spohn 
(1991, p. 70) cites the questions raised by Amelie O. Rorty,“Are they rational or 
irrational, active or passive, motives or intentional states, value moods or directed to 
specific objects, caused by social, genetic, or individual factors?”  
 
One cannot discuss the moral significance of the emotions without some form of 
coherent and adequate account of the nature of an emotion.  For the purposes of this 
study, an attempt to formulate at least a working definition is an imperative. 
 
At the outset, it is important in this discussion to note that human activity is 
integrated.  Human capacities, powers and activities are distinct while not being 
separate.  An emotion is often associated with, mediated through, or modified by 
intellection (concepts), volition, behaviour (action), bodily changes or inner 
psychological states but is not identified with any one or all of them.  For instance, 
knowing what something is does not convey the value of that object to a person.  
This comes through an emotion.  Or, many emotions lead to action but not 
necessarily so, e.g.,  the emotions of wonder or joy are often experienced in and for 
themselves.    
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Spohn (1991, p. 71) notes in reference to affective states that usage seems to indicate 
a ranking based on increasing focus, self-awareness and purpose.  The states range 
from moods, feelings, wants through desires, passions, emotions and affections to 
dispositions and motives. 
 
Emotions are distinct from the following (Gonsalves, 1985, p. 24;  Solomon, 1983, p. 
132ff): 
a)  Moods:  These are emotions that are generalised (on the object side and 
sometimes on the side of the subject).  The mood, e.g., depression, is precipitated by 
an emotion or emotions whose focus is the world as a whole rather than a specific 
object (person, situation, thing);   
b)  Desire:  This is a wanting or a striving for something valued or valuable (or to 
withdraw from something by aversion) but not always based on, or associated with, 
emotions, e.g., “primitive” needs such as hunger or thirst or, alternatively, the desire 
for meaning or holiness with the desire to avoid evil (aversion);    
c)  Feelings:  This word is often used to mean the equivalent of emotion when this is 
seen as the experience with its psychological effects or  as “our subjective awareness 
of our emotional state” (Gaylin,  1979, p. 1) or as bodily modification. 
 
Lonergan distinguishes intentional from non-intentional feelings.  These are 
responses to objects apprehended precisely as satisfying / dissatisfying or as values/ 
disvalues-values.  Non-intentional feelings (or affects) include certain states, e.g., 
anxiety and trends, e.g., hunger.  These have causes (anxiety) or goals (hunger) that 
are known only after the emotion has occurred (Doran, 1993, p. 12).  Intentional 
feelings as understood by Lonergan have the same meaning as “emotions” as defined 
in this study.  Affectivity is used in this study to include both sorts of feelings, plus 
desires and moods.   
d)  Passions: This word is used in common parlance as meaning “emotions” or 
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“feelings.”  Etymologically, passio in Latin seems to focus on what happens to the 
subject, the “being moved.”  Emotion (from ex-movere) seems to stress more the 
subject moving out of the self in relation to an object within a form of relationship.   
 
2. Categories of Emotions  
 
According to Williamson, citing Griffiths, emotions are explained according to three 
main theories, namely cognitive, evolutionary and social reconstructionist 
(Williamson, 1997; also Callahan, 1991).  There appear to be two principal methods 
for categorising emotions.  The first is primary/secondary.  Primary emotions are a 
limited set that are innate, occur regularly across cultures and have a range of 
intensities.  They are usually listed as interest-excitement, enjoyment-joy, surprise-
startle, distress-anguish, anger-rage, disgust-revulsion, contempt-scorn, fear-terror, 
shame-humiliation (Callahan, 1991, p. 102; Williamson, 1997, p. 14f).  Some would 
also include remorse-guilt and affection-love in this category.  Secondary emotions 
appear either to derive from the primary types or combine them.  Examples would be 
jealousy, envy, moral indignation, sympathy, guilt (for some).   
 
The second classification is positive/negative.  This is commonly used but its 
provenance is nowhere explained.  One could suggest Accounting, i.e., profit and 
loss, credit and debit.  The unfortunate result is to reduce positive emotions to be 
assets and negative ones to being liabilities.  A more appropriate source may be 
electricity where the generation of current requires both a positive and a negative 
pole.  Biology could also be a suitable point of origin.  Homoeostasis is defined as 
“the tendency towards relatively stable equilibrium between interdependent 
elements, especially as maintained by physiological processes” (Turner, 1987, p. 
510).  Equilibrium in a sensate organism is associated with comfortable (positive) 
emotions and disequilibrium with the uncomfortable (negative) forms.  The electrical 
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and biological analogies can easily accommodate the need for positive and negative 
emotions together with the constructive or destructive potential of both forms of 
emotion.         
 
Callahan clarifies this further noting that positive emotions are “characterized as 
inducing movement toward an object, or motivating continuing contact.”  Negative 
emotions “induce movement to avoid or overcome obstacles and dangers” (1991, p. 
102).  Gelpi expresses this slightly differently: positive emotions “put us in ongoing 
communication with other persons and with our world” where negative emotions “set 
us in a confrontational opposition to other realities” (1998, p. 75).     
 
In Scholastic Philosophy, e.g., in Aquinas, passions were manifestations of the 
sensitive appetite and its two parts.  There is the Concupiscible appetite which aims 
at pleasure or pain and involves the emotions of love, desire and pleasure and their 
opposites-hatred, aversion and sadness.  The Irascible appetite, on the other hand, is 
concerned with achievement or failure, in overcoming obstacles.  It includes anger, 
fear, courage, hope, despair.  It is intriguing how this division approximates to the 
definitions of positive and negative emotions suggested above by Callahan.  
Aquinas’ treatment will be explored later in this study.  Suffice it to say that these are 
emotions that affect humans profoundly.  Today, perhaps it is best summed by saying 
that “passion” is used to describe any intense or violent emotion (Nuth, 1993, p. 
720).  
 
A loose definition of emotions is suggested by Callahan as “distinctly patterned 
human experiences that, when consciously felt, produce qualitatively distinct 
subjective feelings and predispositions: ‘I am angry and want to attack’, ‘I am afraid 
and want to flee’, ‘I love and wish to approach’ ” (1988, p. 10).  
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This is a point of departure.  This study will suggest the characteristics that constitute 
an emotion, explain them, suggest some modifications, then offer a working 
definition. It is proposed that an emotion is an interactive response which is a 
complex of the cognitive, the affective, desiderative, the intentional, evaluative, 
subjective, and formative.  The account will draw on, qualify, and integrate the 
insights found in a range of authors from Aristotle through Aquinas to various 
modern or contemporary writers such as von Hildebrand, MacMurray, Oakley, 
Nussbaum, Solomon, Spohn, Callahan, Vacek and others.  It also converges with the 
work of others researchers, among them Fuentes (1992), Turski (1990), Kitchen 
(1983), Nash (1986), Sherman (1982), Calhoun (1981), Aultman-Moore (1992), 
Wong (1991), Ihara (1991).  
 
3.  Characteristics 
 
3.1:  Cognitive 
 
An emotion entails firstly the apprehension of an object (person, thing, situation).  
One becomes, in some way, aware, conscious of a specific object.  This knowledge is 
mainly pre-reflective and diffuse.  It can involve a range of ways in which one 
apprehends the world covering beliefs, convictions, thoughts or imaginings (Oakley, 
1992, pp. 14f).  Some of these are culturally conditioned, others combine affect and a 
subject’s earlier experiences retained in the memory (Spohn, 1991, p. 71).  For 
instance, John may be afraid of his neighbour’s dog because he knows that the dog 
really is a threat.  Or, he may know from experience that the dog is harmless.  
However, due to an incident in his childhood, the possibility or thought that the dog 
may attack is enough to instigate fear in John.  People can also have emotions in their 
dreams, day-dreams, fantasies and in relation to fictional characters, e.g., Bart of The 
Simpsons can cause a parent watching TV to bristle with anger just as he can arouse 
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the same emotion in his own parents Homer and Marge.  The cognitive aspect is 
summed up by Oakley: “While emotions always have a cognitive component, there 
is no particular kind of cognition which we always have when having an emotion” 
(1992, p. 15).  
 
Solomon (1983, p. 240) holds that emotions are “rational judgements.”  They are, in 
other words, basically cognitions.  He seems to expand the common understanding of 
a judgement as a conviction about the way something is (its intelligibility) to being 
more active in giving the object meaning and worth (its value).  It must be conceded 
that this has some truth.  For instance, a moral judgement about an action being right 
or wrong is an evaluative action.  Nevertheless, Solomon’s use of  the term “rational 
judgement” is, perhaps, too confusing and associates the cognitive aspect of an 
emotion with the intellect.    
 
It is true that cognition is essential to an emotion and is often the basis for 
differentiating emotions.  Our experience, however, indicates that an emotion is more 
than just cognition.  Vacek sums up the second aspect of cognition as involving the 
consciousness of “the value of a specific object” as one “moment” of an emotion 
(1994, p. 12).  Someone can know a particular object and not be attracted to it, 
repelled by it, or moved in any way.  For instance, John may regularly go past his 
neighbour’s house and the dog in the yard is just a part of the scenery, like the tree or 
the shed.  Or he may judge “that is a dangerous dog”, but by that very judgement, is 
not “affected” or moved to fear.  That is, one can have an evaluative intellectual 
judgement without an emotion just as one can have an emotion without an evaluative 
intellectual  judgement.   
 
Again, to say that an emotion is essentially a cognition leads to another difficulty.  
One must explain how one form of cognition can have different affective outcomes.  
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Mary may know someone she dislikes is very ill.  By that knowledge, she may be 
moved to sadness, compassion, or perhaps pleasure, even a certain malicious delight.  
Is that knowledge sufficient to explain the different emotions?  Callahan sums up the 
relationship between emotions and cognition when she notes “While emotions and 
cognitions are often combined, emotions differ from cognitions in their subjective 
intensity, specificity, and nonverbal richness” (1988, p. 10).   
 
Given the connection with some form of cognition, emotions can be modified when a 
belief or a perception of the truth is modified (because it is false, unjustified or both).  
For example, Mary may be angry since she believes Anne has maligned her behind 
her back.  If Mary finds out that her belief was not true (either because it did not 
happen, or that Anne did not say what was attributed to her or because someone else 
made the comment) her anger will dissipate or turn to another person (object).  
Hence, as Nussbaum notes (1994, p. 81) when using the terms “rational” or 
“irrational” of the emotions, there is not a simple division between the emotions and 
the normatively “rational.”  To some extent all emotions are “rational” in a 
descriptive sense (i.e., they are cognitive to some degree).  They may then be 
evaluated, as are any beliefs, in a normative sense as “rational” or “irrational”, i.e., as 
true or false, or, in their intensity and/or outcome (behaviour), as appropriate or 
inappropriate.     
 
3.2:  Affective 
 
Vacek notes that emotions require in a person a foundational  “openness -to-good”, 
an alertness in one’s “general emotional consciousness” (1994, p. 12).  There can be 
variations in this sensitivity to values or disvalues.  For instance, some people can be 
easily moved in general while others are moved only in specific situations.  
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An emotion entails a disturbance of a person’s affectivity.  For Vacek, being 
“affected by that valuable object” is another “moment” of an emotion (1994, p. 12).  
Often, but not always, this will change the person in a bodily way, for instance, a 
faster heart rate, perspiration etc.  Or it may change someone’s inner psychic state, 
for example, one becomes excited at the prospect of going on holiday, or one has a 
sense of sadness or anguish on hearing that a friend has died.  It is possible also to 
have an emotion without feeling the emotion, in the sense of noticing it  (Oakley, 
1992, p. 9), that is, without subjective awareness of it (Gaylin, 1979, p. 1).  One can 
be unaware of the emotion one is experiencing.  For instance, the hostess might be 
angry with some guests for arriving very late for dinner.  But she may not have 
feelings of anger (i.e., be conscious of them) because she is preoccupied with getting 
the meal on the table.  Again, it is only after John has passed the neighbour’s house 
with the dog outside does he notice that his heart is racing and that he is afraid.   
 
One can also have emotions over a long period of time without the feelings that 
accompany those emotions being present all that time (Oakley, 1992, p. 8).  A widow 
may grieve for her dead spouse without always feeling the grief.  She may also have 
a contrary emotion, for example, anger (at being left on her own unexpectedly). 
 
If having an emotion is not the same as having associated bodily changes or of 
feeling something, that is, noticing it, how, then, is someone “affected”?  Oakley 
suggests that people experience what he refers to as “psychic affects.” When we are 
joyful or despairing without necessarily attending to these emotions “...it seems that 
we may thereby be (inter alia ) mentally ‘buoyed’ or ‘drained’ respectively, and our 
perceptions, thoughts, desires and actions may well express these psychic 
modifications without our realising it” (1992, p. 10). 
 
Some examples.  Felicity may be proud and elated at her graduation ceremony.  But 
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she is more focussed on her delighted parents and on her boyfriend’s success at 
gaining the university medal.  The “psychic affects” of her success and excitement 
which touch her now cluster around her parents and boyfriend rather than around 
herself.  She does not notice what she is feeling but her behaviour is influenced by it.   
 
Emotions, then, change the psychic dimension of a person’s affectivity .  They can 
induce a certain emotional tone that can colour the way one sees the world, people, 
one’s desires and actions, sometimes consciously, often without one being aware of 
it, and can do so over extended periods of time.  For instance, Felicity’s parents’ love 
for each other has often entailed bodily changes and feelings over the twenty five 
years of their marriage.  But, more often, their love involves mutual interest, looking 
forward to and enjoying each other’s company, an easy comfortableness, or finding 
pleasure in each other’s successes.  They and their relationship have a certain 
emotional resonance often without their being aware of it.  
 
To sum up: an emotion has a cognitive and affective dimension.  It can change a 
person’s bodily state and inner psychic state.  These are aspects of what happens to 
each person in an emotion.  What about the “looking outwards” aspect of the 
emotion, the “wanting” dimension?    
 
3.3:  Desiderative 
 
It would seem that certain emotions cannot be sufficiently explained in terms of 
cognition or affects without reference to desire (Oakley, 1992, p. 15; Spohn, 1991, p. 
75).  This need not necessarily be expressed in a conscious effort or in action.  With 
anger, the desire to do something about a situation, to rectify a wrong, seems central 
to it as an emotion.  A “nonchalant activist” or an “apathetic radical” would appear to 
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be oxymorons.   
 
Again, can Joan be said to have the emotion of compassion just because she knows 
someone is in distress and is moved by it ?  Isn’t the desire to be with the other 
person in their distress, to ease their pain, integral to compassion?  Desire here also 
seems crucial to the intention and the motivation to move towards action (even 
though a part of Joan wants to run away).  
 
One can also have desires without being aware of them.  Bill, for instance, may be 
angry with Joe and wants to get even next time he sees him, but just now he is 
absorbed in fixing his car.  Or there is the “he doth protest too much” example.  A 
person disavows a certain desire, e.g., to own a lavish home, but betrays their real 
desires by their attitude and demeanour.  In the popular television series Keeping up 
Appearances, Hyacinth Bucket’s proclaimed love and devotion for her family clashes 
with her chagrin whenever Onslow, Daisy and Rose belch into view in their blue car.   
 
Desire, so understood, also helps to distinguish emotions from each other.  Take fear, 
for instance.  Bill is terrified of fires and Harry is captivated by them.  They both 
know there is a fire in nearby bushland and both are agitated.  There is a common 
knowledge and affect.  What differentiates the emotions?  It is the different desires.  
Bill wants to run for his life. Harry cannot wait to grab his picnic basket and thermos 
and have a day out watching a fire!  
 
Oakley’s treatment of desire as the third component of emotion requires, in the 
opinion of this researcher, some development.  Desire and affect both seem to come 
under the heading of affectivity.  It may be helpful to broaden the context in which to 
discuss desire.  By doing this, its specific contribution to the emotions is more 
intelligible.   
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Emotions are seen by Oakley within the context of Aristotelian flourishing  and 
happiness.  Aquinas, with Aristotle, sees happiness as the goal all humans seek.  In 
Christian terms, this is beatitude or union with God.  Aquinas asks what people want 
and answers “happiness.”  In examining happiness he found inside it the yearning for 
God (Williamson, 1987, p. 31).  Humans are drawn to happiness by desires, their 
attraction to what is beautiful, lovable and good.  This is teleological goodness.   
 
Aquinas, as Aristotle, understood this attraction in terms of appetitus, natural, sensate 
or intellectual.  Appetitus is a form of orexis, a “reaching out for” an object seen in a 
certain way, that is, as good, attractive (Nussbaum, 1994, p. 81).  The word is best 
translated as “appetites”, “desires”, “inclinations.”  These words denote movement 
towards (approach) but not the sense of movement away from  (avoidance) of the 
Latin word (Harak, 1993, p. 61).  Appetitus denotes drawing towards and a 
subsequent movement away from, approach and avoidance, desire and repugnance.  
For Aquinas, appetitus is “other generated.”  In his view  “We are drawn by, are 
attracted by or repelled by, and in each case, and moved by the other” (Harak, 1993, 
p. 61).  
 
Desire captures the orectic configuration of the human person.  Humans are beings 
with a telos, the goal of happiness, of full flourishing.  That objective must truly 
attract them, be knowable and achievable.  Their being is drawn to that end through 
inclinations, desires-spiritual, bodily, affective, intellectual, social.  As Dunne notes 
“We experience an inner pull to direct our own nature through our intelligence, 
wisdom, and love, and particularly through our desire to do what is intelligent, wise, 
loving” (1993, p. 266).  
 
Human beings are attracted to and seek what appears to promote their well-being, are 
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repelled by and avoid what appears to violate it.  In terms of teleological goodness, 
that is, in the non-moral sense, each person seeks good and avoids evil. 
 
Humans are, however, beings who seek happiness consciously, by knowledge and 
choice.  They strive for their goal not by instinct but through freedom and by the 
process of self-determination.  Seeking and finding happiness, then, is a moral 
enterprise.  Human beings achieve teleological goodness (their telos) principally and 
necessarily by seeking and embracing moral goodness, moral value, through right 
action.  This is at the core of the human call to seek good and avoid evil.  This first 
principle, this primordial attraction is seen in Gaudium et Spes no. 16 as a  
“summons” aimed at the human heart for a response.  The foundational moral 
experience is a knowing that is “connatural”, “an affective reaction to value” 
(Maguire, 1978, p. 84).  It is a moral imperative with its centre in the knowledge of 
the heart and is impelled by desire.  As mentioned earlier in this study, humans are 
drawn to choose good and evil consciously and freely “as moved and drawn in a 
personal way from within” (GS, 1965, no. 17).  Drawn to that goal, part of that task 
is the ordering of our desires, seeking to have the right objects for those desires seen 
in relation to God who alone satisfies the deepest longings of the human heart.   
 
Desire, as integral to an emotion, is best understood, then, within this broader 
teleological framework of the makeup of the human person.  Human beings are 
drawn to their goal by the magnet of desire.  It follows that there must be a 
descriptive account of what constitutes happiness if desires are to be properly 
understood, have the proper objects, and point to right and wrong action.  This is the 
task of Theological Anthropology.  Desire and affectivity seen in such a context 
make an emotion more intelligible.  It is a form of seeking what is good and avoiding 
what is evil.  The emotion is a response to the goodness or badness of an object, to a 
value or a disvalue.  This will be examined later.  
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So far, this study has examined three elements that constitute an emotion, namely 
thoughts/beliefs, affect, desire.  An emotion such as fear is susceptible to such an 
analysis-John thinks or imagines the dog will harm him, has feelings of anxiety as he 
passes the house and a desire to put distance between himself and the dog.   
 
Oakley (1992) does not proceed beyond these three aspects in his discussion of the 
nature of an emotion.  There is, however, in the view of this researcher, more that 
can be said on the topic. 
 
3.4:   Intentional 
 
It is “almost always” (Gonsalves, 1985, p. 24) a specific object which defines and 
structures the emotion.  This is tantamount to Lonergan’s definition of intentional 
feelings as responses to apprehended objects.  The emotions are intentional since 
they are, in some way, cognitive and have objects to which they are directed and by 
which they are specified (as final causes are first in the order of intention).  They are 
forms of “intentional awareness”, forms of awareness “directed at or about an object” 
seen from the subject’s point of view (Nussbaum, 1994, p. 80; also Vacek, 1994, p. 
11ff).  Fear, for instance, is not just a bodily reaction or a movement of affect.  An 
adequate account of it must incorporate the object towards which the fear is aimed  
(“What is John afraid of ?  It’s a snake”).  This will also entail how the person 
experiencing the emotion (fear) sees the object.  In reality, the fear may be based on 
a misunderstanding of what is really going on in the situation (“It’s not a snake, only 
a big lizard”).  The fear then dissipates.  Another example is that of love.  John’s 
affections are directed at Mary and are simultaneously about creating a set of 
conditions or states of affairs to express, nourish and sustain that love.     
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3.5:  Interactive Response 
 
“Response” is the term used by Solomon, Gonsalves, Lonergan, Harak and Vacek as 
the movement around which the cognitive, affective, desire, and the intentional 
aspects constellate.  For the sake of clarity, it may be desirable to restrict 
“judgement” to the deliberate, reflective and articulated act of the intellect, and 
“choice” to the act of the will.    
Language is a difficulty here.  An emotion does not appear to be a simple reaction to 
a stimulus (Gonsalves, 1985, p. 25; Harak, 1993, pp. 19ff).  It is a non-deliberative, 
unreflective movement by which an immediate appreciation is made of an object as 
the way the subject perceives that object.  “Response” may not be the best word.  
Yet, it does seem to capture the dependence on the object, the “being moved”, how 
the subject is affected by the other.   
 
In order to compensate for the limitations of the word “response”, interactive is 
proposed as a modifier.  It suggests the subject-object pole, the self-other dimension 
of an emotion, in other words, the relational context of human existence.  With 
Harak, Vacek sees these elements as part of the structure of an emotion, namely 
being affected by, and responding to, an object’s value (1994, p. p. 12).  There is not 
only the passive aspect, being affected. One is changed, moving towards or away 
from the object or being content to rest in its presence (Vacek, 1994, p. 12).  There is 
also the active aspect, the moving out of the self towards the object as valuable in 
which “we affirm the valuable object in its own right and perhaps foster its growth, 
or we reject its evil and perhaps seek to destroy it” (Vacek, 1994, p. 12).  The 
emotions involve a change, even a trans-forming of the subject.  Joan, for instance, is 
slowly altered, gradually becoming more compassionate the more she is moved by, 
and responds to, compassion as a value. 
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3.6:  Evaluative 
 
This aspect is crucial.  An emotion is an interactive response to apprehended objects 
precisely as evaluating them.  “Each emotion intends one or more values, and each 
value is experienced only through an emotion.  Properly functioning emotions give 
access to objective values” (Vacek, 1994, p. 16).  Each emotion is a pre-reflective 
estimate of the object not as a fact, not as true or false, but as important, meaningful, 
good or bad to the subject or to others.  The person, event, thing may be real or 
imaginary but its presence as evaluated is what constitutes it as the object (Solomon, 
1983, p. 176).  Change the object so defined, and the emotion changes.   
 
Contrary to Solomon, objects outside the self can have intrinsic value not given or 
constituted by a person’s perception of them.  In other words, one has the capacity to 
relate to objects in and for themselves, not simply in and for oneself.  In discussing 
the subjective aspect of value, Vacek talks of Bestowal Value.  “Among all the  
valuable objects which are important in themselves and could be important to me,  I 
freely let some have a special importance in my life” (1994, p. 18).  However, he 
also is insistent that some things are experienced “as important in themselves.  We 
recognize that they are good in themselves, whether or not they satisfy any need in 
us” (1994, p. 17).  For instance, one may find working with the poor to be personally 
difficult, even distasteful.  Yet one could still be moved by the evil of poverty and 
convinced of the importance of overcoming it in people’s lives.    
 
The emotion, then, is constituted by the evaluating of the object as desirable / not 
desirable, good / bad relative to the self, others, itself or God.  “Our emotions reveal 
the value that an object has, either its present actual value or the value it can become” 
(Vacek, 1994, p. 16).  The response to the perceived value or disvalue is attraction or 
repulsion.  Emotions enable a person to experience a self-involved participation in 
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the goodness or badness of an object (von Hildebrand, 1972, pp. 233ff).  Love, as the 
“emotional participation in a valuable object” is the paradigmatic expression of an 
experience that can transform the self while affirming the other (Vacek, 1994, p. 
21ff).  Emotion brings a level of subjective engagement, a blending of cognition, the 
affective and desire that brings a positive or negative attunement, a form of unity 
between the subject and the object of the emotion.  This is particularly true when one 
is affected (moved) and then responds.  For instance, one may listen to Fauré’s 
Requiem, be soothed by its submerged joy, then respond by being carried out of 
oneself with the beauty of the music.  It is a form of being  “at-one-with”, “in-tune-
with” the world and inner experience of the composer.   
 
Again, Joan’s empathy somehow enables her to be “tuned-in”, inside the  “skin” of 
someone who is in pain, a sharing whereby she is “con-formed” to the other through 
the emotion.  John’s fear of the dog is a form of inhabiting the “dog-as-threat, dog-
as-bad-for-me” world.  It is something discordant, a negative attunement, something 
he wishes to distance himself from, hence he flees.  He can become so invaded by 
the fear, by the discordance, that it can grip him in the form of a phobia.   
 
There are two classes of objects to which emotions respond: the satisfying /  
dissatisfying and, alternatively, values / disvalues.  Their relationship entails the 
interaction of the objective and subjective facets of experience.  For instance, what is 
personally satisfying may be truly (objectively) worthwhile, for instance, helping a 
migrant to learn English and to get a job.  Something, however, may not be 
subjectively satisfying, may be even disagreeable, yet be worthwhile in itself, for 
example, sitting up all night for three nights with a sick child, or nursing a dying 
AIDS patient while surrounded by an unpleasant stench.  What is the difference 
between the satisfying / value or the dissatisfying / disvalue ?  Values draw us out of 
ourselves towards the objective realm by calling us to self-transcendence.  This 
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provides the basis for an order of values, according to Lonergan.  Values have an 
ascending order from vital, social, cultural, personal to religious (Doran, 1993, pp. 
14f).  It also involves the task of understanding the proper sense in which one seeks 
values in emotional responses. 
 
In discussing the connection between emotions and value, mention should be made 
of an on-going debate.  As noted above, there are, in Lonergan’s view, different 
forms of value.  Moral value is a special kind of value, with distinctive qualities, and 
it is not co-extensive with value as such (Smith, 1967, p. 352).  There are, however, 
differing views concerning value.  The subjectivist position asserts that when any 
object is called “good” or given any value term, it means no more than it is the 
recipient of human interest, desire or approval.  Value is a matter of personal 
assessment or convention (Willumsen, 1993, p. 990).  The value term is 
“constituted” by the feeling aroused in the person.  In this view, “value does not 
reside in the object as something antecedent to the mind that judges, but depends on 
the subjective response” (Smith, 1967, p. 352).  
 
Conversely, the objectivist view would counter by noting that many objects (things, 
facts) of human interest, desire or approval are not, in fact, good but are evil, hence 
to be avoided.  Value can be misplaced.  It requires, then, some standard or 
benchmark.  The problem for the subjectivist is how to actually provide any 
grounding at all for the notion of value.  For the objectivist position, appealing to the 
Natural Law raises problems about physicalism or cultural bias.     
 
The objectivist version (from Socrates, Plato to Hartmann, Scheler) holds that value 
is an intrinsic part or aspect of a particular object or reality, acknowledging the 
different senses of good, cf., moral or non-moral (aesthetic, instrumental, extrinsic or 
intrinsic) noted by Frankena (1973, pp. 81f).  Since value is seen to be independent 
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of the observer and is present even when it is not recognised or is only partly 
appreciated, it follows that one should cultivate the sensitivity needed to perceive 
values (Smith, 1967, p. 352). 
 
It is not the task of this study to resolve this question.  It is suggested that Lonergan’s 
theory of value appears to avoid the extremes of each position by suggesting that  
self-transcendence is the bridge between the subjective and objective domains.  He 
argues, as does Vacek, that the apprehension of values is through feelings or 
emotions.  Such a stance enables one to account for and to incorporate the subjective 
component of human experience, “to identify values as the content of a person’s 
consciousness in deliberative responsible activity” (Willumsen, 1993, p. 991).  
Vacek also points out that “it is important to insist that our affections can attain 
something true about their objects.  That is, they can be objective, revealing what is 
true.”  Citing von Hildebrand, Vacek concludes that they have “ ‘intentionality, 
transcendence, and meaningfulness’ ” (1994, p. 7; also von Hildebrand, 1972, p. 
85ff).   
 
How, then, does one arrive at valid value judgements, at true worth?  According to 
Lonergan, they are assessable, like other truth claims, against the criterion of 
authentic subjectivity.  True, objective value is affirmed by the subject who is 
morally self-transcending.  Given that one’s perceptions and responses can be 
distorted or ignored, valid judgements of value presume conversion and moral 
education.  One author sums it up when he notes 
 
 
The notion that objectivity is the practical achievement of authentic 
subjectivity is derived from Lonergan’s general empirical method.  Its 
application to a theory of value insists that value judgements are 
objective if they are the result of moral self-transcendence (Willumsen, 
1993, p. 991).  
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Understood thus, an emotion differs from a reflective judgement about a subject’s 
emotion (“Where did that come from ?  Why did I react like that?”).  It differs, too, 
from a recognition of an emotion as justified or unjustified whether because of a 
wrong interpretation of facts (hence it is true or false) or because it is expressed in an 
appropriate or inappropriate form (a normative element).  Ultimately, the foundation 
of a subsequent intellectual judgement that something is morally good or bad is in 
the emotion (Gonsalves, 1985, p 22).  Yet, this is only partially true since other 
considerations may lead a person, through reflection and choice, to assess or to alter 
the moral status of an emotion.  Often someone can misread his or her emotions or 
does not  know the real self beneath them.  Again, a person can make up values that 
are not there in reality.   
One should also remember that a person can choose to re-shape emotional responses, 
attitudes and habits.  Though emotions are predominantly pre-reflective or  pre-
volitional, the mind and the will can, and sometimes should, intervene and work with 
them.  Scrutiny and reflection can refine the emotions so that they become more 
discriminating and responsive and can better confront future situations (Nussbaum, 
1994, p. 97).  People can also make choices that direct them to liking or disliking yet 
find they like or dislike despite their acts of will.  Emotions can also become 
reflective and deliberate without necessarily losing their intensity.  In fact, that 
intensity may be increased, hence the proverb “Revenge is a dish best eaten cold.” 
 
Emotions are evaluative responses about the present.  They can be influenced by 
judgement, beliefs, habits and past emotions, (especially when associated with the 
attraction / repulsion of the original context).  For instance, Harry’s long-standing 
anger towards his father has carried over to authority figures all his life.  Emotions 
are also responses about the past in which one shapes past incidents and acts into 
coherent patterns, depending on the judgement of the present situation, for example,  
the parent of adolescent children who says “Now I know how my parents felt when I 
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was a teenager.”  Emotions assess and appreciate the future through one’s intention 
to act, to change the world and oneself in some particular way, if that is possible.  
For instance, a football coach may feel buoyed up and filled with new strategies for 
his team since they have beaten two leading teams in their first two games. 
 
Summing up the evaluative aspect of the emotions Spohn notes that “Emotions are 
not rational in the sense of engendering ‘reflective awareness.’  They operate, rather, 
according to a prereflective, intuitive logic that exhibits the basic feature of 
rationality, i.e., intelligent, purposive activity” (1991, p. 72).  This is confirmed in 
Nussbaum (1994, p. 96) and, in a broader context, by von Hildebrand (1972, pp. 
210ff), MacMurray (1962, p. 19) and Vacek (1994, p. 5ff).  In their view, reason is 
our capacity to behave consciously in terms of the nature of what is outside 
ourselves, i.e., the capacity for objectivity.  Emotions are integral to rationality in 
that they are not just a reaction to a stimulus but are intentional and have objects.  
For MacMurray, an emotion is  “an immediate appreciation of the value and 
significance of real things.  Emotional reason is our capacity to apprehend objective 
values” (1962, p. 31).  Another author, building on MacMurray’s work, sees 
emotional rationality as reason and emotion working interdependently to reveal 
reality to human beings as the condition for authentic human love and the incarnate 
medium for divine revelation (Morrissey, 1989, p. 42ff).  
 
3.7:  Subjectivity 
 
The agent with the emotion has subjectivity.  While the emotion can have inner and 
outer dimensions, that is, a psychic state, a form of cognition, with bodily changes or 
involving behaviour, it is the subject who experiences the emotion.  Emotions, as 
subjective experiences, especially of the inner variety, while not capable of empirical 
measurement, are not, for that reason, invalid or untrue.  For instance, a person can 
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have a deep inner joy or sadness that is not apparent to others yet is very real.  Again, 
subjectivity is a prerequisite of the emotions if one is to examine the moral 
dimension of the emotions, as somehow under the umbrella of deliberation, choice 
and responsibility.   
 
Solomon (1983, pp. 96ff) considers that the ultimate object of the emotions is self-
esteem and personal dignity.  Unless carefully understood, this can be seen as an 
assertion that ego-centrism is necessary to human flourishing.  Emotions are integral 
to self-definition, self-esteem and protecting the self.  For instance, in anger one is 
driven towards an object, fear drives someone away from the object, love drives the 
lovers towards, to be with, each other.  As already explained, emotions facilitate and 
mediate the orexic, desire-based make-up of the human person.  Emotions, then,  are 
essential to human growth.  As interactive responses, they are expressions of a 
meaningful world that is relational.  They need to be adequate to our total affective 
and personal needs, hence have parameters beyond the self, namely, others and God.   
 
The development of personal worth requires and increases mutuality and self-
transcendence.  Defective self-esteem struggles to see beyond survival and the self.  
Responding to value / disvalue is integral to self-transcendence and brings with it 
self-growth.  But a focus on self-growth does not necessarily lead to self- 
transcendence.  The greater the sense of self through integrating the conscious and 
the unconscious, plus the inner and outer worlds, the greater one’s openness to values 
that draw one beyond oneself.  The thrust of human personhood is towards self-
fulfilment-that is true.  But this is achieved through self-transcendence.  It is 
autonomy found in relationship, losing the false self in order to find the true self, 
finding the true self through love.  
 
3.8:  Formative 
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Emotions, as has been explained, are evaluative responses to objective reality in 
relation to the subject and others.  They are an important, but not the only factor, 
whereby a person shapes his or her world.  One’s standards, values, paradigms, 
schemata, narratives come from many sources, for instance, parents, upbringing, 
culture, religious communities.  “The people who are important to us and the 
communities we live in modify, direct, and reinforce our emotional experiences, 
refining them or blunting them” (Vacek, 1994, p. 8).  Beliefs, habits and earlier 
choices colour a person’s evaluations whether they be pre-reflective or reflective.  
They can also create specific cultural configurations, even biases and prejudices, that 
require critical evaluation and modification. 
 
Emotions are crucial in developing a person’s sense of identity and self-esteem.  
They contribute to the standards and evaluations that structure each person’s world.  
It is from that framework that each person experiences his/her knowledge of the 
world as having value and relevance at the personal level.  Emotions help a person 
discover the world, have it revealed to the self.  Without emotions, there is no world 
beyond the self to have values.  Emotions uncover the moral texture of a person’s 
world.  As Oakley notes, quoting Sherman ( The Fabric of Character), 
“Through the emotions we come to recognize what is ethically salient, what a human 
being counts as suffering or cruelty, what is unfair” (Oakley, 1992, pp. 202ff).  
 
According to Unger (1984), as reviewed by Spohn (1991, p. 73), emotions are also 
expressions of human solidarity in the world.  They help foster interpersonal 
engagement and protect each person from domination and depersonalization.  
Emotions as “passions” provide energy not only in forming individual character but 
also in transforming society, especially through love, hope and faith. 
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Reference has been made to the different ways emotions can be seen as justified or 
not either as true or false or as appropriate/inappropriate, that is, as fitting or not to 
the occasion or situation.  They can even be morally right or wrong, for example, if 
deliberately cultivated or, if destructive, are ignored (this will be pursued later).  The 
shape of a person’s world, their very person and character are subject, then, to moral 
appraisal.  One can also expect a morally mature person to have strong emotional 
reactions when deeply held values are threatened or violated (Spohn, 1991, p. 76).  
 
Emotions have a conative dimension, in other words, they entail a tendency to action.  
As operant conditioning indicates, an emotion is reinforced by its expression or, 
contrariwise, extinguishing the behaviour goes a long way to extinguishing the 
emotion.  Behaviours, even postures, can foster an appropriate emotion, for instance, 
when feeling flat, Fiona whistles a happy tune and it lifts her spirits.  Different 
behaviours can be associated with the one emotion.  For instance, one can be rigid or 
trembling with fear, beaming or jumping for joy.  Again, there can be the same 
behaviour for different emotions, for example, rigid either with anger or from fear. 
There can be different behaviours for the same emotion, for instance, with fear one 
can be either agitated or paralysed.     
 
Many, but not all, emotions involve action.  For instance, admiration of Caesar or of 
Weary Dunlop or of Mother Teresa can involve neither bodily nor behavioural 
change.  Again, the emotions of peacefulness or of wonder are emotions which the 
person experiences without any necessary or accompanying behaviour.   
 
For all that, with an emotion there is a thrust towards action, towards creating or 
shaping the world as one would like it or oneself to be, which does not (and should 
not) always eventuate (Solomon, 1983, p. 216).  For example, acting on one’s anger 
does not always make one’s world or the world a better place.  While anger is often 
  73 
rational, acting on the desire to retaliate is, for the most part, irrational.  Again, often 
the meaning of a person’s life depends on the continuity of their emotions rather than 
on their satisfaction through action.  For instance, the sense of comfortableness, of  
“at-home-ness” in marriage or religious life is an on-going emotion that may be more 
significant in giving meaning to a person’s life than the constant satisfaction of a 
particular emotional need, for example, the desire for intimacy.  Or, one may find 
that the desire to help others with the accompanying compassion may pervade and 
integrate someone’s life in a way that satisfying those yearnings by actions would 
never do.  Can love ever be satisfied? 
 
It has been noted that emotions can be positive (characterised by love and attraction) 
and negative (characterised by repulsion and division).  For example, peace and joy 
(positive) are signs of harmony and well-being.  Anger, fear, guilt (negative) are 
pointers to dysfunction, to whatever threatens the self, someone’s relationships and 
world.  Their function is to demand a person’s attention.  Emotions are the indicators 
of the healthy or unhealthy state of a person and their world, and are, to a significant 
degree, the instruments of health and growth.  Emotions are meant to be constructive 
but can, at times, be destructive to oneself and others.  
 
Given that the emotions are central in the overall well-being and growth of the 
person, then the dynamic relationship between the self and life, between the inner 
and the outer world, is integral to such processes.  The self-awareness leading to 
integration necessarily entails a creative handling of a person’s emotions.  This is 
particularly true in the relationship between the unconscious and the conscious.  The 
presence and influence of unconscious states takes the form of psychic energy which 
rises to the conscious level in various forms, for example, depression, projection, or 
in physical or psychological disguises, namely, conversion reaction or reaction 
formation.  The integration of these emotional forces, especially in their negative 
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forms, is largely dependent on their being acknowledged, understood and responded 
to at the conscious level.   
 
It is justified to say, also, that the destructive or constructive character of the 
emotions is related to a person’s overall emotional resonance and sense of inner 
worth.  For instance, a person’s recurrent anger or violence can have roots in low 
self-esteem, as can the opposite, deficit of affect.  Positive, harmonious people, on 
the other hand, have strong self-esteem.  The purpose of the emotions is healthy 
functioning and growth to maturity.  In that light, no emotion, in Häring’s view, can 
be totally negative since a positive base is presupposed (Häring,  1963, p. 196 ff).  
An emotion can also be psychologically negative yet morally positive, for instance, 
hatred or anger over an evil that leads to an act of heroism.   
 
Emotions can be shaped by one’s choices and the cultivation of habits.  They are also 
influenced by forces in people that are sometimes beyond their control.  Antecedent 
and consequent emotions are important considerations in assessing responsibility and 
moral imputability (which will be explored later).  Like reflection and choice, then, 
emotions contribute in a significant way to personal identity and value.  
 
4.  Summary 
 
Emotions are vital signs.  They are, at once, indicators, facilitators and mediators of 
health, well-being, growth and maturity.  They do this in collaboration with other 
functions of humanness, viz., mind, will, body, psyche and spirit.  Without emotions, 
a person’s world “would be experienced as valueless” while through them “we 
become attached to those great goods that inspire out lives” (Vacek, 1994, p. 6).  The 
same author cites Charles Taylor in that without emotions “ ‘we become incapable of 
understanding any moral argument at all’ ” (Vacek, 1994, p. 7).     
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This study has singled out what appear to be eight constitutive aspects of an emotion.  
They are listed here in relation to the definition constructed from them: 
 
1.  Interactive response                                                   2.  Evaluative 
3.  Subjective                                                                  4.  Affective 
5.  Desiderative                                                              6.  Intentional 
7.  Cognitive                                                                   8.  Formative 
 
Relating these categories to each other, the following definition is suggested:  
 
An emotion is an interactive (1), evaluative (2) response whereby a subject   
(3) relates to (4, 5) a specific (6), apprehended object (7) precisely as good   
or bad (4, 5, 2) to the self or others and thereby helps shape (8) his / her world. 
 
This is in substantial accord with Vacek’s analysis (building on von Hildebrand’s 
work) of the four “moments” of the structure of an emotion, i.e., “the self (1) as an 
openness-to-good (2) becomes conscious of  the value of a specific object, (3) is 
affected by that valuable object, and (4) responds to the object’s value” (1994, p. 12).   
 
In returning to Rorty’s questions (p. 39), it is apparent that one can give a qualified 
“yes” to all her alternatives.  Again, Callahan’s loose definition (p. 42) is true but 
only in a partial way.  Ultimately, any definition of an emotion tries to capture 
something that is elusive.  The process of grappling with this task highlights that 
perhaps all one can offer is a working understanding rather than a definition.  It 
underlines how hard emotions are to grasp, to articulate, how they have their own 
unique nature and are evasive in their actual subjective experience.   
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So far, this study has attempted to state and explain the problem, provide a context, 
to present the relevant research, propose a methodology, offer some definitions of 
terms, note the limitations, significance and format of the study, and to suggest a 
working understanding of an emotion.  One is now in a better position to understand 
the significance of the central issue in this study, the moral significance of the 
emotions.  Emotions are, in sum, value-responses in a relational framework, for the 
sake of a person’s happiness and integration.  This is their contribution to the human 
person  “integrally and adequately considered.” 
 
If one regards the emotions as mindless surges of affect beyond human control, then 
Ethics is solely about acts (how one behaves) and not about character (who one is 
and how one feels).  In other words, the sort of person one is and one’s emotional 
configuration is not a moral concern.  Such a view is not acceptable if measured 
against an adequate and integral understanding of the human person and, even more, 
against the vision of the Christian Gospel.   
 
If, however, one sees emotions as purposeful and value-oriented, they are, 
nevertheless, predominantly pre-reflective and pre-volitional (as has been noted).  
The question arises, are they in any way under human control, subject to the person’s 
choice, and hence moral ?  From that question, the primary concern of this study 
emerges, the moral significance of the emotions.  This, in turn, opens the door to four 
underlying issues behind the research questions: 
1)  How, and to what degree, are emotions moral, either in their outcomes  
(behaviour) or in themselves (as movements of one’s affectivity)?  How far are they 
subject to, or assessable in relation to, deliberation and choice as human acts?  The 
focus here is on Ethics as concerned with acts. 
2)  How, and to what degree, are emotions moral in so far as they both shape a 
person and reflect who the person has become ?  How far is a person subject to praise 
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or blame, credit or discredit, for their character and, in particular, for the contours 
and content of their emotional life ?  The focus here is on Ethics as concerned with 
the subject.  
3)  How, and to what degree, are emotions moral in so far as they are instruments of, 
and integral to, virtue-ordered and habitual inclinations to right action, done in the 
right way and to the right degree?  How are the emotions the tools of practical 
reason, of phronesis-the habit of right moral judgement?  How do the emotions and 
intellect instruct and guide each other ?  The focus here is on the emotions as an 
aspect of virtue, the bridge between the subject and his/her acts. 
4) What is the vision of the human person “integrally and adequately considered” 
that is the descriptive account underpinning these questions and any responses? 
 
This study is now in a position to proceed with its task. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Benchmarks For Emotions and Morality in Aquinas   
I:  Foundations 
 
In approaching the three research questions proposed in the methodology, this 
chapter and the following form a unity; the first explores the general picture, the 
following chapter pursues more specific concerns.  This division facilitates both 
clarity of presentation and the development of the principal arguments.   
 
The aims of this chapter are twofold.  Firstly, to respond to the research question:  
“What is the vision of the human person manifest or inferred in Aquinas?”  The 
procedure will be to examine the context within which The Treatise on the Passions 
is discussed.  That context will be studied in the light of its overall structure and 
content.  Once this is done, the nature and place of the emotions will be explored.  It 
is hoped that, by this stage, Aquinas’ view of the human person will have begun to 
emerge. 
 
Secondly, the chapter will then pursue another research question: “How does 
Aquinas portray the moral significance of the emotions in the Christian moral life in 
relation to human acts, virtue and character?”  This will be done by investigating q. 
24 of the Prima Secundae which deals with the morality of the passions.  It is 
envisaged that this particular exercise will throw some light on one aspect underlying 
the research question noted at the end of Chapter Two, “To what extent are the 
emotions human, hence, moral acts?”  The other aspects (concerning virtue and 
character) are discussed in Chapter Four.  The third research question on the 
significance of differences between authors will be covered in the compare 
/contrast/assessment section in Chapters Five, Six and Seven and, finally, in the 
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evaluative overview in Chapter Seven.   
 
1.  Context 
 
1.1:  Structural Considerations   
 
The moral significance of the emotions is discussed in Aquinas’ Treatise on the 
Passions found in the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologiae1.  This magisterial 
theological synthesis is constructed around the two poles of the exitus and the 
reditus.  Everything created has its origin and destiny in God.  In the Prima Pars, the 
exitus unfolds in the theology of God, Creation and Providence.  The Prima 
Secundae and the Secunda Secundae are concerned with humankind’s journey to 
God with the reditus reaching its completion in Christ (Tertia Pars).  The Prima 
Secundae begins with an investigation of the ultimate goal of human life, namely 
beatitude or happiness in God (qq.1-5).  In qq. 6-48, there is a study of the acts 
themselves and in qq. 49-114, the sources of those acts are discussed, e.g., 
dispositions, virtues, grace, beatitudes, sin.  Aquinas examines acts that are specific 
to humans (qq. 6-21), then those acts that humans have in common with other 
animals (qq. 22-48).  Aquinas refers to this class of acts as the “passiones animae” or 
“passiones” (passions).  It is this section of the Prima Secundae that constitutes the 
Treatise on the Passions.  Given Aquinas’ use of the term “passions,” it will be used 
interchangeably with “emotions” during this chapter.   
At the outset, the reader is struck by the length of the treatment Aquinas gives to the 
emotions.  It is approximately the equivalent of a book of 200 pages.  The Treatise 
                                                 
1
  The author of this study has consulted three editions of the Summa Theologiae:  the Latin text 
published by Libraria Marietti (Turin, 1928); The English Dominican version (New York, Benziger 
Brothers, 1947); the Latin/English (Blackfriars) version of the English Dominican Province (London: 
Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1963-1975).  Translated passages from the Summa are those of the 
Blackfriars edition.  Summaries or paraphrases are the researcher’s.  For significant passages, this will 
normally be accompanied by the original Latin.  Translations of the other Latin or French texts are the 
researcher’s, unless otherwise stated.      
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has 27 questions (132 articles) plus 2 later questions (8 articles) on passions and 
moral virtues.  A further 47 questions on the Affective virtues (Fortitude and 
Temperance) constitute another book of equivalent length.  All together this material 
totals more than that on beatitude and human acts combined, or the virtues and the 
gifts or on Law and Grace (Pinckaers, 1990, p. 379).  While this consideration alone 
does not indicate that the emotions are more important than these other topics, it does 
underline that, for Aquinas, they have a significant role in moral activity and the 
moral life.   
 
Again, the particular interest in, and detailed treatment of, the emotions in the Prima 
Secundae appears to be unique amongst theologians in the Catholic tradition prior to 
and since the time of Aquinas.  Usually, the emotions, seen as “passions,” are either 
ignored or viewed as mainly, if not exclusively, disordered or sinful.  The 
theologian’s interest is primarily in the moral dimension of the emotions and their 
role in spiritual development.  A treatment of the psychology of the emotions is 
presumed and not seen to be the task of the theologian. 
 
Why, then, asks Reid (1965, p. xxi) does Aquinas undertake this task of elaborating a 
psychology of the “passions”?  Principally, because such had not been done before 
or, if it had, it was not at a level suitable for Aquinas’ purposes.  His overall aim was 
to have “an orderly and systematic account, in scientific terms, of the truth revealed 
by God and embodied in the articles of the Catholic faith” (Reid, 1965, p. xxi). 
 
Beyond this historical consideration, there is another reason which is intrinsic to the 
task of Theology.  As a science, Theology uses human experience and reflection on it 
in understanding and interpreting divine revelation.  The emotions are an integral 
part of human life.  In a theological treatment of the human journey to God 
involving, as this does, human action and hence morality, a systematic analysis and 
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understanding of the emotions within human psychology is essential.  Emotions both 
mirror and facilitate the delicate relationship between body and spirit that is 
embodied in human affectivity.  Human beings are essentially good, though flawed, 
in their created nature. While human emotions do disturb, can overwhelm (even 
destructively), they are basically positive and healthy, hence integral to human and 
Christian life (D’Arcy, 1967, p. xxvi).  It is the total human person who seeks an 
ultimate destiny.  We are drawn to that end, to God and happiness, by desire.  God 
“seizes man in his capacity and need for sense gratification, appealing to him through 
his loves and desires, hopes and fears, as well as through his higher faculties of 
rational insight and free choice” (Reid, 1965, p.xxi). 
 
Another consideration pertinent to this discussion is the question of Aquinas’ 
motivation as reflected in the structure of the Summa.   In his examination of the 
sources of the Treatise on the Passions, Jordan (1986, p. 85) notes a shift in Aquinas’ 
methodology between the brief discussion of the passions in his Commentary on the 
Sentences of Lombard and that found in the later de Veritate.  There is a move from 
reflection on specific and occasional topics concerning the emotions to a more 
explicit and systematic treatment on fundamental questions concerning the emotions 
particularly in their relationship to moral judgement (Jordan, 1986, p. 86).  This 
transition by Aquinas towards developing a taxonomy of the emotions is paralleled 
by a change to a more “pedagogical” motivation.  There are signs of this in the de 
Veritate but it comes to dominate the Summa and, in particular, to shape its structure.  
Within the Prima Secundae, “...the pedagogical innovations of structure give the 
discussion of the passions a proper independence as a topic in the moral account of 
human life” (Jordan, 1986, p. 86).   
 
Keenan (1992, p. 39) also notes that the Summa Theologiae is not speculative but 
pedagogical.  Its aim was to help preachers and confessors in pastoral judgements.  
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Aquinas provided a theological context from which determinations and assessments 
could be made about specific acts.  “Thus, the practical interest of Thomas’s students 
was to understand why certain ways of living were described as right or wrong” 
(Keenan, 1992, p. 39).     
 
There is a final aspect to the structural dimension of the context for the passions.  
Within the Summa’s overall design, the Secunda Secundae is more specific in its 
focus.  By contrast, the Prima Secundae deals with human activity in general.  That is 
certainly how Aquinas views it as he opens the Prima Secundae.  The focus for the 
Prima Secundae is the human person as the image of God, as self-directing, free and 
responsible for his/her actions (I.II. prol.).  While recognising the overarching 
theological setting of the Summa, the Prima Secundae provides “something like a 
fundamental philosophical anthropology designed to undergird a moral treatment of 
human life in particular” (Jordan, 1984, p. 86).  This brings this study to the next 
aspect of the context.   
 
1.2: Doctrinal considerations 
 
Having examined the structural context that frames the Treatise on the Passions, 
attention must now be given to the doctrinal character of the context with its 
philosophical, psychological and theological components.  Central to this is the 
teleological configuration of the created world.  This study now approaches one of its 
research questions noted in the methodology: “What is the vision of the human 
person manifested or inferred in Aquinas?”  In other words, what Theological 
Anthropology underpins his view of the emotions and the moral life? 
 
For Aquinas, creation has its origin in the God who is love.  In the very core of  
God  there is love and mutual sharing.  From that love, the Trinity creates so as to 
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share love with creatures.  Through participating in being, through their uniqueness 
and through being sustained in existence by God who is good, all creatures 
participate in the good and in God’s love.  Aquinas’ theology on creation has its 
roots in the theology of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob-hence in a personal, historical 
approach to God.  It is also influenced by an optimism towards creation which relates 
creation to the Trinity in an analysis that is both psychological and metaphysical 
(Carroll, 1987, pp. 250f).  
 
Pivotal in Aquinas’ perspective on creation is that it is relational, a relationship that 
arises from the gift and reception of existence between creator and creature.  As  
creatures, humans come from God and are made to return to God to find the 
fulfilment of their being, to find completion.  This is the final goal of life.  This 
process has two aspects to it-the individual and the relational.  A human being is 
drawn to be fulfilled as an individual, in oneself,  while being ordered to other beings 
proportionate to it.  Hence, as creatures who are persons, humans need to have 
sustaining and ordered relationships in order to reach integration and happiness.  As 
one author remarks “creatures need relationships to be fully individuated, and need to 
be individuated in order to be in relationships with others, and both are the dynamics 
of love” (Harak, 1993, p. 58).  Made in God’s image, humans are persons  in 
relationship called to grow in God’s likeness through loving relationships. 
 
In the Summa contra Gentiles, Aquinas explores how all beings have God as their 
natural end and tend to God as their Supreme Good.2  All things arrive at their 
perfection by acquiring their designated likeness to God.  Ranging from the simplest 
to the most complex, all beings are inclined to the goal or purpose for which they are 
created.  In ontological terms, this can be expressed as the metaphysical principle of 
                                                 
2
  S.C.G. III. 2 and 3. 
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finality:  all substances and persons exist and act in view of a definite perfection 
which is their completion (esse completum in bonitate) (Walgrave, 1984, p. 203).  
What is specific and different for human beings is that they have dominion over their 
actions.  They move themselves to their final end, to perfection, to the ontological 
good, and hence, to happiness, through free will (I.II.1.2).   
 
The foundation of Aquinas’ ethics is that the final end of a rational being can only 
consist in the vision of God.  There is in each human being an inbuilt, natural desire 
or inclination to the goal of existence, viz., fulfilment or beatitude.  This naturale 
desiderium is an ontological relationship “although in man it manifests itself in the 
disappointments of experience when one tries to find a final beatitude in something 
else than God” (Walgrave, 1984, p. 205).   
 
This ontological dimension manifests itself in the immanent teleology of the human 
person within Aquinas’ Philosophical Psychology.  At the heart of the will there is a 
basic thrust or necessary orientation to the good that underpins any act of choice.  It 
is a basic act that is “unfree and yet implied in every free act...called by Thomas 
voluntas ut natura.  It is the condition of possibility of any free act which he refers to 
as voluntas ut voluntas” (Walgrave, 1984, p. 205).  In other words, humans cannot 
will universal evil.  “The power to reject the universal good, which is the power to be 
bad, rests in the power we enjoy not to consider the good” (Keenan, 1992, p. 54).  A 
deliberate choice of evil is not of evil qua evil but of something under the aspect of 
good for this person, in these circumstances (I.II.27.1 ad 1).  Pinckaers (1995, p. 327 
ff) refers to this necessary inclination of the will to seek the good as freedom for 
excellence compared to the freedom of indifference of the Scotist voluntarist 
tradition that denies this necessary internal orientation of the will to the good.   
 
So far, this study has given a brief overview of the basic teleological character of the 
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created world and, in particular, of the human person, who seeks the goal of 
existence through deliberation and free choice.  The study will now proceed to a 
more specific aspect of Philosophical Psychology and Anthropology, namely the 
nature and role of the emotions within that teleological perspective.   
 
1.3: The Nature and Function of Emotions 
 
At the outset, it is necessary to clarify two concepts of Aquinas’ Philosophical 
Psychology in order to understand the emotions.  Firstly, there is the immanent 
teleology of natural forms that underpins the faculty psychology of Aquinas.  Simply 
put it is this.  Each human power, cf., intellect, will, passions, appetites, bodily 
functions, memory etc., is distinguished from the others by its act which, in turn, is 
determined by its object.3  For instance, the will performs a different function from 
the intellect or from the sense of sight.  It does this because it has a different object, 
namely, good, compared with the intellect whose object is abstract knowledge or 
sight whose object is sense knowledge.  While these capacities are distinct, they are 
nevertheless interrelated and interdependent.   
 
The second idea that needs mention is that of the hylomorphic makeup of the human 
person.  As a rational animal, a human person is a being constituted of soul and body 
with a unifying spiritual centre and range of powers.4  Some powers are the province 
of the soul, others are shared by both soul and body.  Amongst the latter are the 
                                                 
3
  An object as used here is “anything considered as terminating and specifying an elicited act, 
cognitive or affective.  The emotions are constituted formally by the aspects of sensible good or evil 
under which something attracts the subject’s attention and arouses appetition” (Reid, 1965, p. 188). 
 
4
  A power is “the capacity or ability to act or react.  The sense appetites are powers...A power is 
spoken of in the line of psychic (psychosomatic action). The term ‘faculty’ has misleading and 
unacceptable connotations and is better avoided” (Reid, 1965, p. 189).  One presumes Reid’s 
hesitations refer, in part, to the view associated with faculty psychology, that each power (faculty) is 
located in an organ and to the impression that the faculties tend to take on a life of their own  
(Researcher). 
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emotions.  For Aquinas, “passion” is properly found where there is bodily change.  
He goes on to describe an emotion or “passion” as a spontaneous feeling that is 
located in a physiological modification but it is essentially an affective response to an 
object (I.II. 22.3).  For Aquinas, an emotion is an experience of the whole person 
involving intellect, sense knowledge, spontaneous volition, bodily change (all of 
which will be developed later).  Emotions such as fear, love, hatred (among the 
eleven listed by Aquinas) are all actions of both soul and body, an affective 
experience made up of psychic and corporeal elements (Barad, 1991, p. 399).   
 
As has been outlined in Chapter 2 of this study, emotions are manifestations of the 
orectic makeup of the human person, namely, humans are drawn to their goal 
(happiness) by desire.  Aquinas saw this attraction in terms of appetitus whether 
natural, sensate or intellectual.  A being or power has the in-built inclination to act in 
accord with, and to fulfill, its specific nature or form (I. 80.1).  In human beings, with 
intellect and freedom, the natural inclination or appetitus is directed at apprehended 
objects to which it tends in so far as they are fitting or good (I.II. 9.2).  Appetitus or 
orexis is a reaching out for an object as good or desirable or a recoiling from what is 
evil and undesirable.  As has already been noted, these two words are best conveyed 
in English by “appetites”, “desires”, “inclinations.”  Appetitus combines movement 
towards and movement away from, approach and avoidance.5 
 
Aquinas approaches his subject by asking where the emotions are seated (q. 22).  He 
argues that they are in the soul in so far as the soul forms a composite with the body.  
Each emotion has a physiological modification of its materia (I.II. 22.1).  The bodily 
changes cause the emotion only in the sense that they are its material embodiment.  
                                                 
5
  D’Arcy tries to capture this dual aspect by translating appetitus and appetitiva as orexis and orectic.  
He does this to convey the dual movement together with the intellectual (will) and sensory level of the 
emotions.  He also notes the usage in modern psychology of orexis and orectic to distinguish the 
affective and conative dimensions of human activity from the cognitive ( D’Arcy, 1967, p. xxiv).  
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Bodily change is a necessary but not sufficient condition for an emotion, since alone 
it does not account for the different types of emotions.  The emotions are in the 
appetitive (affective) part of the soul rather than the cognitive (apprehensiva) part.  
Finally, the emotions are in the sense appetite rather than the intellectual appetite 
(will).  It is necessary to recall Aquinas’ division of human powers into vegetative, 
sensory and intellectual, with a sensory and intellectual power of apprehensio and a 
sensory and intellective appetitus. 
 
It may be helpful to give a diagram of Aquinas’ division of the powers of the soul.6 
 
                             Intellective 
Apprehensio   
(Knowledge)        Sensate  
 
                             Intellective (Will) 
                                                                           Hope                   Sense-perceived 
Appetitus                                         Desire 
(Appetite)                             Love                      Despair                    Good  
                             Sensory               Joy 
 
                                                                           Audacity            Sense-Perceived 
                                                        Aversion 
                                             Hate                         Fear                        Evil 
                                                        Sorrow------Anger 
                                             
                                            Concupiscible          Irascible 
                                                 
6
  Adapted from Hill (1966, p. 141). 
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                                        Appetite (emotions)     Appetite (emotions) 
 
 
The distinction between the intellective and sensate appetitus is one between “two 
moments of a single power” (Jordan, 1986, p. 88).  The apprehended object as 
present to the knowing subject constitutes the cognitive moment of the appetite.  The 
sensitive moment lies in the actual inclination, being drawn to what is apprehended 
or known as good and desirable (I. 81.1; I.II. 9 ad 1).  Jordan notes that, for Aquinas, 
there is an implicit teleology, an essential interconnection in this process, “the 
apprehensive moment is always tending toward the sensitive” (Jordan, 1986, p. 88).   
 
Aquinas divides the sensitive appetitus (orexis) into appetitus concupiscibilis and the 
appetitus irascibilis.  Again, this is teleological in character where the end or goal is 
sought in two ways-directly or indirectly.  Since they have different formal objects, 
they are different functions or powers.  The concupiscible power (affective orexis) 
seeks the good directly, in so far as it is agreeable or pleasing, or by fleeing from evil 
as harmful or unpleasant.  The irascible power seeks the good indirectly by opposing 
whatever attacks it.  Its object is the good (sense) or pleasant that is difficult to attain 
or an evil (sense) that is difficult to avoid (bonum arduum vel malum arduum).  “The 
irascible is teleologically subordinate to the concupiscible from which it begins and 
in which it ends” (Jordan, 1986, p. 89).  It is based on this division that Aquinas 
classifies the eleven principal emotions, six under the concupiscible appetite (love, 
hatred, desire, aversion, joy, sadness) and five under the irascible appetite (hope, 
despair, audacity, fear, anger) (I.II. 23.1). 
 
In employing a teleological framework, Aquinas uses movement as the model by 
which he describes the emotions.  The analogy is with physical movement.  A human 
power has an inclination and a function determined by its goal.  This enables 
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Aquinas to understand the structure of an emotion in terms of inclination/movement/ 
repose which is paralleled by love/desire/pleasure and hatred/aversion/grief.  This 
provides the basis for the eleven different emotions in terms of movement in relation 
to their goal or objects (D’Arcy, 1967, p. xxvii ff). 
 
Aquinas’ naming of the faculties discussed here is also taken from the most 
significant characteristic of each (D’Arcy, 1967, p. xxv).  Hence, “concupiscible” 
since concupiscentia (desire) is the one felt most keenly; “irascible”, since anger 
(ira) is the one felt most readily (I.II.25.2 ad 1 and 25.3 ad 1).  As is noted by 
D’Arcy (1967, p. xxv), to modern ears, it sounds unusual to classify grief and hatred 
as emotions of the desiring orexis, and even misleading when it comes to hope and 
fear as emotions of the irascible orexis. It is perhaps even more confusing trying to 
relate Aquinas’ division of the appetitive powers and types of emotions to the 
modern distinction between negative and positive emotions.7  Generally, D’Arcy 
uses “emotions” in his translation of “passiones animae” since the term covers the 
eleven different forms of principal emotions listed by Aquinas, whereas the word 
“passions” connotes more intense movements of emotion (D’Arcy, 1975, p. xviii).  
 
In Aquinas’ discussion of the emotions, there appear to be three understandings of 
the term.  There is the sense of it as an “emotion.”  Here the stress is on the agent 
                                                 
7
  D’Arcy presumably considers hope and fear too distinct from the object of anger to be included 
under the rubric of “irascible.”  Reid’s rendition is possibly more suitable;  “impulse emotions” 
(concupiscible) and “contending emotions” (irascible).  The impelling drive of pleasure or pain 
towards the agreeable or from the disagreeable needs an added mobilisation of resources when this 
enjoyment or avoidance encounters difficulties and obstacles (Reid, 1965, p. 139). 
    Reid notes that, for Aquinas, “the distinguishing principle within each appetite is not simply an 
opposition of positive and negative values at the sense level” (p.139).  Positive emotions are 
characterised by harmony, a sense of well-being, energy within the self, towards others and life, e.g., 
joy, love, delight.  Negative emotions bring a sense of dissonance, unease, flatness, upset indicating 
something is wrong with the person, with others, or with life, e.g., anger, fear, sadness.  These are 
descriptions of the quality of the affective movement in the person, the texture of subjective 
experience.  Aquinas, in using the analogy of movement, is concerned with the object of the emotion, 
the aspect that attracts or repels and which differentiates one emotion from another.  It is a question of 
using different criteria (subjective or objective) which generates two (complementary?) models.   
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responding, moving by attraction or avoidance in relation to a known object.  
Secondly, there is the sense of being-acted-upon, where the emphasis is on the object  
arousing a response in the agent who is “passive’, hence, a “passion.”  The third 
sense is as a “passion” whereby a subject suffers pain, damage, harm, deterioration 
of some kind.  Aquinas refers to this usage as being “passion” in the fullest sense of 
the word (I.II. 22.1).  In this instance, the subject is drawn away, by the affective 
shift, from what is not fitting or suitable for it.  For Aquinas, this pejorative meaning 
of “passion” is most properly applied when the emotion is for the worse rather than 
for the better, hence sorrow is more a “passion” than joy (I.II. 22.1).  Fear, too, is 
properly a passion, less so than sorrow (concerning a present evil) since it concerns a 
future evil and the motivation is not as strong as that of sorrow (I.II.41.1).   
 
Behind this usage is the notion of passivity as an ontological concept.  It connotes 
two things: an inherent imperfection together with a capacity to be perfected or 
aroused to self-determination (Reid, 1965, p. 151).  Passivity implies receptivity, the 
quality associated with the interdependence of a subject on external sources for its 
perfection.  The change may be for the enhancement of a perfection already existing 
in a subject by which it moves towards fulfilment.  But where it involves a lessening 
(worsening) of a “native perfection” this is a “more radical passivity and more 
representative of the root condition.  Such a condition is indicative of a more 
complete and unmixed passivity than that which results in a gain or added 
perfection” (Reid, 1965, p. 151f).   
 
Can it be inferred that Aquinas sees the emotions (“passions”) as undesirable, 
harmful?  If emotions are considered per se-the answer is no.  If they are considered 
per accidens the answer is yes, namely, when emotions are immoderate, and hinder 
psychological and moral well-being.  The serious, extensive and positive treatment of 
the emotions within a broad context captures his fundamental attitude towards them.  
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This pejorative view of one aspect of emotions reflects an attempt, on Aquinas’ part, 
to capture their complexity and richness.  In life, one is more conscious of those 
emotions that cause upset or distress than of those that accompany healthy and happy 
living.  When one is physically or psychologically well, one tends to take good 
health for granted.  The emotions associated with this state are not pervasive 
elements in self-awareness.  It is only when something is wrong, when there is pain, 
dissonance, when life is not going well through, for example, fear, pain, sadness, that 
a person starts to notice what is happening.    
 
These negative emotions, then, intrude in our consciousness in a way the positive 
emotions do not.  One feels oneself in their grip.  Aquinas alludes to this sort of 
pattern in I.II. 29.3.  There, he notes that love is felt more keenly in the absence of 
the object loved.  The unbecoming or dissonant nature of what is disliked is felt more 
keenly than the becomingness or fittingness of what is loved.  Often, too, one has to 
move to self-awareness consciously so as to notice and be aware of many positive 
emotions.  But without conscious choice, one feels, is aware of negative emotions 
more quickly and more acutely then positive emotions.  That is the nature of those 
emotions that indicate that something is amiss, is ‘out of sync.’8 
 
For Aquinas, what are the characteristics of an emotion?  It is an affective response 
to a specific, apprehended object by which it is determined and classified to be “this” 
emotion (D’Arcy, 1967, p. xxx).  An emotion is cognitive, intentional and involves 
physiological change though Aquinas “does not regard the perception of those 
changes as essential to its cognitive element” (Barad, 1991, p. 402).  While Aquinas 
                                                 
8
  A valuable insight is that “the feeling of strangeness and the fact of being powerless to exercise 
control over some expressions of emotionality both point in the direction of an anomaly or living 
tension which has beset man since his expulsion from Eden...In extreme situations this aspect 
(passivity) is felt subjectively as an overpowering and darkly mysterious affliction, almost as if 
emotionality were an alien realm...”(Reid, 1965, p. 153).   
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sees an emotion as “passio” (being-acted-upon), this does not connote “pure, inert 
passivity” (D’Arcy, 1967, p. xxii).  D’Arcy suggests “reaction” as activity produced 
by some other agent, ‘acte reçu’ is one rendition in French.   
 
As explained in Chapter 2, this study adopts a similar interpretation of an emotion as 
“interactive response.”  An emotion as cognitive and affective involves a movement 
towards and away from, entailing attraction and avoidance.  There is also the element 
of desire.  Once an object is known, the emotion involves an affective movement as 
the object is perceived to be useful or harmful, pleasant or unpleasant.  It is a 
response to value, i.e., the agreeable or disagreeable, good or evil.  Hence the 
emotion is evaluative.  It is desire, the affective response, that mediates the 
apprehension and communicates it to the body (Barad, 1991, p. 402).  Aquinas notes 
that emotions like anger and fear (as all emotions) can be produced only if there is 
apprehension and desire on the part of the soul.9  In such cases “the emotion begins 
in the soul as far as the soul is the mover of the body and so enters the body.” (Barad, 
1991, p. 402). 
 
Aquinas, then, portrays the emotions in terms of a process of apprehension, affective 
movement, desire and bodily change.  An emotion has active and passive 
dimensions.  A person can act out of fear, hatred, anger or love.  Or the same person 
can be disturbed, even overwhelmed by fear, hatred, anger or love.  “Emotion” 
captures the first sense; “passion”, the latter sense.  What is central here is the unity 
of the human being.  Emotions are psychosomatic phenomena.  For Aquinas, 
emotions are the bridge between the sensate and spiritual worlds (an aspect he 
pursues more specifically in a later discussion of love and pleasure).  As Pinckaers 
notes, Aquinas’ discusses the emotions not from the perspective of either Physiology, 
                                                 
9
  Quaestiones Disputatae 26.2. 
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Psychology, or Philosophy but by integrating these within the horizon of the 
theologian.  It is the emotions as contributing to moral action and the journey to God 
that is Aquinas’ principal concern.  For Aquinas, it is affectivity (“sensibilité”) that 
provides the primary metaphor and basic language to express spiritual realities.10   
The soul and body with the various powers act as a single principle of operation.  
They are interconnected and interdependent.  One author notes a consequence of this  
(to be pursued later), “Because of continuous interactions between the rational and 
emotional factors in the human being, rational judgement may modify physical 
feelings, and physical reactions may obstruct rational judgements” (Barad, 1991, p. 
403). 
 
Barad’s observation brings this section of the study to a critical stage.  The Prima 
Secundae has a teleological framework built on the highest human end.  Aquinas 
begins with the goal of human life because this alone gives intelligibility and 
coherence to everything else.  The various factors influencing the approach to, and 
achievement of, that end (especially freedom and grace) govern the development of 
the various questions and articles.  Acts are named “human” through their relation to 
rational will.  Those acts that are both human and animal are called “passions of the 
soul” or emotions (I.II. 6. prol.).  Having probed Aquinas’ vision of the person (his 
Theological Anthropology) and his view of the nature and function of emotions, the 
study must now consider another research question.  ‘What is the moral significance 
of the emotions for Aquinas?’  The question explores how emotions are related to the 
power of reason, in what sense they are rational, human, moral and, finally, the way 
in which they contribute to the moral life of a person.  This is taken up by Aquinas in 
q. 24, whose main focus is the emotion as a human act.  
 
                                                 
10
  “...il découle aussi du fait que la sensibilité fournit à l’homme une première image et un 
vocabulaire de base pour exprimer les réalités spirituelles” (Pinckaers, 1990, p. 382).   
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2.  The Moral Significance of the Emotions 
 
Aquinas’ division of the eleven emotions captures the principal affective movements 
of human life.  The strength of this approach is its intentional character, the specific, 
other-directed, relational quality of emotions.  In seeing them as responses to 
value/disvalue, there is an understanding of reality that attracts human affectivity “by 
satisfying desire, meeting need and enhancing perfection” (Reid, 1965, p, 188).   
 
The category of “concupiscible” or “affective” emotions captures the overall 
dynamic of human experience and the moral life as the movement towards good and 
away from evil.  It is built on love as attraction to the good, desire as movement 
towards the good which, once possessed, brings happiness and joy.  Conversely, one 
hates what is perceived as harmful or evil, one moves away from it in aversion, and 
if the presence of the evil persists, one experiences sadness (I.II.23.2; 23.4).  Such     
a description implies the formation of the affections-to learn to love what is truly 
good and hate what is truly evil.  It also involves seeking loving intermediate goods 
in right relation to the ultimate good.  
 
The moral life, however, is not a smooth path.  Obstacles that hinder progress can 
arise within and outside a person (Wadell, 1992, p. 98).  At times it is a struggle and 
it is here that the emotions called the “irascible” or “spirited” make their 
contribution.  The five emotions (courage, fear, anger, despair, hope) give us the 
strength and impetus when we are “dispirited” and “the good we seek is hard to 
attain and evil hard to avoid” (Wadell, 1992, p. 98).  These emotions are at the 
service of the affective emotions, empowering and confirming one’s resolve to 
pursue what is essential to one’s happiness and well-being. 
 
Against this backdrop, the morality of the emotions is addressed in a general way by 
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Aquinas in one question  that contains four articles (I.II.24. a.1-4).  It is discussed 
later in more specific terms in relation to pleasure (I.II.34), in relation to sorrow or 
pain (I.II. 39), and on moral virtues in relation to the passions (I.II.59). 
 
2.1:  Emotions as Morally Good or Evil 
 
 In q. 24. art. 1, Aquinas asks whether one can find moral good and evil in the 
passions?  He replies with his customary distinction.  Emotions can be seen in two 
ways: in themselves (intrinsically) or subject to the control of reason and will.  In 
themselves, “emotions are simply movements of the non-rational orexis; one cannot 
therefore ascribe to them moral good or evil, which we have shown to involve 
reason” (I.II. 24.1).  For instance, the surge of anger a person may feel when he or 
she is addressed in an abrupt manner happens spontaneously.  It is not something a 
person thinks about or wills.  Hence, there is little control over the immediate 
presence of anger inside the person.  So in a restricted sense, emotions are neither 
morally good nor morally bad.  As contemporary language would have it, they are 
“psychological facts.”  Understood thus, emotions are not voluntary since 
voluntariness requires an act of knowledge in the same way as it requires an act of 
will; namely, in order that it be in one’s power to consider, to wish and to act (I.II. 
6.3 ad 3). 
 
Aquinas, then, makes the point that, “in so far as the emotions are subject to the 
control of reason and will, moral judgements do apply to them” (I.II. 24.1).  They are 
called “voluntary to the extent that the will commands them, or at least does not 
check them” (I.II. 24.1)  The angry person mentioned above may be responsible for 
how he expresses or acts on the emotion of anger but not for the initial onset of the 
emotion.  Even then one could ask: isn’t the person accountable because they 
misread the situation (the other person was in physical pain) or because the anger 
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was an overreaction (influenced by a family argument before coming to the office)?   
 
In q. 24. art. 2, Aquinas asks whether all emotion is morally evil.  In the first article 
and later, in articles 3 and 4, Aquinas draws on passages from Augustine’s de 
Civitate Dei to provide the context for the discussion of this aspect of the emotions.  
Art. 2 is built on the debate mentioned in Augustine between the Stoics and the 
Peripatetics (Aristotelians).  Aquinas sees his treatment of the emotions within a 
broader historical and philosophical context.  For the Stoics, all emotion was evil.  
They did not distinguish between sense and intellect, hence between sensory and 
intellectual orexis nor, consequently, between emotions and movements of the 
rational will.  The term will described, for the Stoics, an orectic movement under 
rational control whereas emotion described any movement not under rational control.  
Hence, as in Cicero, emotions were seen as diseases of the soul (I.II. 24.2). 
 
The Peripatetics, holding to the distinctions rejected by the Stoics, used emotion to 
describe every movement of the sensory orexis (in contrast with the intellective 
orexis).  They were thus able to distinguish morally good and morally evil emotions-
those under rational control and those that were not.  This is Aquinas’ position.  
Emotions are subject to a mean and can be moderate or immoderate.  They “are not 
‘diseases’ or ‘disturbances of the soul’ except precisely when they are not under 
rational control” (I.II. 24.2).  
 
2.2:  Emotions as Intrinsically Good or Evil 
 
After considering emotions a) in themselves  and b) as moral, Aquinas poses the  
question in art. 4: “Is there any emotion which is always morally good or evil (by its 
very nature)?” (I.II. 24. 4).   
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Firstly, it is necessary to clarify an issue of terminology in this article.  Earlier, in q. 
24, art. 1, Aquinas argues that emotions, considered in themselves, i.e., intrinsically 
(secundum se), cannot be called good or evil in a moral sense.  Here in art. 4, how is 
the question different?  The phrase ex sua specie (by its very nature) gives the clue.  
Aquinas, in this context, is referring to an emotion in its moral species, i.e., as 
intrinsically good or evil morally.  Secundum se, used in art.1, denotes, from the 
context, the emotions as psychological facts or experiences.  Aquinas expresses this 
same meaning in art. 4 by making a distinction similar to that made in art. 1.  In art. 
4, he refers to the emotions not secundum se but in genere naturae-translated by 
D’Arcy as “natural phenomena” which is tantamount to “psychological facts.” 
Beneath this use of language is an important consideration.  Aquinas seems to imply 
that, while an emotion can be viewed in itself, that is not sufficient.  An adequate 
understanding of an emotion must view it as essentially relational.  Its full 
significance can only be appreciated through its interconnection with other human 
powers, with the total person, especially when it is considered under the guidance of 
reason.   
 
The question that opens art. 4 assumes that context of relationality.  The emotions are 
an integral part of the immanent teleology characterised by the positive, mutual 
interdependence of powers, guided by right reason, that drives the functioning and 
developing human person.  Aquinas here is asking: are there some emotions that of 
their very nature, or per se, conform to the teleology of rationality in the human 
being?  Are there, conversely, emotions that of their very nature, or per se, are 
opposed to that teleology?  From a developmental perspective, the question could be 
re-framed: are there some emotions that, in all situations, either facilitate or prohibit 
happiness and personal integration, foster or impede growth in love, cultivate or 
undermine inner and outer harmony in the person and in relationships ?    
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Aquinas’ answer is again based on a distinction.  Emotions  
 
may be classified merely as natural phenomena; from that point of view, moral 
considerations are irrelevant.  But second, the passions and emotions may be 
classified from the moral point of view, in so far as they are part of the life of 
free and rational choice.  In this way a particular kind of emotion may be good 
or evil of its very nature, because its object is one that is in tune with right 
reason, or at odds with it (I.II. 24.4).   
 
Hence, there are emotions that, of themselves, always foster or always oppose 
healthy human, moral and spiritual functioning and growth.   
 
What is interesting is that having acknowledged the general principle, Aquinas now 
qualifies it by the types of examples he uses.  Having listed eleven principal 
emotions, he has laid the foundation in order to examine each one in subsequent 
questions.  He will unfold their place in the immanent teleology of human powers 
and of the total person.  He will show an acuteness of observation in capturing the 
multivalent character of emotions as revealed in a variety of contexts.   
 
But he has a problem.  If any one of these eleven principal emotions is intrinsically 
evil, it should never have been included in the list.  As D’Arcy notes (1967, p. 42), 
Aquinas does not want to say that any of “the supreme species of the emotions is 
good or evil by its very nature.”  Also, those emotions that are good ex obiecto, can 
be vitiated by the evil intention of the agent.  Hence, he uses a sub-species of fear 
and sadness (those “more properly” called “passions” [as seen earlier]) to qualify his 
general statement.  He cites modesty (fear of being unchaste) as an example of an 
emotion good in itself, and envy as an example of an emotion evil in itself (I.II. 
24.4).  The intrinsic good or evil of these emotions seems to rest on their 
correspondence with the good or evil of the external action which they produce.  In 
other words, they belong to the same moral species as the external act.11  One can 
                                                 
11
  This is because of their relationship with the will.  The interior act of the will and the external 
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reasonably infer that they retain the same moral species even if there is no external 
act.  It could be argued that the very existence of these two emotions in a person 
reveals, even reinforces, underlying attitudes that unavoidably influence that person’s 
behaviour.  In other words, if one has these types of emotions, it says something 
significant about the moral texture of that person, about their character. 
 
The full significance of these examples (and the interpretation suggested) can be 
appreciated by linking them with art.4. ad 2.  There, it says that those emotions are 
good which “create a favourable attitude towards something truly good or an 
unfavourable one towards something really evil; and those emotions are evil which 
create an unfavourable attitude towards something truly good, or a favourable one 
towards something really evil” (I.II. 24.2 ad 2). 
 
Aquinas seems to be arguing that certain emotions have moral significance since 
they reveal the moral configuration of a person in terms of both the origin and the 
consequences of those emotions.  Beneath the sources and outcomes of the emotions 
are the attitudes.  Certain emotions are intrinsically good or evil because of their 
formative influence on the whole person and on others by either reflecting or creating 
certain attitudes and dispositions.  They reverberate in both the inter- personal and 
intra-personal domains.  
 
Modesty is, by definition, a mean between exhibitionism and prudery.  It protects 
and respects the intimate centre of persons.  It enables humans to deal with the 
demands of shame in the realm of sexuality.  The fear of being shamed, of public 
exposure, whether physically or psychologically, is a healthy emotion.  Shame, in the 
broad sense, is a virtue since it is a praiseworthy emotion (II.II. 144.1).  A good 
                                                                                                                                          
action, considered morally, are one act,  cf., I.II.17.4; I.II.20.3. 
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person would feel ashamed if he/she did something dishonourable.  Hence, Aquinas 
sees shame as a sentinel of moral sensitivity and integrity (II.II. 144.4).  Emotions 
combined with the virtue promote an attitude towards a value that is good in itself, 
namely, respect for oneself and for others.   
 
Envy is the sadness at another’s good fortune and gifts.  Taylor (1988, pp. 234f) 
notes two forms of this “destructive” envy.  It can take the form of “object-envy” 
where the object is the good(s) the other person has.  It can lead to an immoderate 
desire to acquire them for oneself, even unjustly.  Sometimes, this envy takes the 
form of “state-envy” where the object is the other person precisely as possessing a 
particular good.  The other is seen as a rival whose success is linked with, or 
highlights, ones failure.  There is a pattern of comparing oneself with another, feeling 
deprived and attempting to build oneself up by undermining the other person.  It is 
corrosive and life-denying especially as ressentiment.  There is something  
repellent about being that sort of person.  While modesty as self-respect promotes 
integration, envy impedes it. 
 
What move has Aquinas made?  He has carefully restricted the understanding of his 
answer that there are some emotions either good or evil “ex sua specie” or of their 
very nature.  He would be aware that it is very difficult to describe and define 
emotions as inherently right or wrong, i.e., as, in themselves and always, promoting 
or hindering human flourishing.  He has attempted this by using specific examples 
that include, in their moral description, the object (a certain form of fear (shame) or 
sadness (another’s success), the end (creating a favourable or unfavourable attitude 
concerning a good or an evil), and a circumstance (fear in regard to one’s body or 
person in a public context; gifts that are another’s).  In other words, the intrinsic good 
or evil of these emotions is described in synthetic terms. 
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2.3:  Emotions and Practical Reason: A Working Blueprint 
 
Having examined the moral status of the emotions, Aquinas broaches a question 
implied in the research question and in the three articles just discussed: ’How and to 
what extent are emotions to be under the control of reason?’   
 
The best strategy for a response is suggested by Jordan (1986, p. 89) that one starts 
with Aquinas’ language.  Throughout q. 24, the reader finds words connoting 
authority, especially having political overtones, e.g., “power”, “to obey”, etc. 
together with images of limits, moderation, proper order (ordinatio), commanded by  
or regulated by reason.12  Jordan notes that the use of such metaphors is congruent 
with Aquinas’ use of explicit political images in a prior discussion of the relation of 
sensitive appetite to reason.    
 
Earlier in the Summa, Aquinas asks whether the irascible and concupiscible powers 
obey reason.   He draws on a quotation from John Damascene in the sed contra to the 
effect that the lower powers are capable of being persuaded by reason.  Aquinas then 
develops the metaphor of persuasion as the core of his argument.  The sensitive 
powers are directly guided by the vis cogitativa in the knowledge of particulars.  This 
power in turn is guided by universal reason in the process of abstract knowledge.  
The will, too, exercises control but over the irascible and concupiscible appetites.  
These wait on the imperium of the higher power-the will.  In the ad secundum, 
Aquinas proceeds to use a political metaphor to express the whole of the relationship 
of reason to the sensitive appetite.  It is a relation that is political and regal, not 
                                                 
12
  It may help to note the original Latin (as does Jordan, p. 91). For instance: q. 24, a. 1 corp., “quod 
subjacent imperio rationis, et voluntatis”;  q. 24, a.1 corp., “quod a voluntate imperantur”;  q. 24, a.1 
ad 1m., “quod a ratione imperantur”;  q. 24, a.4 ad 1m and 3m., “obedit rationi”; q. 24, a.2 corp., 
“extra limites rationis”;  q. 24, a.1 ad 3m., “a ratione ordinantur”;  q. 24, a.3 corp., “per rationis 
regulam dirigantur”; “per rationis regulam”; “regulatae per rationem”; “inordinatos motus.” 
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despotic.  The latter is characteristic of a man ruling his slaves who do not have the 
right to resist commands.  Political and royal power is that of a man ruling over free 
subjects who, though they are subject to the ruler’s authority, still have their power to 
resist (I. 81.3 ad 2; I.II.9.2 ad 3; 17.7).  By contrast, in The Republic, Plato “portrays 
reason as the helmsman of the soul and ship of state, beleaguered by the motley crew 
of rebellious passions.  For Kant, practical reason finds no truth in the counsel of 
experienced interests and desires” (Spohn, 1991, p. 70).13   
 
What is Aquinas trying to say?  Later in the Summa when Aquinas examines law, he 
defines it is an ordinance of reason for the common good.  Authority is not based on 
rational will but on reason as mind.  Only then can the use of power have limits and 
avoid dictatorship, oppression or tyranny.  Authority, properly understood, is 
exercised by the direction of reason for the sake of the whole, the common good, the 
polis.  The same image of the common good of the person is used in Aquinas’ 
description of the will as coordinating and directing the other human powers in view 
of a common goal (I.II. 9.1).  The will must work in concert with the intellect and the 
emotions to rightly choose the right objects.  True authority must weigh all that 
contributes to the total good.  True authority has the quality of reasonableness.  It has 
a coordinating function which acknowledges and respects the fact the members in a 
community have a certain freedom, or autonomy, in their life and roles.  As a result, 
in their participation in the life of the polis, there is the possibility of refusal, even 
opposition (often to the individual’s detriment and that of the community).  In 
Damascene’s view, this is the style of governance or authority reason has in regard to 
                                                 
13
  Also, note the following comment:  “The political experience of the philosopher’s culture provides 
different analogues for intrapsychic order.  Robert Merrihew Adams rejects Plato’s autocratic model 
of the soul for ‘something like the American system of representative government with ‘divided 
power,’ with opposing tendencies and competing interests retaining an independent voice and 
influence...the everpresent possibility of internal conflict is not only a vexation...it is also a wellspring 
of vitality and sensitivity, and a check against one-sidedness and fanaticism’ ”  (“Involuntary Sins,” 
Philosophical Review 94 [1985] 10-11).  In Spohn (1991, p. 70, footnote 4). 
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the emotions.   
 
Emotions are not subject to the direct control of reason (as are bodily members or 
movements) but to indirect control.  As Aquinas says the sense appetite is subject to 
reason not immediately but through the will (I.II. 46.4).  Each emotion has itself its 
own power of freedom to cooperate or to resist.  It is the role of the virtues to guide 
the emotion, to overcome any resistance “but in such a way so as not to suppress the 
power itself” (Barad, 1991, p. 413).  Such an approach rests on and needs persuasion 
and instruction.  It appears closer to coordinating than ordering, to collaboration than 
domination.  This is a more developed form of the model that Jordan (1986, p. 89) 
argues is adopted by Aquinas to describe the relationship between the orectic powers  
 
 
 
(the emotions) and right reason.14   
 
This study has now uncovered the template that Aquinas uses to design his moral 
account of the emotions.  It provides both the basic configuration and the boundaries 
to the emotions’ participation in reason, the mode of their moral responsibility in 
relation to practical reason, and the pattern of the mutual instruction between 
practical reason and the emotions.  How does this happen?   
 
                                                 
14
   This interpretation of Aquinas’ language and imagery seems to be consonant with the idea of 
“democracy.”  Aquinas is aware of the term (in the discussion on Law in I.II. 95.4).  Naturally, for 
him, it does not have the modern connotations of mutuality, equality, human and political rights.  
Aquinas draws, instead, on a political system of his acquaintance, namely, monarchy.  He uses the 
image of the benevolent ruler combined with the “democratic” qualities of participation and the 
collaboration of free persons for a common goal.  One could speculate about the influence of his 
Dominican background.  From its origins, the Dominican order had an ethos and form of governance 
characterised by structures that encouraged both participation and individual autonomy.  It was the 
community, especially the Chapter, that was the locus of authority and wisdom (Zawilla, 1993, p. 288; 
Tarnas, 1991, p. 179).   
 
  104 
Emotions are susceptible to rational guidance when they come under the 
consideration of intellect and will.  Only in this way, can they become good or bad in 
the moral sense.  This means that the person needs to engage in some form of 
reflective self-awareness.  Once emotions arise, it is a person’s attitude towards them 
that shapes how they are integrated with reason and will into the person’s life. A 
person may refuse, or even not be ready, to deal with a certain emotion.   
 
Given that emotions are spontaneous and, for the most part, involuntary, are they, 
therefore, irrational?  Alternatively, is a human activity against reason if it is not 
deliberately and consciously willed? 
 
Aquinas addresses this question.  In q. 34. art.1, he discusses the emotion of pleasure 
as one that can hinder or undermine the use of reason.  He notes pleasures not in 
accord with reason.  He then takes the example of conjugal intercourse as a pleasure 
“perfectly in accord with reason which hinders reason; nevertheless, it impedes the 
exercise of reason because of the physical reactions involved” (I.II. 34.1 ad 1).  This  
pleasure is not morally evil, hence irrational.15  He then suggests sleep as a further 
example.  Moderate sleep is an instance of reason itself demanding that the use of 
reason be, at times, interrupted (I.II. 34.1 ad 1). 
                                                 
15
  Aquinas, having asserted the absence of moral malice (mortal or venial sin) in the pleasure of 
conjugal intercourse, then proceeds to say that it proceeds from a kind of moral malice (scilicet ex 
quadam morali malitia) due to the sin of the first parent.  He refers back to I.88.2. where he states that 
the lower powers in the state of innocence were completely subject to reason, but that after the fall 
there is a certain deformity of excessive concupiscence.   
    Is Aquinas trying to have it both ways?  Or is he struggling with (and does not resolve) two forces 
in human sexuality: the emotional component of self-giving love embodied in surrendering oneself 
into the hands of the other and, on the other hand, its explosive and destructive power?  Grace 
working in the fallen human being?  Could one argue that sexual surrender (“loss of control”), done 
out of love, is a sacrament of the ecstasy of divine love, of the total self-donation of the three persons 
in the life of the Trinity?  This possibly is what John Paul II alludes to when he speaks of discovering 
“in the body the anticipatory signs, the expression and the promise of the gift of self, in conformity 
with the wise plan of the creator” Veritatis Splendor No. 48.  It also captures something of the sexual 
dynamism as viewed by Rahner, that “human eros is the deep potentiality and longing in the person 
(obedientia potentialis) for divine agape” (Crossin, 1985, p. 27).  
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Emotions, consequently, are a form of momentary and, at times, extended, temporal 
“interruptions” to the use of reason that are not contrary to reason.  It is not irrational 
for emotions to perform their function as spontaneous responses to value or disvalue.  
Elsewhere, Aquinas notes that one can be clouded by passion, yet still have sufficient 
freedom to hold oneself in check.  One can have sufficient self-awareness to distance 
oneself from the emotion and not be overwhelmed by it (I.II. 10.3 ad 2). 
 
These points highlight two aspects about  “control” of the emotions.  Firstly, Aquinas 
sees this in terms of “moderation”, of balance or equilibrium.  Secondly, control may 
not be solely, nor most importantly, temporal (simultaneous) but spatial (attitudinal).  
It is one’s stance towards the emotions that is in question.  It may be one of 
proximity (engagement) or distance (denial, suppression, repression).  This underlies 
their role in the moral life and in personal integration. 
 
Aquinas notes that emotions, the lower orectic faculties “may be called rational to 
the extent that there is a sense in which they have some share in the life of reason, as 
Aristotle says” (I.II.24.1 ad 2).  He suggests that emotions are more intimately 
connected to reason than our bodily members.  Since bodily movements and actions 
can be called morally good or bad in so far as they are voluntary, a fortiori this can 
be said of the emotions (I.II.24.1).  Implicit in both these considerations is the notion 
that the emotions, by participating in some way in rationality, are designed to  
contribute, in an appropriate way, to the process of moral evaluation.  If emotions 
share, in an incipient but real way, in rationality, they are, to that degree, incipiently 
moral.  This is another way of saying that they are responses to value or disvalue.   
 
Aquinas goes on to say that emotions are morally good or bad to the extent that they 
are voluntary and hence “to the extent that the will commands them, or at least does 
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not check them” (I.II.24.1).  A person may feel a surge of anger before having time 
to think about it.  The experience, considered in itself, is morally neutral.  It becomes 
moral, i.e., right or wrong, when the person expresses that anger immoderately 
thereby going beyond rational or reasonable limits.  To deliberately arouse oneself to 
a blazing rage can be as morally blameworthy as neglecting to restrain one’s anger.  
It can also be a moral issue when a person feels no anger, nor another emotion, e.g., 
compassion, when one could reasonably expect such an emotional reaction of the 
normal person in a particular situation (finding a battered child at the door).      
 
Considered apart from reason (intellect and will), the emotions are inadequate in 
guiding moral action. “Emotions lack an internal system of controls” notes Barad 
(1991, p. 405).  It is their organic relationship to the rational powers that provides 
that system of direction and restraint.  Without this, even positive emotions can 
become destructive.  When one experiences an emotion, there are appropriate and 
inappropriate ways of responding.  There must be some determination whether the 
object of the emotion is truly good or bad and whether the emotion is appropriate in 
the situation (Barad, 1991, p. 405).  That evaluation requires reasoning through the 
intellect which can understand causes and make comparisons.   
 
For instance, a person’s anger at a belligerent comment can be assessed as reasonable 
or not by comparing what caused the feeling of being attacked with the person’s 
knowledge of what actually could endanger his/her well-being.  If it is clear that the 
anger fosters the person’s human development, it is morally good (right).  If the 
anger does not meet this standard, (namely, it is based on a mistaken belief or, while 
perceived accurately, is an overreaction), then it is morally bad (wrong).  The status 
of emotions as morally good or evil emerges from their relationship to the human 
good, as compatible or incompatible in achieving it.  But more of that later. 
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“Does emotion add to or detract from the goodness or evil of an act?” then asks 
Aquinas (I.II. 24.3).  He replies by noting, against the Stoics, that a feature of human 
excellence and maturity is the “existence of the emotions and their control by reason.  
For the root of all human goodness lies in the reason; human excellence will 
therefore be the greater, the greater the number of human elements under rational 
control” (I.II. 24. 3).  The more the emotions are directed by right reason, the more 
they facilitate the use of reason and draw a person more intensely to what is good.  It 
is better that a person “be bent on the good, not merely with his will, but also with 
his sensory orexis” (I.II. 24. 3).  It is a morally better action that is done, not just by 
choice, but also with an accompanying affective element, namely, done from the 
heart.  There is a deeper investment of the person.  This is another example of a 
general principle.  Personal integration with its moral,  psychological, or spiritual 
components will be greater the more the various facets of the human person are 
under rational control.  In other words, they are moving in a life-trajectory in a way  
that is increasingly coordinated, harmonious, self-transcending and centred on love.   
 
There is a two-fold relationship between reason and emotions in the formation of the 
moral judgement.  This is central to the working blueprint for the emotions.  In 
relation to deliberation and will, emotions can be antecedent or consequent.    
 
Antecedent emotion is experienced prior to a moral judgement.  Given that emotions 
are inherently characterised by attraction or avoidance, they can colour the 
judgement by presenting it with an object as more attractive or repellent than it really 
is. They can be powerful enough “to cloud rational judgement on which the moral 
worth of an act depends, and so detract from it” (I.II. 24. 3 ad 1).  Antecedent 
emotion can also diminish or remove imputability when a person, under the influence 
of an emotion, performs a harmful action, for instance, homicide from fear for one’s 
life. 
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What is an instance of an emotion diminishing the goodness in an action?  One could 
envisage someone helping another person motivated more by what other people will 
think (embarrassment) than because the action is good in itself.  Aquinas uses the 
emotion of pity as an another example.  “An act of charity is more praiseworthy 
when done from deliberate choice than simply from a feeling of pity” (I.II. 24. 3 ad 
1).16  The condensed form of the example makes it difficult to understand Aquinas’ 
point.  Prima facie, he seems to be saying the following: one may help someone in 
need, in a spontaneous manner, simply because one feels sorry for them.  A more 
considered evaluation of the situation may indicate that, in terms of practical reason, 
it requires another form of intervention that is more loving and effective to be 
morally good.  Later, one can see this interpretation confirmed.  In discussing the 
virtue of pity, Aquinas describes the act of the virtue of pity as a movement of the 
soul “complying with,” “at the service of” reason, viz., when pity is bestowed so that 
justice is preserved (human rights recognised) as when help is given to the poor or 
forgiveness to the penitent.  Pity as a virtue leads one to be compassionate according 
to reason, i.e., to render what is due.  Acting solely from the emotion can lead to 
misguided actions that do not promote justice or continue to violate a person’s rights 
(I.II. 59.1 ad 3).  
 
Antecedent emotions limit reason’s scope in weighing and assessing the alternative 
choices available and highlight or diminish their attractiveness.  Aquinas shrewdly 
                                                 
16
  In this context, Barad (1991, p.408) says “When an emotion becomes the sole motive for an act, 
the act is no longer voluntary and loses its moral value.  This is why Aquinas says, ‘ It is more 
praiseworthy to do a work of charity from the judgement of reason than from the mere emotion of 
pity.’ ”  This researcher considers the use of “mere” is misleading.  Barad’s “sole motive” is more 
accurate, hence “solely (simply) from the emotion of pity.”  It would seem to be straining the 
language of this and I.II. 24.3 ad 1 above, to arrive at Barad’s interpretation that the act “loses its 
moral value.”  In both instances, a comparative, not an absolute, measure is used (“detracts from the 
goodness” -diminuunt actus bonitatem; “more praiseworthy”-laudabilius).  Goodness is diminished 
not removed.  There are circumstances where Barad’s statement would be true e.g., the homicide case 
mentioned above, but proof for it is not found in these particular texts. (Also I.II.10.3). 
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illustrates how perceptions are shaped by emotions.  To a person affected by passion, 
things seem greater or smaller than they really are (I.II. 44.2).  For the lover, the 
beloved is perfect.  For the fearful pedestrian, the barking spaniel appears as a 
snarling Doberman.  Strong emotion makes the object so appealing or repellent that 
nothing else matters as being worthwhile. One hears it said that “hanging 
concentrates the mind.”  The trajectory of someone’s emotional state (ranging from 
distraught to agitated to calm) shapes the trajectory of moral judgement (from 
erroneous to sound).   
 
Antecedent emotion, as defined by Aquinas, obscures the judgement which provides 
the basis for the moral value of an act, even to the point that the act is no longer 
voluntary.  For this reason, antecedent emotion does not have normative status. 
 
On the other hand, Aquinas sees consequent emotion (which follows the judgement) 
as having normative status.  It provides a benchmark for moral evaluation primarily 
because of its goodness/rightness, but also for its evil/wrongness.     
 
Consequent emotions contribute to the goodness of an action, firstly, by an 
overflowing of intensity downwards so that the emotion is both the result of the 
will’s intense orientation to goodness and a sign of the action’s greater moral worth.  
“But when emotion is subsequent to rational judgement, there are two possibilities.  
First, it may take the form of a kind of overflow; the higher part of the soul is so 
strongly bent upon some object that the lower part follows it” (I.II. 24. 3 ad 1).  The 
presence of the emotion is a sign of “the will’s intensity, and hence an index of 
greater moral worth” (I.II. 24. 3 ad 1).  For example, a person judges she should help 
street people.  She is moved to pity when she meets one begging for food on the 
street on a freezing day.   
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Harak renders per modum redundantiae (I.II.24.3 ad 1) as the emotions “resonate” 
with the will as it moves towards the good (Harak, 1993, p. 79).  Elsewhere, Aquinas 
uses identical terminology in speaking of the intensity of the yearning for wisdom 
and other spiritual goods “overflowing” or “resonating” in the emotions.  They seek 
higher goods in their own way and the embodied affectivity is at the service of 
spiritual values (I.II. 30. 1 ad 1).  This rendition captures well the reverberations that 
can affect the total person through the interrelationship of powers.  It also adds 
another dimension to the political, spatial and participative metaphors used by 
Aquinas to portray the embodied and mutual quality of the relationship between 
reason and the emotions. 
 
Secondly, the intensity of an action may result from a deliberate decision to cultivate 
a certain emotion precisely to act more promptly and intensely for good.  Consequent 
emotion “may be the outcome of choice, i.e., a man may make a deliberate decision 
to be affected by an emotion so that he will act more promptly” (I.II. 24.3 ad 1).  
Besides increasing the goodness of an action, consequent emotion enables a person 
to act more promptly and easily than would be the case without the emotion.  When 
the emotion is attuned to the will’s choice, there are psychological and physical 
reverberations that facilitate the act.  Aquinas uses the example of courage.  When a 
person has the virtue of courage, anger following on that choice facilitates the eager 
performance of the act.17  “The increased adrenalin brought on by a person’s anger 
can give him the physical boost he needs to deal more efficaciously with a  perceived 
wrong” (Barad, 1991, p. 410).   
 
It must be noted that what is true of consequent emotion with regard to good actions 
is also true of evil actions.  There exist the same two forms of influence between the 
                                                 
17
  Quaestiones Disputatae  26.7. 
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will and the emotions.  In this instance, there is an increase both of the malice of the 
action and of eagerness in its performance.  The emotion facilitates a morally bad 
judgement.  For instance, if a person judges that Aborigines should not be given 
charity, his cultivated hatred or anger towards them would increase the malice of 
failing to help them or be an indicator of it (I.II. 24.3 ad 3). 
 
In the instances discussed, the emotions follow a judgement and, therefore, they are 
voluntary.  A person is responsible for any act that results from those emotions.  
They can be evil.  But Aquinas’ principal concern is to argue that consequent 
emotions are praiseworthy because they increase the moral worth of an act and 
intensify a person’s commitment to the good act. 
 
3.  Overview and Comments. 
 
It is time to recapitulate the discussion of the morality of the emotions thus far.  To 
adapt Jordan (1986, p. 93), in q. 24, Aquinas takes the following steps: 
a)  there is an aspect of an emotion that is truly rational and, hence, morally good;   
     but... 
b)  not all emotions are rational, i.e., morally good/right. Some are evil/wrong.  What   
     is true is that...  
c)  there is a teleological interdependence between reason and the emotions that   
     involves a “positive mutual causality” in determining morally good and evil  
     emotions (Jordan, 1986, p.93).  Nevertheless... 
d)  there are some emotions, that, in themselves and carefully defined, are consonant  
     with right reason (intrinsically good/right), just as there are some emotions that, in  
     themselves and carefully defined, oppose right reason, i.e., are intrinsically  
     evil/wrong and are, consequently, excluded from the principle of positive mutual  
     causality. 
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The overall focus for Aquinas has been on emotions and morality as human acts-as 
personal acts that are right behaviour.  Emotions, for him, are neither sickness nor 
irresistible forces.  While they can sway a person, even destructively, they are 
basically human powers with a positive role in life.  Human life is the task of a 
rational being.  Emotions must somehow be related to, contribute to, the good, to the 
life-project of the total person.  Since emotions have no internal controls, their true 
function is exercised within a relationship with reason, i.e., in its most proper sense.  
With the discussion so far, however, does Aquinas demonstrate that reason governs 
the emotions?  This question is rightly asked by Jordan (1986, p. 95). 
 
From q. 24 there appears to be no single argument to the question.  It is rather a 
cumulative one that is contextual in character, namely, from the content and structure 
of the Summa and, in particular, of the Secunda Pars (as discussed earlier).  Firstly, 
to consider content.  The teleological principle at work in creation, in the organic and 
human world, in society, is also the organising principle of the human being.  There 
is a dynamic movement towards a goal at each level.  The human being comprises a 
teleological and hierarchical order of powers, each with its own specific purpose, but 
directed to the common end or goal of life by the highest of those powers, viz., 
intellect and will (the “rational” proprissime dicta).  Secondly, there is the structural 
factor.  Within the framework of the Summa, the placement of the Treatise on the 
Passions reflects the relative, yet integral, place the emotions have in the overall 
scheme of human life. 
 
The immanent and hierarchical teleology (involving a dependence of lower on 
higher) is described by Aquinas in language or imagery that has particular qualities, 
as has been noted by Jordan (1986 p. 95).  The language of “participation” is at work 
in the idea of the emotions as participating in reason (to a certain degree).  There is 
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also a dimension of this in the subordination in animals to the higher reason of God 
in striving for their purpose in life.  The grammar of embodied experience is 
reflected in the “resonance” process associated with the emotions.  Together with the 
imagery, there are the spatial metaphors that have already been discussed, e.g., 
emotions as “subject to” reason, “under the control” of reason, “closer to reason than 
the bodily members.”  (Jordan, 1986, p. 95).  These are modified, even amplified, by 
the political images employed by Aquinas.  The languages of participation and 
resonance, the spatial and political images converge in q. 24, art. 3 where the positive 
mutual causality between reason and emotion is analysed18 (an aspect that will be 
pursued further in the next chapter).  Overall, Aquinas uses these devices to correct 
any residual dualism in his work, to overcome the constraints of his world view and 
his language and to capture both his sensitivity and insight into human experience.   
 
Underlying all this, there is an integrated vision of the human being within the plan 
of God.  For Aquinas, there is the teleological structure of creation, of the organic 
world, of the human being, of human powers and of the human community.  
                                                 
18
  Harak aptly elucidates the interactive nature of emotions in Aquinas (between the subject and the 
object poles).  He also highlights rationality as permeating the whole person, including the passions.  
As Harak points out (1993, p. 162), Aquinas avoids mechanistic dualism of the spirit directly acting 
on the body by proposing the “heart” as the driving centre of the person (24.2 ad 2; 37.4).  Or he 
locates the centre of the person in the imagination. One stresses the physical, the other, the intellectual 
aspect of human operations.  One author notes, “What is remarkable, given the limitations of time and 
opportunity, is St. Thomas’ continuing interest in the role of bodily resonance in man’s emotional life 
and the extent and diversity of his comments on the subject”  (Reid, 1965, App. VI, p. 172).   
    Harak chides D’Arcy for his translation which shows how “committed he is to the Cartesian model 
of control of the passions’ (Harak, 1993, p. 162, footnote 22).  Later, Harak notes how D’Arcy 
translates such phrases as limites rationes (sic), moderatione rationis, ordinatae a ratione, and even 
conveniunt (24.3) as “under rational control” (p. 164).   While Harak may have a point in the rendition 
of conveniunt, he seems to be less than fair to D’Arcy.  Any translator is subject to the limits of the 
language of the original text. D’Arcy notes that Aquinas occasionally uses dualistic language 
(D’Arcy. 1975, p. xxvii).  The evidence indicates that Aquinas does use phrases mainly concerned 
with control, order, higher / lower, superior / inferior to describe emotions in relation to reason (cf. 
footnote 12).  This terminology mirrors Aquinas’ world view which saw hierarchy, orders of being, 
powers within persons, the society and the cosmos as the ontological foundation of existence.  
Aquinas’ achievement was to attenuate and transcend the limits of language and his mindset by the 
complementary images he uses to convey the collaborative and mutual relationship between the 
intellect and the emotions.      
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Emotions are part of the teleological makeup of the human being, epitomised, for 
Aquinas, in the soul-the guiding and integrating principle.  As a given component of 
a moral being who arrives at his/her goal by self-direction (through knowledge and 
choice), the emotions are subject to the control of reason.  They are part of the moral 
realm.  Emotions, carefully understood, can be described as human, hence, moral 
acts. 
 
The vision of the human person and the moral significance of the emotions are, for 
Aquinas, necessarily interrelated and interdependent.  Aquinas seems to offer a 
blueprint of the human person that is best understood through the image of a series of 
transparencies containing different models meant to be placed one over the other.  
The core design is the teleological shape of the real which gives intelligibility and 
purpose.  The models are as follows: 
 
i.   A theological model framed on the Exitus/Reditus that reveals God’s loving  
     providence; 
ii.  A cosmological model, delineating the design and direction of the created  
     world; 
iii. An organic model to describe living beings in their internal structure and  
      external relationships;  
iv.  A moral model to describe the unique human expression of the organic model  
      in which the end is sought through the use of freedom; 
v.   A social/political model describing a) the human being in relationship in  
      community and b) the human powers in relationship with each other.  
These models complement, amplify and correct each other.  In them, one can discern   
the interpenetration of the macrocosm and the microcosm.   
 
This chapter has examined the vision of the human person in Aquinas together with 
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the moral significance of the emotions.  What has emerged is a coherent and 
consistent understanding of the human person in Aquinas.  The study has also 
disclosed Aquinas’ understanding of the moral significance of the emotions in so far 
as they are acts of the person that are rightly ordered.  He has also signalled the 
formative role of the emotions as moral activity that influences attitudes and 
character.  He has outlined a normative account with regard to consequent emotions 
and, initially, concerning moderate emotions.  Aquinas has done this in the form of 
general considerations.  The working assumption for Aquinas is that emotions are not 
the enemies of freedom.  The question arises: “Does q. 24 represent the full extent of 
Aquinas’ thought on the moral significance of the emotions?”  The pursuit of an 
answer to this question will enable the research questions to be completed in this 
section of this study.  Such is the concern of the following chapter.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
Benchmarks for Emotions and Morality in  Aquinas   
 
II:  Specific Issues 
 
 
 
The aims of this chapter are twofold.  Firstly, to conclude the probing of the research 
question begun in Chapter three; “What is the moral significance of the emotions in 
Aquinas?”  The focus now becomes more specific.  The method used will be to 
examine specific emotions of the concupiscible and irascible appetites under the 
modern rubric of positive and negative emotions.  One must acknowledge the risk of 
portraying Aquinas as “a good deal more ‘modern’ than his account really warrants” 
(D’Arcy, 1975, p. xv) or, conversely, of underestimating the significance of that 
account.  It has already been noted how Aquinas’ two-fold classification 
approximates the positive/negative division used by Callahan.  As explained earlier 
(Chapter three, footnote 7), positive emotions entail a sense of harmony and well-
being, cf., love, desire, happiness, pleasure, joy.  Negative emotions bring a state of 
unease, uncomfortableness, dissonance, e.g., sadness, hatred, anger, fear.  These 
descriptions of the subjective quality of emotional experience offer a useful 
hermeneutical lens that gives a contemporary slant on Aquinas’ view of emotions in 
terms of human acts.  Further, it is hoped that from this methodology will emerge 
Aquinas’ view on the emotions as they influence two other aspects underlying the 
research question- -virtue and character (the moral subject).  
 
Secondly, this section of the study will conclude with an overview and evaluation of 
the study’s discussion of the Theological Anthropology and the moral significance of 
the emotions in Aquinas.   
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One could get the impression that q. 24 represents Aquinas’ complete treatment of 
the topic under discussion.19  Further examination of the text of the Prima Secundae 
reveals that this is not the case.  One can glean further insights that expand and 
enrich one’s understanding of Aquinas’ work on the emotions and the moral life.  
These are found in q. 24 itself and in the discussion on the individual emotions.  This 
is especially the case in the treatment of the morality of pleasure (I.II. 34) and of the  
morality of sorrow or pain (I.II. 39).  To begin this, it may help to retrace a few steps. 
 
1.  The Moral Significance of the Positive Emotions 
 
1.1: Love, Fittingness and Pleasure 
 
1.1.1:  Love 
 
Human beings are incomplete and need others to complete them-other people, goods, 
experiences.  Through needs, humans are attracted to food, drink, sleep, friends, 
company, love.  Experiencing these is pleasurable and can bring degrees of 
contentment.  Failure, suffering, violence can make people fearful or angry.  When 
Aquinas talks of the emotions being ‘subject to reason’ does he mean that human 
beings are to reach a point where they no longer need emotions so that they can think 
and will their way through everything?  Basically, his answer is no.  Human beings 
                                                 
19
  Jordan’s aim is to detect and decipher the sources of article 24, and to expose the philosophical 
underpinnnings of Aquinas’ moral account of the passions.  Barad’s focus is the relationship between 
the emotions and and moral judgement and activity.  She constructs her case around q. 24, and does 
explore the role of specific emotions e.g. sadness, fear.  While acknowledging the centrality of 
happiness and pleasure, she does not develop the point.  Harak builds on and develops the work of 
these and other authors.  He arrives at a more integrated and, consequently, adequate portrayal of 
Aquinas’ view of the emotions in the moral life.  Nevertheless, he still leaves some issues unresolved, 
e.g., the role of the negative emotions; the political model suggested by Aquinas and its relationship to 
the limits of Aquinas’ language, to his world view and to the structure of his Philosophical 
Psychology.   
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are embodied spirits (or enspirited bodies? depending whether one is Greek or 
Hebrew).  Aquinas’ view was both radical and unpopular in his day, according to 
Chenu (1981, p. 194).  His conviction flowed from the “principle of consubstantiality 
of body and soul that he defended when analyzing the morality of the passions as 
actions of the sensitive powers of people” (Chenu, 1981, p. 194).  The possession 
and use of emotions is part of our created and gifted reality from God.  And so one 
returns to the question:  if they are to be subject to right reason, exactly how is one 
morally responsible for how one feels, for one’s emotions?  How are emotions 
rational?  How are human beings to have emotions in the right way, at the right time, 
to the right degree, towards the right person?     
 
With further and more careful examination of q. 24, one can detect that Aquinas 
makes three other moves.  Firstly, he cites Augustine who says that all our passions 
are good or bad according as our love is good or bad.  Aquinas notes later that love is 
the first of the concupiscible passions (I.II. 25.2).  D’Arcy (1967, p. 139) notes that 
“love” is better understood primarily as “liking”, an attachment to some objects 
arising from a sense that the object and oneself are naturally fitting to each other. 
This arouses the desire to move towards attaining the “good” object that has 
stimulated love.  There is the pattern of love (inclination), desire (movement) and 
rest (I.II. 26.2).  Once the object loved and desired is attained, there emerges rest and 
delectatio.  This pattern is true of the sensitive and the intellective appetite.   
 
A difficulty arises in this context in the translation of amor.  D’Arcy notes that there 
are “important differences between loving and liking; but St. Thomas has to give a 
single account of amor” (1975, p. xv).  The movement model he uses for the 
emotions meant that he had to “squeeze his concepts” into its framework in a way 
that doesn’t do justice to ordinary language, to experience or to his own  
“sensitivity or acumen” (D’Arcy, 1975, p. xxv).  Overall, there seem to be three 
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usages of “Love” as response to good in the Summa:  a) Amor concupiscentiae or 
passion-love.  This is the desire for what is good for the subject (or another), 
implanted in the person by the Creator God and having continuity with grace;  b) 
Amor benevolentiae which is good will towards another (or the self) or disinterested 
affection which does not involve intensity or desire (I.II. 27.2).  One form of this is 
loving God precisely as good;  c) Friendship (philia, amicitia) transcends the two 
forms just noted.  It is the union of one or more persons with common interests, 
sharing, companionship.  Charity (Agape-love, caritas) includes and surpasses 
friendship (Hill, 1966, pp. 142, 184).20 
 
It may help to make some distinctions.  Human faculties need virtues to fulfill their 
purpose.  The will needs the human virtue of love as it does of justice.  The sense 
appetite or affectivity needs virtues for the same purpose.  Love as part of affective 
life needs the habit of sound inclinations toward objects of value or away from 
objects of disvalue that Temperance brings.  But more than that, just as love as 
kinship with, or aptness for, something as good, underlies all the activities of the 
will, so too with the emotions (I.II. 27.4).  All the emotions arise from a single 
source, viz., love, wherein they are connected with one another (I.II. 41.2 ad 1).  
Human life, however, entails a conscious embracing of what attracts a person, a 
process facilitated by the virtues in the various human faculties.  Consequently, just 
as beneath a person’s choices there is a fundamental attitude or direction, so beneath 
the emotions there is a dominant attitude or “love.”  For a person to be integrated, 
right reason requires human beings to have a single attraction, a dominant love which 
unites and coordinates their desires, attractions, repulsions, their emotions, in fact, 
their whole being.21  This relationship is the paradigm “from which and through 
                                                 
20
  In his discussion of Love, Vacek distinguishes three kinds of love “by asking ‘for the sake of’ 
whom we are loving.  We love our beloved for the sake of the beloved (agape), or for our own sake 
(eros), or for the sake of a ‘friendship’ we share with them (philia)” (Vacek, 1994, p. xvi).   
 
21
  S.T.I.II. 24.2:  “ On the other hand Augustine says that when a man loves aright, all his emotions 
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which all our other passions must be ordered” (Harak, 1993, p. 77).   
 
The love by which human beings are most perfected and developed is the love of 
God (I.II. 28.5).  This love measures reason and is not measured by it (I.II. 64.1-4; 
II.II. 24.7).  It is the infused virtue of Charity (as supernatural love) that animates the 
moral life and regulates human loves and the acquired virtues.  As Vacek points out: 
“For Aquinas, the religious relation makes a difference: ‘the end of all human actions 
and affections is the love of God,’ and this end measures all our other affections and 
actions” (1994, p. 2).        
 
A full account of love in Aquinas is not part of this project.  However, it is important 
to pick up D’Arcy’s point above and pursue it.  Aquinas’ effort to go beyond his 
framework and language elaborated earlier is also apparent in his treatment of love.      
In I.II.28, Aquinas discusses some of the effects of love, i.e., union, mutual 
indwelling, ecstasy, zeal.  In 28.5, he talks of a certain “melting” or “dissolving” of 
the heart that occurs in which lovers become what they love and take into themselves 
what they love.  Love brings the experience of living in the other and the other in the 
lover.  Such language does not fit with a metaphysics of substance.  Aquinas is here  
engaging in a phenomenology of loving, points out Vacek.  “Aquinas rightly saw that 
the life of the beloved becomes even more rooted in us” comments Vacek (1994, p. 
53).  Aquinas is also capturing the transcending dimension of love where as one goes 
out of oneself, one is inwardly transformed by the person or value to which one 
extends oneself.  Love, as mutual indwelling accompanied by ecstasy, is a self-
transcending emotion that transforms the lover.  For this reason, Aquinas rightly sees 
love as the standard for the other-directed and transcendent dimension of emotions as 
responses to value as in, for instance, courage or compassion.          
                                                                                                                                          
are healthy.” 
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1.1.2:  Fittingness 
 
In the second  move, Aquinas has said that the objects which are the specifying cause 
of emotions must, themselves, have a yardstick.  Aquinas has earlier spoken of the 
emotions as being already naturally ordered to reason (I.II. 24.1 ad 2).  The measure 
of “ordered to”, “subject to” etc. explored earlier in the discussion of q. 24, is 
expanded by the important work of  Keenan (1992) which is confirmed in Torrell 
(1996, p. 244).  Keenan argues that in the de Malo 6 and q. 9 of the Prima Secundae 
one can discern a significant development in Aquinas’ thought.   
 
Prior to this, Aquinas tended to the view that the will was moved by reason (by way 
of final causality).  It was the indeterminacy of the preceding judgment that was the 
basis for the freedom of the deliberative will (Torrell, 1996, p. 244).  Aquinas 
advances a new position concerning the autonomy of the will.  He makes a 
distinction within the will itself: the will quantum ad exercitium in which the will 
moves itself under God’s providence (in terms of its innate inclination to the 
universal good as its final cause) to move the other powers (including the intellect) as 
efficient cause willing the means to the end.  The other movement of the will is 
quantum ad specificationem where it is specified as to its object by reason, i.e., as 
regards this good.  The will is autonomous in that it moves itself (carefully 
understood) to universal good but needs the counsel of reason about the appropriate 
means, i.e., moving to a  particular good (Keenan, 1992, pp. 38ff).  Aquinas, then, 
sees four factors converge: “reason as formal cause, the passions of the sensible 
appetite, which influence the way in which the object is presented to the will, the will 
that moves itself because of the end that it pursues; and finally God himself” (Torrell, 
1996, p. 245).   
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In q. 9, Aquinas discusses what moves the will.  He explains that the sensitive 
appetite (passions) is moved by an object (real or imagined) as fitting or harmful.  In 
art.1 he explains that the intellective appetite (will) is not moved just by knowledge 
(the truth) but by the truth precisely as good and desirable (I.II. 9.1; 9.1 ad 3).  It is 
the practical intellect not the speculative intellect that moves the will (quantum ad 
specificationem) (I.II. 9.1 ad 2).    
 
Associated with this distinction, is a shift in terminology about right reason as a 
measure.  Aquinas starts to use words such as “fitting” (conveniens), “consonant” 
(consonans) or “dissonant” (dissonans) to describe actions being subject to, ordered 
by, right reason.  The act is good because reason judges it fitting or appropriate, i.e., 
to achieve the goal of human life.  The “fitting” gets its meaning from the 
teleological framework of the human person.  As a person approaches what is fitting, 
the more a person becomes fully human.  As a person withdraws from what is fitting, 
he/she becomes “alien” to the truest self.  The more immoderate passion increases by 
act or habit, the more a person becomes alien to the self and there emerges a 
disfigurement of the soul (Harak, 1993, p. 72).22  
 
It is the notion of the “fitting” that links the will’s in-built orientation for the good 
with an object that is apprehended by practical reason as good.  In other words, 
something is good because it is fitting.  In Aquinas’ terms, something is good 
because reason judges it fitting or appropriate.  The concept of fitting has two roles.  
Firstly, it requires that an object, presented by reason, can only be accepted by the 
will to the extent that the will has a disposition towards it.  The will is inclined to 
what appears fitting to it.  A well-ordered will tend towards, has a “connaturality” 
with, what is truly and rightly good.  A disordered will tends to what is perceived as 
                                                 
22
  S.T. I.II. 22.1.   
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fitting but is, in reality, evil.  The object is apprehended as good, and willed as such 
(Keenan, 1992, p. 50) but is, in fact, disordered.  Secondly, the notion of the fitting 
distinguishes what is good from what is true.  The fitting implies the good since both 
terms involve a relation between the object and the moral agent.  “Whether the good 
is truly or rightly so, that is, whether it, in fact, perfects us, is a subsequent 
judgement” (Keenan, 1992, p. 50). 
 
There are two consequences of these considerations.  In the articles in q. 24 and 
others (to be discussed later) about the emotions and morality, Aquinas uses the 
terms “good,” “bad,” “goodness,” “badness.”  Keenan’s work enables this study to 
say that the measurements of fittingness that “yield what Thomas calls ‘goodness,’ 
we call “ ‘rightness’ ” (Keenan, 1992, p. 66).23  In other words, when Thomas 
describes an act that reason judges to be fitting, he calls it “good,” contemporary 
usage would call it “right.”  If it is not fitting, Aquinas would use “evil,” rather than 
“wrong.”  Secondly, the will’s attraction to any given object tells us not whether the 
will is good but whether the will is rightly ordered.  If the will is inclined to the right 
object, it is well-ordered; towards the wrong object, it is disordered.  Hence, the will 
and the virtues are subject to a “right-wrong” measurement.   
 
Aquinas now proceeds to examine whether the emotions move the will.  Something 
that is a value (good, fitting) or a disvalue (evil, unfitting) can arouse a person either 
from the condition of the object or the condition of the person.  Fittingness is a 
relationship.  An emotion modifies a person’s disposition or affectivity.  Hence, 
something can seem fitting in that state which does not appear so when the subject is 
not so affected.  For instance, for someone who is angry, something seems good, 
valuable when he is in that state that is not seen in the same way when he is calm.   
                                                 
23
  The distinction of “good,” “bad’’ for persons from “right,” “wrong” for actions has its roots in 
Principia Ethica of G.E. Moore. 
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Through its object, then, the emotion moves the will. 24  Further, in noting that the 
emotions can oppose or facilitate the task of the will, Aquinas again employs the 
political metaphor discussed earlier to describe their relationship (I.II. 9.2 ad 3).   
 
In I.II. 24.4 one finds similar language ( conveniens -fitting),( dissonum -at odds 
with) in referring to the emotions.  If this is true, then the emotion is fitting, in tune 
with the whole person who is made up of body, senses and spirit.  The other (object 
of the emotion) must be fitting for the person.  Here, rationality as fittingness is the 
principle governing human interaction in relationships, with the world, and in 
emotions as interactive responses.  Emotions are “good” (“right”) or “bad” 
(“wrong”) due to their being “fitting” or not in the judgement of practical reason.  
The benchmark is whether or not they protect and promote the values that facilitate 
or impede happiness.     
 
1.1.3:  Pleasure 
 
The third move made by Aquinas in q. 24 is in his comment, already noted, that it is 
better rationally to not only will and do what is good, but to desire and to delight in it 
(I.II. 24. 3).  It is also more godlike to be drawn by God through love (with its 
emotional component) than simply through a person’s own power of choice (dilectio) 
(I.II. 26.3).  This is inherent in the notion of a creature’s “receptivity” within the 
passivity described earlier.  It is the “potentia obedientialis” at the core of human 
self-transcendence.  Humans are more fully rational if they have emotional 
                                                 
24
  S.T. I.II.9.2:  “...that which is apprehended as having the meaning and force of being good and 
fitting sets the will in motion after the manner of an object.  To be good and fitting, that is a relative 
notion, which depends on the condition of both sides, the object presented and the subject to which it 
is presented. The disposition of the latter can vary, so that there is no uniformity of taste: what is 
agreeable to one strikes another as disagreeable...Clearly an emotion of the sensitive appetite so 
affects a man’s dispositions that an object he would not otherwise approve of can chime in with his 
feelings, for instance, when he is in a rage an action may appear good, though this would not have 
been the case had he not lost his composure.  In this manner, through an influence coming from the 
object as it affects a person, the will is moved by the sensitive appetite.”    
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involvement in seeking, doing and achieving what is good through desires, love and 
delight.  Without this dimension, one is prone to be less rational, hence less 
integrated as a human being.  Aquinas sees its extreme form where a person abstains 
from all bodily or emotional pleasure as the vice of insensibility (II.II. 142.1).  One 
also runs the risk of diminishing, even losing the ability to have feelings.   
 
When humans love a thing by desiring it, it is because it is perceived as belonging to 
one’s well-being (I.II. 28.1).  What is the most fitting other, the good most in tune 
with human needs and desires?  It is God, and human beings are improved, perfected  
 
through love of God.  God, in Jesus incarnate, wants to meet humans in their total 
humanness.  It is fitting, good for the human person to delight in the good physically, 
to reflect on it.  Given this, the question that arises in the Treatise on the Passions 
“How can I be fully rational?” can be expressed alternatively as “How can I best be 
delighted?” (Harak, 1993, p. 78).   
 
Among the emotions listed by Aquinas that entail a sense of, or an inclination to, 
well-being are love, desire (concupiscentia) and pleasure (delectatio) epitomised in 
delight.  Having discussed love in Aquinas, attention must be given to desire and 
delight.     
 
1.2:  Desire (Concupiscentia) 
 
The reader of Aquinas cannot help but be struck by the positive portrayal of desire 
when compared with the Manualists.  The phrase normally associated with 
concupiscence is that it is the fomes peccati, the kindling wood of sin, hence it has a 
dominantly pejorative sense.  While Aquinas does not deny the power and 
attractiveness of “lower” desires, his basic view of desire is that it is positive and 
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healthy.  He recognises the participation of the emotions in the spiritual dimension 
through the sensitive appetite’s “yearning for wisdom” (I.II. 30.1 ad 1).  Good is the 
object of love, which inclines towards satisfaction (pleasure, repose) through the 
mediation of desire.   
 
Concupiscentia has an integral part to play in human teleology.  On the one hand 
there are  natural desires, e.g., food, drink, as suitable to animal natures and, as such, 
are common or necessary.   On the other hand, there are elected desires proper to 
humans through their knowledge and choice of something as good or suitable beyond 
what nature requires.  These are acquired and vary from person to person.  Aquinas,  
 
quoting Aristotle, refers to the former as irrationales and the latter as cum ratione.  
These terms refer primarily to knowledge and choice absent in the first and present in 
the second form of desire.  Emotions are not “irrational” (against reason) as opposed 
to “rational” (according to reason).  The meaning is rather “sub-rational” or “non-
rational” compared to “rational” (I.II. 30.3).  The modern equivalent in Psychology 
would be the unconscious as non-rational compared to the conscious as rational.  
Nowhere does Aquinas refer to concupiscentia as, in itself, contra rationem.  Its 
object is the good, natural goods which are limited, but also spiritual goods which 
can arouse limitless desires.  Concupiscentia is God’s gift enabling humans to be 
creatures drawn by desire while acknowledging the need for desire to be well-
ordered.   
 
Desire is also affected by hope.  As desire, so hope connects love and joy.  In 
Aquinas’ categories, it is a response to some good object perceived as possible but 
difficult to achieve.  As a positive emotion it “adds to desire a certain drive and a 
buoyancy of spirit about the prospect of winning the arduous good” (D’Arcy, 1975, 
p. 158).  It can also be a source of pleasure when, in doing good to another, “one may 
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be hoping get something good for oneself, either from God or from man” (I.II. 32.6).  
Sometimes hope, more than love, may be more keenly experienced in daily life.  It is 
through hope that love “stays alive and moves to fullness” (Wadell, 1992, p. 103).  
Hope also keeps our eyes on the big picture.  As a virtue it fixes our attention on the 
best thing that can happen to us as possible of realisation (Wadell, 1992, p. 103).  
With hope goes magnanimity and courage.  Magnanimity, Pieper notes, is “the 
aspiration of the spirit to great things” and that a “person is magnanimous if he has 
the courage to seek what is great and becomes worthy of it” (cited Wadell, 1992, p. 
103f).   
 
 
1.3: Pleasure as Delight (Delectatio). 
 
“How can I best be delighted?” is the question Aquinas takes up in I.II. 34.3 in his 
discussion on the morality of pleasure. Pleasure and sadness are the principal 
passions of the concupiscible appetite because all others converge on, and are 
completed, in them.  The objects of these two emotions are present good and evil 
(I.II. 26.1).  In response to the question whether some pleasure is the greatest good, 
Aquinas replies thus:  
 
Happiness is the greatest good, for it is the supreme end of human life.  But 
perfect happiness includes pleasure...Accordingly one may say either, that the 
ultimate end of man is God himself, the supreme good without any  
qualification; or, that it is the enjoyment of God, which includes the pleasure of 
enjoying one’s ultimate end.  In this sense one may say that there is one pleasure 
that human beings may enjoy which is the greatest of human goods (I.II. 34.3).  
 
Since happiness is the greatest good and happiness brings pleasure (delight), the 
greatest delight for humans is God, the ultimate good.  For Aquinas, the most rational 
thing a person can do is to delight in and with God.  All pleasures, delights, passions 
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must be in tune with, permeated with, a desire for God.  Other pleasures, goods, 
values must be related to, lead to, and promote the core emotion of delight which is 
happiness as experienced.  To choose any one of these true but lesser goods or 
pleasures as one’s ultimate good, is neither in harmony with, nor leads to, our final 
goal that is found in God.  It is irrational.    
 
How exactly does Aquinas relate rationality to the emotion of delight?  He does this 
by arguing that pleasure in the appropriate object is the benchmark by which we 
measure good or evil.   
 
 
Now the repose of the will (or of any orectic power) in some good object is, 
precisely, pleasure.  A person is therefore judged good or evil chiefly in terms 
of what his will finds pleasurable.  That person is good and virtuous who takes 
pleasure in good deeds, that person is evil whose pleasure lies in evil deeds 
(I.II. 34.4).   
 
It is not any pleasure but that associated with the actions of the virtuous person, for 
such actions are enhancing human flourishing.  A central argument in Aquinas, as in 
this study, is that humans are drawn to God primarily through appetitus, which 
generates desire, then love, and love brings delight (I.II. 26.3 and 26.4).  When the 
will achieves its goal, it is at rest in it.  That rest (quies) brings delight.  Hence, rest 
and delight in the truly good are an indicator, even more, a measure, of whether a 
person is good or evil, and, by implication, whether actions leading to that state of 
rest and delight are right or wrong.25     
 
                                                 
25
  This raises the question of the person in a state of invincible ignorance who performs an action that 
is objectively disordered / wrong but without guilt (i.e., in good faith).  Associated with this state of 
good or “peaceful”conscience is rest and delight.  One could make three observations.  There is a 
discordance with an objective hierarchy of values. Secondly, such an action still seems to impair full 
moral development since it is not “fitting” as promoting human well-being.  Thirdly, ultimately one 
would have to test the quality of the person’s subjective experience of moral awareness and of God 
against that of the truly virtuous person in which right will, right affections and right reason are 
coordinated-where the objective and subjective are in harmony with each other. 
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What, then, according to Aquinas, is rational pleasure or delight?  It is pleasure 
moderated by reason which ensures that it is not excessive and possibly harmful (I.II. 
37.4).  To do so would be irrational because intemperate pleasure can emerge as pain 
and that is not desirable.  One gauge of whether our emotions are rational and, hence, 
moral, is consistent delight in true values that emerges from inner harmony.   
 
Aquinas tests this by looking at the effects of pleasure on the person and on others 
when good actions are performed.  When one is the recipient of good actions, there is 
a reinforcing of self-esteem (“it helps one appreciate one’s own goodness”), 
increased motivation in oneself to give pleasure to others, together with the 
strengthening of bonds of friendship and common interests (I.II. 32.5).  When one 
does good to others, there results a stronger self-image, a deepening sense of one’s 
goodness, of possessing a self that is worth sharing with others (I.II. 32.6).  Solidarity 
is strengthened whereby the welfare of oneself and others seen to be interconnected.  
The pleasure associated with good actions intensifies habits and impels a person to 
further good actions so that “it can become second nature to do good to others; and 
this makes it a pleasure for the open-handed man to make gifts” (I.II. 32.6).  
Enjoyment in virtuous action means that a person “gives it his more eager attention 
and performs it with greater care” (I.II. 33.4).  It can also have a transforming effect 
since what one does or suffers for a friend brings pleasure since it is done out of love 
(I.II. 32.6).  Pleasure or delight, then, is a significant factor in the process of 
consolidation and habituation in the moral life. 
 
Why, one asks, is delight so crucial for rationality for Aquinas?  Because pleasure,  
or delight associated with happiness, is purposeful, namely, it is integral to the 
teleological view of the created world.  It flows from arrival at the goal, the point of 
completion.  Each created pleasure or good should draw a person, guided by 
rationality, in the organic unity of the human being, closer to God.  Each person must 
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see and respond to life’s pleasures and delights in the light of the greatest delight 
which is found in God (I.II.34.3).  In this way, one sees and experiences the meeting 
of horizons-the particular and the universal, the historical and the eternal, the 
objective and the subjective.  This underlies Aquinas’ argument in I.II. 34.4 about 
delight as the measure of morality.  All desires, delights and values must be aligned 
with and in tune with God.  Further, this movement towards God, impelled by and 
bound by love, integrates lower and higher desires.  Delight is etymologically 
connected with joy and dilation  (Latin: delectatio; laetitia; dilatatio).  “The term 
laetitia derives from dilatatione cordis, swelling of the heart-one might almost have 
latitia” (I.II. 31/3).  Pleasure and delight that is rational (attuned to deepest human 
needs and inclinations) educates a person, makes one more expansive, open to the 
embrace of God (Harak, 1993, p. 93).  Maguire sums this up when he says that, for 
Aquinas, “ In delighting, we are stretched and enlarged as we strain to contain the 
new good...The good delighted in is experienced more expansively and thus is better 
known” (Maguire, 1986, p. 261).    
 
As the will, so the person, finds happiness (delight) when it arrives at, and is at one 
with, the good suited (connatural) to it.  “Pleasure is to the experiences of the soul 
what natural rest is to the body: each takes place in something naturally congenial” 
(I.II. 31.8 ad 2).  For this reason, Aquinas notes that delight is more perfect than the 
other passions since its object is a good attained, while their object is a good sought 
(I.II. 31. 2 ad 3). 
 
What is it about delight that is special for the rational animal, the human being?  
With other animals, a human can advance towards a goal (e.g., get food), be satisfied 
(experience rest (quies)), then pleasure (delectatio) and does so with the knowledge 
(awareness) that the goal has been attained.  The difference is in the next stage.  
Humans can reflect on their knowledge and on their experience (I.II. 31.5).  Once 
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humans have achieved their goal, they can reflect on their happiness, on their delight.  
This consciousness of a being reflecting on its happiness and delight (in God) takes 
the form of joy (gaudium), the pleasure that “results from interior perception” (I.II. 
35.2), which can be experienced, in a real though imperfect way, in this life (I.II. 
11.4 ad 2).  As with other forms of self-awareness, reflection on the experience of 
delight reveals its meaning, doing so from within the delight itself.  It is from this 
process that joy emerges.  In God, one’s deepest desires are satisfied and the total 
person is flooded with the fruits of happiness.  Understood thus, joy can be viewed as 
the epitome of the human being’s moral life as a response in love to God.  
 
2.  The Moral Significance of the Negative Emotions.  
 
Having explored the relationship between the emotions, morality, desire, happiness 
and pleasure (especially joy), this study comes to another stage.  Firstly, there is the 
final systematic discussion on the emotions and morality by Aquinas.  This occurs in 
I.II. 39 on the goodness and evil of sorrow or pain.  Secondly, there are also insights 
into the significance of other negative emotions in personal and moral integration, for 
instance, sadness, hatred, aversion, fear, anger.   
 
2.1:  Pain and Sadness 
 
Pain (dolor) has earlier been described by Aquinas as the reverse side of delight and 
sorrow or sadness (tristitia) as the reverse of joy (I.II. 35.3).  Pleasure (delectatio) 
perfects an operation since it is “the repose of the orexis coming to rest in the good 
which, we are assuming, has been attained” (I.II. 33.4).  While pleasure leads one to 
grasp it firmly, it also means that “one opens one’s heart to it, the better to enjoy it” 
(I.II. 33.2 ad 3). It expands the mind, imagination and the affections. Hence, pleasure 
in the truly good fosters life, integration and the drive of the person towards God.   
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Pain’s object is principally bodily dysfunction arising from an external source 
through sense knowledge.  For sadness, a species of pain, its object is psychological 
and, in particular, spiritual distress arising from an internal awareness (intellect or 
imagination) (I.II. 35.1 ad 2).  It is a feeling of depression and of resignation in the 
presence of an unavoidable evil (Reid, 1965, p. 189).  Alternatively, it is seen as the 
“occurrence of and displeasure caused by some evil that had given rise to hatred and 
aversion” (D’Arcy, 1967, p. 139).  One flees both types of pain from the urge for  
self-preservation, more from spiritual than from bodily form.  One would endure 
bodily pain, even with joy, to avoid inward pain, i.e., “sorrow of the heart.”  There 
may even be instances where “exterior pain can become a source of interior pleasure 
and joy” (I.II. 35.7).   
 
Sadness or pain are life-denying, firstly, in terms of the quality of the person’s 
experience of these emotions.  More importantly, sadness, in particular, inhibits the 
natural momentum of a person’s life, the élan vital, even the desire for pleasure (I.II. 
37.2 and 37.3)  There is something deeply repugnant about sadness.  It can become a 
pall of ongoing disappointment and depression.  It can also take the form of 
melancholy, weariness, dissatisfaction.  Aquinas considers that “the body is harmed 
by sorrow more than by any other emotion” (I.II. 37.4).  Its pervasive character 
attacks the very dynamism of human life that springs from the heart and animates the 
rest of the person (I.II. 37.4).   
 
If, for Aquinas, it is not natural for humans to be sad since it hinders vitality, 
spontaneity and undermines inner and outer harmony, on what grounds and in what 
sense can pain or sadness be called “good” morally?  The grounds are the 
interrelated, orectic makeup of the human person, the pattern of attraction and 
avoidance in relation to the good that is epitomised in the emotions.  Human beings 
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need emergency emotions such as anger and fear to warn them about dangers to life 
or well-being.  So too with pain and sadness.  They are needed so that one can 
respond to, to distance oneself from, an evil that is a threat to one’s well-being, 
happiness or joy.  “Given some saddening or painful object, it is a good thing if a 
person feels sorrow or pain about it.  For if he did not, it would have to be because he 
did not feel it, or did not look on it, as unwelcome; and each of those attitudes would 
obviously be an evil” (I.II. 39.1).  It may be pain (dolor) and distress that alert one to 
a bodily or psychological evil (illness).  When sadness is a form of sorrow, of 
internal pain at something concerning values being amiss concerning oneself or 
others, it has a significant moral role.  If one did not feel this emotion, it indicates 
either a deficiency in a person’s emotional capacity or in the practical reason’s 
capacity to discern that this object is evil.   
 
In other words, it is indicative of the moral attitudes and moral sensibility of a person 
that one’s right reason and right will “resonate” through having a “nose” for evil, a 
refined sensitivity to what is fitting or dissonant with true human happiness.  A sign 
of that is a certain spontaneous uneasiness (anxiari de malo praesenti [I.II. 39.1]) 
that becomes an ache or a sadness that something evil is present or going on.  It will 
be tristitia-that can take the form of uneasiness, sadness, spiritual distress concerning 
a moral evil.  If it is evil to delight in evil things, so it is morally good to be sad about 
evil (I.II. 39.1).  Aquinas later elaborates in saying    
 
In the case of interior sorrow, the recognition of evil is sometimes due to a 
correct judgement made by the reason, and the rejection of it to a will of such 
habitual goodness that it detests evil.  Now all moral goodness consists in these 
two things, viz. correctness of reason and of will.  Clearly then, there can be 
moral goodness in sorrow (I.II. 39.2).  
 
Sadness, then, has a positive role in workings of practical reason.  It also indicates 
the presence of virtue in a person and deepens its influence.   
  134 
2.2:  Duty of Self-Care and The Negative Emotions 
 
Having examined Aquinas’ treatment of some positive and negative emotions, one 
can observe that he does not appear to be overly concerned with issues of morality 
when it comes to individual emotions.  He has already examined the principles 
governing them in q. 24 and clarified these in a systematic yet more specific manner 
with pleasure and sadness.  It is the task of practical reason to apply the general 
principles to particular situations and emotions.   
 
Overall, it is characteristic of, and consistent with, Aquinas’ Theological 
Anthropology, that his view of the emotions is within a setting of the normal rather 
than the pathological.  His balanced and realistic view of human nature and 
behaviour is reflected in his portrayal of the emotions as essentially positive and 
healthy.  Their conflicting, even destructive, side is acknowledged, but only in 
relation to their normal and natural functioning.  How they are viewed and handled is 
seen through the lens of well-being whether that be psychological, bodily, spiritual, 
rational, emotional or moral in form.  While Aquinas does not systematically 
examine this in every emotion, one can detect sufficient evidence to construct a 
picture about emotions in relation to the duty of self-care.  This is the point where the 
psychological and the moral converge.     
 
Firstly, from Aquinas’ discussion of hatred, emerges an insight into care for oneself 
and the relationship between self-esteem and the moral life.  Confronted by the 
question whether one can hate oneself, Aquinas makes a distinction.  Properly 
speaking, one cannot hate oneself since there is an in-built inclination to seek 
happiness, towards the good.  Per accidens, a person can mistake and choose 
something as good or a value which, in reality, is evil and against their true good.  
That is a form of self-hatred (I.II. 29.4).  Each person has a frame of reference.  A 
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person can  have a restricted view of life, of themselves, or a defective self-image 
and low self-esteem.  They can also deny their deeper needs in a way that is contrary 
to right reason, and this can manifest itself in a form of self-hatred.  Either way, this 
affects attitudes and behaviour (I.II. 29.4).  The roots of self-hatred lie here, together 
with the self-deception about the truth that accompanies this which is used to justify 
one’s actions or way of life (I.II. 29.5).   
 
It must be acknowledged that Aquinas seems to view the factors arousing self-hatred 
as the result of deliberation and choice.  There is no mention of the role of defective 
upbringing, trauma or environmental dysfunction as factors contributing to a 
person’s perception and evaluation of themselves and of the world.  For all that, for 
Aquinas, a person’s basic emotional stance towards the self shapes one’s character, 
view of life and behaviour.   
 
A clearer indication of Aquinas’ thought can be found in an article which asks 
whether self-love is the cause of all sin (I.II. 77.4).  He responds that the cause of all 
sin is inordinate self-love and concludes that a properly ordered love of self is both 
obligatory and natural so that one may will for oneself those things that are good and 
fitting for oneself.  This is seen again when he states that love of the body is integral 
to charity (II.II. 25.5) as is, more importantly, love for oneself.  In self-love, a person 
is “one with himself” which enables and originates love with and for another.  In 
reality,   
 
love for ourselves is the model and root of friendship; for our friendship for 
others consists precisely in the fact that our attitude to them is the same as to 
ourselves.  Aristotle remarks that friendly feelings towards others flow from a 
man’s own feelings towards himself (II.II. 25.4).   
 
 
A second aspect of self-care is evident in Aquinas’ discussion of pain and sadness.  
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In this study, mention has already been made of the emotions viewed either as 
psychological or as moral realities-as “psychological facts” or “moral” events.  This 
distinction, found in Aquinas and in contemporary parlance, is important.  With 
negative emotions such as hate, anger, fear or shame, one feels uncomfortable, upset 
about something.  It is easy and common for a person to then think that a) such 
feelings are bad (wrong), or b) one is bad (wrong) to have such feelings.  In other 
words, emotional discomfort equals moral discomfort, feeling bad = being guilty.  
On this basis, negative emotions are morally disordered emotions. 
 
The distinction between the psychological and moral aspects of an emotion, enables 
one to understand and interpret emotions correctly.  It underpins the appropriate 
attitude towards them as intelligible phenomena in life.  The correct attitude will lead 
to a suitable strategy in dealing with emotions.  Emotions, including, even especially, 
negative ones, are basically healthy and normal.  Their contribution to well-being 
depends on their source and particularly on how they are viewed and handled.  Their 
function as indicators and facilitators of growth requires a person to be conscious of 
them in a reflective manner.  Emotional health requires awareness leading to self-
awareness.  Only then can the moral significance of emotions be properly assessed 
without collapsing the psychological into the moral.     
 
In dealing with emotions responsibly, a simple process of four steps is suggested 
(adapted from Whitehead and Whitehead, 1994, p. 175ff), namely, to name, claim, 
tame and aim one’s emotions.  A method such as this avoids unwarranted denial and 
repression while fostering a balanced life and emotional integration.  It also offers a 
modern benchmark in approaching Aquinas’ discussion of the remedies for pain and 
sorrow in q. 38. articles 1-5.  There, one finds a similar 5 step strategy to deal with 
sadness, depression, loss, grief.  Experience indicates that this process can be used 
with other negative emotions, e.g., anger, fear.  Aquinas’ treatment reveals his acute 
  137 
powers of observation and insight into psychological and inner movements.   
 
1.  It is permissible to cry, to wail, to express what is happening inside oneself by 
talking about it and showing one’s emotions.  It is normal and natural to react like 
this when one is in pain and to have a sense of relief in being able to communicate.  
“Hurtful things hurt still more if they are pent up within us, for the soul is then more 
concentrated upon them” (I.II. 38.2).  It is more harmful to bottle up the distress, i.e., 
to repress it, which can also lead to self-absorption.  Expressing and sharing one’s 
feelings of pain or sorrow entails certain pleasure because these emotions are 
lessened or dispersed.  This can also be facilitated by actively engaging one’s 
imagination in the process, particularly in facing rather than denying one’s emotional 
state (I.II. 38.2 ad 3).  For Aquinas, tears, grief and sadness are healthy, not signs of 
“breakdown.”    
 
2.  It is normal and wholesome to want to have an understanding friend to talk to 
about the emotion.  Aquinas points out “It is natural, in sorrow, to be consoled if a 
friend shares our grief” (I.II. 38.3).  Sharing the burden lessens it.  More importantly, 
one feels one is not alone, that one is cared for, accepted and loved.  This acceptance  
 
brings consolation, a certain pleasure and easing of the load (I.II. 38.3)  So far these 
steps mean that a person has been able to identify, experience, acknowledge and 
enter the cage with the emotion.  This is to name, claim and tame it.  
 
3.  When one engages in such a process, one can then consider another perspective, 
see and assess the emotion of pain or grief against a larger canvas.  Contemplating 
the truth or reflective self-awareness and the nourishment this provides is the next 
step.  Aquinas highlights the backdrop of “the things of God and the happiness to 
come” (I.II. 38.4)  Seeing one’s situation in that context can be a source of pleasure, 
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especially “the more perfectly one loves wisdom” (I.II. 38.4).  This can “spill over” 
from the “higher powers,” can have a resonating effect on the emotions, mitigating 
the negative state and inducing a certain consolation.  One can begin to reclaim a 
renewed vision, vigour and motivation to direct the emotional energy in a creative 
manner, hence to aim it constructively.  Imagining things differently is a crucial step 
in change, integration and conversion.   
 
4.  Love of self and the instinct for self-preservation is stronger than the love of 
another person who has died or is, in some way, absent.  Ultimately, the desire for 
happiness drives out sorrow, loss or grief.  Generally, people have a basic urge to 
live, to experience life and its pleasures and joys ( I.II. 38. 1 ad 3).   
 
5.  Anything that stimulates a person to a sense of vitality ( “the body’s vital 
motion”) and prods the person towards normal functioning is worthwhile.  “By 
restoring the system to normal, these remedies are a source of pleasure”(I.II. 38.5).  
Inner sorrow, loss, grief can be modified and lessened by one’s behaviour and the 
way one treats one’s body.  In modern parlance, “listen to one’s body” is really what 
Aquinas means.  He is equivalently saying that, in such circumstances, give oneself a 
treat by taking a long soak in the bath and getting a decent night’s sleep (I.II. 38.5).  
It is good for the heart and, consequently, for the whole person (38.5 ad 3).   
 
Q. 38 is evidence that Aquinas’ methodology was not simply a priori, focussed on 
the intellectual dimension of the human psyche, “abysmally unmindful of empirical 
observation and practical therapy” (White, 1952, p. 103).  The same author sums up 
the discussion on this topic in professional terminology: 
 
In Question 38...on the remedies of depression...we find a surprisingly up-to 
date application of the principle of functional opposition and compensation, 
recognition of both the organic and the psychological function of weeping, an 
  139 
exact description and explanation of the releasing effect of transference through 
“a certain imagination that others bear the sufferer’s burden” (“quaedam 
imaginatio quod onus alii cum ipso ferant”), and more than a hint of such 
“modern” methods as hydrotherapy and prolonged narcosis (White, 1952, p. 
103).   
 
The sanity and wisdom of Aquinas’ remarks is all the greater when one recalls that 
he did not have the advantage of modern understandings of the person from the work 
of Freud, Jung, Erikson, Rogers and the various schools of Psychology.  For the 
purpose of this study, it has been important to record Aquinas’ advice.  It blends 
attitudes and strategies that appreciate correctly the role and psychological 
significance of the emotions.  Such is the necessary condition for understanding and 
assessing correctly the role and moral significance of the emotions.  To look, listen 
and learn with regard to the emotions is not just a psychological ploy.  It is integral to 
one’s moral responsibility to strive to have emotions appropriately.  In Aristotle’s 
words, “Anyone can become angry-that is easy.  But to be angry with the right 
person, to the right degree, at the right time, for the right purpose and in the right 
way, this is not easy” (cited Goleman, 1996, p. ix).  By moderating the emotions, one 
is also exercising responsibility for the configuration of one’s emotional life.  In all, 
one is allowing the emotions to be wise guides.   
 
2.3:  Virtue, Character and The Negative Emotions 
 
This discussion has shown earlier how a negative emotion such as sadness can have 
an important role in moral reasoning and in reflecting the shape of one’s character.  
The same is true of hatred and aversion (though Aquinas’ understanding of aversion 
is inferred rather than stated).  These emotions are indicators of a person’s basic 
moral response as of they are of the state of a person’s moral development.  Hatred is 
a “felt antipathy towards a disagreeable object, whether person or thing...(it)..is the 
most primitive and undifferentiated emotional attitude towards the sensibly 
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unpleasant” (Reid, 1965, p. 187).  Aquinas describes hatred in terms of “dissonance” 
with what is perceived as repugnant or hurtful (I.II. 29.1).  Hatred originates in and 
finds its meaning in love (I.II. 29.2).  The greater one’s love, the greater the hatred  
(and hence aversion) for what threatens that love and its relationships (I.II. 29.3).   
 
Earlier, in examining the role of pleasure and sorrow in moral evaluation, an 
important aspect to this study has emerged.  These two emotions can motivate a 
person towards making right choices because the good is appealing (pleasure) and 
evil unappealing (sadness) (I.II. 59.3).  One may, for instance, watch an appeal for 
money on TV to help a family with a sick child needing expensive surgery.  One is 
moved with sadness and pity for the child and family.  One may then reflect on those 
emotion as worthwhile, even prompting pangs of conscience to make the judgement 
“People in that sort of situation should be helped.”  One then sends off a cheque.  
Moderate sorrow can also bring insight (I.II. 37.1 ad 1).  Loss of money, even one’s 
home in a fire, may initiate a radical review of the one’s life.  What are the things 
that really count and make one happy?  Without those losses and the ensuing sorrow, 
personal reflection may never have occurred nor its repercussions for the moral life.    
 
Further, these are instances where moderate emotions can be stimulants in forming 
moral judgements, in forming virtue and in shaping character.  The emotions can 
urge someone to reflect on a moral issue or situation, perhaps more deeply than 
previously (Barad, 1991, p. 408).  Aquinas uses fear and anger as other instances of 
this process.  
 
2.3.1:  Fear 
 
“Is fear a sin?” asks Aquinas (II.II. 125.1).  No, he replies, when one is moved to fear 
what should be feared and avoided.  When the fear is out of proportion to the object, 
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this is irrational.  When a person is fearless this can be “a moral fault whether caused 
by insufficient love, or by swelled head, or by sheer dimwittedness” (II.II. 125.1).  
Moderate fear can make one more careful and attentive in one’s work and can help 
one be open to counsel (I.II. 44.4).  Disordered fear can prompt a review of oneself.  
Habits of perception and evaluation of people and situations can produce fear and 
can, in turn, be enhanced and confirmed by the same fear ( I.II. 41.4; 42.5).  They 
can also be based on wrong information or a wrong interpretation of facts (I.II. 42.2).  
For instance, a fearful reaction to a foreigner who is Asian may move a person to 
reflect on the fear.  Does it come from a prejudice, or from something about the other 
person’s character that is a threat?  From this process may come an insight into a 
negative side of one’s character, to form a moral judgement about it, i.e., it is an 
undesirable attitude and emotional response, then to try to do something about it.  
“Thus, deliberating or learning about the object of an emotion can draw one’s 
attention to the moral aspects of a situation one has never previously considered” 
(Barad, 1991, p. 409). 
 
2.2.2:  Anger 
 
Anger, as fear and sorrow, can urge a person to reflect on a moral issue or on the 
shape of one’s moral life and responses (even when those emotions take immoderate 
form).  Aquinas notes that while, of all the emotions, anger can be the most manifest 
obstacle to reason, it is, in a sense rational, and hence it is natural to be angry (I.II. 
48.3; 46.4).  The brave person makes uses of anger in action, provided it is confined 
and controlled (II.II. 123. 10).  Moderate anger reveals a) a person’s capacity to 
measure and respond to personal relationships in terms of justice, b) the depth of 
one’s love and c) produces in the subject a greater magnanimity and openness (I.II. 
46.5; 46.6; 48.2; 48.3).   
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In I.II. qq. 46-48, Aquinas engages in an analysis of the dynamics of anger.  This is 
examined in a recent book reviewed by Westberg (1997).  The object or objective 
cause of anger is, firstly, an unmerited or unjustified attack on one’s self esteem 
(“excellence”) or on values or persons that one esteems.  This is the evil done.  
Subjectively, one experiences a natural desire to repel that sorrow/hurt from the 
slight since it involves a sense of loss and is accompanied by hope of retaliation.  
Vengeance is the desire to correct the default, to maintain justice in relationships and 
to counter the inappropriate low regard of a person that prompts the offence.  The 
goal of anger is to make the offender realise the needs and vulnerability of all human 
beings, to re-establish just relations where equality in difference is recognised.  
Ultimately, reconciliation involves confession, repentance and forgiveness.   
 
This “remarkably astute” analysis has recently been measured against the experience 
of a black woman growing up.  “The experience of numerous slights to excellence, 
when her identity as a black woman is insulted, generates anger and illustrates the 
Thomistic pattern of injuries to self-esteem, sorrow, and desire for vengeance” 
(Westberg, 1997, p. 93).  This is another example of Aquinas’ ability to notice and 
articulate the subtle calibrations of human experience.  It is also an instance of the 
how emotions are social in their origin and their goal.          
 
Barad sums all this up by noting that, regrettably, Aquinas does not offer a normative 
account of moderate emotions.  He describes rather than prescribes the effects of the 
emotions.  He treats the effects of the emotions in descriptive rather than in 
prescriptive terms, suggests rather than explicitly states “how moderate emotions 
may stimulate the formation of moral judgements” (Barad, 1991, p. 409).  Perhaps, 
as will be discussed later, the contextual nature of the emotions and of the affective 
virtues in establishing a mean makes it difficult to elaborate a general normative 
account of moderate emotions.   
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Overall, for Aquinas, the negative emotions, even when disordered, can stimulate a 
person to evaluate and re-shape attitudes, modify emotional responses and the habits 
from which they flow.  More importantly, they are necessary, in their moderate form, 
as responses and virtues, to foster and reflect moral development.  Negative 
emotions, then, assist in forming a person’s character.   
 
In examining the moral significance of the emotions it must be remembered that their 
quality as positive (attraction) or negative (repulsion) is related to a person’s overall 
emotional resonance and sense of inner worth.  Further, positive and negative are 
psychological descriptions.  At times the moral categories of positive and negative 
(or right and wrong) can be contrary to the psychological experience.  For instance, 
hatred or anger may be psychologically negative yet morally positive or 
praiseworthy, e.g., as a response to disvalues or to evil, the hatred of evil may even 
lead to heroism.  Conversely, a positive emotion e.g., desire, love, pleasure can be 
morally negative (wrong, disordered) if it is against right reason, by violating the 
right order of values ( the person’s total good), e.g., sexual desire for, or pleasure 
with, a person who is not one’s marriage partner.  
 
3:  The Moral Significance of the Affective Virtues in Character 
 
In approaching this aspect of the research topic, some reminders are necessary.  At 
the outset, it should be noted that the general framework of the moral dimension of 
the emotions discussed in q. 24 applies as much to the virtues and character as it does 
to human acts.  Further, Aquinas’ treatment of human acts, passions, habits and the 
virtues can easily be read as a philosophical discussion.  Such an approach would be 
to take the treatment out of its context which is theological.  The direction and the 
parameters are set in the Prima Pars and, more proximately, in the Prima Secundae in 
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the discussion of man’s last end.  They are resumed explicitly in the analysis of the 
virtues, especially of the infused theological and moral virtues and the need for, and 
role of, grace.   
 
Too often, says Spohn (1991, p. 85), “Catholic treatments of the virtues ignore 
specifically Christian experience in favour of very general philosophical analysis.”  
A more recent article has noted that some treatments of virtue tend to view grace as a 
type of “topping up” of the person and the natural virtues with faith, hope and 
charity.  The same author points out that grace, for Aquinas, is primarily understood 
as a formal cause, a form of life whereby a person participates in deeper levels of 
God’s life and is transformed in one’s capacities for knowledge and love (I. 43.3).  It 
is grace “that is the intrinsic form mediating between the divine and the human” 
(O’Meara, 1997, p. 265).   
 
The participation in Trinitarian life is characterised by a relationship that is one of 
friendship, which, for Aquinas, is the foundation of the Christian moral life.  A  
human being is a dynamic reality, existing to live, act and grow in terms of a goal 
and fulfilment.  Grace finds concrete expression in concrete, incarnate, historical 
events, actions and people.  The person is capable of free choice, of secondary 
efficient causality, in the direction of his or her life.  It is the dispositions, habits, 
virtues that, flowing from the transformed self, enable the person to seek and find 
God with powers commensurate to the task “through the gift of the Spirit out of 
which the human person acts” (O’Meara, 1997, p. 265).  The infused virtues 
(theological and moral virtues) are effects intrinsic to the reality of being “graced.”  
O’Meara notes that some authors tend to identify charity with grace or with the Holy 
Spirit.  Charity emerges from the presence of the Trinity but has its own proper, 
coordinating activity in the graced moral life of a person. 
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The predominant focus of this section of the study will be the moral significance of 
the emotions as they have bearing on virtue and character.  This concerns the moral 
virtues that form the sense appetite or affectivity-the affective virtues.   
 
The principal moral virtues are the cardinal virtues.  Prudence is concerned with right 
judgment, the ability to know what needs to be done.  Justice deals with right action, 
doing what needs to be done in a way it needs to be done.  The two affective cardinal 
virtues are Fortitude and Temperance.26  Their objects are emotions as hindering 
rather than facilitating doing what is good.  Fortitude overcomes fear, difficulty, pain 
or whatever obstructs the seeking of the good.  Temperance concerns well-ordered 
affections in tempering down excessive emotions or arousing those that are listless.  
“Temperance does not suppress the emotions but shapes them to their most 
appropriate expression, using them to empower virtuous behaviour rather than 
obstructing it” (Wadell, 1993, p. 1006).   
 
3.1:  The Necessity of the Affective Virtues 
 
The question arises of the necessity of the virtues, especially of those concerned with 
the emotions.  Firstly, it needs to be noted, that human life and growth is 
characterised by a certain degree of continuity.  In a good or virtuous life, it is 
necessary but not sufficient to perform individual actions that are morally significant.  
For a life to be called good in its entirety or without qualification, there is required an 
overall direction that can be “best characterised as sustaining a course of activity, 
rather than performing a series of discrete actions” ( Porter, 1990, p. 102).   
 
                                                 
26
  An extended discussion of the various parts of these two virtues is found in II.II. qq. 123-170.  The 
substance of this material is used by the Manualists.  To avoid repetition, it will be examined in the 
following chapter of this study. 
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Secondly, how is a person to sustain such a course of activity without having to be 
consciously aware of “one’s overall aim at every moment, and so determine one’s 
actions and reactions?” (Porter, 1990, p. 102).  Aquinas points out that conscious and 
continuous awareness of one’s goal is not necessary for a person to be directing 
one’s actions towards that goal (I.II. 1.6 ad 3).  More specifically, Aquinas’ response 
to the question centres on the role of the moral virtues.  These shape the person as a 
being of desire such that one spontaneously desires and seeks what is in harmony 
with the truly good life that one is endeavouring to pursue (I.II. 55.4).  The different 
aspects of human desire require different moral virtues that modify the will, e.g., 
justice, and human affectivity, e.g., Temperance and Fortitude, all of which are 
governed by Prudence (I.II. 56.4 ad 4; 61.2) and are animated and integrated by love, 
“the mother and the root of all the virtues” (I.II. 62.4).  
 
The necessity and possibility of a person having affective virtues is implied in the 
content of Chapters 2 and 3 of this project.  It is explicitly discussed by Aquinas in 
his treatment of virtue in relation to the passions (I.II. 59.2; 59.4; 59.5).  While the 
emotions are not fully rational, they do participate in reason as an aptness for the 
good, as revealers of value or disvalue and as having a cognitive dimension that is 
susceptible to change and re-direction by reason.  For instance, it is possible to 
modify one’s fearful response to the dog next door because, despite its barking 
whenever one passes, it really is friendly once it sees the passer-by is known by its 
owner.  Again, one can lessen, even eliminate, one’s initial movement of anger to a 
fellow-worker’s belligerent comments by taking into account his stressful family 
situation.  One modifies one’s belief system or way of viewing a situation.  Aquinas’ 
points out that the imagination is central to how one perceives and interprets things 
then reacts emotionally (I.II. 44.4 ad 2).  It will be Ignatius of Loyola who develops 
ways of modifying our imagination and mental scenarios in order to change attitudes 
and emotional responses (Harak, 1993, p. 98).    
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While acknowledging that other factors assist in shaping and changing emotional 
responses, it is substantially true, then, that “the formation of the affective virtues 
consists precisely in the reeducation of one’s emotional responses in this way” 
(Porter, 1990, p.103).  The more this is carried out, the greater is the convergence 
between one’s immediate rational response and considered rational judgments in a 
given situation.  The same author sums it up:  
 
And that is precisely why the truly virtuous person does not require constant 
conscious deliberation on his final end in order to act in accordance with it.  
His immediate responses will reliably direct him to act appropriately, at least in 
normal circumstances (Porter, 1990, p. 103).   
 
The final consideration for the need of virtue involves the woundedness and the 
effect of sin on human beings.  Humans are prone to error and deception in seeking 
the truth or to obsession or addiction in seeking the good.  They can recognise what 
is true and good yet fail to pursue it.  These tendencies reflect a loss of harmony, an 
alienation within oneself, with God, with others and the world.  Humans are neither 
completely sick nor completely healthy.  People can have conflicting objectives, 
have a bent toward disordered activity in the intellect, will and emotions (I.II. 82.1; 
82.2 ad 5; 85.3).  This disharmony, the tendency to distort the tension between  
matter and spirit, felt especially in the sensitive psyche has been called 
“concupiscence” within the Catholic tradition (Doran, 1993, p. 13).  Human beings 
need grace to overcome this tendency and the capitulation to it that is sin.  It is grace 
that restores and preserves an inner harmony, felt as equilibrium.  What is significant 
for this study is that Aquinas, with Anselm, differed from Augustine by locating the 
essence of Original Sin in the disordered human will rather than in the disordered  
sensual concupiscence (Principe, 1993, p. 1031).  This more positive and balanced 
view did not prevail, as will become apparent in the Manualists.    
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3.2:  The Location of the Affective Virtues 
 
Central to Aquinas’ discussion of the emotions and virtue is the question of the 
location of the virtues.  Here, the principle of consubstantiality of body and soul is 
most clearly at work.  Against the voluntarist position of Bonaventure, Aquinas holds 
(with Aristotle) that some moral virtues are grounded in and modify the seat of the 
emotions (“sense appetite”) rather than the will (“intellective appetitite”).  They can 
do so since the emotions and their source (human affectivity or the irascible and 
concupiscible appetite) participate, to some degree, in reason and can therefore be a 
subject of virtue and a principle of human acts (I.II. 56.4; 41.1 ad 1).  If they are not 
permitted to share in reason, that is precisely how they are frustrated.  As one author 
says “Since individual and repeated acts of the appetites for sense objects are capable 
of and indeed call for rational control, these appetites should be impressed by reason 
and habituated to the spiritual, not simply repressed by the will” (Hughes, 1969, p. 
243).   
 
It is ordered emotion, then, that modifies a subject’s affectivity just as the vice does 
so as a disordered emotion.  For instance, Courage and Temperance are virtues 
because they are ordered emotions rather than actions proceeding immediately from 
the will as virtues perfecting that power, e.g., justice.  With the affective virtues there 
is “no need for virtue in the will” (I.II. 56.6 ad 3. Also I.II. 50.3 ad 3).  As habitual 
and firm dispositions to do what is good, affective virtues achieve the values and 
purpose inherent in them.  In so doing, they are components in the task of practical 
reason presenting the fitting object to the will.  One author sums it up by saying 
 
 
Amid the exuberance and the dejection, the foolhardiness and the fear of 
anyone’s emotions, moderation, stability and rectitude are possible.  The rule of 
reason does not refuse to recognise the good within the object of the appetite, 
but is aware that a particular good is to be loved as such.  At the time, in the 
place and in the way the limitations of the sense object allow, the appetites may 
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give themselves to their proper objects (Hughes, 1969, p. 246).   
 
The radical nature of Aquinas’ position on the body/soul relationship is particularly 
evident in his understanding of the moral function of emotions and of the affective 
virtues.  He rejects any dualistic position whereby true virtue lies in the superior 
dimension of the spirit.  In such a view, the affective powers are “the subject of 
virtue only insofar as they participate in reason, being penetrated and finalized by the 
mind and the will” (Chenu, 1981, p. 196).  Understood in this way, the emotions and 
the body are external and even superfluous to the Christian spiritual and moral life.  
For Aquinas, on the other hand, while the affective powers are integrally related to 
mind, will and freedom, they have their own proper perfection.  For this reason 
Aquinas uses the governing metaphor of political rather than despotic rule.  As 
Chenu points out “the human dignity of the passions is such that they enjoy in the 
active outflowing of the spirit (derivatio) their natural energy and even their freedom 
of direction.  In this way they are subjects of virtues and possess authentic moral 
value, for better or for worse.” (1981, p. 197).   
 
3.3:  The Immanence of the Affective Virtues 
 
So far, the discussion has examined how emotions, as ordered, can be morally good.  
Further, a person’s affectivity can be gradually modified in its habitual disposition so 
that the subject is transformed and seeks, recognises and responds to what is truly 
fitting and good with greater promptness, ease and joy.  There is, however, a 
particular way in which the moral agent is shaped by affective virtues. 
 
 
 
The very term “virtue” denotes “a determinate perfection of a power” (I.II. 55.1).  
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Aquinas asks the question “are moral virtues engaged with what we do different from 
those which are engaged with our emotions ?” (I.II. 60.2).  He distinguishes between 
moral virtues that are about actions and those concerned with emotions.  In the 
former, the operation terminates outside the person (transitive).  In this instance, “the 
good or evil in certain actions is judged from their very nature irrespective of the 
mood in which they are performed, namely in so far as they are commensurate with 
something else” (I.II. 60.2).  Matters of justice come under this category.  Virtues 
concerning the emotions involve an operation that terminates and remains in the 
moral agent (immanent).  In this case, their  
 
activities as good or evil is weighed only by how they fit the person acting.  It 
should be evaluated by how well or badly he is affected by them.  Accordingly 
also in their case virtue is necessarily chiefly a matter of internal affections, 
called passions of the soul, as appears with temperance, courage and the like 
(I.II. 60.2).   
 
The conclusion is that happiness as delight (I.II. 31.1 ad 2) and other affective virtues 
e.g., Fortitude and Temperance have an intrinsic reference to the good of the agent 
(I.II. 56.6 ad 1).  It is still true that the moral subject becomes whatever he or she 
does whether by way of transient or immanent action.  What is significant is that a 
person is responsible for both forms of activity. In this discussion, this involves 
accountability for the shape of one’s emotional life especially through the affective 
virtues.  Specifically, to pick up Porter’s point earlier, “we are responsible for how 
we take things-for the meaning that things have for us” (Harak, 1993, p. 97).  It is 
meaning that connects the cognitive and affective aspects of emotion.  It underpins 
and shapes one’s emotional responses and the affective virtues.   
 
3.4:  Emotions as Instruments of Virtue 
 
Emotions can intensify a person’s moral life by becoming instruments of virtue 
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(Barad, 1991, p. 410).  The activity of the moral virtues requires the direction of 
Prudence and the right intention of the end, which, in the case of the emotions, is due 
to their good disposition (I.II. 56.4 ad 4).  The activities of the affective virtues, by 
definition, require appropriate emotions.  If not, such capacities are superfluous: they 
are not doing their job (I.II. 59.5).  One can only be exercising the virtue of 
Temperance if one actually experiences certain physical desires and emotions in a 
moderate way.  Courage can co-exist with and even require fear.  For the brave 
person, virtue is in overcoming a justified fear and in confronting the danger (II.II. 
123.3) (Barad, 1991, p. 411).  Moral virtues residing in the will are enhanced by 
accompanying emotions (as a form of consequent emotion) and are more meritorious 
(I.II. 77.6 ad 2).  Justice requires the capacity to experience anger at perceived harm 
and injustice in order to move to effective action.  Joy can result from an act of  
justice and can overflow into the emotions (I.II. 59.5)  Mercy operates more fully 
when accompanied by, or overflowing into, pity and empathy (II.II. 30.3). 
 
These considerations highlight the mutuality in the relationship between emotions 
and reason.  For Aquinas, they tutor each other in what can be called a “symbiotic 
relationship” (Barad, 1991, p. 411).  It is significant that the metaphor of political 
rule used by Aquinas of the emotions is also used of the affective virtues (I.II. 56.4).  
As noted earlier, the analogy is that of civil rule over free agents within a 
community.   The exercise of the moral virtues is not just an intellectual activity.  
The individual emotions, the affective virtues and reason share the common ground 
of human life and have a teleological unity of purpose.  Virtues, such as friendship, 
Justice, Fortitude and Temperance must somehow foster the satisfaction of the 
emotions and assist in developing the implied good of these emotions (Baillie, 1988, 
p. 227).  For Aquinas, when emotions function correctly, they are responses that 
draw a person to what is truly good and incline one to avoid what is truly evil, on the 
basis of sensual pleasure or pain rather than on that of intellectual judgment (I.II. 
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22.2; 23.1).   
 
While the emotions are not sufficient for moral decision-making on their own, they 
can orient and guide moral choices by directing reason to noble, good responses to 
value.  They can also limit a person’s choices by ensuring that one takes into account 
the emotional and human dimension in the context of each situation in one’s moral 
decisions.  For instance, Aquinas notes that profession of faith is a desirable good.  
Yet, there is nothing commendable in doing so publicly if it were to cause upset to 
unbelievers and be of no benefit either to the faith or the faithful (II.II. 3.2 ad 3). 
 
3.5:  Habituation, Transformation, Character and Affective Virtues 
 
In his treatment of the necessity of habits, Aquinas elaborates the psychological 
conditions that make habituation possible, whether of good or bad habits.  Firstly, the 
human agent is only capable of developing a habit “because of being only partially 
formed, half way between capacity or potentiality and complete actualisation” 
(Fearon, 1969, p. 234).  Secondly, the capacity for habituation assumes that the agent 
has more than one available option, i.e., the habit has further to develop.  Thirdly, it 
requires many repeated acts and experiences “to develop an acquired manner of 
responding than a single experience” (Fearon, 1969, p. 233).   
 
Virtue, as a good habit, then, is transformative, a modification of the subject (I.II. 
52.2).  A person is changed whereby one takes on qualities one did not have before 
or loses those one did have.  This change is intensive so that the person has an 
increasing participation in a quality in the same way that people can be more or less 
healthy or knowledgeable (I.II. 52.1).  As mentioned in the discussion on pleasure, 
the orientation to what is good becomes “connatural” or second nature (I.II. 32.6).  It 
is the moral subject who becomes more just, or becomes more courageous by 
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consistently overcoming fear.  Conversely, the virtue can be diminished or lost by 
lack of exercise or by behaviour that falls short of the level of virtue already acquired 
(I.II. 53.1; 52.3).  
 
Nelson points out that, in Aquinas, the role of the virtues is not solely to provide 
motivation for the agent.  Their function is to give the human powers direction and, 
above all, the capacity to work well, to achieve their purpose.  We need good habits 
to be human and “to act in a truly human fashion” (Nelson, 1992, p. 65). 
 
From the discussion of the virtues as immanent and transforming, a significant point 
has emerged.  The acquired virtues enable a person to achieve a particular good, to 
act promptly, easily and with satisfaction and joy.  In the case of affective virtues, the 
sensitive appetite (human affectivity) can be an authentic location or subject of 
virtue.  This means that the terminus of the affective virtues is not an action but the 
changes in the subject (power, faculty) from which emerges the appropriate level of 
emotional response.  The locus of the virtue (affectivity) is “ordered” by its 
harmonious relationship with reason.  “Moral virtue perfects the appetitive part of the 
soul by directing it to the good of reason” (I.II. 59.4).  In contrast with Bonaventure 
and the voluntarists, this reinforces Aquinas’ understanding that the sense appetite or 
human affectivity is perfected in itself, in that it achieves its own internal harmony 
because of its right relationship with right reason.  For Aquinas, intellect, will and 
sense appetitite or human affectivity are meant to be modified and transformed by 
virtues as habitual perfections.27    
 
It is worth noting that Aquinas, in I.II. 52.1, and I.II. 59, 60 and 74 uses “subject” for 
the moral agent (rather than for the faculty or power that is the seat of a virtue).  This 
                                                 
27
  It is interesting to compare the definition of human virtues as “firm attitudes, stable dispositions, 
habitual perfections of intellect and will that govern our actions, order our passions, and guide our 
conduct according to reason and faith.” (Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1994, No. 1804).   
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highlights the danger of personifying the human powers (will, intellect, appetites, 
virtues) so that they seem to have separate realities.  Such terminology may help for 
the purposes of clarification and analysis.  Ultimately, however, “the substantial 
unity of the human person is the most fundamental assumption of all in the 
psychological writings of Aristotle and Aquinas” (Fearon, 1969, p. 244).  In this 
present discussion, one must keep in mind that behind action, habit, emotions and 
affective virtues lies the human person, who can grow or fail to do so.  Developing 
the affective virtues, then, is growth in character.  One becomes a certain type of 
person with a configuration to one’s emotional life that is increasingly integrated and 
hence admirable and praiseworthy.   
 
3.6:  Affective Virtues and The Mean 
 
Aquinas, with Aristotle, sees virtue as consisting in a mean established by Prudence.  
Right reason measures and guides actions, emotions and virtues so that a person 
“avoids the extremes of excess and defect in moral matters” (Cessario, 1991, p. 130).  
Emotions and their virtues are right (ordered) or wrong (disordered) in terms of a 
measure or a mean.  With regard to the moral virtues, there is a distinction between 
the “real” mean and the “reasoned” or “rational” mean.  The moral virtues involving 
operation (transitive) e.g., Justice, observe an objective or “real” mean based on an 
object or benchmark that determines the measure of the just act, i.e., right relations 
between people.  Affective virtues (immanent), i.e., Temperance, Fortitude, observe 
a “rational” or “reasoned” mean that cannot be quantified in the same way, since it is 
determined by the agent (Porter, 1990, p. 116).  Subjective factors such as stage of 
development, particular gifts, strengths, capacity, context and circumstances all 
contribute to the prudential judgment of the right balance of emotion and, where 
appropriate, of action by this person, in this situation (I.II. 64.2).  For instance, 
temperance in emotional responses, intimacy and sexuality will differ according as 
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one is married or a religious.  Or, the level of appropriate anger when a child is 
treated unfairly will vary between the child’s parent and a stranger who observes the 
incident.  The mean for courage in the face of a barking dog will be influenced by 
whether or not the person was attacked as a child by a dog.   
 
Aquinas understands a mean as a property of virtue where Aristotle saw it as its very 
essence.  “As a property, a mean is not a factor in the nature of virtue itself, but 
rather is a relation of that nature to its existential situation” (Hughes, 1969, p. 249).  
The transformation in Aquinas is to view the mean as contextual in character.  This 
has a significant implication for the affective virtues of Fortitude and Temperance.  
The descriptions of the kinds of actions that are examples of these virtues (and their 
opposing vices) “will have an open-ended quality that will give them sufficient 
flexibility to be applied to persons in different conditions” (Porter, 1990, p. 116).  
Certainly, a description of the central characteristics that constitute temperate or 
courageous behaviour is essential.  Nevertheless, before one can judge that a 
particular emotional response or act emerging from an affective virtue is moderate or 
ordered, one “must know enough of the individual’s proclivities and the 
circumstances of his action to be able to say that this action is truly in accordance 
with his overall individual good” (Porter, 1990, p. 117).   
 
There is a further implication for affective virtue and the mean.  One could ask 
“Do phrases such as ‘ordered emotions’ or ‘ordered habits’ (virtues) connote, for 
Aquinas, ‘dominated by the reason or the will’? ”  Is affective virtue a matter of self-
control?  In approaching the issue, Porter (1990, p. 112) points out that Aquinas, 
following Aristotle, distinguishes between the true virtues of Temperance and 
Fortitude, on the one hand, and self-control (continentia - “continence”) or skill in 
facing dangerous situations (II.II. 155.1; 123.1 ad 2).  These latter may have 
elements or semblances of virtue but cannot be described as virtuous in the 
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unqualified or full sense of the term.  This again raises the unity of the human 
subject.  The various capacities of intellect, will, senses and emotions can be 
distinguished as different ways the human subject lives in, and interacts with, reality.  
One can be mistaken, or torn by conflicting urges or between conflicting desires and 
duties.  One may, at times, require self-control through dominating an emotion by 
sheer will power.  But ultimately, for Aquinas, the person of true virtue, i.e., in the 
unqualified sense, is the one who has a harmony, a unanimity, an integration of the 
emotions, judgments and will (II.II. 155.4).  A person will want to do what he or she 
knows one ought to do and will act easily and readily in the process (Porter, 1990, p. 
114).  This is a far cry from the Stoic, Kantian and voluntarist models of the moral 
life, especially in relation to emotions and affective virtue.   
 
This brings this study to the importance of the virtue of Prudence.  To follow right 
reason is to act virtuously, to have reason governed by right desire.  We cannot act 
rightly without Prudence since to determine right or wrong actions, one has to 
discern whether they are reasonable and virtuous.  This is an ability that needs to be 
learned, especially through habits that incline one to what is truly fitting and good 
with facility and ease.  Such a person desires, loves, fears, enjoys only the right 
things, in the right time and place and to the right degree.  Prudence depends on the 
moral virtues, and especially, virtuous affectivity in performing its function.   
 
It is also here that one should recall that ethical reasoning is different from its 
speculative counterpart.  It incorporates pre-discursive knowledge, intuition, pre-
volitional responses and emotions, and, as Aquinas would say, a “connaturality” or 
attunement for the good and the order of values.  Moral reasoning demands “that 
practical conversion called wisdom-an evaluative sensitivity to relative importances, 
their interrelation, their densities, their urgencies, and an assessment of their probable 
consequences” (Vacek, 1985, p. 297).  It is worth noting the comment of one author 
  157 
about the central role in Aquinas’ moral vision of the Holy Spirit and of the wisdom 
(rather than Prudence) which the Spirit imparts (Mahoney, 1987, p. 78).   
 
Aquinas agrees with Augustine’s view that virtue is the art of right conduct (I.II. 58.2 
ad 1).  There is an artistry in living a good life.  Like the gifted pianist, years of 
practice make it appear effortless.  Yet Christian virtue is not just about techniques 
for living but about the person and the capacity for being changed. “It amounts to 
possessing a talent or genius for doing the good human action in the same way that a 
true artist possesses a creative spirit that defies description according to the 
conventional norms” (Cessario, 1991, p. 53).  A beauty is revealed in one who does 
what is good with style and grace, with a balance of mind and heart, intellect and 
emotion (II.II.145.2; 145.4). 
 
3.7:  Acquired and Infused Virtues and Human Affectivity 
 
Aquinas’ Theological Anthropology and the exitus-reditus framework of the Summa 
Theologiae imply that human beings have at their disposal the means (natural and 
supernatural) by which it is possible to return to God.  Amongst these are the virtues 
which enable the person through intellect, will and emotions to be disposed regularly 
and easily to what is true and good.  There is, however, a difference between aretaic 
descriptions of virtue (the good life lived especially through the cardinal virtues) and 
a theology of knowing and loving God through responding to grace.  For human 
beings as created and especially through their unique powers and actions, to intend 
God as their ultimate goal, i.e., as a supernatural destiny, the divine gift of grace 
must be given or “infused.”  This is a participation in the inner life of God.  “Just as 
grace perfects nature, so the infusion of the theological virtues of faith, hope and 
charity perfects and gives a supernatural finality to the actions which were performed 
under the acquired virtues of prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude” (Walter, 
  158 
1987, p. 1083).   
 
The person, then, has acquired (natural) and infused (supernatural) virtues that differ, 
not as habits, but in their finality or “the kind of goodness to which they regularly 
dispose us, in the kind of merit that is gained, and in the degree of perfection that is 
reached by the powers of the soul” (Walter, 1987, p. 1083).  There is a reconstructing 
of the self that is both humanising and sanctifying.  Made in God’s image, the person 
now grows in and into God’s likeness in Christ.  Aquinas’ position, while grounded 
in the radical change in the state of being at the metaphysical level, also embraced 
human nature as a principle of action.  This “new creation” is not just a static reality 
but a dynamic one-the human person growing and moving through new powers of 
action towards personal union with God. 
 
This raising of rational beings above their natural order, while a gift and needing 
some form of conscious consent, engages the total person, especially in head and 
heart, “at more intensity than on the natural level, and with a heightened and wider 
scope” (Hughes, 1969, p. 247).  This process is not an addition for Aquinas but a 
transformation, since grace permeates nature.   
 
Can a person experience the infused virtues, i.e. Theological (Faith) or Cardinal (e.g., 
Temperance, Fortitude) at the affective level?  The natural (acquired) affective 
virtues of temperance, courage, pity are more tangible and verifiable in terms of 
emotions, physical and normal well being. The supernatural virtues (Theological or 
Cardinal) may have less psychological, emotional and physical effects but may carry 
more conviction.  For all that, the phenomenon of emotional resonance and overflow 
does have a role here though it is not developed in Aquinas.  One cannot have 
absolute certainty from experience or deduction that one is in the state of grace.  One 
can only have a moral certainty which, as Aquinas points out, is “conjectural.”  One 
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can reasonably infer the presence of grace and a share in divine life through certain 
“signs”:  when one is conscious of delighting in God, is aware of inner peace and 
harmony through not being conscious of grave sin and is conscious of a certain 
sweetness (I.II. 112.5).  One experiences a certain harmony and equilibrium of one’s 
being.   
 
This understanding concurs with Aquinas’ vision of the goal of the moral life.  It is 
an increasing harmony, integration and equilibrium within the person in which the 
various human powers collaborate for a common goal, namely, human flourishing 
and deepening response in love to God.  His account of the emotions and the 
affective virtues is consistent with this.  Nevertheless, the predominantly 
metaphysical vision underlying his view of grace and his Philosophical Psychology 
may account for his hesitations in elaborating the psychological reverberations of the 
infused, especially the Theological, virtues.   
 
If Prudence gives direction to the moral life and friendship with God through grace 
and the indwelling Spirit provides the context, it is Charity that gives it energy and 
life.  For Aquinas, it is love that gives the virtues their shape and meaning especially 
when transformed by the infused virtue of Charity.  The virtues, especially the 
affective virtues, are principally strategies for loving.      
 
The other-directed and transcendent quality of certain emotions with regard to values 
e.g., courage, compassion, mercy, anger for justice, highlights the paradigmatic role 
of love in the moral life for Aquinas.  For him, Charity and love, infused and 
acquired virtues, form the bond, the unifying principle and form of the virtues.  As 
Vacek points out  
 
 
Above all, as a prerequisite for doing ethics, love is required.  If love can be 
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described as an emotional, participative union with the dynamisms of beings and 
Being moving in the direction of their value-enhancement, then love is 
necessary not only for living ethically-as almost all religious persons agree- but 
also for doing ethics (Vacek, 1985, p. 297).    
 
4.  Overview and Evaluation 
 
This study has examined the first research question “How does Aquinas portray the   
moral significance of the emotions in the Christian moral life in relation to human 
acts, virtue and character?”  This part of the discussion has confirmed the findings in 
Chapter three concerning the emotions as such.  The emotions, and their affective 
virtues, are inherent in, not external to, the search for human fulfilment and 
happiness.  They are part of the human person’s need and ability to adapt constantly, 
at the intellectual and affective level, to his or her milieu, doing so with deepening 
self-possession, greater trust and a more inclusive love in the image of Christ.  The 
affective virtues are measurable according to human and graced excellence and 
integration.  They are also contextual in character, shaped by the individual’s 
temperament, development and circumstances.  Human rationality is richer if one 
seeks, does and achieves what is good through right actions and ordered emotions 
and affectivity.  Such emotions, whether positive (e.g., love, desire, hope, courage, 
pleasure, joy) or negative (e.g., hatred, aversion , sadness, fear, anger) and their 
associated virtues make a necessary contribution to moral growth and integration.,  
Overall, Aquinas gives a coherent and internally consistent account of the moral 
significance of the emotions and the affective virtues.   
 
Secondly, the text of Aquinas has surfaced further evidence of his efforts to go 
beyond his framework, language and metaphysical categories.  The findings of the 
previous chapter are confirmed even further by Aquinas’ display of sensitivity and 
acumen in his phenomenological analyses of love, anger and sadness.      
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Thirdly, the collaborative implications of the political model seem to best capture the 
place of emotions and their virtues within Aquinas’ view of the person and his 
Theological Anthropology.  In Freudian terms, the relation of reason to the emotions 
is not that of repression wherein the will prevents the non-rational participating in the 
rational through conscious awareness.  Human affectivity and emotions share in 
reason “not by being subject to frustrating commands, but by finding contentment in 
the proper scope of their own function of loving limited objects for what they are 
worth” (Hughes, 1969, p. 246).   The affective virtues are necessary for the will itself 
to function well.  Experience points out that “anyone who attempts to live according 
to sheer will-power in defiance of his other appetites, is a candidate for a neurosis or 
an ulcer” (Hughes, 1969, p. 246).   
 
The study has uncovered a further important insight in Aquinas.  Affective virtues, as 
immanent in character, are not primarily dispositions to virtuous action but to 
virtuous emotional responses (which may or may not lead to action).  This 
constitutes their proper function or perfection.  The habits of well-ordered emotional 
responses, especially in presenting the appropriate object to the will, are essential in 
order that Prudence perform its task.  Not only are emotions needed for our most 
elementary moral responses.  They are needed for the on-going process of moral 
reasoning.   
 
This study has addressed the second research question “What is the vision of the 
human person manifest or inferred in Aquinas?”  His anthropology of the person is 
grounded in a Christian reading of Aristotle.  He attempts to provide a solid 
psychological foundation for a realist Moral Theology in which “virtue can radically 
transform human behaviour of every sort” (Cessario, 1991, p.65).  The specific 
context for Aquinas’ treatment is that of a need theory of value, that “the experience 
of obligation is implicit in the practical knowledge that an act is desirable or that an 
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act is necessary to realise a good appropriate to man in virtue of certain appetites 
rooted in human nature” (Fay, 1961, p. 42).  Its general metaphysical context is one 
“which considers the tendencies of the moral agent as ordered to the conservation 
and expansion of its own being” (Fay, 1961, p. 42).  The Natural Law ethics of 
Aquinas emerges from a Theological Anthropology built on the goodness of creation 
and emphasises the moral significance of human affectivity.   
 
In Aquinas, the ontological unity of the person means that human affectivity 
possesses an autonomy which entails a participative relationship with mind and will.  
The phenomenon of bodily resonance, for instance, is a central indicator that the 
human sensibilities are virtuous not by simple docile subordination or by simple 
habituation “but by an intimate penetration.  It is thanks to this penetration-or better 
interpenetration-that the spirit finds home in our sensibilities or passions” (Chenu, 
1981, p. 197).    
 
On the disputed question of the degree to which rational control can effectively shape 
emotional behaviour, most Christian thinkers agree that rational powers do have 
some form of control over emotions but disagree on the exact dynamics of the 
process (Cessario, 1991, p. 63).  The political or collaborative model proposed by 
Aquinas combined with his occasional use of a form of phenomenological method 
give him the means to temper and transcend the limits of his world-view and his 
language.  It also enables him to avoid the extremes of repression based on religious 
sanctions and the over-optimism of later romantic humanism in the tradition of 
Rousseau.  Aquinas endeavours to capture a moral realism that “rejects all forms of 
anthropological dualism” (Cessario, 1991, p. 63).  This stance also ensures a balance 
between accepting the fundamental goodness of human nature and the reality of 
moral evil (personal and social) with the consequent need for reconciling grace.  
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The building blocks for Aquinas’ Theological Anthropology are found in his 
Philosophical Psychology, which he adapts from Aristotle.  Understandably, his 
language and style seem strange to the twentieth century reader.  As with any 
philosophical framework, that used by Aquinas has limits and inadequacies, 
particularly by modern standards.  Although his psychology is more a Philosophical 
Anthropology which contrasts with the more experiential approach of modern 
Psychology, there are nevertheless perennial truths and insights combined with an 
acute understanding of the human psyche and spirit.   
 
One must recall that Aquinas was strongly influenced by the scientific method of his 
teacher Albertus Magnus.  Observation, experiment and the inductive method are 
integral to his methodology.  This, together with his emphasis on the bodily 
component of human life, even of psychic activity, e.g., imagination, emotions, 
memory, places him closer, from one perspective, to modern empirical schools of 
Psychology.  Yet, Aquinas was intensely aware of the total human being as a blend 
of body, psyche and spirit.  He was conscious of the inherent limitations of the 
method of observation and description and of the validity of realities that transcend 
empirical observation (White, 1952, p. 103f).  This is something he shares with 
analytical and psychodynamic schools of Psychology.   
 
One must be cautious in judging Aquinas solely from a modern perspective.  Within 
the confines of his view of the human person, his Theological Anthropology is 
basically coherent and consistent.  For instance, in his treatment of the emotions, this 
discussion has shown no evidence of a voluntarist position lurking beneath the 
surface-a “theory in use” that is at odds with the “manifest” theory.  The emotions 
and affective virtues are consistently linked with happiness and full human 
functioning in terms of “right reason” or “ordered emotions.”  The psychological and 
moral function of emotions and affectivity converge in the overall well-being and 
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harmony of the integrated and virtuous person.  The normative and the descriptive 
meet in the true virtue and character.  In Aquinas’ vision, there is an inherent 
connection between being and action that gives his moral theory its ontological and 
epistemological foundation. 
 
Recent studies of Aquinas have highlighted the profoundly existential quality of his 
metaphysics.  In his thought, argues Clarke (1986), existential presence and action 
entails self-possession (awareness and self-direction), self-communication (in 
relationships) and self-transcendence (in love for God and for others).  Such a 
modern interpretation of Aquinas’ thought captures the centrality of conscious 
knowing, willing, self-direction, love and response in human life.  Emotions are 
integral to a self who is transformed and finds fulfilment by giving, communicating, 
loving and self-transcending.  One sees Aquinas portraying emotions as expressions 
of these qualities-anger at another’s injustice, courage in saving another in the face of 
fear, compassion, mercy and love leading to unselfish action.  More significantly, 
emotions are, for Aquinas, the expressions of human need, desire, incompleteness.  
They manifest the interactive nature of human life, with other humans, with God, the 
world and with values.  These provide the objects by and about which humans are 
moved and respond.  Emotional experience, as human existence, is essentially 
embodied, social and interdependent.   
 
For all that, the philosophical underpinnings of Aquinas’ Theological Anthropology 
still have inadequacies.  One cannot avoid comment on what has come to be known 
as his “faculty psychology.”  According to Philibert (1987, p. 111), this term has 
become identified with the caricature of it that resulted from the ridicule it suffered 
from the nineteenth century philosopher Johannes Herbert.  In attempting to 
understand the human person, Aquinas distinguished the various “faculties” or 
powers of the human person.  He also attempted to determine the organic location of 
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various human capacities, i.e., memory, imagination, interior senses, sense appetite.  
From a modern perspective, this appears at times reductive, even misguided.     
 
A further criticism is that the various faculties tended to take on a life of their own, 
fragmenting the total unity of the personality (Hughes, 1969, p. xxi; Cessario, 1991. 
p. 58).  This was particularly the case with the virtues, since Aquinas places the seat 
of the virtues in various faculties, i.e., intellect, will or sense appetite.  They then 
seem to become “a plurality of partial moral subjects within the human personality” 
(Philibert, 1987, p. 111).   
 
Aquinas, in reality, was attempting to capture the body/spirit unity of the human 
person, its subtlety and variety while solving the problem of how body and spirit 
relate to each other.  Mention has been made of Aquinas’ on-going interest on the 
place of bodily resonance in human emotional life (Chapter three, footnote 18).  One 
is also aware that though the intellect, will, memory or imagination may not have a 
specific location inside the body, brain injury can certainly impair their function.  It 
can also affect some emotional responses.  Aquinas’ teaching about various faculties 
and, in particular, on the varying seats or subjects of virtue was intended as “a 
heuristic description of the rich versatility of the human psyche” (Philibert, 1987, p. 
111).  He was attempting to clarify, analyse and understand the riches of the human 
person.  Distinctions to achieve this are secondary and derived.  However we name 
the range of human activities and powers, what matters is that it is the person who 
knows, wills, remembers, imagines, feels and that these functions, though 
interdependent, are somehow different from each other. 
 
In the last analysis, argues Keenan (1995, p. 723), Aquinas’ Theological 
Anthropology is built on the question “what is it?”  The answer emerges from an 
investigation of what the human person has and does, as a being of a certain nature 
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with given powers that are perfected by the virtues.  The human being is an object, 
something to be known.  The modern turn to the subject assumes that humans know.  
The question then becomes “who are we?”  In this case, humans see themselves as 
agents or subjects who are relational.  From this perspective, the virtues “do not 
perfect what we have or what we do; rather they perfect who we are in the mode of 
our being, which is as being in relationships.  Virtues do not perfect powers or 
‘things’ inside of us, but rather ways that we are” (Keenan, 1995, p. 723).    
 
Again, there is, in Aquinas, explicit recognition of the social nature of human beings. 
The satisfaction of human needs and the process of development requires family and 
society together with associated responsibilities.  Porter, however, points out (1990, 
p. 176) “it might be said that he still assumes that the human person is finally a self-
contained individual, capable of knowledge and free choice apart from the 
conditioning influences of society.”  One can ask whether Porter’s reservation 
concerning Aquinas’ treatment of the social nature of the person is true of his 
approach to the social and relational context of the emotions.  Perhaps it true that the 
awareness of emotions as developmental influences within the person and within 
relationships is more implied than elaborated in Aquinas.  More specifically, a 
person’s emotions and affectivity, together with the beliefs that underpin them, are 
influenced by previous experiences, by social structures, and by “culturally 
conditioned patterns of evaluation and response” (Spohn, 1991, p. 71).  This is a 
dimension that is not evident in Aquinas.  While not succumbing to determinism, 
human freedom must understand these influences in order to rise above them.  It will 
only be in the twentieth century with the work of Erikson, Kohlberg, Gilligan,  
Fowler and others that the formative influences of family, society and faith 
community will be identified and examined. 
 
Again, there is an inadequacy in Aquinas in the domain of the subjective.  Since the 
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time of Aquinas in the thirteenth century, there is a deeper insight and more acute 
description of human self-awareness, the emotions and inner movements of the 
psyche and the spirit.  It is only through phenomenology and the personal 
philosophies and psychologies of this century one is able to explore the rich and 
subtle texture of subjective experience.  Aquinas cannot be condemned for being a 
creature of his time.  Despite his occasional detailed probing of the experience of 
some emotions, his dominant metaphysical and philosophical methodology makes it 
difficult for Aquinas to locate and clarify the human experience of grace.  In this 
study, it has been shown how Aquinas does pursue the bodily reverberations of 
human emotions.  He also has a positive attitude to the role and significance of 
emotions and human affectivity.  Nevertheless, unlike Ignatius, there seems to be a 
hesitation, perhaps an inability, in Aquinas to describe and account for the 
psychological and affective reverberations of the influence of grace and the infused 
virtues.   
 
More pertinent to this study, however, is the issue of the roots of emotional responses 
and behaviour.  Again, Aquinas cannot be convicted for failing to be aware of the 
existence of the unconscious and its relationship to, and influence on, the conscious 
life-something that comes with Freud and Jung.  An important aspect of this is the 
impact of negative states and their associated emotions that are hidden in the 
unconscious but which influence psychological and moral functioning.  Awareness 
of these states comes by means of devices employed by the psyche to gain a person’s 
attention (cf. by establishing a position in the conscious through, for instance, 
depression; by emerging in disguised form in a physical condition [conversion 
reaction] or in a psychological form [reaction formation]; by displacement or 
projection etc.).  These states, with their potential to be constructive or destructive in 
a person’s life, are significant factors that colour one’s view of emotions being 
“moderated by reason”, or being “ordered emotions.”   
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Porter and Harak, as mentioned earlier, saw Aquinas’s view of the emotions as 
centred on the “meaning” one gives to things.  Hence, change the meaning, or belief 
or interpretation, then there is a change of attitude and, consequently, of emotional 
response.  This is generally true.  But it can raise difficulties when it comes to intense 
emotions that surge up from negative states in the unconscious.  One must first 
attempt to identify the emotion, acknowledge it, and try to discern what prompted it. 
Its roots may well be in the memory or in a forgotten hurt or trauma that needs 
attention.  This may even require professional help.  Only when the meaning of the 
emotion and its roots are clearer can one begin to shift to a new meaning, or belief 
and hence to more accurate self-appropriation.  One cannot see things differently 
merely by judgement, will power, or choice.  A number of preliminary steps may be 
required.  The re-education of the emotions and the formation of habits may be 
impaired by a failure to engage in these processes.  The moral responsibility of 
emotional self-care may be more complex than it is portrayed, or is interpreted to 
exist, in Aquinas. 
 
How does Aquinas’ treatment of the emotions measure up against contemporary 
feminist thought?  Porter points out that Aquinas’ attitudes to women are ambiguous, 
“negative in many respects, at least by our standards, but also positive in some 
important ways” (1994, p. 323).  Aquinas insists that every person, man or woman, 
possesses the image of God in the primary and essential sense, ie., has the capacity to 
know and love God (1.93.4 ad 1) (Porter, 1994, p. 325).  Aquinas’ understanding of 
the emotions confirms this.  For him, they are essential components of human nature, 
i.e., for men and women.  Nowhere does Aquinas associate emotions or a specific 
emotion with those instances where he regards women as less rational (to a certain 
degree) than men (1.92.1 ad 2).  Further, when he describes the dynamic of emotions, 
his mode of language either centres on the emotion rather than on the person or on 
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emotions emanating from the “agent” or the “soul” (life-principle).  When he does 
appeal to human experience or attempts to generalise, where English translations use 
“man”, Aquinas consistently uses more inclusive Latin words such as aliquis 
(someone), homo (human being), humanus (human), and never a gender-specific 
word such as vir (man).  Overall, one can agree with Porter when she says that “no 
amount of sympathetic interpretation will turn him (Aquinas) into a feminist” (1994, 
p. 315).  Nevertheless, from a modern vantage point, the content and language in his 
treatment the emotions tend to support those instances where he affirms the equality 
of women and a form of implied inclusiveness.   
 
In Aquinas, the Gospel narrative, symbols and parables are not part of his 
understanding or treatment of the virtues.  He grounds his discussion on a common 
human nature where natural virtues are elevated and transformed by grace.   
However, in evaluating Aquinas’ treatment of the emotions and the affective life, one 
could well keep in mind the point made by Alisdair MacIntyre in Whose Justice? 
Which Rationality?  Aquinas’ synthesis is original, cohesive and comprehensive 
because it emerged from someone who inhabited both the Augustinian and the 
Aristotelian traditions.  Aquinas’ treatment of the emotions and the affective virtues 
exemplifies this.  The presence of Aristotle is obvious but so is the influence of 
Augustine and the place of love, desire and affectivity in Aquinas’ view of the 
person.   
 
It has been observed recently that, in Aquinas’ later years, there is a greater emphasis 
on the role of affectivity and that his whole anthropology appears in the sequence: 
intelligence, affectivity, heart (Torrell, 1996, p. 31 and xii).  The same author, citing 
Ramirez, sees an increasing influence of Augustine on Aquinas and on his thought as 
they matured.  In the Secunda Pars, First Truth as the proper object of faith is also the 
end of all human desires and actions.  Again, knowing is not just discursive and 
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analytical but also by way of affective connaturality.  To see Aquinas simply as the 
speculative, analytical, metaphysical thinker in the Aristotelian mode, does not do 
justice to the man, to his thought and to the two dominant schools of his time 
(Torrell, 1996, p. 39).  Aquinas’ religious psychology has some key features, namely, 
it is centred on Christ, on love of wisdom that flowers in theology, on love as the 
soul of morality and the perfection of Gospel spirituality, on love of peace as the fruit 
of Charity.  These are the “fundamental traits that are distinctively his, and they are 
bound up with deep personal experience” (Leclercq, 1968, p. 332f).  It is true to say 
of Aquinas that his own life and writing mirror his age “when the door between 
Theology and the experimental knowledge of God was not yet closed” (Leclercq, 
1968, p. 336).   
 
The modern sensibility, with its sense of the self and the role of subjective 
consciousness as the ground for truth, insight and certitude, finds more resonances 
with the voice in Augustine’s Confessions than that found in the Summa Theologiae.  
Conversely, twentieth century existential angst, the plurality of moral languages and 
the postmodern unintelligibility of reality would be beyond the experience (even the 
comprehension ?) of Aquinas and his contemporaries.  Presumed certainties (for 
instance, in Theology, Cosmology), a confident epistemology, academic convention 
and personal style converge in Aquinas’ method of detached, scientific and objective 
analysis, couched in the third person and set in a formal style which is, in reality, a 
conversation.   
 
Generally, in Aquinas’ writings, there is a reticence about himself.  One rarely sees 
the man behind the veil of scholarly detachment.  Nevertheless, particularly in 
Aquinas’ discussion of morals, emotions and the virtues, one can occasionally detect 
the influence of personal experience, even faint echoes of his own voice.  It may be 
that the nature of the material demands a constant correlation with, and testing 
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against, life.   It could also reflect the development in his own life, in his perception 
of reality and in his thought.  Something of Aquinas the human being is betrayed in 
his psychological insight, his understanding of the subtle shifts of the human heart 
and the psyche examined in this study, e.g., his discussion of the emotional 
repercussions of love, fear, anger, pity; his considerations on the effects of pleasure 
and good actions on people; his practical method for dealing with sadness and 
depression.  Again, his discussion of friendship (II.II. 23.1) has a “delicate 
sensibility” that it is “difficult to think that the man who spoke in this way had 
nothing but a literary knowledge of affection” (Torrell, p. 1996, p. 283).     
 
Aquinas’ view of the emotions emphasises their organic character-a position that is 
consistent with his faculty psychology.  It has been argued in Chapter two that the 
bodily dimension in emotions is a necessary but, for all that, not a sufficient part of 
their description.  Aquinas’s view of them as interactive responses underlines the 
relational quality of the human existence, the need for habits in affectivity and the 
embodied nature of the human person.  As the Whiteheads point out, emotions are 
neither passive nor private but are social in both their origin and goal (1994, p. 8ff).  
They capture the historical, incarnational and interactive dimensions of human and 
Christian life. 
 
Perhaps the best summing up is that of O’Meara when he notes that, strictly 
speaking, Aquinas’ Moral Theology is not an ethics of virtue. The emotions and the 
affective virtues are one “set of forces” amid various instructive resources and 
instruments that are part of human life and of participating in the divine life.  
“Aquinas’s theology does not begin with human virtues nor does it end with them.  It 
proceeds from two vital sources, the total human personality and divine grace, and it 
ends in the instinctual Gifts of the Spirit” (O’Meara, 1997, p. 279).  Its horizon is 
beatitude, its guide is Prudence and its impulse is Charity.  Exploring the role and 
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moral significance of the emotions and the affective virtues, returns one to the 
sapiential tradition in Aquinas, something that can help bridge the polarisation 
between virtue ethics and Natural Law theory (Kennedy, 1995, p. 176).   
 
This study has engaged in its first task, namely, an examination of the moral 
significance of emotions in Aquinas and the underlying view of the human person.  
The next step is to investigate selected authors from the Manualist tradition using the 
three research questions and to measure them against the historical benchmark of 
Aquinas.  This is the purpose of the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
Emotions and the Moral Life in the Manualist Tradition c. 1960 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine selected Manualists in the light of the three 
research questions outlined in the methodology in Chapter one.  The validity of using 
a representative selection (4 authors) to provide a reliable sample has also been 
explained in the same discussion of the methodology.28 
 
1.  The Moral Significance of the Emotions 
 
The chapter has three sections, built on the three research questions.  It commences 
by investigating the first research question:  “ How do these authors portray the 
moral significance of the emotions in relation to human acts, virtue and character?” 
 
1.1:  Emotions and the Human Act 
 
1.1.1:  Context 
 
                                                 
28
  A note on the availability of primary texts.  The most recent editions available of Noldin-Schmitt 
and Aertnys-Damen were both published in 1956.  Davis has a fourth edition published in 1943 but it 
was not available to this researcher.  Its treatment of the emotions and the material discussed in this 
chapter is identical with the 1935 edition.  Prümmer’s Handbook of Moral Theology (1963) contains a 
concise summary of the treatment of emotions found in the edition of 1935.  
    In the bibliography of Davis (1935) are some of the commonly cited Moral Manualists, namely, 
Aertnys-Damen, Alphonsus Ligouri, Genicot-Salsmans, Koch-Preuss, Lehmkuhl, Merkelbach, 
Noldin-Schmitt, Prümmer, Slater, Vermeesch.  The widespread acceptance and use of these 
Manualists is perhaps indicated by the numerous editions of their works, for instance, Davis (1943), 
4th. edn.; Prümmer (1935), 8th. edn.; Prümmer (1956), 5th. edn.; Noldin-Schmitt (1956), 21st. edn.; 
Aertnys-Damen (1956), 17th. edn.  These authors, with Merkelbach, and later, Zalba, seem to have 
been among the commonly used texts for teaching Moral Theology in English speaking seminaries in 
the late 1950s.  A turning point was the English version of Häring’s The Law of Christ Vol. 1 (1961). 
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The moral manuals, especially the neo-Thomist ones,29 are a theological genre-
convenient ways of classifying particular forms of written or oral expression.  
Manuals of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries were eclectic.  Those after 1879 
and Aeterni Patris are described as summaries of St. Thomas (Gallagher, 1990, p. 
37).  Their structure was virtually identical-General Moral Theology, Special Moral 
(Sins, Virtues or Decalogue), Canon Law of the Sacraments.  They were “culturally 
invariant texts” considered suitable for all seminaries (Gallagher, 1990, p. 40).   
 
The immediate context for the treatment of the emotions is that of human acts in 
General Moral Theology.  The Manualists discuss the first intrinsic principle of the 
human act which is knowledge or deliberation and its defects, namely, ignorance and 
inadvertence.  They then proceed to the second principle (the voluntarium) drawing 
on Aquinas’ work in I.II. 6. a.1-8 on the Voluntary and the Involuntary. 
 
It is significant that the Manualists, unlike Aquinas, discuss the emotions under the 
heading of “obstacles to the human act” (Davis, 1935, p. 16) or of “impediments to 
the human act” (Noldin-Schmitt, 1940, p. 56).  Aertnys-Damen (1956, p. 41) uses 
more neutral language (de Involuntario) when he sees emotions as one factor that can 
make the human act an involuntarium because of absence of deliberation or consent.  
In the heading used by Prümmer (1935, p. 49), the language is the strongest when he 
refers to “enemies of the human act” (hostibus voluntarii).  The same author then 
expresses the disclaimer that passion and habit are not always the enemies of the 
human act.30   
                                                 
29
  Neo-Thomism was a movement of Catholic Theologians, especially influenced by Joseph 
Kleutgen, that endeavoured to establish the teaching of Aquinas as the authoritative foundation for 
Catholic thought.  From Aeternis Patris (1879) until Vatican II, Neo-Thomism was the driving force 
of Papal theology.  At the same time, it offered “a coherent, unified, systematic theology and 
philosophy as an alternative to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and other modern philosophers” 
(Gallagher, 1990, p. 49).   
 
30
  “Passio et habitus non semper sunt hostes voluntarii” (Prümmer, 1935, p. 49). 
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The distinction is made between actual impediments (ignorance, concupiscence 
[passion], fear, violence [force]), and habitual impediments (evil habits of mind and 
will, pathological states) (Davis, 1935, p. 16; Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 51; Aertnys-
Damen, 1956, p. 42).  This study will confine itself to examining concupiscence 
(passion), fear, conditions of mind, will and pathological states in so far as these are 
actual or habitual obstacles to the human act.   
 
1.1.2:  Definition and Types of Emotions 
 
Only Prümmer (1935, p. 55) directly cites Aquinas (I.II. 22.1) in his definition of an 
emotion as a “movement in the sensitive appetite caused by the imaginative 
awareness of the presence of good or evil and productive of some change in the 
body” (Prümmer, 1963, p. 17).  He notes the distinction between the Stoic view of 
emotions as any movement of the sensitive appetite not under rational control and the 
Aquinas’ view of an emotion developed in Chapter three of this study.  Here, an 
emotion is a response of the sensitive appetite which has a both a psychological and a 
moral dimension.  Further, an emotion can be ordered or disordered, moderate or 
immoderate.   
 
All four authors use “concupiscence” as a synonym for “emotion” (de passione seu 
concupiscentia) (Prümmer, 1935, p. 55; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 45).  Prümmer and 
Noldin-Schmitt distinguish the three senses of the word concupiscentia: 
a)  The particular emotion that is desire (desiderium).  Aquinas uses concupiscentia 
to describe this particular emotion (I.II. 31.3 ad 2).31   
                                                 
31
  “S. Thomas hanc passionem non nominat desiderium, sed concupiscentiam” (Prümmer, 1935, p. 
57). 
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b)  Inclination32 of the appetite to moral evil or sin through the influence of Original 
Sin, as witnessed in Scripture (Gal. 5:17) and human experience after Baptism 
(Davis, 1935, p. 20).  This is the sense often used by modern authors.33   
c)  Emotions involve the activity of the whole affective dimension of a person’s life 
(total vitam affectivam) (Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 55; also Prümmer, 1935, p. 55; 
Davis, 1935, p. 20).  An emotion is the movement of the sensitive appetite towards 
good and away from evil (as described above).  This is the sense used in the 
Manualists’ treatment of the emotions or “passions” as impediments to the human 
act. 
 
Davis notes that the word “passion” indicates “excitement in an intense degree, 
whereas the human act may be only partially disturbed by concupiscence in the sense 
in which it is used here” (Davis, 1935, p. 21).  This is a variation of the distinction of 
“passion” from “emotion” explained earlier, the former being an intense form of the 
latter.   
 
While three authors note the distinction between concupiscible and irascible 
appetites together with the eleven principal emotions enumerated by Aquinas, 
Aertnys-Damen (1956, p. 45) seems to assume this without explicitly mentioning it.  
Davis (1935, p. 21) and Noldin-Schmitt (1956, p. 55) list the emotions briefly 
whereas Prümmer (1935, p. 56-59) outlines the salient characteristics of each in a 
paragraph drawing on Aquinas’ treatment in I.II. qq. 22-48.  By implication, 
Prümmer’s summary expands his earlier comment that emotions (and habits) are not 
                                                 
32
  Inclinatio is discussed by Aquinas in I.II. 49.2.  Fearon defines it as “the innate ordination of a 
power, or the training given it by repeated actions of the same kind, or by the endowment of grace.  
Applies to habit, vice, virtue” (1969, p. 249).      
 
33
  “... moderni autem auctores sub nomine concupiscentiae intelligere solent totum appetitum per 
peccatum originale corruptum, ut iam dictum est” (Prümmer, 1935, p. 57). 
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always “enemies of the human act.”   
 
Davis develops an apologia for emotions understood as “concupiscence.”  “It must at 
once be obvious that concupiscence has no connotation of evil.  The appetite 
stretches out instinctively towards its own object, and exercises its own natural 
activities” (Davis, 1935, p. 21).  This is pre-moral in character.  Experience indicates 
that humans can reach out for the wrong things, that emotions can “distract right 
reason or incline the will to be improperly ordered” (Gallagher, 1990, p. 81).  “The 
first movements of our appetites are like undisciplined children; they do not wait 
upon reason, but anticipate it.  They have to be taught to obey” (Davis, 1935, p. 21).   
 
The appetites are gifts from God, meant for self-preservation and thus essential for 
humans if they are to change and develop.  God, in his wisdom, has associated 
natural faculties and activities with a sense of pleasure, part motivation, part 
indicator of an orderly and harmonious functioning.  The desire for truth, for the 
good, for happiness exist  “so that we may truly live and exercise all our faculties 
with pleasure, but according to right reason, which should dominate every activity, 
an orderly and harmonious microcosm.  Concupiscence, in this sense, as is evident, is 
in itself neither good nor bad; it is simply a natural tendency” (Davis, 1935, p. 21; 
also Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 137).  In this view, natural inclinations, tendencies, 
affections are integral to the understanding of Natural Law and as concurrent causes 
in the morally good action by participating in right reason.  This has been developed 
more recently by Grisez and Finnis (Gallagher, 1990, p. 81).  It contrasts with the 
understanding of Natural Law as right reason that participates in Divine Law without 
cognisance of pre-moral dispositions embedded in human nature (Prümmer, 1935, p. 
105; 1963, p. 29).    
 
Davis proceeds to use a ruling metaphor for the role of the emotions and their 
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relation to right reason.  They are analogous to the “mechanical forces in some 
delicate piece of machinery, with their mutual interdependence at play, all of them 
directed to one grand effect by some ruling power extrinsic to them.  We may look 
upon reason as the ruling power extrinsic to concupiscence” (Davis, 1935, p. 21f).  
The emotions (“movements of concupiscence”) “sometimes distort the clear view of 
reason, and baulk the activities of the rational will” (Davis, 1935, p. 22).  
Concupiscence has a bearing on human acts as moral realities by diminishing or 
augmenting responsibility (Davis, 1935, p. 22).  This is the next topic of this study. 
 
1.1.3:  Antecedent and Consequent Emotions 
 
The main concern of the Manualists in their treatment of emotions is the influence on 
the human act or the voluntarium.34  The three authors discussed here present, in a 
compressed form, the key ideas developed in I.II. 24.3, already discussed in Chapter 
three of this study.  The most summary discussions are those in Noldin-Schmitt 
(1956, p. 55f) and Aertnys-Damen (1956, p. 45f).  Prümmer’s treatment (1935, p. 
60f) follows that of Aquinas the most explicitly.  Davis (1935, p. 22ff) is similar in 
substance but offers more examples and a more pastoral thrust.  Rather than repeat 
the full discussion of Chapter three on this aspect of the emotions, the salient points 
in these selected authors will be highlighted.   
 
The distinction between antecedent and consequent emotion is assumed by the four 
authors (Prümmer, 1935, p. 60; Davis, 1935, p. 22; Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 55; 
Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 45).  Davis notes that, in one sense, every passion or 
emotion is “antecedent to an action done under its influence” (Davis, 1935, p. 22).  
The distinction is to assist in determining the morality and imputability of actions in 
                                                 
34
  Cf., Definition of terms, Chapter one.  
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so far as they are willed.  Antecedent emotion precedes the consent of the will and 
arises from causes independent of the will, for example, a sudden surge of anger 
leading to an act of violence.  Consequent emotion follows the consent of the will.  
This can occur by way of: 
i)  deliberate consent of the person to a spontaneous emotion or “failure to check it 
when” one “could or should do so” (Davis, 1935, p. 24: Prümmer, 1935, p. 60; 
Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 55).   
ii)  deliberate choice of a person to arouse or foster certain emotions. 
iii) overflow (redundantia) from the will to the emotions.   
 
How do emotions, then, influence the morality of the human act?  Prümmer (1935, p. 
60), Noldin-Schmitt (1956, p. 56) and Aertnys-Damen (1956, p. 45f) sum up what is 
common to the Manualists. 
 
i)  Antecedent emotion (concupiscentia, passio) diminishes freedom and, at times, 
removes freedom completely.  This is true of any impediment, here an emotion, that 
influences the deliberation of reason .  It is also true of any pressure on the will that 
affects or removes its impartiality (indifferentia) with regard to its objects of choice.  
Prümmer notes, citing Aquinas, that, simply speaking, an emotion can increase the 
voluntarium by increasing the thrust of the will towards its object while diminishing 
its freedom.35  Again, Davis makes the point that spontaneous emotion “has certainly 
anticipated the will, and is, therefore in itself and before advertence, not 
blameworthy” (Davis, 1935, p. 23).  There can be instances where a spontaneous 
emotion is antecedent to the will’s consent but becomes a consequent emotion when 
                                                 
35
  “... concupiscentia seu desiderium boni sensitivi auget quidem voluntarium simpliciter dictum 
(quia ea adiuvante et impellente, voluntas fertur maiore impetu in obiectum), sed minuit voluntarium 
perfectum et liberum, quia minuit indifferentia voluntatis” (Prümmer, 1935, p. 60, footnote 109).  
Also Aertnys-Damen (1956, p. 45).   
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someone deliberately consents to it or fails to check it when obliged to do so.   
Further, a person may be responsible for the effect of the antecedent emotion if it 
leads to a wrong action.  A person may not be responsible for the particular act 
because of lack of deliberation or free choice.  However, the person may be culpable 
by reason of negligence with regard to the cause of the action.  “He may be 
antecedently blameworthy for his remissness in trying to overcome vicious 
propensities” (Davis, 1935, p. 23).  One should not be quick to blame such a person, 
even then, but encourage them to have resort to the helps provided by God.   
 
ii)  Consequent emotion deliberately chosen or aroused by the will increases the 
voluntarium, hence moral imputability.  The will is more intensely ordered to its 
internal and even its external act through the involvement of the emotion(s) 
(Prümmer, 1935, p. 60; Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 56; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 46).  
Hence, this form of consequent emotion can increase both the rightness of the action 
and the praiseworthiness of the person.36  Conversely, it can augment the malice of 
an action and the blameworthiness of the agent.37   
 
iii)  Consequent emotion that arises by way of an overflow from the will (per modum 
redundantiae) neither increases nor decreases the act of the will or its freedom but is 
a sign of the will’s intensity (Prümmer, 1935, p. 61; Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 56).38  
                                                 
36
  “Alio modo per modum electionis, quando scil. homo ex iudicio rationis eligit affici aliqua 
passione, ut promptius operetur, cooperante appetitu sensitivo; et sic passio animae addit ad bonitatem 
actionis” (Prümmer, 1935, p. 61). 
 
37
  “Ex illa igitur colligitur intensio voluntatis praeviae; inde S. Thomas de ea dicit: ‘Quanto aliquis 
cum maiori libidine vel concupiscentia peccat, tanto magis peccat’ ” (Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 46). 
 
38
  Prümmer (1935, p. 61) says that the consequent emotion, in this instance, does not increase the 
intensity of the will or voluntarium (non quidem auget voluntarium) but is a sign of that intensity.  
Noldin-Schmitt, however, says that spilling over from the will to the emotions neither increases nor 
decreases freedom (libertatem, nec auget, nec minuit) but is a sign of the freedom’s intensity.  In this 
sense, it is sometimes said to increase the voluntarium (hoc sensu dicitur quandoque augere 
voluntarium ) (Noldin-Schmitt, 1940, p. 62).  Interestingly, consequent emotion seen per modum 
redundantiae is omitted in Aertnys-Damen.  
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There is a stronger movement of the will and affectivity towards the object.   
 
Prümmer cites mostly I.II. 24.3 in his treatment.  Unlike the other authors, Prümmer 
notes that Aquinas sees this form of consequent emotion as a sign of the intensity of 
the will’s consent but also that the emotion adds to the goodness of the action (and 
by implication indicates a greater moral level of praise for the agent).39 
 
The discussion of antecedent and consequent emotions is the hub of the Manualists’ 
treatment of the moral significance of the emotions, particularly with reference to 
human acts.  One finds here the general principles by which the moral function of the 
emotions is assessed in terms of their influence on the voluntarium.  
 
1.1.4:  Fear 
 
The specific emotion in relation to the human act that attracts the most attention of 
the Manualists is fear.  The earlier discussion concerning emotions in general as 
impediments to the human act applies equally to the emotion of fear.  The separate 
and special treatment of fear arises from its impact in civil law, for example, on 
contracts and in “several practical applications in the body of positive Ecclesiastical 
law” (Davis, 1935, p. 27).   
 
     1.1.4.1:  Definition of Fear 
 
Fear as a “shrinking from an impending evil” (Davis, 1935, p. 27) 40 captures one but 
                                                 
39
  “... uno modo per modum redundantiae...et sic passio exsistens consequenter in appetitu sensitivo 
est signum intensioris voluntatis; et sic indicat bonitatem moralem maiorem” (Prümmer, 1935, p. 61 
citing I.II. 24.3 ad 1).   
 
40
  “Mentis trepidatio instantis vel futuri periculi causa” (Prümmer, 1935, p. 51). 
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not all of the meanings of the word.  This disturbance, involving a movement away 
from an evil, affects the appetites.  The will withdraws from spiritual evil (metus).  
The sensitive appetite withdraws from an evil perceived by the senses and causing 
the emotion of fear (timor).  Fear can be with regard to oneself or another, for 
instance, a parent afraid for her child.   
Fear can be antecedent-the cause that moves the will to action (ex metu), for 
example, lying from fear of punishment.  Fear can also be concomitant- -
accompanying though not causing an action, for instance, fear experienced by a 
person at impending death at the hand of another (Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 57; 
Prümmer, 1935, p. 52).   
 
     1.1.4.2:  Division of Fear 
 
        1.1.4.2.1:  By reason of quantity, fear is grave or light in so far as the evil that 
induces the fear is grave or light.  Grave fear has the following qualities: 
 
a)  Grave fear requires an impending grave evil that would upset even people of 
resolute character,41 for example, death, mutilation, extended imprisonment.  
 
b)  Grave fear demands that the evil (light or grave) can be averted only with 
difficulty, otherwise it is light fear (Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 57).   
c)  Grave fear is  
   i) absolutely grave if the evil feared is truly a grave one, namely, it would disturb 
any person of firm disposition. 
                                                 
41
  “... non tantum movet mulieres et homines timidos, sed etiam constantem virum” (Prümmer, 1935, 
p. 51).   
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  ii) relatively grave if the evil prompting the fear is light in itself but is perceived as 
grave because of the condition of the person, for instance, being youthful, 
scrupulous.  In moral matters, relatively grave fear is tantamount to absolutely grave 
fear in its effects on deliberation and freedom.42   
        1.1.4.2.2:  By reason of cause fear is  
  a)  intrinsic:  from a cause internal to a person or from nature, for example, illness, 
disease, or natural tempest. 
  b)  extrinsic:  caused by another free agent (Prümmer, 1935, p. 63).  Extrinsic fear 
can be incurred justly in so far as the person inducing the fear has the legitimate right 
to bring about the evil, for instance, a ruler threatening punishment.  Unjust fear 
arises when a person is threatened without sufficient reason or in an excessively 
harmful way, for example, when a parent threatens to disinherit a son if he does not 
succeed at university.   
 
        1.1.4.2.3:  Reverential fear is “the shrinking of a subject from the possible 
displeasure of and punishment by another in a position of authority” (Davis, 1935, p. 
29; Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 57f; Prümmer, 1935, p. 52).  It can be a real 
impediment to the free human act by diminishing liberty of choice and action. 
 
Usually, reverential fear is light but can be grave in both the internal and external 
forum, according to circumstances, persons, temperament (Davis, 1935, p. 29; 
Prümmer, 1935, p. 52).  Because of its bearing on the free act and the validity, for 
example of contracts, grave reverential fear, even in the external forum, requires 
clear proof that the displeasure of the person in authority does cause grave harm.  An 
example of this is the placing in doubt of the validity of a marriage through the 
                                                 
42
  “Metus relative gravis in re morali aequiparatur metui absolute gravi, quia eandem mentis 
trepidationem inducit et proinde eundem in actionem influxum exercet” (Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 57).   
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defective consent prompted by reverential fear (Prümmer, 1935, p. 52).   
 
     1.1.4.3:  Fear and the Human Act 
 
As an emotion, fear causes a state of excitement “in which the judgement is easily 
distorted and freedom of choice thwarted” (Davis, 1935, p. 27).  In general, then, fear 
can diminish a person’s responsibility for a particular act.  It does so under certain 
conditions, outlined by Davis (1935, p. 27ff), Noldin-Schmitt, (1956, p. 58) and 
Prümmer (1935, p. 52ff).   
 
        1.1.4.3.1:  If a person acts as a result of, and under the influence of, antecedent 
grave fear, this diminishes moral culpability.  However, if the fear is extreme and is 
sufficiently overwhelming to impede the use of reason, it can remove all culpability. 
 
Davis notes (1935, p. 27) that, except in the extreme case (frenzy), even with fear, “a 
man is responsible for his actions, at least to some extent... .”  Noldin-Schmitt (1956, 
p. 58) expresses this in other terms.  An action under the influence of grave fear is 
“per se simpliciter voluntarius et secundum quid involuntarius est” (also Prümmer 
(1935, p. 52).  There is deliberation and consent while freedom can be undermined or 
removed by the fear.  While fear can diminish responsibility, there is the common 
opinion in society that fear does not excuse from certain obligations.  For example, a 
soldier being obliged to remain at his post until death; a crew, for fear of drowning, 
taking life-boats and leaving passengers behind (Davis, 1935, p. 28).  According to 
Noldin-Schmitt (1956, p. 58), fear does not excuse when it comes to actions 
intrinsically evil.  While culpability may be diminished, fear does not change the 
species of an action so that a mortal sin becomes venial.43   
                                                 
43
  “... si agitur de re intrinsecus mala nullus metus a peccato excusat nec culpam adeo minuit, ut 
peccatum mortale propter metum fiat veniale;” (Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 58). 
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        1.1.4.3.2:  Positive Laws (human or divine) do not oblige under grave fear or 
grave inconvenience (Prümmer, 1935, p. 53).  Grave fear never excuses from the 
negative Natural Law which binds under all circumstances, for instance, murder, 
theft.  Grave fear would normally excuse some from “immediate compliance with 
human law, divine positive law, and the affirmative Natural Law, such as the 
obligation of restoring ill-gotten goods” (Davis, 1935, p. 28).  One is not bound to 
observe such laws when its is morally impossible to do so.  There is a limit to this in 
that fear cannot excuse when the violation of a law “does great harm to the common 
good” (Davis, 1935, p. 28; also Prümmer, 1935, p. 54) or would foster hatred of the 
Church or of religion (Prümmer, 1935, p. 54; Davis, 1935, p. 28; Noldin-Schmitt, 
1956, p. 58).    
 
        1.1.4.3.3:  Acts and contracts undertaken from grave fear unjustly induced to 
extract consent are per se valid, but can be subsequently rescinded because the unjust 
pressure has constituted a grave injury (Prümmer, 1935, p 54; Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, 
p. 58).  On the other hand, some contracts or acts undertaken under the influence of 
fear can be rendered null and void by positive law (Prümmer, 1935, p. 54).  This fear 
“must have been induced by some extrinsic rational agent, acting wrongfully, and for 
the purpose of compelling at least the outward acquiescence of the person who is 
intimidated” (Davis, 1935, p. 29).  Examples would be marriage, admission to 
novitiate, religious profession, absolution from censures and other ecclesiastical 
penalties (Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 58; Prümmer, 1935, p. 54).   
 
To sum up:  it is evident that the treatment of fear is predominantly in the context of 
its influence on human acts as a significant impediment.  Its context is primarily that 
of Law-divine, human, ecclesiastical.  There is no discussion of its positive role in 
practical reason, in moral discernment, in virtue or in the development of the moral 
life.     
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1.1.5:  Habitual Impediments to the Human Act 
 
The Manualists, having treated the role of actual impediments to the voluntarium, 
customarily proceed to examine habitual obstacles.  As this chapter has confined 
itself to the emotions, especially fear, it will be concerned predominantly with habits 
that influence the sensitive appetite or human affectivity.   
     1.1.5.1:  Definition and Types of Habits 
 
A habit is a constant inclination, superadded to a faculty by repeated action, whereby 
it can produce similar acts easily and promptly.44  Habitual impediments are twofold: 
a)  those affecting the will, either directly or through the emotions.  These can be 
  i)  natural inclinations to evil (for instance, anger, lust, drunkenness) that arise from 
temperament, bodily constitution, hereditary factors; 
 ii)  acquired habits inclining a person to morally evil actions; 
b)  those affecting the full and free advertence of the intellect.  These can be either 
erroneous opinions or mental illnesses (Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 60; Davis, 1935, p. 
66). Fear can directly influence the intellect by distorting perception.   
 
1.1.5.2:  Influence of Habitual Impediments on the Human Act 
 
Two of the selected Manualists observe that, in relation to an evil object, emotions 
(passions), whether from natural inclinations or acquired habit, if wilfully adhered to, 
reinforce the inclination to evil and lessen the strength of the will to overcome that 
                                                 
44
  “Habitus definitur constans inclinatio ad similes actus producendos facultati superaddita.  Habitus 
confert potentiae, cui inest, ut haec facile et prompte operari possit et operetur.” (Noldin-Schmitt, 
1956, p. 60; also Prümmer, 1935, p. 62).   
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tendency (Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 60f; Davis, 1935, p. 30).  Conversely, resistance 
to the same emotions and tendencies strengthens the will, gradually forms an 
opposing inclination of the will towards good, diminishes the hold of the emotional 
habit or tendency and subjecting it to the will.  Interestingly, Noldin-Schmitt notes 
that there is a modification in the seat of the emotions such that there is induced a 
fitting disposition to virtue (as there is to vice).45   
 
        1.1.5.2.1: Voluntary Habits 
 
A habit, resulting knowingly from free acts and not effectively removed or checked, 
when one could or ought to do so, increases the impetus of the will (voluntarium) 
and does not diminish freedom (Prümmer, 1935, p. 62; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 50).  
If a person, under the influence of such a habit, “fully adverts and consents to each 
act of sinning, each act is fully imputable” (Davis, 1935, p. 32).   
 
If a person, under the influence of the habit (natural inclination or acquired) does not 
advert to each act, then the act is not imputable, though the habit is imputable “if it is 
voluntarily fostered or retained or not disposed of as far as possible” (Davis, 1935, p. 
32; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 50).  For instance, one is responsible for the habit of 
anger (iracundia) that leads to frequent and immoderate outbursts, even though these 
are done without advertence.  If the acts involve grave harm (“grave material sin” 
[Davis, 1935, p. 32]), there will be a grave obligation to get rid of the habit “and 
therefore grave negligence in the matter will be serious sin.  There will not, however, 
be grave sin, if some measure of diligence be used to get rid of the habit, even though 
such diligence is, in point of fact, insufficient” (Davis, 1935, p. 32).46   
                                                 
45
  “... quin et ipso corporis organa experientia teste dispositionem virtuti consentaneam induunt” 
 (Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 61). 
 
46
  “Per se patet, peccatorem habituatum vel consuetudinarium stricte teneri ad remedia efficacia 
adhibenda pro exstirpatione pravi habitus, ut infra tractatu de poenitentia explicabitur” (Prümmer, 
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What has been said applies principally, in this context, to habitual tendencies and 
acquired habits affecting the emotions, affectivity and the will.  It is also true of 
beliefs and opinions that may be false or may distort the truth.  It has already been 
noted in Chapter two that these undergird emotional responses.  Change in a belief is 
often required to modify an emotional response so that one seeks the truly good and 
does so in a way that is appropriate or moderate.  This is noted by Noldin-Schmitt 
(1956, p. 62) especially in reference to false views on matters religious or moral.  
Together with Davis (1935, p. 32), he notes the importance of education, family life 
in the formation of sound beliefs and attitudes as the foundation of good habits.   
 
        1.1.5.2.2:  Involuntary Habits 
 
A habit resulting from free acts but renounced by a definite act of the will or by 
sincere sorrow (in the case of sinful habits) becomes either partly voluntary or  
completely involuntary ( Prümmer, 1935, p. 62; Davis, 1935, p. 32).  This depends 
on whether advertence is partially or totally removed.  Hence, one can say “if one 
seriously endeavours to break off a habit of sinning, no sin is committed by an 
inadvertent act done from such a habit, for the act is not voluntary in any way” 
(Davis, 1935, p. 32).     
 
     1.1.5.3:  Pathological States 
 
What has been said in relation to habits in relation to the human act applies to 
medical conditions that diminish or remove culpability since a person may be 
“practically incapable of clear thought or deliberate volition” (Davis, 1935, p. 33).  
This is an area in which there is an evident connection between bodily, psychological 
                                                                                                                                          
1935, p. 62).   
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and spiritual well-being.  The point is made that spiritual powers such as intellect and 
will can be said to be “sick” only in so far as they are impaired in their function by 
other faculties, e.g., imagination, emotional disturbance (Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 
62; Prümmer, 1935, p. 62ff).  One must also be aware of a “pressing duty,” arising 
from true charity to ourselves, “to have a moderate care for our health” (Davis, 1935, 
p. 33).  In an earlier edition of their work, Noldin-Schmitt point out that the advances 
in psychiatry, in the knowledge of pathologies of the psyche and the emotions assist 
Moral Theology in understanding factors that diminish imputability or excuse from 
positive laws.  These advances also provide pastoral resources in the guidance of the 
spiritual and affective life of people (Noldin-Schmitt, 1940, p. 69).  The later 
Noldin-Schmitt (1956, p. 62ff) and Aertnys-Damen (1956, p. 51ff) make the crucial 
distinction between psychoses and psychoneuroses.  Psychoses so impair 
deliberation or place a person under such compulsion to evil action, that all 
culpability is removed.  With psychoneuroses, such as phobias, depression, hysteria,  
obsessive-compulsive disorder, a person, per se, enjoys basic deliberation.  However, 
people with these conditions exhibit a certain disposition in their affective life which, 
in certain circumstances, can undermine or remove judgement or the will’s 
indifference.  Then, actions can be partly voluntary or completely involuntary.   
 
Overall, by the circumstances of history, the Manualists are more aware of emotional 
states and the influence of the unconscious on motivation and imputability than was 
Aquinas.  More recent editions of their work (published in the 1950s) seem to betray 
a greater knowledge of, and confidence in, dealing with insights from Psychology.   
 
1.2:  Affective Virtues and Character 
 
1.2.1:  General Considerations on Virtue 
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This section of the study will give a brief survey of the foundation provided for the 
affective virtues in the authors under consideration.  In three of the four authors 
(Prümmer, Davis, Aertnys-Damen), the treatment of the virtues (Theological and 
Moral) follows that of Conscience, Law and Sin.  In Noldin-Schmitt, the Cardinal 
virtues precede the discussion of Sin. 
 
 
     1.2.1.1:  Definition of Virtue 
 
Having dealt with acts and the moral norms determining their morality (Law and 
Conscience), the departures from those rules (Sin), attention must now be given to 
the principles (Virtues) by which a person is strengthened in performing acts in 
accordance with moral norms and in avoiding evil (Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 255).  
Prümmer, in similar vein, proceeds to distinguish extrinsic principles of human acts, 
such as divine grace, from internal principles, namely “human powers instructed by 
habits” (Prümmer, 1935, p. 298) that perfect intellect, will or the sensitive appetite.  
He refers the reader to Aquinas’ discussion of psychology and assumes his teaching 
on potency and act and on the role of habits in this process with regard to human 
powers (Prümmer, 1935, p. 299).  
 
Drawing on Aquinas, all four authors commence with Habits in general and provide 
a definition of virtue as a “good operative habit that gives both the power and the 
impulse to do readily that which befits rational nature so as to achieve true 
happiness” ((Davis, 1935, p. 253; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 255f; Prümmer, 1935, p. 
299; Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 241).  In his treatment of virtue, Prümmer, citing 
Aristotle, highlights an important aspect when he notes that “virtue is that which 
confers goodness on its owner and makes his acts good” (Prümmer, 1963, p. 78; 
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Prümmer, 1935, p. 304).47   
 
Prümmer alone proceeds to clarify the nature of virtue by examining the Gifts and  
Fruits of the Holy Spirit and the Beatitudes.48  Whereas the virtues (acquired or  
infused) enable a person habitually to live well whether by reason or faith, the Gifts 
are “habits accompanying sanctifying grace whereby a man is well disposed, to 
receive the inspirations and movements of the Holy Spirit” (Prümmer, 1963, p. 78; 
Prümmer, 1935, p. 307).  With virtue, the precise disposition to be moved towards 
goodness arises from right reason or faith.  With the Gifts, the disposition is to be 
moved by God towards goodness that is in harmony with the divine life.  The Gifts 
enable a person to be more receptive to divine movements and more prone to go the 
extra mile, even to the heroic act (Prümmer, 1935, p. 307).  The Fruits of the Holy 
Spirit (as in Gal. 5) are acts that “results from the gifts of the Holy Ghost and refresh 
man with holy and sincere joy” (Prümmer, 1963, p. 79).  The Fruits and the Gifts are 
expressed in the Beatitudes-external acts which “in their own special way lead man 
to happiness both on earth and especially in Heaven” (Prümmer, 1963, p. 79; 
Prümmer, 1935, p. 311).49 
 
     1.2.1.2:  Division of Virtues 
 
a)  By reason of origin or efficient cause: 
 
                                                 
47
  This is the same used in I.II. 56.3 
 
48
  These are discussed by Davis (1935, p. 256) and Aertnys-Damen (1956, p. 281ff) but not in the 
developed form found in Prümmer.  Prümmer is an example of the comment that “the Dominican 
school emphasized the gifts of the Spirit.  Moral theology did not end with an ascetically developed 
set of virtues nor with a high degree of will power or rational discussion, but with a familiarity with 
the divine that is intuitive and instinctual”(O’Meara, 1997, p. 276).   
 
49
  One could possibly argue that the Beatitudes are more atttitudes from which emerge certain types 
of behaviour. 
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i)   Natural / Acquired virtues (whose object is a rational good or natural happiness 
known by reason) are intellectual, for instance, Wisdom (perfecting the speculative 
intellect) or Prudence (perfecting the practical reason) or moral (perfecting the 
appetitive powers of will and affectivity (sense appetite)).  Natural moral virtues are  
acquired by repeated action and “give one facility in action and induce one to act 
rightly” (Davis, 1935, p. 253).   
 
ii)  Supernatural / Infused virtues have, as their object, God or a supernatural good 
known by reason illumined by faith.  They are good qualities “of the soul enabling 
man to live well, which no one can use for evil, produced in man by God without 
mans’ assistance” (Prümmer, 1963, p. 78).  They are either Theological ( where God 
is the object) or Moral (concerned with a created good, e.g., the goodness of an 
action in relation to one’s final goal) (Prümmer, 1935, p. 299ff; Aertnys-Damen, 
1956, p. 255ff; Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 241f; Davis, 1935, p. 253f).  Supernatural 
virtues give the appropriate power of supernatural action “but they do not give the 
facility of an action” (Davis, 1935, p. 254).  The consolidation of supernatural virtue 
comes through the power of God “on account of meritorious acts” (Davis, 1935, p. 
254).  The same author acknowledges that the “facility in eliciting supernatural acts 
issues from the exercise of the infused virtues at least indirectly, since those acts and 
that exercise remove contrary dispositions”(Davis, 1935, p. 256).   
 
b)  By reason of the subject: i.e., intellect, will, affectivity (sense appetite). 
 
i)  Perfect virtues ( Theological or Moral: Acquired or Infused) are those “that dwell 
in a free faculty, viz., one that is itself free or one that is under the control of 
freedom” (Davis, 1935, p. 253; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 256).  Davis (1935, p. 253) 
notes that the Moral virtues are perfect virtues in that “they make a man good.”   
ii)  Imperfect virtues are those that are acquired and intellectual, for instance, 
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Wisdom, Science, Understanding (speculative reason); Art ( practical reason).  These 
virtues may “be in a power not under the control of freedom or independent of it” 
and make a person “capable of good work” (Davis, 1935, p. 253).   
 
iii)  By reason of the subject,  Noldin-Schmitt (1956, p. 242) distinguish the 
proximate subject (the faculty in which the virtue resides and from which acts of that 
virtue emerge) from the remote subject (the person possessing the virtue).  On the 
same basis, Prümmer (1935, p. 300) distinguishes entitative from operative habits.50   
 
The former immediately perfect a person’s nature, modifying one’s being in some 
way, for instance, sanctifying grace.  This sharing in the divine life does not per se 
and immediately dispose to action, but does so through the mediation of the infused 
virtues.  Operative habits, conversely, immediately perfect a power to act promptly 
easily and with a certain pleasure as in the case of the moral virtues.   
 
     1.2.1.3:  Acquired Virtues-various aspects 
 
The authors discuss the mean of virtue.  While Theological virtues have no absolute 
mean or limit, all moral virtues require a rational mean (medium rationis) which 
varies from one person to another.  For example, in the matter of the emotions and 
moderation, the particular exercise of the virtue of Temperance and Fortitude in one 
person may be excess in another (Prümmer, 1935, p. 317; Davis, 1935, p. 258).  
Justice, however, demands a truly objective mean (medium rei) that provides a 
consistent, general standard of what is rightly due (Davis, 1935, p. 258; Noldin-
Schmitt, 1956, p. 243f; Aertnys- -Damen, 1956, p. 259f).     
 
The infused moral virtues are interconnected through grace and charity but they do 
                                                 
50
  Noldin-Schmitt use the terms substantive and operative habits (1956, p. 241) 
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not necessarily entail the acquired moral virtues (unified by Prudence).  For instance, 
a baptised child will possess the infused moral virtues while not having the acquired 
forms.  Conversely, an adult may have the acquired moral virtues while lacking the 
Theological virtue of Charity, i.e., being in a state of sin (Davis, 1935, p. 256).  
Acquired moral virtues can have unequal levels of development in a person.  In a 
person who has not reached perfection various virtues can co-exist in a perfect and 
imperfect form.  They can increase and decrease (Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 244f; 
Prümmer, 1935, p. 319ff).  In other words, for most people, a high level of virtue in 
one moral area does not always and necessarily mean a correlative development in 
other moral virtues.   
 
The discussion of the increase and decrease of virtue in these authors summarises 
that of Aquinas.  Increase in virtue is not quantitative but qualitative.  Repeated acts, 
at an increasing level of intensity, perfect a power in its specific capacity.  Decrease 
in virtue results from either contrary acts, cessation of virtuous acts or by actions at a 
level of intensity that is less that the capacity of the acquired virtue (Aertnys-Damen, 
1956, p. 258).   
 
There is a gradation of virtues according to their objects.  Firstly there are the 
Theological and other infused virtues, especially Charity.  The intellectual virtues 
then precede the moral virtues by virtue of their object.  However, citing Aquinas, 
the moral virtues have priority over the intellectual virtues in the order of action 
since they move the other powers to act.  Finally, there are the moral virtues in order-
Prudence, Justice, Fortitude and Temperance (Prümmer, 1935, p. 321; Noldin-
Schmitt, 1956, p. 246f).   
 
Prümmer (1935) is the only author to discuss duration of the virtues.  Drawing on 
Aquinas, he employs the axiom that the moral virtues endure beyond earthly life as 
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far as their formal, not their material, object is concerned.51  What endures is the 
right order of reason existing in them.  As regards their material acts, i.e., precisely 
as embodied, “those virtues which control our inordinate passions will not be found 
in heaven where such passions no longer exists” (Prümmer, 1963, p. 80).  The 
affective powers will function totally in harmony with the order of reason.52 
 
 
1.2.2:  The Affective Virtues 
 
     1.2.2.1:  Definition and Nature 
 
The discussion of the affective virtues is under the heading of moral and Cardinal 
virtues and precedes that of the Theological virtues in Aertnys-Damen (1956, 265f) 
and Davis (1935, p. 254ff).  It precedes Sin in Noldin-Schmitt (1956, p. 244ff) and 
follows the treatment of the Theological virtues in Prümmer (1963, p. 218f).   
 
Moral virtues are habits (acquired or infused) that perfect human powers (will and 
sense appetite) to right and good action in accordance with right reason or reason 
illumined by faith (Prümmer, 1935, p. 313; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 359).  As 
discussed earlier, the two Cardinal affective virtues are those located in the 
concupiscible appetite (Temperance) and in the irascible appetite (Fortitude).  The 
qualities of virtue discussed immediately above apply to these virtues.  The 
interrelationship and mutual dependence of the affective virtues and Prudence is 
noted by Aertnys-Damen (1956, p. 260f) and Davis (1935, p. 155, p. 259).  There is 
                                                 
51
  “Virtutes morales durent post hanc vitam quantum ad earum formale, non autem quantum ad 
earum materiale” (Prümmer, 1935, p. 322).   
 
52
  “... et vis appetitiva omnino movebitur secundum ordinem rationis in his, quae ad statum illum 
pertinent” (Prümmer, 1935, p. 323).   
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the initial impression that they are seen in a restrictive sense.  Temperance is 
whatever restrains and suppresses the passion.  Fortitude is the strengthening of the 
person against all passions (Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 267)53.  As special virtues, 
Temperance curbs desire for pleasures of touch and Fortitude strengthens one against 
dangers of death (Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 267).  By contrast, another author sees 
Fortitude as what strengthens a person against any sort of difficulty and, citing 
Aquinas, describes Temperance as moderation in all things (Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 
248).54   
     1.2.2.2:  Location of the Affective virtues 
 
Davis (1935, p. 255) explicitly cites Aquinas’ discussion on the location of Fortitude 
and Temperance.  The appetitive powers, considered as part of the sense appetite, are 
not a competent subject of virtue in themselves.  They are so only in so far as they 
participate in reason by having a natural aptitude to obey reason.  On this basis, they 
can be the principle of a human act.55  The virtue in these powers is essentially an 
habitual conformity to reason.  Fortitude and Temperance perfect the appetitive 
powers “giving them the facility to act well, and causing them to act well” (Davis, 
1935, p. 254).  It is noted by Aertnys-Damen (1956, p. 278) that the will can be 
impeded by desires that attract a person contrary to right reason or by whatever 
repels a person so that the right and good are difficult to perform.  It is under the 
heading of these two Cardinal virtues that the moderation of emotions involved in 
attraction and repulsion is discussed. 
 
                                                 
53
  “...et omnis virtus, quae cohibet passiones et deprimit, dicatur temperentia; et omnis virtus, quae 
facit firmitatem animi contra quascumque passiones, dicatur fortitudo” I.II. 61.3.  
 
54
  These authors cite Aquinas I.II. 61.2-4. 
 
55
  I.II. 56.4. 
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     1.2.2.3:  Fortitude 
 
The name “Fortitude”, considered in what it has in common with other virtues, can 
be used of any virtue that strengthens the mind against any passions as it seeks the 
good of reason.  In this sense, Fortitude is involved in the practice of every virtue 
requiring perseverance and stability of will (Davis, 1935, p. 264).  If it is considered 
in the strict sense, as specifically different, with its own object and matter, Fortitude 
is the virtue strengthening a person against the dangers of death (Aertnys-Damen, 
1956, p. 267).56  Fortitude is now defined as “that cardinal virtue which strengthens 
the irascible appetite (and will) enabling it to continue its pursuit of difficult good 
even in the face of the greatest dangers to bodily life” (Prümmer, 1963, p.218; 
Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 278; Davis, 1935, p. 264).    
 
Prümmer (1963, p. 218) notes that Fortitude “resides in the irascible appetite to the 
extent that it is subject to the control of the will, since it strengthens this appetite to 
curb the passion of fear and recklessness easily and promptly at the approach of 
supreme danger.”  Davis notes that Fortitude urges us, through the emotions, “to go 
forward in enterprises where we could unreasonably be apt to shrink from 
difficulties” (Davis, 1935, p. 255).  It must be noted that it is reasonable for a person 
to be apt to react in fear (shrink from difficulties) yet not be overcome by it.  The 
formal object of the virtue is the reasonableness of the moderation of fear or 
recklessness-the medium rationis-since it befits a person’s dignity that one “should 
not be overcome by either” (Davis, 1935, p. 265). 
 
The two acts of Fortitude are overcoming fear and curbing recklessness says 
Prümmer (1963, p. 218) citing Aquinas (II.II. 123.3).  Since, according to Aquinas 
(II.II. 123. 6), allaying fear is more difficult than moderating daring, the principal act 
                                                 
56
  The author explicitly cites I.II. 61.3. 
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of Fortitude is endurance (Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 278; Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 
258f).  It is understandable, then, that the vices opposed to Fortitude are Timidity  
(excess of fear and lack of daring or cowardice), Fearlessness (insufficient fear of 
danger) and Recklessness (excess in meeting danger).  Fortitude helps a person to 
face dangers that can be “reasonably and honestly faced, otherwise it would 
degenerate into ferocity and temerity” (Davis, 1935, p. 265).  Dangers noted are, of 
war, private hostility, persecution for conscience sake, exile, sickness, imprisonment, 
death.  Christian Fortitude reaches its peak in Martyrdom-“the endurance of death in 
witness to the truth of Christianity” (Davis, 1935, p. 218).   
 
Finally, the authors outline the integral and potential virtues that facilitate the acts of 
Fortitude and concern less difficult matters. 
 
i)   Magnanimity:  This is the virtue inclining a person to perform, with God’s help, 
great works in all virtues.  These are works that deserve high honours and involve, in 
the person, moderation in prosperity and adversity (Prümmer, 1963, p. 219; Davis, 
1935, p. 265; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 278).  The person with this virtue takes a 
restrained delight in even the greatest of honours offered him, is not ambitious, has 
no fear of people (Prümmer, 1963, p. 219).  The contraries of this virtue are 
Pusillanimity (by defect) which inclines a person to refuse to undertake something as 
being beyond his or her strength when in fact it is not the case.  By excess there are 
the vices of a) Presumption which leads a person to undertake tasks beyond one’s 
strength; b) Ambition which involves an inordinate desire for honour; c) Vainglory is 
an inordinate desire to manifest one’s personal excellence, for acknowledgment and 
praise from others.  These vices seem to be compensatory devices to overcome 
inadequate self-esteem.  
 
ii) Magnificence ( or Munificence) inclines a person “to undertake great expenses in 
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external works and with a royal generosity, but always in accord with reason” 
(Davis, 1935, p. 265; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 279).  As a virtue, it moderates the 
love of money not in small things but with regard to the special difficulties attached 
to the risk in incurring heavy expenses for external works (Prümmer, 1963, p. 219).  
Its contrary is unreasonable Lavishness (by excess) and Niggardliness (by defect) by 
which someone refuse unreasonably to incur necessary expenses.  
 
iii)  Patience is “the virtue which inclines a man to endure present evils so that he 
may not be unreasonably sorrowful” (Prümmer, 1963, p. 220; Davis, 1935, p. 266).  
It is the virtue that moderates the emotion of sadness at the delay in achieving a 
particular good or benefit.  It may also regulate anger that can underlie impatience.  
The opposing vices are (by defect) Insensibility, or in modern terms, deficit of affect.  
This a lack of that level of feeling reasonably expected in a person by which they are 
moved by the plight of oneself or of others.  By excess, there is the vice of 
Impatience which inclines a man to excessive sadness and, because of this, draws 
him away from the good (Prümmer, 1963, p. 221).   
 
iv)  Perseverance is the “virtue which inclines man to continue in the exercise of the 
virtues in accordance with right reason notwithstanding the irksomeness which 
results from protracted action” (Prümmer, 1963, p. 220; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 
279; Davis, 1935, p. 266).  There is a particular and admirable goodness in seeing 
things through to the end in spite of accompanying difficulties which may prompt 
emotions such as sadness, anger or despair and emerge in impatience and 
recklessness.  The opposing vices are Inconstancy (by defect) by which a person 
inclines to cease some work because of difficulties.  By excess the virtue is 
Pertinacity which is the inclination to persist in a course of action when that is 
unreasonable.   
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     1.2.2.4:  Temperance 
 
In the broad sense, Temperance curbs and moderates the concupiscible appetite 
(even the spiritual component) in anything that attracts it against the order of reason, 
especially in regard to honours and pleasures.57  Understood in this way,  
Temperance includes four forms of pleasure: 
a)  the purely spiritual arising from intellectual activities concerning spiritual objects, 
e.g., joy from the Theological virtues; the Beatific Vision; 
b)  the broadly spiritual that comes from intellectual activity concerning material 
things, e.g., a rich man’s enjoyment of his money; 
c)  those of the sense from perceiving pleasing object, e.g., music, a beautiful scene; 
d)  sensual pleasure from taste and touch, e.g., from food, drink, sexual intercourse. 
 
In the strict sense, Temperance is a special virtue “which regulates, according to 
reason, the sensitive appetite in the pleasures of taste and touch, so as to preserve the 
mean in the use of food, drink and sexual matters” (Davis, 1935, p. 267; Prümmer, 
1963, p. 122; Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 262; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 279).  It is the 
“imperious” nature of these appetites and the strength of their pleasures that require a 
special virtue moderating them (Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 262; Davis, 1935, p. 267).  
This is the sense in which these authors, following Aquinas, consider it to be a 
Cardinal virtue.  The virtue is immanent, i.e., its principal effect is to modify the 
person (Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 262).  Its subject is the concupiscible appetite.  Its 
material object is the pleasure of touch, taste and sexuality.  Its formal object is the 
moderation of these pleasures in a way that is fitting to a rational being (Prümmer, 
1963, p. 222; Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 262; Davis, 1935, p. 267).  As the mean 
between extremes, Temperance is a medium rationis, that is relative to the person 
                                                 
57
  “Temperentia in genere seu latiore sensu accepta appetitum concupiscibilem (etiam spiritualem) 
refrenat et moderatur in quacunque re contra praescripta rationis alliciente, praesertim quoad honores 
et voluptates” (Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 262).  
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“for what would be temperate for one person would not be so for another (Davis, 
1935, p. 267).   
 
The pleasures moderated by Temperance are intended by God to ensure the 
conservation and propagation of the human race and, hence, to be enjoyed in  
harmony with these goals (Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 262; Davis, 1935, p. 268).  
Considered as a natural and acquired virtue, it “has no other purpose than man’s 
health” (Prümmer, 1963, p. 222).  This is the good of personal well-being and 
harmony which the virtue, its emotional responses and any resulting acts are meant 
to promote.  This differs specifically from the supernatural/infused virtue of 
Temperance “which is under the direction of faith and has as its chief effect man’s 
spiritual welfare” (Prümmer, 1963, p. 222).  This particular virtue may sometimes 
motivate practices such as fasting, sexual abstinence which “are abhorrent to natural 
temperance” (Prümmer, 1963, p. 222).  One could well question this last comment 
and its underlying assumption.  Overall, Pieper sums the matter up by saying that 
“the purpose and goal of temperentia is man’s inner order, from which alone this 
‘serenity of spirit’ can flow forth” (1966, p. 147).   
 
The vices opposed to Temperance are Insensibility (by defect) and Intemperance (by 
excess) through Lust, Gluttony or Drunkenness.  Insensibility here is not physical 
insensibility but “psychical, that is, unwillingness to use sensitive pleasures when 
they should reasonably be used” (Davis, 1935, p. 267).   
 
Having defined and discussed Temperance in the narrow sense, these authors follow 
Aquinas’ approach to the problem of how virtues moderate other activities of the 
concupiscible appetite.  In other words, how does Temperance, in the broader sense, 
modify the affectivity and the person so that one is inclined to appropriate forms and 
levels of emotional response and, possibly, to certain actions?  It is done by annexing 
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to Temperance many virtues that have no reference to the pleasures of taste or touch 
but which moderate “psychical pleasure and satisfaction”(Davis, 1935, p. 268).  In 
other words, these are virtues that regulate the positive emotions of love, desire and 
pleasure. The Manualists use Aquinas’ division into integral, subjective and potential 
parts of Temperance.    
 
a.  Integral parts of Temperance. 
These are, properly speaking, not virtues but the necessary conditions for a perfect 
act of virtue (Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 280; Prümmer, 1963, p. 223).  They emerge 
from the emotional tone of one’s self-esteem and from self-love. 
 
(i):  Love of Propriety and Decorum (honestas) is an attraction to what is fitting, an 
attunement to whatever undermines or offends one’s person and others especially in 
social relationships.   
(ii):  A sense of Shame (verecundia) is a “praiseworthy feeling which makes men 
blush as soon as anything shameful touches them” (Prümmer, 1963, p. 223).  It is the 
response to unwarranted public exposure, to the invasion of personal privacy.   
 
b.  The Subjective parts of Temperance. 
 
(i):  Abstinence is the virtue inclining a person to the moderate use of food for his 
own moral good (Prümmer, 1956, p. 223; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 280; Noldin-
Schmitt, 1956, p. 263).  Prümmer then proceeds to examine in detail Fasting and 
Church Laws.  The opposing vice is Gluttony, lack of moderation in the use of food 
and non-intoxicating drink.   
(ii):  Sobriety is the virtue “regulating man’s desire for and his use of intoxicating 
drink” (Prümmer, 1963, p. 228).  The aim of food and drink is to promote health.  
Hence, the opposing vice is Drunkenness which is the deliberate excess in the use of 
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intoxicating drink or drugs to the point of forcibly depriving oneself of the use of 
reason to satisfy an inordinate desire and not for the sake of fostering health 
(Prümmer, 1963, p. 228).  Such a state differs from sleep which is a deprivation of 
the use of reason in a natural manner.  The forcible deprivation of the use of reason 
which involves a moral fault or sin of Drunkenness is manifest by  
a)  acts totally contrary to normal behaviour; 
b)  inability to distinguish between good and evil; 
c)  forgetting afterwards what one had done while drunk (Prümmer, 1963, p. 228).  
 
In terms of the moral significance of Drunkenness, a person is responsible for wrong 
acts committed in this state to the extent one could or should have foreseen them 
(Prümmer, 1963, p. 229).  It is more appreciated these days that such a pattern of 
behaviour can be prompted by psychological and emotional factors.  Drunkenness 
may be the presenting rather than the real problem.  It is these underlying affective 
states and influences that shape the moral significance of the inordinate desire.  They 
should provide the focus for the moral responsibility entailed in the duty of self-care.   
 
(iii):  Chastity is the virtue moderating the desire for sexual pleasure, especially in 
intercourse, in accordance with right reason (Prümmer, 1963, p. 229; Noldin-
Schmitt, 1956, p. 263; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 280).  The virtue is relative in that it 
moderates the desire and use of sexuality and excludes it in those with vows and 
those unmarried.  Prümmer (1963, p. 229ff) gives a full treatment of the opposing 
vice of Impurity and Lust. 
(iv):  Modesty or Purity (pudicitia) is distinct from Chastity in that it is concerned 
with the attendant circumstances of the sexual act, e.g., pleasure from kissing, 
touching (Prümmer, 1963, p. 223; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 280).   
 
c.  The Potential parts of Temperance. 
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These are secondary virtues that moderate the emotions in the concupiscible appetite 
(love, desire, pleasure) in their impulse towards something and concerning matters 
less difficult to control than those of touch and taste.  The four authors follow 
substantially Aquinas’ treatment in II.II. 143. 4 with some minor variations.   
 
c.1:  Interior Movements. 
c.1.1:  Continence is a virtue inclining the will when moved by desire to resist evil 
desires concerned with touch.   
c.1.2:  Meekness as a virtue moderates the movement of anger and its inclination 
towards revenge.  Its vices are Anger (by excess) and Indulgence (by defect).  
Clemency moderates the effect of anger, namely, punishment.  Its vice is Cruelty.  
Anger is an emotion of the irascible appetite.  At times, anger may need to be 
aroused in order to respond when the rights of others are attacked.  Davis points out 
(1935, p. 268) that “it is praiseworthy to be angry when cherished objects are  
attacked.”  The opposing vices are unjust Revenge (by excess) and Excessive 
Leniency or Supineness (by defect). 
c.1.3:  Humility moderates the movement of the emotions towards hope and daring, 
curbing a person’s immoderate desire for honour or the esteem of others.  This virtue 
inclines one to recognise one’s own worth in its true light (Prümmer, 1963, p. 238; 
Davis, 1935, p. 269).  The moral significance of Humility is twofold: to check an 
immoderate desire for personal excellence and to subject a person to God by 
recognising that all one has comes from God (Prümmer, 1963, p. 238).  Humility is 
grounded in the truth and is not incompatible with Magnanimity.  Humility also 
presumes a sound level in feelings of self-esteem.  Its opposing vices are Self-
depreciation (by defect) and Pride (by excess). 
c.1.4:  Studiousness moderates the desire for knowledge and learning by being 
inclined to acquire necessary knowledge in a reasonable manner.  It is a virtue that 
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checks a form of obsession, also involving Fortitude.  Vices are excessive Curiosity 
and Negligence (Prümmer, 1963, p. 238; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 281; Davis, 1935, 
p. 269).   
 
c.2:  Exterior Movements. 
c.2.1:  Modesty in external behaviour inclines a person to reasonable decorum in 
bodily movements, in recreation, dress, conversation, in the light of place, time and 
persons.  Opposing vices are Insolence or Rusticity. 
c.2.2:  Eutrapely (Courtesy, Urbanity) is the virtue bringing moderation in the use of 
recreation and laughter.  Its opposing vices are Moroseness (by defect) and 
Buffoonery (by excess).   
 
To sum up.  The understanding of the affective virtues stems from, and basically 
concurs with, that of Aquinas.  It reflects a refined sensitivity to variations in 
emotional life.  Compared with the emotions as human acts, the textual evidence on  
 
the virtues portrays a more positive view of the role of the human powers and of the 
person from which the virtues emerge.  This is partly due to the nature of virtues as 
good operative habits.  While the seat of the virtues and the various aspects of 
habituation are summarily treated, there is no development of the relationship 
between emotions, virtue and character.   
 
On the other hand, there is still some unease in that the moderating role of the virtues 
is exercised mainly by restraining the emotions.  Again, the various categories of 
virtues inherited from Aquinas are put under strain at times.  For instance, 
Temperance governs physical needs as well as emotions.  Again, from one angle,  
Magnanimity could well come under Temperance and Meekness under Fortitude.  
The language used by the Manualists replicates that of Aquinas - “moderates”, 
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“curb”, “control”, “appetites participating in reason” and able to be the “location of 
virtues”.  Yet, overall, the Manualists’ understanding of the affective virtues does not 
exhibit the degree of ambivalence present in their treatment of the emotions in 
relation to human acts.   
 
 
2.  Theological Anthropology in the Manualists 
 
 
This study now examines the second research question “What is the vision of the 
human person manifest or inferred in these authors?”  After some initial comments, 
there will be a discussion of the structure and content of the Manualists’ Theological 
Anthropology underlying their view of the moral significance of emotions. 
 
The overall context for discussing the emotions follows Aquinas’ design of the 
Exitus/Reditus.  The Manualists draw on the structure and content of the Prima  
Secundae beginning with general principles that provide the substance for teaching 
Fundamental Moral Theology.  There is an investigation of the ultimate goal of  
human life-the glorifying of God through beatitude or happiness in God, the role of 
desire and of human acts in achieving life’s purpose (Davis, 1935, p. 11ff; Aertnys- -
Damen, 1956, p. 3ff; Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 15ff; Prümmer, 1935, p. 18ff).   
 
In terms of content, the vision of the human person is, prima facie, a truncated 
version of that found in Aquinas.  The human person is a body/spirit composite, a 
relational being, possessing reason and free will, with desires for what is true, good, 
beautiful and “placed in the hierarchy of nature to preserve the order established by  
God, an order that is made known to him by the light of reason, and by God’s 
positive legislation in this regard” (Davis, 1935, p. 6f).  Humans are beings elevated 
by divine grace, redeemed by Christ-needed to achieve one’s destiny in God. 
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In essence, the Manualists draw, in summary form, on the ontology and the 
teleological framework found in Aquinas.  As already discussed (infra 1.1.2), the 
Manualists see the emotions as the working of the human person’s affective life 
through the movement of the sensible appetite (concupiscible or irascible) towards 
good and away from evil.  Davis (1935, p. 21) notes that emotions understood as 
“concupiscence” are neither good nor bad but natural tendencies.  From such a 
statement together with Davis’ apologia for emotions noted earlier, one could infer a 
positive role for the emotions in the Manualists’ vision of the human person.  A 
closer examination of the context and content of the evidence emerging from the 
study of the emotions in the Manualists seems to indicate otherwise.   
 
2.1: Context 
 
The structure of the treatises on Moral Theology in the Manualists is significant in 
itself, in relation to the emotions and to the Summa Theologiae.  In outline these are: 
Prümmer                          Davis & Aertnys-Damen   Noldin-Schmitt                   Aquinas 
Man’s Last End                Man’s Last End                 Man’s Last End                    Man’s Last End 
Happiness                        Happiness                           Happiness                            Happiness 
Human Acts (Passions)  Human Acts (Passions)        Human Acts (Passions)    Human Acts (Passions) 
Conscience                      Conscience                        Laws                                    Virtues 
Law                                  Law                                   Conscience                      Gifts/Fruits/Holy Spirit 
Sin                                   Sin/Vices                          Cardinal Virtues                     Sin/Vice 
                                                                                                                                 Grace = New Law  
Virtues (Moral/Theol)     Virtues (Moral/Theol)      Sin 
 
The Manualists and Aquinas commence with Man’s Last End, Happiness and  
Human Acts (including Passions).  Aquinas then discusses aspects of the positive  
human response to God through Virtues, Gifts and Fruits of the Holy Spirit followed 
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by the negative response in Sin and Vice.  Finally, he comes to the Law and to Grace 
as the New Law of the Indwelling Spirit.  As one author notes “If one were to ask 
‘what is the most central and most dynamic factor in Aquinas’ view of Christian 
morality?’ the correct response would be, ‘the energising and transforming power of 
grace’” (Philibert, 1987, p. 106).  Aquinas starts with God’s invitation to our deepest 
desire for love.  He then moves to human participation in the divine life through 
Grace and its transforming effects in a person’s deepest being.  The virtues and 
human actions (including emotions) emerge from and manifest this state of 
transformed existence.  The emphasis is on the momentum of life-giving response to 
God through human acts impelled and guided by the virtues and the Holy Spirit.  Sin 
and Vice, as failures to respond, have a real, though secondary place, in Aquinas’ 
overall perspective.   
 
By contrast, after the common beginning with Aquinas, the different ordering of the 
material results in a significant change in the overall structure of the approach to  
 
Moral Theology in the Manualists.  As one author notes, “the neo-Thomist manuals 
were the product of displacement and combination “(Gallagher, 1990, p. 44).  For 
pastoral and pedagogical reasons, the first two parts were separated from the unified 
view in the Summa Theologiae and combined with a third part assimilated from the 
Summa Confessorum (Gallagher, 1990, p. 44).  
 
In all four Manualists noted, Conscience and Law immediately follow Human Acts.  
In three of the Manuals, the next topic is Sin/Vice.  Conscience, Law, Sin, Vice now 
take centre-stage not only in the order of the topics but in the space devoted to them.  
Grace is not treated as part of Law (interior dwelling of the Holy Spirit as the New 
Law) but as a separate treatise in Dogmatic Theology.  The preoccupation is now 
with the requirements of the human act as a moral reality.  This involves Conscience 
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in so far as it observes or transgresses Law (Divine, Ecclesiastical, Civil).  Further, 
the working assumption appears to be that Sin and Vice predominate in people’s 
lives and that the principal task of the moral life and of Moral Theology is to the 
avoidance of sin.  The central thrust towards human flourishing, strengthened and 
transformed by Grace, no longer pervades and directs the Manualists’ Theological 
Anthropology as it does that of Aquinas.  It has been reduced to one that is centred 
on external acts and Law, “a mongrel account that took key ideas from the Summa 
and relayed them through juridical structures” (Philibert, 1987, p. 113).  Growth 
from inner sources has been replaced by conformity to external benchmarks.  This 
shift in perspective and emphasis is mirrored in the treatment of the emotions. 
 
2.2:  Content 
 
The structural considerations are reinforced by the evidence that has emerged in the 
examination of the texts of the Manualists. 
 
Firstly, the style of language betrays certain attitudes to the human person.  Emotions 
are discussed under a rubric that is restrictive and negative as “obstacles,”  
“impediments,”  “enemies of the human act.”  Prümmer expresses the disclaimer that 
they are not always enemies of the human act, no doubt foreshadowing the treatment 
of consequent emotions which outlines, in principle, their positive moral 
significance.  Noldin-Schmitt see them as involving a person’s total affective life.  
Davis also offers an apologia for the emotions.  For all that, any constructive 
elements of the emotions seem to be muted by the terminology, concerns and 
attitudes of the Manualists.  In treating emotions as human acts, the view emerges 
that they are, at the most, antagonistic and, at the least, obstructive to  
human well-being and moral activity.58   
                                                 
58
  Prümmer is chided by his Dominican confrère Pinckaers for parading his negative picture of the 
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This is not so much the case when it comes to the affective virtues.  While virtue 
does, at times, need to curb the destructive energy of the emotions, it also has the 
capacity to incline a person towards what is good and can thus guide the energy of 
the emotions.  There is not the same level of uncomfortableness towards the affective 
virtues as is shown towards the emotions.  The question arises: “How can one 
evaluate this uneven understanding of the emotions as acts or as virtues in the 
Manualists?”  The language noted earlier (Footnote 12) may provide the key. 
 
A closer examination of the terminology (especially the verbs) used by Aquinas and 
the Manualists reveals different shades of meaning. These variations indicate that 
between the emotions and “right reason” there appear to be three levels of 
relationship. 
 
Levels of Meaning. 
 
1.  Emotions as commanded                                  imperium, impero. 
                      obeying, subject to reason           obedire, subjacent imperio rationis. 
    Virtues as curbing, repressing                          cohibet et deprimit passiones  
  Virtues as strengthening against passions  facit firmitatem animi contra passiones 
 
2.  Emotions as regulated, adjusted                      dirigatur per rationis regulam 
                      disposed, guided                         moderatur, ordinantur, moderatione 
                                                                regulatae per rationem; inordinatos motus 
    Virtues as inclining to the good           inclinatur, disponitur ad bene operandum 
                                                                                                                                          
emotions as the traditional one in Moral Theology when he says “... mais ce morceau reste un organe-
témoin introduit dans le contexte d’une appréciation négative qui s’imposait comme traditionelle 
désormais en théologie morale: les passions sont des obstacles à la liberté et à la qualité morale des 
actes” (Pinckaers, 1990, p. 380).   
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3.  Emotions/Virtues guiding right reason         conveniens, consonans, dissonans 
                                                                         regulatae per rationem.59 
 
Aquinas sees the emotions as acts and as affective virtues in terms of all three levels.  
He attempts to account for the reality of experience where emotions do need 1) to be 
curbed, or 2) to be guided by right reason or 3) to act as a guide to right reason 
(though this is the least developed in Aquinas).  The Manualists see the emotions as 
human acts mainly in terms of the first level of meaning, requiring suppression and 
restraint since they undermine freedom and imputability.  They treat the affective 
virtues in terms of levels one and two-restraint plus guidance or moderation by 
reason.  But in their treatment either of the emotions or the affective virtues, no 
evidence appears of the third level of understanding.   
 
Secondly, there is the formulation of questions and topics for discussion in the 
Manualists.  The predominant concern concerning the emotions is their effect on the 
voluntarium.  The general principles governing the moral significance of the 
emotions draws on Aquinas’ discussion in I.II. 24.3 on antecedent and consequent 
emotions.  As for specific emotions, the focus does not move beyond fear and 
emotional states that constitute habitual obstacles to the human act.  These issues are 
valid and necessary in any treatment of the human person and the moral response.  
As they are presented in the Manuals they rely heavily on Aquinas.  Nevertheless, 
unlike Aquinas, other than with fear, there is no treatment of individual emotions in 
the Manualists.  Anger, sorrow, as fear, can have a positive moral significance just as 
                                                 
59
  In Chapter four of this study, there is a discussion of Fittingness and how the object of the 
emotions, precisely as good, moves the will.  This is the basis for the educating role of the Affective 
virtues.  It is interesting to correlate this notion with these three levels of meaning.  The primary 
instance of the fitting (conveniens) appears to be Level three; its secondary instance is Level two 
(most common in Aquinas), and it is present in Level one (sense used least in Aquinas yet most 
common usage in Manualists).   
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love, desire and pleasure can be emotions that are morally negative.  In the light of 
the earlier discussion (Chapters three and four), the Manualists lack the formulation 
and discussion of related questions that enabled Aquinas to account for the harmful 
effects of emotions while recognising their positive function in the human person.  
Further, their treatment of the emotions and Affective virtues appears, at times, too 
philosophical and mechanistic, at a distance from people’s lives.   
 
Thirdly, the treatment of emotions in the Manualists generally takes the form of 
statement and explanation, usually in a truncated form.  Prümmer generally has a 
fuller treatment through a more extensive citing of Aquinas.  The justification of 
positions through arguments is generally minimal or done through a form of elision 
by brief reference to arguments that can be found in Aquinas.  Overall, the probative 
force of discussion in the Manualists rests on authority.  This takes the form of citing 
Law (Divine, Ecclesiastical), the Fathers (especially Augustine), recognised authors 
(particularly Aquinas).  As one author says, the authority of the manuals is one of a 
“self-authenticating tradition” (Gallagher, 1990, p. 51).  In discussing the emotions 
or the affective virtues, Scripture is rarely quoted.  There is also, by inference, a 
reliance on the authority of a pastoral tradition for confessors that underlies the 
purpose and style of the Manuals.  
 
Fourthly, there is the question of imagery.  For Aquinas, imagery enabled him to 
temper the connotations of language and to transcend its limits.  This does not 
emerge with the Manualists.  The restrictive and, at times, pejorative, understanding 
of emotions that seems to characterise the Manualists is perhaps best summed up by 
the metaphor of Davis mentioned earlier.  In his view, emotions are part of a delicate 
machine directed by reason-a power extrinsic to the emotions.  The basic setting is 
mechanical, the relationship of emotions to reason is to something extrinsic to them.  
The shift is from Aquinas’ organic, living model with an internal relationship of 
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mutual interdependence of powers to one that is mechanical, inanimate, where 
emotions are controlled by an external power.  Human growth is through conformity 
to an external criterion (Law) rather than through interiorisation and inner 
transformation.  Aquinas’ Theological Anthropology has suffered distortion.  
 
Finally, does the point raised in the outline of the methodology of this study apply to 
the Theological Anthropology found in the Manualists?  Is there a discrepancy 
between “espoused theory” and “theory in use”?   
 
In evaluating the Manualists, the Theological Anthropology underlying the emotions 
seems to be more manifest than inferred.  The considerations outlined above 
regarding structure, language, formulation of questions and issues, forms of 
argument, imagery converge towards that conclusion.  To that extent, the “theory in 
use” is evident and is consistent with the “espoused theory.”  However, Aquinas’ 
vision of the teleological structure of existence, of the human person and the role of 
emotions within that context does have a lingering presence in the Manualists.  
Given that, there seems to be a continuing tension, even conflict, within the 
Manualists’ understanding of the human person.  At one level, they attempt to 
replicate Aquinas’ view of the human person.  But, in reality, their Theological 
Anthropology emerges in the form of a juridical, mechanical, extrinsic model which  
 
seems unable to incorporate those residual elements from the organic, animate, 
developmental model characterised by the internal interrelationship of various 
powers.  The discrepancies are such that it could be argued that they cannot be 
resolved.  One is, in fact, faced with two irreconcilable Theological Anthropologies.   
 
3.  Comparison and Contrasts in Manualists and with Aquinas 
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This study now addresses the third research question “What is the significance of the 
different understandings and treatments of the emotions and of the human person in 
these authors?”  This will be discussed, firstly, in relation to the Manualists and then 
with reference to Aquinas. 
 
3.1:  Comparison and Contrast among Manualists 
 
One area of contrast is that of morality centred on virtue.  Noldin-Schmitt (1956) 
devotes some space to it.  Aertnys-Damen (1956) and Davis (1935) have more 
extended discussions.  But it is Prümmer who gives it a more central place in both 
editions (1935, 1963).60  Overall, if this variation is seen in the light of the above 
discussion, what seems significant in the Manualists are not their differences but 
their similarities.  In comparing the Manualists-the structure, content, issues, 
language, arguments, imagery, inclusions and omissions-one arrives at a map of their 
domain.  This evidence indicates a substantial unanimity amongst the Manualists in 
their view of the human person as also in their understanding of the emotions as 
human acts and of the affective virtues. 
 
 
3.2:  Comparison and Contrast of Manualists and Aquinas 
 
What is the significance of the different understandings and treatments of the 
emotions and of the human person in the Manualists in relation to Aquinas?  To 
some extent, this has already been answered in the discussion above on Theological 
Anthropology.  This section will pursue the precise significance or import of these 
                                                 
60
  The point is made that Dominican Manualists such as Merkelbach and Prümmer “wrote large 
multivolume handbooks for priests, which, despite their deviation from Aquinas’s order, occasioned 
by arrangements of practical issues drawn from the 19th. century, managed to retain something of the 
pattern of virtues” (O’Meara, 1997, p. 272). 
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contrasting positions in terms of coherence and adequacy, of a governing metaphor, 
of the history of Christian Anthropology and, finally, of moral theory.   
 
The Manualists omit aspects of the emotions discussed by Aquinas that enabled him 
to hold in balance the different and, at times, opposing aspects of emotions.  Aquinas 
was thus able to portray emotions as having a creative, life-giving role in a person’s 
life.  In I.II. q. 24, for instance, in his discussion of the goodness/rightness or 
badness/wrongness of emotions, Aquinas provides and justifies distinctions that give 
a foundation to a coherent and adequate account of the moral significance of 
emotions.  This colours his discussion of individual emotions and of the affective 
virtues.   
 
Conversely, the Manualists highlight antecedent and consequent emotions, fear and 
habitual impediments.  They do not offset this by providing the accompanying 
context and the moderating treatment of individual emotions found in Aquinas.  Even 
when the positive moral significance of emotions is acknowledged, this is not 
developed, except in the general principles of consequent emotion.  The restricted 
focus in discussing emotions as human acts means that the Manualists have difficulty 
in going beyond a portrayal of the emotions simply as factors that hinder or oppose 
personal well-being.  The process of selection combined with the neglect of the 
original context and surrounding content seem to have resulted in the Manualists 
misrepresenting  Aquinas and transmitting a distorted view of the moral significance 
of the emotions and, hence, of the human person. 
 
The import of this takes the form of three areas of unresolved internal conflict in the 
Manualists’ understanding of the emotions.  Firstly, the uncomfortable position 
towards emotions is indicated in the discussion of consequent emotions as facilitating 
moral goodness under the heading of Impediments to the human act.  
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Secondly, Aquinas sees emotions, whether positive or negative, as having the 
potential to be either constructive or destructive to the human person and to 
relationships.  For him, emotions are principally meant to be friends but, as 
experience shows, they can easily become enemies.  The Manualists, on the other 
hand, seem to work from the assumption that emotions are either obstacles to, or 
destructive of, the truly human.  Emotions are principally enemies and are seldom, or 
with difficulty, one’s friends.  Consequently, there is a conflict for the Manualists in 
accounting for the experience of emotions as constructive factors in human life and 
for the common estimation of moral growth as having an affective component.   
 
Thirdly, the Manualists’ ambivalence towards, even negative understanding of, the 
emotions in relation to human acts is at odds with the less ambivalent and more 
constructive treatment of the affective virtues.  It is difficult to weave together these 
contrasting strands into a consistent whole.  Authors such as Prümmer, Davis and 
Aertnys-Damen are indicators of the neo-Thomist revival and the effort to restore the 
place of the virtues.  Nevertheless, by retaining the order and extensive treatment of 
Conscience, Law and Sin, the Manualists, in fact, did not effect any notable shift 
from the juridical model.  The evidence indicates their inability to retrieve the finely 
balanced and carefully calibrated construal of the Prima Secundae with its interplay 
of human acts, emotions and virtues.    
 
These three unresolved issues, then, render the Manualists’ understanding and 
treatment of the moral significance of the emotions and of the human person less 
than coherent and, to that extent, inadequate. 
 
The second area of significance is the dominant metaphor.  In terms of their moral 
significance, the emotions, for the Manualists, are more forces of conflict than of 
creative tension, working in opposition to, rather than in collaboration with, practical 
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reason.  This is epitomised in the image shift in Davis from the organic to the 
mechanical model, from the governing metaphor of political rule to that of despotic 
or autocratic rule.  Such an understanding of the moral significance of the emotions 
and of the human person has more affinity with Cartesian dualism than with 
Aquinas’ nuanced vision of the person as body/spirit meant to be an harmonious 
composite.  For him,  human powers are mutually interdependent, emotions 
participate in rationality and human affectivity perfects itself by serving the spiritual 
assisted by the virtues which tutor it.61  Without emotions, one is less a person. The 
human person moves towards integration through fostering this mutual relationship 
of emotions and practical reason.  It is precisely here that the moral significance of 
emotions is to be found. 
 
Thirdly, the fear of the emotions in the Manualists is part of a deeper distrust of the 
goodness of the body, of sexuality and of all forms of human spontaneity.  As one 
author notes, this kind of Christian Anthropology has its roots in Stoicism and 
Neoplatonic dualism conveyed to the West by the Fathers of the Church (Principe, 
1993, p. 1031).  While Aquinas, mirroring the vital spirituality of the twelfth century, 
has a more positive and integrated perspective on these matters, the more anxious 
and pessimistic spirituality prevailed from within later Medieval spirituality until the 
middle of the twentieth century.  The Manualists are symptomatic of this. 
 
Finally, the incompatible views of the human person epitomised in the image shift 
mentioned above can be interpreted in terms of moral theory.  Firstly, the pre-
occupation of the Manualists with individual acts brings with it one of the strengths 
associated with Nominalism noted by Häring- “the analysis of the moral act in its 
                                                 
61
  “Dans cette vue, la sensibilité se parfait en servant l’esprit, avec l’aide des vertus qui l’éduquent.  
C’est donc grâce à l’union naturelle entre le corps et l’âme et à l’harmonie de fond qu’elle crée entre 
nos facultés, que peut s’opérer un passage spontané des passions au spirituel et que le spirituel peut, à 
son tour, rejaillir sur le sensible, pour le bien comme pour le mal” (Pinckaers, 1990, p. 383).  
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singularity and uniqueness, in its subjective and objective presuppositions” (Häring, 
1961, p. 15).  The Manualists also “functioned as voices of reason” against the 
tendency to multiply laws for ordinary people (O’Connell, 1990, p. 20).  The cost of 
this was that, in the Manualists, morality as a response to the question of happiness 
where moral norms emerge from a teleological account appears to move to the 
margins.  Emotions have few if any claims in a morality preoccupied with 
establishing and defending the constraints of law (Pinckaers, 1990, p. 381).  The 
overall impression is that, for the Manualists, morality revolves around the question 
of obligations.  Historically, this can be traced to post-Occam Nominalism where 
morality is grounded in the imperium of divine will rather than in the intelligibility of 
the created world.  The centrepiece of morality becomes individual acts to the 
detriment of the virtues.   
 
Secondly, despite the acknowledged place given to natural tendencies and 
inclinations in right reason in authors such as Davis, the overall picture in the 
Manualists on this topic is of the more restricted understanding of right reason.  The 
helmsman of the moral life is not practical reason understood as the cooperation of 
intellect, will and emotions through the guidance of the virtues.  Practical reason has 
moved closer to Kant’s rational will where desires and emotions have no part to play 
and where they are either repressed or rebel.  Duty, now separated from happiness, is 
the guiding star.  Freedom is seen through the lens of will, law, obligation.  In other 
words, the moral theory of the Manualists that underlies their treatment of the 
emotions seems to be predominantly voluntaristic in character. 
 
This study has made significant progress in investigating the focal question of this 
study: “ How adequate is the treatment of the moral significance of emotions in 
Catholic Moral Theology 1960-1990 in the light of the work of Aquinas and of some 
contemporary authors?”  After investigating the work of Aquinas, this present 
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chapter, pivotal in the study, has been made up of three elements: firstly, the 
selection of four Manualists whose dates of publication span the thirty years prior to 
the second Vatican Council (1935-1963); secondly, controlled soundings made in 
their writings; thirdly, an investigation of these texts using the three research 
questions which include an evaluation in the light of Aquinas.  The next step will be 
to use the same process and the same three investigative tools with representative 
authors published in the thirty years since the commencement of Vatican II (c. 1962- 
-1990).  This is the task of the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Emotions and the Moral Life in Renewing Catholic Theology 1960-1990 
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine writing in Catholic Moral Theology from 1960 
till 1990 in relation to the principal research question and the three component 
questions.  The predominant, though not exclusive, focus will be the two sets of 
volumes on General and Special Moral Theology of Häring (1963, 1965, 1967; 1978, 
1979, 1981) and Peschke (1979, 1978; 1986, 1993).  Reference will also be made to 
the work of Grisez (1983), Maguire (1986), Lobo (1989), O’Connell (1990).  
 
The publication in German in 1954 of Häring’s The Law of Christ was a turning 
point in Moral Theology.  It was a significant trigger in a process that would see the 
decline of the Moral Manuals in seminaries in Europe and the English speaking 
world (Gallagher, 1990, p. 170).  Häring’s work both foreshadowed and stimulated 
developments in the following four decades.  Peschke’s subsequent work is a witness 
to this influence.  The impact of Conciliar renewal is evident in the mature thought of 
Häring’s later synthesis Free and Faithful in Christ.  Although not designed to be an 
“abridged or revised edition” of his earlier work, it does have substantial continuity 
with The Law of Christ (Häring, 1978, p. 5).  While the volumes of Häring and 
Peschke deviated from the Moral Manuals in both structure and content (whether that 
of theological presuppositions or moral theory), they still had roots in, and some 
commonality with, that particular theological genre.   
 
As in the preceding chapter, this chapter is constructed on the three research 
questions.  In the first section, the first research question will be explored: “How do 
these authors portray the moral significance of the emotions in relation to human 
acts, virtue and character?” 
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1.  The Moral Significance of the Emotions  
 
1.1:  Emotions and The Human Act 
 
1.1.1:  Context. 
 
Häring notes, at the outset, that the structure of his treatment is largely traditional 
(1963, p. x).  After a brief history of Moral Theology, he develops the essential 
concepts of the discipline.  In his second work, Häring commences with “Biblical 
Perspectives” and proceeds to the development of Moral Theology (1978, p. 8ff).  
Both volumes then pursue key notions.  Christian moral life is inherently religious.  
It is not built on a reasoned understanding of the human person and perfection as in 
Autonomous ethics.  Häring is closer to the position of Faith ethics.  This entails a 
conception of “the Holy as a Power which advances towards (man) and to whom he 
can turn in dialogue” (Häring, 1963, p. 35).  Religious ethics, in its pure form, has 
the nature of response in which “moral conduct is understood as response to the 
summons of a person who is holy, who is absolute” (Häring, 1963, p. 35; 1978, p. 
62ff).  For Häring, the key elements in Christian morality are clear:  relationship of 
persons (human and divine), dialogue, invitation, response, responsibility.  This is 
sharpened later in his desire to “deepen the vision of responsibility in Jesus Christ by 
giving greater attention to its expression in creative liberty and creative fidelity” 
(Häring, 1978, p. 1).   
 
For Häring, the human person is inescapably religious.  His vision of the moral life is 
built on call and response.  It is not found simply in fulfilling a set of impersonal 
norms or principles.  God addresses the person through the laws of morality, 
conscience, the need of one’s neighbour and pre-eminently through the coming of 
God’s Kingdom in the person of Jesus Christ.  This is a revelation event demanding 
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decision which is embodied in the Christian life.  The Christian moral life then is an 
affirmative response to the call of Jesus Christ that emerges from an identification 
with him through membership of his body and results in the imitation of Jesus 
animated by the Holy Spirit.  It is the person responding in love to the invitation 
revealed in God’s self-gift to us in Jesus by a commitment to doing gladly what God 
wants us to do.  “The principle, the norm, the center, and the goal of Christian Moral 
Theology is Christ.  The Law of the Christian is Christ Himself in Person” (Häring, 
1963, p. vii; also 1978, p. 60).   
 
Part Two of his first volume sees Häring outline a Theological Anthropology-“...the 
teaching on the subject and bearer of moral value” (1963, p. x).  The parallel volume 
of Free and Faithful in Christ has a more elaborate Theological Anthropology (four 
chapters) and a greater emphasis on the person as called to faithful response in a 
covenant community (Häring, 1978, p. 3).  The total human person (body and soul) 
responds to Christ’s invitation to follow Him and does so as a relational being.  It is 
both the individual person and the community that are the subjects of moral value.  
Each is capable of responsibility, of praise or blame, of moral worth and a certain 
“objective spirit” (Häring, 1963, p. 79).  They are also bearers of moral value in so 
far as the person and the community embodies such values and have a mutual 
influence in the process of moral growth and integration.  The human person is 
simultaneously an historical being who in the innermost depths is called to worship.  
In Häring’s view, “all moral goodness is holiness, all right human action is worship 
and the highpoint of life is adoration of the living God” (Kennedy, 1990, p. 207).   
 
The centrality of Scripture and of Christ shows Häring’s indebtedness to the earlier   
 
 
 
  223 
work of Fritz Tillman.62  Subsequently, the scriptural foundation, its themes, with a 
Christocentric, Trinitarian and Communitarian perspectives will emerge as the 
renewed vision of Moral Theology after Vatican II.  These are evident in 
foundational moral texts of, for instance, Lobo (1989) and O’Connell (1990) though, 
in the latter’s case, there is not the development of the Trinitarian and 
Communitarian dimensions.  This brings us to the first volumes of Peschke. 
 
Peschke’s two volume works on Moral Theology are presented in the light of 
Vatican II.  Volume I on General Moral Theology was first published in 1975 and 
the revised edition in 1986.  The structure of both editions is almost identical apart 
from the omission of the chapter on the history of Moral Theology in the 1986 
edition.  As with Häring’s two first volumes, the content is substantially the same 
with some development or refinement in certain sections.   
 
Peschke builds his vision of Moral Theology on the same foundation as Häring- 
Scripture (call, response, conversion) and the centrality of Christ.  He does not 
explore the Theological Anthropology of the human person and community as the 
subject and bearer of value and of the human vocation to worship.  Further, in Part 
Two, Chapters one and two of both editions, Peschke treats the Nature of Morality 
and the Moral Law prior to Conscience and the realisation of moral value in Human 
Acts, which reverses Häring’s order of treatment.63  Alternatively, in both volumes, 
Häring discusses the true basis of morality.  It rests on human freedom where 
responsibility requires the knowledge of values, personal conscience together with 
inner disposition and spirit.  Both authors approach the emotions (“passions”) as in 
                                                 
62
  Tillman’s approach to Moral Theology centred on Scripture and the call to follow Christ.  Two of 
his works published in 1934 reflect this in the titles:  Die Idee der Nachfolge Christi and Die 
Verwirklichung der Nachfolge Christi.  A later work was translated into English and published in 
1960 under the title The Master Calls: A Handbook for Christian Moral Living. 
 
63
  Häring’s order for treating Conscience follows that of St. Alphonsus Liguori. 
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the Manualist -as factors in the “Diminution or Destruction of Liberty” (Häring, 
1963, p. 108) or as “Obstacles impairing human acts and voluntariness of their 
effects” (Peschke, 1979, p. 188).  This is the next concern of this study. 
 
1.1.2:  Content 
 
In his 1978 work, Häring replaces the earlier detailed treatment of morality with a 
discussion of bondage and freedom in Christ.  His earlier volume (1963) and the 
work of Peschke essentially follow the traditional schema found in the Manuals for 
impediments to the voluntarium examined in the preceding chapter.  The “passions” 
(the term used by both authors) understood as concupiscence, fear, together with 
habits, and pathological states are the main influences diminishing free consent.  The 
treatment of both authors concurs substantially with that of the Manualists.  It would 
serve no useful purpose to repeat this material.  It suffices for this study to highlight 
the significant elements and to note differences and advances in thought in these and 
other authors.   
 
1.1.2.1:  With regard to antecedent and consequent emotions both authors retain this 
classical division under the rubric of either “unbridled” or “disordered” 
concupiscence.  They also retain and apply the same principles governing the 
influence of the emotions on the voluntarium (Peschke, 1979, p. 192; 1986, p. 257) 
or on freedom (Häring, 1963, p. 109), (also Lobo, 1989, p. 365).  In this context, both 
explain the difficult distinction between voluntarium (the force of the will) and 
liberum (the power of free decision).  The confusion arises from the use of 
“voluntariness” in English to describe liberum, that a person acts freely.  Peschke 
notes that if passion diminishes voluntariness (i.e., power of free decision), it 
increases the inclination of the will (voluntarium)  “In other words, what is willed 
through antecedent passion is willed with greater intensity but less freely” (Peschke, 
  225 
1986, p. 256).   
 
At the end of his treatment of fear, Häring notes that what is true of fear holds for 
other emotions, e.g., sadness, joy, anger.  He is primarily referring to general 
principles governing antecedent emotions. He also alludes to those governing 
consequent emotions when he says that “the passion which is controlled and 
channelled properly by the free will increases the force of the free action” (Häring, 
1963, p. 109).   
 
Pertinent to this topic is the significant treatment of the emotions by Grisez (1983).   
While not using the accustomed terminology employed above, he draws on Aquinas 
in a probing discussion on the relationship between emotions and the will.   
 
Experience witnesses to the fact that will and emotions do not directly affect each 
other.  The will can resist the pull of emotions towards an evil object yet it cannot 
arouse feelings by choice (Grisez, 1983, p. 414).  The relationship between will and 
emotions is indirect.  Through the will, one can choose what one thinks, imagines or 
does and, by such means, can alter “one’s emotional actuations” (Grisez, 1983, p. 
414).  For instance, thinking of happy things or acting in such a way can ease or 
remove a person’s sadness.   
 
Conversely, emotions affect the will indirectly.  Here Grisez cites I.II. 9.2 and 77.1 
and 2 as the basis of his argument.  He elaborates, in contemporary language, this 
aspect of Aquinas explored by Keenan and discussed earlier in Chapter four of this 
project.  Grisez is offering another version of Aquinas’ account of how emotions 
present the object to the will.  The arousal of an emotion fixes a person’s attention.  
“If one sees some intelligible good in a possible course of action which would satisfy 
the emotion, one spontaneously wills the course of action and carries it out, unless 
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some reason comes to mind for not doing so” (Grisez, 1983, p. 414).  The emotion, 
then, starts a process that leads to the choice of a course of action which is “naturally 
suitable...intelligent, appropriate” (Grisez, 1983, p. 414).  
 
Grisez notes two ways in which emotion influences the will through attention.  
Firstly, it causes a person to attend “to certain possible courses of action and ignore 
others” (Grisez, 1983, p. 414).  These possibilities must have some emotional base so 
as to “seem interesting and really possible for oneself” (Grisez, 1983, p. 414).  
Secondly, Grisez notes that a strong emotion can compel a person to “reconsider a 
possibility previously rejected as unacceptable” (1983, p. 414).  This phenomenon 
explains “persistent temptations to commit certain sins of weakness” (1983, p. 414).     
 
Grisez points out that “underlying every choice is some emotion” (1983, p. 415).  
Often, one is not particularly conscious of emotions unless they are strong or have 
some noticeable bodily effects.  If choices for what is good involve emotions, so also 
do sinful choices.  Emotions can dispose one to act otherwise than in a fully 
reasonable way.  Strong emotions can resist reason and result in sins of weakness, 
i.e., from antecedent emotions.  Emotions can influence the morally required act by 
a) inhibiting or delaying it, b) distracting from its gravity, c) prompting an action 
inconsistent with a person’s virtuous character and d) propelling towards an act as a 
“quasi-compulsive” influence within a pattern of struggle in a person’s life (Grisez, 
1983, p. 417f). 
 
What is significant (and unique among the authors examined in the post-conciliar 
period) is the analogy used and developed by Grisez to characterise the relationship 
between emotions and reason (intellect and will).  It is that of the deliberative 
assembly.  At times, the desire of some members of that body to have their own way 
is apparent in their effort to keep presenting a rejected proposal.  At times, for the 
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sake of peace and harmony, it is passed.  “Similarly, the temptation to commit a sin 
of weakness arises when emotions are strong and unruly enough to resist a 
reasonable decision, distract attention from other matters, and keep demanding 
reconsideration for a rejected proposal” (Grisez, 1983, p. 415).  What is not stated 
but is assumed is that other proposals can have the approval of all members of the 
assembly as the best action to help promote overall well-being, i.e., emotions guiding 
and facilitating practical reason.    Grisez, in reality, has reformulated the political 
analogy discussed in Chapter three as Aquinas’ ruling metaphor for emotions and 
their relationship to reason.        
 
1.1.2.2: With regard to Fear, Häring and Peschke are authors who follow the 
classical approach and distinctions e.g., grave/light; extrinsic/intrinsic; 
antecedent/concomitant.  They then develop the principles governing its influence on 
freedom or voluntarium (Häring, 1963, p. 108; Peschke, 1979, p. 194f; 1986, p. 
257f).   
 
Häring advances on the Manualists in noting the distinction in modern Psychology 
between fear and anxiety.  In his view, fear concerns a specific object, is 
proportionate to what causes it and hence is more readily controlled.  Conversely, 
anxiety is that free-floating fear in which “the individual does not know what he 
fears” (Häring, 1963, p. 109).  He then carries on to say that anxiety results when a 
person succumbs entirely to the fear so that the feeling of anxiety (acute anxiety) “is 
out of all proportion to the cause of fear” (Häring, 1963, p. 109).  When such is the 
case and a person’s mind is wholly or partly unbalanced, freedom is lessened or 
removed and guilt is diminished or absent.  O’Connell takes this further in the light 
of the work of Abraham Maslow who made the distinction between people motivated 
by the desire to eliminate “deficiencies” in their lives and those motivated by a desire 
for being and for living.  O’Connell points out that “the anxiety generated by 
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deficiencies in one’s life makes a decision for fuller being difficult, if not 
impossible” (1990, p. 54f).  He also makes the interesting observation that the input 
of the social sciences has confirmed the “older wisdom” in its understanding of fear 
as an obstacle to freedom and human growth (1990, p. 54).   
 
Peschke, in his second edition, also goes beyond the Manuals.  Häring mentions the 
impact of mass suggestion and of being carried along by the herd as factors affecting 
freedom (1963, p. 112f).  Peschke mentions one form of fear-the impact of social 
pressure.  The often unrecognised need for acceptance, esteem, safety etc., can 
pressure human beings to “conform to prevailing opinions and behaviour patterns” 
(1986, p. 257).  When it comes to questioning erroneous beliefs, prejudices or false 
ideologies, it can be difficult either to recognise and resist them or, once recognised, 
to stand up against them (Peschke, 1986, p. 258).   
 
1.1.2.3: Again, dispositions and habits receive the standard treatment with the 
accustomed distinctions between natural inclinations and acquired habits, good and 
bad habits, voluntary (deliberately admitted habit) and involuntary (an opposed 
habit).  There is also the familiar application of the principles governing the 
influence of habits and dispositions on the human act (Häring, 1963, p. 111; Peschke, 
1979, p. 197f; 1986, p. 261f).  This is also true of pathological states which in Häring 
covers 6 pages (1963, p. 114ff).  With his usual brevity and clarity, Peschke devotes 
half a page to the topic.  In his view, Psychic defects or illnesses “can ultimately be 
reduced to the other impairments of human acts and their freedom” (1979, p. 198f; 
1986, p. 262f).  They either result in defective knowledge (deliberation) or in psychic 
compulsion along the line of dispositions and habits that impede freedom of the will. 
 
Grisez cautions against the reduction of morality to issues of emotional health and 
sickness.  Emotional pathology and immaturity entail a lack of harmonious 
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functioning often through emotional extremes that cannot be easily explained by “the 
actual situation and the content of consciousness” (Grisez, 1983, p. 415).  
Consequently, guilt will be diminished or, more often, removed.  On the other hand, 
a person can have proportioned and appropriate emotions that are explained by the 
situation and the content of consciousness.  In this instance, sinful weakness or 
malice have their roots in the conflict or disharmony between emotions and the 
mind-between the appeal of a “sentient satisfaction” and the possibility of an 
intelligible good (Grisez, 1983, p. 416).  It should be noted that even in such a case 
the influence of a bad habit if regretted can diminish malice.   
 
1.1.2.4:  Understanding the emotions is a further consideration.  In Chapter five of 
this study, the nature of emotions was discussed prior to examining their moral 
significance.  In this chapter, the order is reversed principally to highlight the 
developmental aspect of the topic under discussion.   
 
     1.1.2.4.1:  Continuity with Aquinas and the Manualists:  Peschke 
 
In both editions of Peschke, the definition, classes (concupiscible, irascible), of 
“passion” or “concupiscence” are identical with those used by Aquinas and the 
Manualists (1979, p. 192f; 1986, p. 255f).  Emotions are gifts from God with the 
constructive role of ensuring the self-preservation of the individual and the human 
race.  A person without them would lack the capacity for self-defence, growth or 
improvement. These points mirror those of Davis noted in the preceding chapter (p. 
159f).  Emotions are integral to the lives of the saints and of Christ himself.  Lobo 
notes that without emotions “human existence and freedom would lack vitality and 
vigor” (1989, p. 365).  O’Connell refers to them as “the fuel of energetic moral 
action” (1990, p. 54).   
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On the other hand, it is immediately evident to human experience that emotions can 
become destructive and evil if they are not controlled by reason or, as Lobo says, 
“directed to the good, pressed into the service of freedom ...which is done by a 
process of integration into the total personality with its values (1989, p. 365).  
O’Connell points out that it is the mark of an adult “to be aware of the extent to 
which anger, envy, sexual desire, and other emotions can limit one’s freedom of 
choice” (1990, p. 54).  Peschke sees the process of gaining control over the emotions 
as constituting probably the most significant aspect of moral education in early and 
more mature years (1986, p. 256).   
 
Significantly, Peschke points out that it is not the conceptual but the affective grasp 
of moral value through “devoted, effectual love” that is the beginning of virtue 
(1979, p. 345).  In his brief exposé and assessment of the ethics of values, Peschke 
notes that such a school is correct in understanding the human grasp of the “moral 
task in an act of intuition and faith” (1979, p. 87).  He notes that it “has accorded a 
fairer role to man’s emotions in the realm of morality” by “giving attention to the 
value responses that re-echo in the heart of man” and “call forth emotions of love, 
devotions and enthusiasm” (Peschke, 1979, p. 87).  While Peschke goes this far, he 
does not elaborate on the way in which emotions can facilitate and assist in the task 
of moral reasoning.   
  
     1.1.2.4.2:  Retrieval from within a Tradition: Maguire 
 
The affective dimension of practical reason found in Aquinas, while noted in 
Peschke, is not elaborated by him nor by the Manualists and other recent Moral 
Theologians.  One exception is Maguire who attempts to underline the affective 
component of moral consciousness and moral judgement.  He explores this in an 
article “The Knowing Heart and the Intellectualistic Fallacy” that is the final chapter 
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of his The Moral Revolution (1986).  This refines the thinking found in “The Feel of 
Truth,” a chapter in his earlier The Moral Choice (1979).    
 
Maguire’s concern is the fallacy in modern ethical deliberation that morality is 
essentially analytical and rationalistic in form, with the clarity of logic and 
mathematics.  He notes carefully the limits of the evidence.  Aquinas does not 
explicitly or substantively systematise the idea of affective knowledge.  It is an 
implication of his view of practical reason which orders behaviour to what is good.  
For Aquinas, emotions and affectivity are involved in practical reason’s role of 
determining what is truly reasonable, truly good (Maguire, 1986, p. 258).  This 
enables right reason to be the measure of moral action.  A later commentator, John of 
St. Thomas, explicitly develops the notion of affective knowledge and makes it “the 
controlling category for an understanding of the gifts of the Holy Spirit” (Maguire, 
1986, p. 262).  It is also discussed by Maritain (1942, p. 22ff).   
 
The first concern here is moral judgement.  “Right reason, perfected by moral 
virtues, has a connatural orientation to the good” (Maguire, 1986, p. 158).  Earlier in 
this study there was the discussion of how Aquinas develops the implications of this 
in his treatment of Prudence, the moral virtues, the gifts of the Holy Spirit (especially 
Wisdom) as factors that perfect moral reasoning.  These help deepen a way of 
knowing that is “affectively qualified” (Maguire, 1986, p. 259).  These influences so 
attune a person to the morally good that it becomes second nature to judge correctly 
about what is good (1986, p. 259).  A virtuous person has interiorised and integrated 
the moral norms so that “his moral reasoning is facilitated and made certain” (Grisez, 
1983, p. 81).  The phenomenon of affective knowing is even clearer in Aquinas’ 
notion of “connaturality through love” or “affective connaturality.”  The Philosophy 
and Theology of Aquinas “include love not only as a stimulator to knowledge but as 
an illumining factor in knowing” (Maguire, 1986, p. 262).   
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The second concern is more pertinent here, that of moral consciousness, in particular 
the foundational moral experience.  Maguire address the question of that primordial 
experience that makes humans morally aware and gives “meaning to moral language 
and judgment” (1986, p. 263).  It is the epistemological issue of what grounds moral 
consciousness.  For Maguire, it is born in “awe, in affectivity.  The foundational 
moral experience is the experience of the value of persons and their environment” 
(1986, p. 264).  Such an evaluative knowing is universally available to all persons, 
though it may be embraced or applied in a limited way.   
 
Maguire argues that the foundational moral experience is a sure way of knowing that 
can neither be seen nor proved.  He offers two examples.  Jean-Paul Sartre was once 
holding an infant and realised at that moment that all he had ever written or done 
would not outweigh the value of this precious human life in his arms.  Again, 
Maguire cites the instance of the soldier who is executed for refusing to shoot 
hostages in war (who would die anyway).  Could one prove the preciousness of the 
infant or the rightness of the soldier’s action?  Both instances indicate that “the value 
of persons and the environment that undergirds all moral consciousness and 
civilization is believable, but beyond proof” (1986, p. 267).  It is closer to a form of 
faith that, according to Aquinas, “lends a kind of certitude that is in the genre of 
affection” (Maguire, 1986, p. 267). 
 
Maguire, then, retrieves and expands an epistemology which underlines the cognitive 
significance of affect in moral knowledge.  He sums it up when he cites his earlier 
work:   
 
The foundational moral experience is an affective reaction to value.  It is not a 
metaphysical or a religious experience primordially.  It is not a conclusion to a 
syllogism, though it may be supported by syllogisms and reasoning.  The value 
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of persons cannot be taught, subjected to proof, reasoned to, or computerized.  It 
can only be affectively appreciated (Maguire, 1979, p. 84).    
 
     1.1.2.4.3:  Creative interpretation from within a tradition: Grisez 
 
The other author who explores the affective component of practical reason is Grisez.  
With Maguire he acknowledges, though in a qualified way, the primordial moral 
consciousness (“conscience”) available to every person “for its demands are ‘written 
in their hearts’-that is known spontaneously” (1983, p. 77).  In citing Gaudium et 
Spes 6, Grisez reminds the reader that “heart” for both Paul and Vatican II does not 
indicate “a power of feeling what is right or a disposition to love what is good” 
(1983, p. 77).  The Biblical notion of heart is the focus of a person’s psychic energy 
which embraces one’s mind, will, emotions and desires, in other words “the whole of 
one’s interior life” (Grisez, 1983, p. 77).     
 
More significantly, while heavily dependent on Aquinas, Grisez does offer a 
circumspect yet insightful account of the emotions and their moral significance.  
Where free choices are made from judgements about what promotes or hinders 
personal fulfilment, emotions are aroused by “sentient awareness of what is suited or 
unsuited to the person as organism” (Grisez, 1983, p. 119).  Normally, a person’s 
outward behaviour will be a combination of both emotion and will.  In many 
instances, “emotion and will work together in motivating action.  Emotion advances 
possibilities, intelligence considers reasons for acting on the possibilities proposed, 
and will initiates action” (Grisez, 1983, p. 119).   
 
Generally, Grisez sees a positive function for emotions in terms of the survival and 
health of the human organism (suitable, unsuitable; agreeable, disagreeable).  Felt 
pleasure, pain and their accompanying emotional reactions have intelligibility and 
value (Grisez, 1983, p. 120).  As such, in one passage, he notes that they “are not 
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morally evil” and uses the example of Jesus (1983, p. 190).  Elsewhere, citing 
I.II.75.2, he remarks that “emotions, though good in themselves, are not in 
themselves rational, and these nonrational motivations can make sinful possibilities 
appealing” (Grisez, 1983, p. 320).  This is substantially Aquinas’ position, though the 
rational component of emotions through the incipient relationship to reason could be 
clarified by Grisez.  Grisez acknowledges that often emotions and intelligible good 
compete to be the determinant of behaviour.  One can allow oneself to be determined 
by emotion “to the detriment of a fully reasonable judgment of conscience” (1983, p. 
190).   
 
Further, through emotions, a person is moved towards limited goods in fulfilling the 
sentient self.  Grisez goes on to say that “by contrast, left to themselves, intelligent 
love and unrestricted reason would move us towards integral human fulfillment” 
(1983, p. 190).  If this implies that appropriate emotional responses and the affective 
virtues are not needed in the truly virtuous and integrated human being, such a view 
does not appear to represent the position of Aquinas.      
 
Grisez does not see calm and cool judgement as the criterion of moral reasoning.  
Emotions are at work in any particular instance of good (experienced as real or 
imagined) (1983, p. 190).  Emotion plays a role in all choices, normally by not 
calling attention to itself.  Awareness of its influence arises “if it is not entirely 
integrated or brings about unusual physiological symptoms” (Grisez, 1983, p. 190).  
Grisez rightly notes that people are attracted to definite goals by imagination and 
emotion.  This explains their immediate appeal when contrasted with more general, 
intelligible values (1983, p. 191).   
 
In differentiating between forms of emotions, Grisez explicitly draws on Aquinas, for 
instance, I.II. qq. 25-28 (and other texts).  All emotions are “based on love or closely 
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related to it, since their whole function is to enable creatures with cognition to fulfill 
themselves by action” (Grisez, 1983, p. 574).  Love is the basic disposition which 
“adapts one to a known good” and leads to desire and satisfaction (pleasure or joy) 
(1983, p. 578).    Grisez says that an emotion such as love is difficult to isolate.  A 
person can only be aware of what one loves and others love emotionally by 
observing what arouses desire and gives pleasure (Grisez, 1983, p. 574).      
 
Grisez makes a significant  distinction.  Emotions are “consciously experienced” 
especially if they are “unusual or particularly strong” (1983, p. 575).  Conversely, 
with Freud and others, one can (with good reason) refer to unconscious or 
subconscious emotions, for instance, love, hatred, anger.  Grisez then points out that 
what is essential to emotions is not the conscious experience, the actually having of a 
feeling, but “...that one is disposed to behave in certain ways” (1983, p. 575).  
Perhaps it is more accurate to say that an emotion is essentially a disposition to 
respond in certain ways (which may emerge in action).   
 
Grisez picks up the relational and social context of the emotions.  Citing Aquinas 
(I.47.1; 60.5), humans are made for fulfilment in various forms of common life and 
relationships.  “Emotional love of another is a compound of various degrees of 
sympathetic natural love of the other’s own good and care about the other insofar as 
the other is identified with oneself.  All of these affections are mingled and brought 
to focus on the other” (Grisez, 1983, p. 576).   
 
Grisez points out that emotions are spontaneous (similar to reflexes) and their 
character is not altered by their “duration, intensity or recurrence” (1983, p. 370).  
Citing Aquinas (I.II.74.4) he then says that “there can be no personal sin in the mere 
experience of an emotional reaction” (Grisez, 1983, p. 370).  Nevertheless, given the 
fallen human condition, the normal emotion lacks and resists reasonable integration 
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into a good life.  Grisez shows how emotions can be unreasonable, disruptive, 
abnormal and perverse-a state of affairs known as “concupiscence”, the “residual 
effect of original sin” (1983, p. 415).  (As has already been noted, this pejorative 
sense of “concupiscence” is not its only nor primary meaning).  Drawing on Becker’s 
The Denial of Death, Grisez sees the basic distortion of the emotions as resulting 
from anxiety concerning death.  This results in a radical bias towards intense 
pleasure to offset an elemental fear (1983, p. 344).  An individual’s emotional 
reactions can also be “badly conditioned by inappropriate habituation in childhood 
and by personal sins” (Grisez, 1983, p. 371).  Consequently, emotions very often 
“are not easy to integrate, and one experiences in one’s members a law at odds with 
the law of one’s mind (See Rom. 7.23)” (Grisez, 1983, p. 415).  Grisez captures the 
complexity of this by saying “emotional resistance to reasonable decisions cannot be 
accepted as humanly normal and healthy, even though in our actual condition it is 
virtually universal and not pathological” (1983, p. 415).     
 
     1.1.2.4.4:  Discontinuity and development:  Häring 
 
Consideration of the affective response to value is continued in Häring, though not 
by means of an appeal to a Thomistic heritage.  He explicitly acknowledges (1978, p. 
90) that his methodology has its provenance in Existential Philosophy and the 
German school of ethics of value especially those from the phenomenological school 
of Husserl.  Häring takes an innovative step when he engages in what is entitled “a 
phenomenology of the emotions” (1963, p. 196).  He does not repeat this detailed 
analysis in his later volume (1978), confining himself to a more readable treatment 
that is summary in content and, at times, conversational in style.  He examines the 
psychological structure of emotions, their object, nature, categories and their relation 
to the inner act-aspects that will be discussed here.  His further considerations on the 
emotions, for instance on fundamental dispositions, will be examined in the section 
  237 
on the affective virtues and character.  The initial task is to outline the context of 
Häring’s analysis of emotions.   
 
         (i)  Context 
 
Firstly, it has been noted that, for Häring, it is the whole person, body and soul, that 
is “formed in the likeness of the essential image of the Father” (1963, p. 63).  It is not 
human nature that is the subject of Moral Theology.  For Häring, it is the human 
person in relationship, whose dynamic of being and becoming is embodied in call 
and response from which emerges responsibility, moral goodness, holiness and, 
ultimately, worship.  This pattern has reverberations in human emotions and 
affectivity.    
Secondly, Häring’s unique contribution is the moral theory that he draws from his 
reshaping of the theology he had assimilated from Tillman.  The role given to value 
distinguishes him from Tillman and the neo-Thomists.  “The knowledge of value was 
the keystone of Häring’s moral theory” says Gallagher (1990, p. 172).  Its foundation 
is the person’s status as created in the image and likeness of God.  This entails the 
possession of a limited knowledge, an awareness of the divinity.  For Häring, this 
knowing is not primarily conceptual or abstract intuition.  It is either the “practical 
perception of value” or it is “the sense of value.”  In the former (the less perfect) 
“value is plainly discerned in its clarity and splendor and its concrete worth and 
claim to our acceptance” (Häring, 1963, p. 125).  In the latter (the more perfect) “one 
experiences the value not merely in the full radiance of its beauty and exaltation, but 
also with ardent devotion to it...the sense of value attains perfection only in the total 
response to its word of love” (Häring, 1963, p. 125).64  The divine image and activity 
is the centre of value.  In his doctoral thesis Das Heilige und Das Gute,  Häring 
                                                 
64
   In a footnote, Häring points out that “This sense of value (Wertfühlen) is a kind of spiritual 
understanding, not at all an unspiritual sensation or mere feeling.  But feeling and sensation also play 
their roles” (1963, p. 566). 
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explains that Christians, once they are aware of it, are drawn to “the ground of all 
value and all law, because it is essentially a personal relationship, it is dialogue” 
(cited Häring, 1963, p. 173).    
 
For Häring, then, it is the awareness of value that is the basis of the consciousness of 
obligation.  On the subjective level, knowledge of values “is based essentially and 
primarily on our affinity for the good, which is a kind of second nature 
(connaturalitas)” (Häring, 1963, p. 133).  It is not only an awareness but an 
appreciation (1963, p. 126).  The objective sources of knowledge are revelation, the 
believing and teaching community of the Church and the example of fellow 
Christians and saints (Häring, 1963, p. 131f).  Häring’s convergence of these two 
dimensions enables him to overcome two difficulties associated with axiological 
ethics-the need for a) a superior, objective criterion beyond subjective experience 
and b) “a satisfactory basis for the categorical character of the moral demand” 
(Peschke, 1986, p. 86).   
 
The knowledge of true value does not guarantee the right appreciation of all types of 
value or of particular values.  Various forms of blindness or, conversely, lack of 
progress in virtue are influences here.  Types of values refer to a set of specific 
values that share a more general value, for instance, charity and justice (Häring, 
1963, p. 127f).  Particular values refer to “the specific values realized in concrete 
human acts-the avoidance of scandal, feeding the hungry, appropriate sexual 
behaviour” (Gallagher, 1990, p. 174).  Types of values are related to the virtues 
(Theological and Cardinal).  They play an intermediary role between basic and 
particular value, placing the latter within a hierarchy of goods (Gallagher, 1990, p. 
174).  Particular values provide the basis of moral norms. 
 
Häring, then, integrates the objective and subjective dimensions of the moral order.  
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Objective moral values are experience by the Christians as a “summons and 
invitation to the exercise of liberty arising from the value in the object...to preserve 
and nurture value in freedom (Häring, 1963, p. 227).  That call demands a response 
that has an inner and outer dimension-the third aspect in the context of Häring’s 
discussion of emotions.  He distinguishes between the inner act that is turned inward 
and the exterior action that “is extended in its efficacy to the outer world” (1963, p. 
189f).  This external activity is human action “accompanied and sustained by an 
inner acts of insight and freedom” (1963, p. 190).  The human act reveals the moral 
value or its lack in the person.  The external action must “flow spontaneously from 
the heart of a man” if it is not to “soon prove inwardly false and shallow”(1963, p. 
193).  The sphere of moral activity requires interior moral disposition for action to 
have value and depth (1963, p. 196; 1978, p. 93).  It is from the inner resources that 
arises the response to value “which actually and directly sustains value in the act” 
(Häring 1963, p. 190).  This provides the immediate setting for Häring’s treatment of 
the emotions. 
 
         (ii)  Psychological structure of emotions 
 
At the outset, Häring notes the emotions have to be related to the control and 
direction of freedom if they are to become acts of the inner man, shaped by the 
attitudes of the “I at the very center of a man’s being” so that they become “free 
human sentiments, that is deliberate and responsible acts of the inner emotional man” 
(1963, p. 197).  Affectivity and sensitivity to values are particular indicators of “the 
human longing for inner wholeness, for integrity and integration” (1978, p. 90).   
 
Häring proceeds to outline the psychological structure of emotions.  Most of the 
elements he describes have been noted in Chapter two in this study on the working 
understanding of an emotion.  It will suffice to highlight the main points noted by 
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Häring.  Emotions have the following characteristics: 
• cognitive:    they are a form of knowing involving non-abstract thought, 
memories. 
• affective:     they involve a special intimate relation or tendency of the heart 
that requires the direction of a higher sentiment or emotion for them not to be 
destructive (1978, p. 92).   
• intentional:  emotions have a purpose in that “they are specified and their 
natures are determined by the objects to which they are consciously directed” 
(1963, p. 198).   
• experience of value or non-value:  the tendency of the heart is the distinctive 
and primary character of an emotion through which its object or “the objective is 
immediately experienced as value or non-value” (1963, p. 198).  Value or defect 
of value is the means by which emotions are aroused (1963, p. 199).  The object 
is not merely known.  It is appreciated. 
• interactive response:  in contrast with knowing or willing, every species of 
emotion is “a re-echoing response to a value or non-value centering in the subject 
which is the very depths of the human soul” (1963, p. 198; 1978, p. 91).  
Emotions cannot calculate or resolve to act.  “The value invites: emotion 
essentially responds” (1963, p. 202; 1978, p. 91).   
• desiderative:  emotions often release or are accompanied by the urges to seek 
and yearn.  Yet this is not their essence since some emotions entail rest and 
satisfaction, for instance, love, affection, friendliness (1963, p. 198).   
• participative:  emotion as response “re-echoes in the subject” but not in the 
sense of locking themselves up in “the psychic enclosure of man” (1963, p. 198; 
1978, p. 91).  Precisely as responses they are attached to the object, especially 
those not accompanied by desire or yearning.  There is an “intimate relation with 
an object” that exceeds “the most intensive thinking and willing” (1963, p. 198).  
The response to value within the person “re-echoes within the object itself” 
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(1963, p. 198).   
• relational:  there is an inward orientation of the subjective towards objective 
value that is so perfect “that the emotions and sentiments are like spiritual 
outpourings or impulses moving toward their object” (1963, p. 198).  This can be 
impeded by contrary “repressive or convulsive dispositions” that lessen that 
power (1963, p. 199).  
 
For Häring, then, affections such as love, kindness, reverence, are the positive 
expressions of the “psychological and moral aspects of the inner life of man” and 
have “a vitalizing, purifying, enriching effect” (1963, p. 199).  Emotions are psychic 
energies that in some manner, “precede every decision and influence it” through 
being “an intimate approval of their object, a ‘purposeless’ confirmation of their 
worth” (1963, p. 199).  The negative dispositions, conversely, tend to “disdain and 
denial, repudiation and disruption” as if “to blot out the very existence of the object 
of hatred, disdain, envy” (1963, p. 199).  Emotions have a “direct and immediate 
influence” on the subject-either to “promote or vitalize” or “to scorn and isolate” 
(1963, p. 199).  Emotions, for Häring, “make up the very heart of man, from which 
come both good and evil” (1963, p. 199; 1978, p. 92).   
 
         (iii)  Object of the emotions 
 
For Häring, the immediate object of the emotions is value or disvalue.65  Ordinarily, 
the object of an emotion is a person, for instance, God, oneself, a neighbour, a 
community.  Material objects, possessions, plants, animals cannot “be the object of 
                                                 
65
  Aquinas and, for instance, Grisez would tend to use the word “goods” instead of values.  There are 
various types of values-economic, political, social, aesthetic, personal, religious.  Moral values or 
“goods” are those such as friendship, respect for life, keeping promises etc. that are necessary for 
human flourishing and, hence, obligate a person in the exercise of freedom.  Moral goodness is 
attributable to the person who embraces such values and moral badness to the person who impedes or 
rejects them.         
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the emotions in the same profound sense as persons, nor can they be the object of 
emotion at all unless there is some reference or relation to persons” (1963, p. 199).   
Häring’s thinking here could be clearer if he attempted to account for the sense of 
wonder and awe that nature can arouse in human beings.  The object of the emotions 
here does not depend on the presence of, or association with, persons.  There is an 
intrinsic beauty and goodness in creation that can awaken emotions in the observer. 
 
Häring notes the “sharp” distinction  between emotions “directed primarily toward 
value or defect of value” and those directed “toward the person who is the subject of 
the value or defect” (1963, p. 199; 1978, p. 92).  The emotion is more immediate and 
vital when it is a response to a person rather than a quality or virtue, for instance, 
love for a person compared to admiring the person’s courage.  Conversely, one 
should reject, even hate, the faults (disvalues) in another yet love the person for their 
actual value in the eyes of God (1963, p. 200).   
 
Personal values are capable of releasing “the most tremendous positive emotions” 
(1963, p. 200).  If one does not discover “the personal values at their truest and 
profoundest” one “will readily be immersed in superficial values or in non-values” 
(1963, p. 200).  The person will not develop depth of feeling in the heart.  One who 
is spiritually free can really discern true values, discriminate between values, and not 
be overwhelmed by particular values or their lack.  Such a person has a heart that is 
open to “those noble moral sentiments which are owing to men and women as 
persons, as sympathy, pity, reverence, and the like” (1963, p. 200).  
 
         (iv)  Nature of the emotions 
 
An emotion can be central, pertaining to “the actual centre of conscious life” and 
“occupying a broad zone of thought and conduct” (1963, p. 202).  An emotion can, 
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on the other hand, be peripheral.  One may submit to it or reject it but it does not 
“press to the foreground of consciousness (1963, p. 202).  Häring uses hatred as an 
example.  A feeling of hostility that “has taken a deep hold of a man’s heart” is more 
harmful and “morally more decisive than it would be if it occupied only a tiny sector 
of the spiritual life” (1963, p. 202f).   
 
For Häring, emotion as inner disposition is subject to “dimensional depth.”  From an 
objective perspective, this prompts the question “how elevated is the value and how 
profoundly is it grasped?” (1963, p. 203).  Is it only that actual value that is “grasped 
and expressed” or also “its most profound source, which is God?” (1963, p. 203).  
Loving a neighbour in and for God’s sake is a higher value than “mere humane love 
of one’s fellows” (1963, p. 203).  The depth of a person’s grasp has its roots in a 
“vital and affective sense of value, or an intimate and conatural (sic) grasp of value” 
(1963, p. 203).  Häring draws the contrast between the “purely humane love of a 
noble man” which is “warmer and more vigorous than the religious love of 
neighbour of a superficial person” (1963, p. 203).  This sensitivity to attractive and 
enriching values “precede and transcend particular actions” and are “richer and more 
profound than mere conceptual understanding” (1978, p. 91).   
 
Another distinction made by Häring is between emotions that are genuine/authentic 
and those that are fraudulent/unauthentic.  Genuine emotion will not be “fictitious” 
(the pretence that it is being experienced) nor identified with “vigor or vehemence of 
feeling” (1963, p. 203).  For instance, there are counterfeit emotions which 
exaggerate “feeling far beyond the conscious sense of value” or are “artificially 
keyed up beyond the bounds of sincerity and reason” (1963, p. 203).  Genuine 
emotion demands some warmth of feeling, especially if it is “to be permanently 
sustained” (1963, p. 203).  On the other hand, a sign of the “genuine character of our 
inner dispositions” and deeper emotional orientation is perseverance in the spiritual 
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life at times of aridity “when feeling is lacking” (1963, p. 203).  Häring notes the 
“psychosomatic feeling” that depends on the vigorous or defective state of the 
organism may “in no wise be made the test of the true depth and genuineness of 
dispositions or emotions” (1963, p. 204).   
 
         (v)  Categories of emotions 
 
Häring sees two tendencies in emotions and dispositions.  Positive emotions “are 
characterized by affirmation and union, and they center on love” (1963, p. 204).  By 
implication, the negative emotions are characterised by denial, disunity and centre on 
hatred, which Häring sees as “the extreme negative tendency” (1963, p. 204).  It 
implies an “attitude of negation, aloofness, division regarding its object” (1963, p. 
204).  When negative emotions are not integrated into a “positive commitment and 
disposition” they can be signs of “emotional starvation” and of a “loss of 
responsiveness to positive values” (Häring, 1978, p. 92).  For all that, Haring does 
not appear to appreciate the constructive potential of negative emotions.   
 
Häring notes that this terminology is from a psychological perspective.  The moral 
categories of “negative” and “positive” are often the very opposite (1963, p. 204).  
For instance, hatred or another emotion that is psychologically negative (anger, fear) 
must be deemed morally positive (right) if it is “the response to negation or defect of 
value, according to the true hierarchy of values” (1963, p. 204).  By contrast, the love 
of something or someone more than God may be psychologically positive but 
morally negative (wrong) by violating “the right order of values” (1963, p. 204).   
 
Häring says that no emotion can be totally negative.  “The negation always 
presupposes a positive basis” (1963, p. 204).  For instance, hatred of another’s gifts 
indicates a psychologically and morally negative disposition.  But its actual basis is 
  245 
“the psychologically positive disposition of disordered self-love” (1963, p. 204).  
Häring seems to be unclear in his thinking here principally from his use of the word 
“positive.”  He appears to use the word to refer to an “actual” or “real” state 
(disordered self-love) that has definite presence and influence on a person.  It no 
doubt has its roots in defective or absent self-esteem.  This seems at odds with 
“positive” if the word is understood in terms of affirmation, union, love, well-being-
qualities of the healthy functioning of a person.   
 
The positive basis for emotions can be seen from another perspective  in Häring.  
The setting and function of the emotions is the healthy equilibrium of the person, 
psychologically and morally, with a corresponding sense of harmony, peace and 
love.  The role of positive emotions is basically to be the indicators of that state.  The 
role of the negative emotions is that of the warning flares that there is the presence of 
a threat to that balance and harmony in the person and in one’s relationships.  Häring 
further points out that though dispositions may be “morally positive and therefore 
good,” one must not “give them a motivation which is primarily negative 
psychologically” since this is “spiritually unsound” (1963, p. 204).  For instance, if 
zeal is to be morally integrating, it should be for a good cause rather than a 
“righteous indignation against evil” (1963, p. 204).  Overall, “the health, wholeness, 
responsiveness and creativity of the person depend greatly on whether positive or 
negative emotions prevail” (Häring, 1978, p. 92).   
 
     1.1.2.5:  Summary 
 
To sum up.  This investigation of selected post-conciliar authors in relation to 
emotions and the human act has brought to the surface six key elements.  Firstly, 
there is maintenance.  The authors studied preserve the traditional (and necessary) 
treatment of emotions and the human act in terms of influence on the voluntarium in 
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the discussion of antecedent and consequent emotions, fear and habitual 
impediments.   
 
Secondly, there is rediscovery.  Maguire and, to a lesser extent, Peschke reclaim, 
from within the Thomistic patrimony, an affective component in moral reasoning 
and, more importantly for them, in fundamental moral awareness.  Grisez 
acknowledges but does not give much weight to the primordial moral consciousness.  
He does, however, make an advance in analysing the function and moral significance 
of emotions through a creative and contemporary re-interpretation of Aquinas’s 
work.  Amongst the authors studied he is unique in utilising and expanding Aquinas’ 
governing metaphor for the emotions in relation to reason.  He preserves Aquinas’ 
detailed analysis of the process in which the moral judgement blends the affective 
and intellectual dimensions of the self. 
 
Thirdly, there is the innovation that is apparent in Häring’s rich and detailed 
phenomenology of the emotions and in their central  role as value responses in both 
basic moral consciousness and in moral reasoning.  
 
From these emerges the fourth element-a lack of correlation by Häring between his 
analysis of the emotions and the discussion elsewhere in his work on consequent 
emotions.  The normative account of these forms of emotions found in Aquinas ( cf. 
Ch. 3 of this study) and, in more truncated form, in the Manualists, could be enriched 
and consolidated by Häring’s approach.  
 
Fifthly, there is the aspect of commonality.  The notion of connatural knowledge 
provides, to some degree, a shared understanding of moral epistemology for Peschke, 
Maguire, Grisez and Häring.  On the other hand, there are the contrasting views of 
the human person and of morality but these will be explored later in this study. 
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Finally, there is the attitudinal shift present in these authors.  An affirming and 
constructive view of the emotions takes a muted form in Peschke, is more apparent in 
Maguire and Grisez and provides the predominant tone for Häring.     
 
1.2:  Affective virtues and Character 
 
It serves no useful purpose to repeat material already examined and discussed.  As 
above, this section will note similarities and highlight differences in treatment. 
 
1.2.1:  Context 
 
For both Häring and Peschke, the context of the virtues is that of conversion.  For 
Häring the heading is “Imitation and Response to Imitation of Christ” (1963, p. 387).  
For Peschke it is “Conversion, Virtue and Perfection in Holiness” (1979, p. 255; 
1986, p. 325).  The summons is extended by God to every human being.  Conversion 
entails the renouncement of sin (negative phase) and the return to God (positive 
phase).  It is the reclaiming, under grace, of one’s true self and calling (Häring, 1963, 
p. 389ff; Peschke, 1986, p. 325ff).  Conversion is needed for individuals, often for 
communities and nations.  It becomes, in the process, historical in its transmission 
across generations (Peschke, 1986, p. 329).  This is not a “mere moral conversion” 
where there is a renunciation of a non-value or a defect of value in order to enter a 
“new relationship towards moral values” (Häring, 1963, p. 393).  Conversion is a 
religious event that is profoundly transforming since it restores the bonds of personal 
intimacy and friendship of the child with its heavenly Father (Häring, 1963, p. 393; 
Peschke, 1986, p. 331f).  This conversion is an on-going relationship (the following 
of Christ) demanding “greater depth and purity” (Peschke, 1986, p. 328).  This 
process is facilitated by the virtues.   
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1.2.2:  Virtues in general 
 
The early Häring and Peschke (both editions) outline the standard notion of virtue- 
“the habit that gives both the inclination and the power to do readily what is morally 
good” (Peschke, 1986, p. 339).  Häring expands this when he says that virtue “...is 
the most basic harmony with what is good...” and perfect virtue ... “is the 
fundamental right attitude so deep-seated as to have become a kind of second nature” 
(Häring, 1963, p. 486).   
 
Both authors explain the customary distinction between acquired and infused virtues, 
the relationship between them and their supernatural finality.  Two points stand out.  
Firstly, virtue must flow from “the correct fundamental option which is an 
unequivocal orientation to God out of love, for “God’s glorification and for the 
realising of God’s saving plan for humankind and the world” (Peschke, 1986, p. 
339).  Secondly, Christian virtue is not centred on the human person and self-
perfection as the ultimate goal in life. “Its source is Christ and leads to Christ as its 
fulfilment and goal”  through the gift of the Spirit and its emergence in love of God 
and neighbour (Häring, 1963, p. 486f).         
 
In discussing human fulfilment and virtue, Grisez (1983) employs the term “modes 
of responsibility.”  These are “intermediate principles which stand midway between 
the first principle and the completely specific norms which direct choices” (Grisez, 
1983, p. 189).  They are named as such because “they shape willing in view of the 
moral responsibility inherent in it” (Grisez, 1983, p. 189).  These modes make 
specific or ‘pin down’ the primary moral principle by excluding immoral actions that 
involve specific forms of willing inconsistent with a will directed towards “integral 
human fulfillment” (Grisez, 1983, p. 189).  They are negative in form by excluding 
ways one limits fulfilment. Hence, they set boundaries in moral activity.  It is the 
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virtues that embody the modes of responsibility.  Choices made in accord with first 
principles of morality and the modes of responsibility shape “the existential self of 
the good person, this self shapes the whole personality, and so good character 
embodies and expresses the modes” (Grisez, 1983, p. 192).   
 
     1.2.2.1:  Fundamental direction:  the ruling passion 
 
Virtue for Häring entails his emphasis on the fundamental option for God in terms of 
the dominant tendency whether it is named passion, emotions, sentiment.  The 
understanding of the psychological and moral dimension of the emotions requires 
some determination of “what sphere of values occupies the principal place in a man’s 
emotions and sentiments” (Häring, 1963, p. 205).  Häring cites the principal “value 
types” used by Edward Spranger.  Each has a dominant value that corresponds to its 
“ethos or dispositional orientation” (Häring, 1963, p. 205).  He lists six of these with 
the orientation in parentheses: (i) economic-value of profit (devotion to work); (ii) 
aesthetic-enjoyment of beauty (nurture of harmony in oneself and from culture); (iii) 
political-force of power (courage, self-mastery); (iv) theoretic-value of science 
(desire to seek truth); (v) social-good of community (devotion to the ‘Thou,’ 
community); (vi) religious-union with God, salvation of the person (devoted to God, 
detachment) (Häring, 1963, p. 205).  To preserve the true hierarchy of values 
together with a balance between these as inner dispositions, religious value must 
occupy a central place in the heart (Häring, 1963, p. 206).  A failure to do this can 
lead to the highest or noblest values being used as a means to serve the “predominant 
value” (1963, p. 206), for instance, the politician who attends Church to attract votes.                
 
Häring distinguishes two things.  Firstly, there is the basic orientation of a person, 
one’s total potential orientation, prior to any particular decision, “characterised by 
the predominant instinctive emotions and impulses of his temperament” (Häring, 
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1963, p. 201).  The basic intention, on the other hand, is the option for value, “a 
deliberate ‘pre-decision’ with its source in knowledge and the depth of freedom” 
(1963, p. 201).  It determines the inner structure of disposition and temperament 
from which determined patterns of action emerge.  “The basic good intention, if truly 
comprehensive and universal, affects all the particular inordinate impulses of the 
temperament” (Häring, 1963, p. 201).  Even if such impulses do arise, the good 
intention or foundational attitude deprives them of “their full moral significance” 
(Häring, 1963, p. 201).  The basic intention is transformed into a fundamental 
attitude “when the entire inner man with all his instinctive sentiments and emotions, 
his impulses and actions, is thoroughly animated by it...(and it)...dominates his whole 
life” (Häring, 1963, p. 201).  This transformation  takes place “in the dynamic area of 
the dominant passions” (1963, p. 202).  Achieving this requires the dynamic power 
of the will and the education and cultivation of emotional life.     
 
     1.2.2.2:  Morality of the “heart” 
 
From what has been said, it is logical that Häring develops an ethics of the heart.  
This is a morality that finds inner disposition as the source which is ordered to 
action.  “The Biblically orientated ethic of interiority stresses the primacy of love as 
an inward acquiescence in the love of the Creator and the Redeemer” (Häring, 1963, 
p. 212).  Educating the heart sustains and deepens a person’s love.  The Scriptures 
see the heart as the seat of disposition which, with actions, must be well ordered to 
seek true values.  Conversion or metanoia (inner change of thinking, interior 
reorientation) is empowered and activated by the Spirit of Christ dwelling in us so 
that we put on the mind and heart of Christ.  The good tree bears good fruit.  
Theological tradition since Aquinas has emphasised the importance of the will in 
relation to the emotions through the deliberate cultivation of the good emotional 
impulses and the whole emotional structure (Häring, 1963, p. 210).   
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The later Häring (1978) discusses the heart within a full chapter of over 50 pages 
devoted to the Fundamental Option.  He goes beyond Spranger by using the 
contributions of Erikson, Kierkegaard, Maslow and Frankl to expand and deepen his 
treatment.  It is built on basic freedom and knowledge, the centrality of the heart and 
the ethics of response- “that inmost point where the person is sensitive and open to 
the other” (1978, p. 185).  This is the aspect that, for Häring, reveals the promptings 
of the Holy Spirit (1978, p. 201).  The Fundamental Option is a fundamental 
response to God and the good and is embodied in basic attitudes, virtues and a whole 
life-style (1978, p. 195).  It is the Fundamental Option that will provide the 
foundation of Häring’s mature theological vision (something to be explored later). 
 
     1.2.2.3:  Systems and the diversity of virtues   
 
Häring and Peschke note that the great ethical systems hold that one virtue is the 
fundamental or primary one including all other virtues in itself (Häring, 1963, p. 488; 
1986, p. 340).  The views on this have ranged from wisdom (Socrates), to justice 
(Plato), prudence (Aristotle), love of God (Augustine), universal sense of duty 
(Kant).  Aquinas sees prudence as the central moral virtue and charity as the 
fundamental Christian virtue (Peschke, 1986, p. 341; Häring, 1963, p. 491ff).   
 
 
The diversity of virtues arises from their plurality of objects- “the particular domain 
of value to which each virtue is related and directed” (Häring, 1963, p. 488; Peschke, 
1986, p. 342).  From Greek philosophy and the Wisdom tradition four important and 
basic virtues have been singled out-the Cardinal virtues.  Aquinas sees all other 
moral virtues within this framework.  Peschke (1986, p. 343), citing Fuchs, and 
Häring (1963, p. 546ff) see this scheme as not fully satisfactory, principally because 
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it omits certain basic and important Christian virtues, for instance humility, 
obedience, gratitude, fraternal love.   
 
Associated with the need to supplement the traditional understanding of virtues is the 
question of morality itself.  Peschke points out that it is from the ontological point of 
departure that one studies what human beings are, their possibilities and limits, the 
surrounding world in order to lay the foundation for a realistic moral discourse. 
(1979, p. xiv; 1986, p. 8).  He suggests the need to complement this perspective ‘by 
the teleological and eschatological point of departure, which tells us more about the 
goal to be achieved, the kind of person he should be and the work he is to do” (1986, 
p. 8).  The orientation and norms of morality must come equally from the new 
creation, “from the perfection of the kingdom of God which God has planned for the 
end of time” (Peschke, 1993, p. 3).  Virtues (especially the eschatological) and 
actions then must emerge from the calling of human kind to cooperate with God in 
the task of bringing creation to its perfection and give glory to God.  The need for 
this balancing approach is seen by Wendland as “the theological task whose solution 
is necessary for the theology of society and the Christian image of the responsible 
society in social ethics’ (cited Peschke, 1978, p. xiv).  It is this viewpoint and the 
eschatological virtues that are stressed by the later Häring. 
 
1.2.3:  The affective virtues 
 
The earlier Häring (1963, p. 497ff) follows the traditional order and treatment of the 
Cardinal virtues, adding Humility as the basic Christian attitude. Häring takes a 
slightly different angle.  He cites Ambrose and sees the content of the Cardinal 
virtues as “the means and the approach to the love of God, the first rays of the life of 
grace in moral activity” (1963, p. 497).  Peschke (both editions) compresses the 
central elements of the Cardinal virtues under the heading “fundamental 
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requirements of virtue.”  There is a) moral knowledge and prudence, b) love of moral 
value and c) dominion over passions (Peschke, 1979, p. 274ff; 1986, p. 343ff).  
Peschke then investigates the content of the three Cardinal virtues as an exercise of 
Prudence under the rubric “Christian Responsibility Towards the Created World” 
after dealing with the Theological virtues in “Christian Responsibility in the 
Religious Realm.”   
 
The most decisive and essential element in virtue consists in “love of the true values” 
(Peschke, 1986, p. 346).  For Peschke and Häring this consists in a profound 
appreciation or affective grasp of the moral good.  Nevertheless, acquiring and 
realising moral values can “still be impaired by insufficiently controlled passions” 
(Peschke, 1986, p. 346).  A person can still have a basic orientation to goodness 
while still being imperfect in virtue and continues to strive to master passions.  
Parents and educators are significant in this task.  Peschke also makes the cautionary 
note that “good behaviour patterns are not identified with virtue” (1986, p. 347).  It is 
love of true values that is the core of virtue.  But repetition leading to habitual 
dispositions in directing and controlling one’s emotions “renders the practice of 
virtue easier and more efficient.  No perfect virtue can exist without it.  Habitual 
dominion over passions, too, is an integral part of virtue” (Peschke, 1986, p. 247).   
 
 
     1.2.3.1:  Temperance 
 
Temperance as the result of the coordination of human powers is underlined by 
Häring when he says “temperance restrains the affective life and its longings and 
desires” (1963, p. 488).  It maintains a balance in the appetites of desire 
(concupiscible), “holding to the right mean between dullness and lust” (1963, p. 
498).  The focus of Temperance is the self in the need for self-preservation.  It is an 
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expression of self-love, an immanent virtue that can be formulated as the duty of 
self-care.  Its function is “to keep in balance the entire emotional and spiritual life.”  
Particularly in a fallen world, this requires “an orderly conformity with the varied 
world of values...(and)...direct control of spiritual faculties and activity” (Häring, 
1963, p. 529.  It requires both self-understanding and self-discipline.   
 
Häring’s discussion follows the standard course-definition of the virtue, species and 
cognate virtues (in summary form), the role of discipline and moderation plus an 
extensive treatment of self-denial and mortification.  It is substantially representative 
of what is found in the Manualists as discussed in the previous chapter.  Häring 
departs from the Manuals and Aquinas in not treating Humility as a potential part of 
Temperance but as a separate and distinctively Christian virtue.   
 
Overall, Häring sees Temperance in a positive light.  It is an aspect of self-care, 
promoting inner and outer harmony, guiding between extremes in the desiderative 
aspect of the affective life.  Intemperance is primarily a failure in self-love which 
undermines, even “destroys the capacity for true love”-of God and others (Häring, 
1963, p. 530).  Augustine correctly points out that the virtue of Temperance is “in the 
service of love” (cited Häring, 1963, p. 531).      
 
     1.2.3.2:  Fortitude 
 
Häring’s early work again continues the traditional approach.  Fortitude (courage), 
according to early Häring, “controls the affective life in its impulses to vehemence 
and anger (aggressive acts)” (1963, p. 488).  It keeps the irascible appetite under 
control “maintaining a balance between timidity and insolence” (Häring 1963, p. 
498).  Fortitude enables a person  to control emotions of fear and terror, especially in 
the face of what threatens well-being, for instance, suffering or death.  The virtue 
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also empowers a person to take advantage of the dynamic power of anger to oppose 
injustice and evil.  It guides a person in responding with moderate fear, anger etc.  
For Aquinas, its principal act is perseverance and patience (Häring, 1963, p. 526).  
Constancy requires emotional integration and “real greatness of soul” since one’s 
emotional resources can be depleted in face of persistent evil and suffering (Häring, 
1963, p. 526).  Its apex is martyrdom.     
 
     1.2.3.3:  Affective virtues:  divergent approaches 
 
          1.2.3.3.1:  Innovation from within a tradition:  Grisez 
 
Grisez delineates the content of the traditional account of the affective virtues in 
terms of modes of responsibility.  He explicitly refers to S.T. I.II. 61 (Cardinal 
virtues) and to II.II. 141 (Temperance) and 123 (Fortitude).   
 
The innovative aspect of Grisez’ account is his devising of general principles 
governing the emotions and their relation to the will either as responses of attraction 
or of aversion.  Temperance as traditionally understood is re-formulated as the third 
mode of responsibility that “One should not choose to satisfy an emotional desire 
except as part of one’s pursuit and/or attainment of an intelligible good other than the 
satisfaction of the desire itself” (1983, p. 208).  Impulse, habit, fixation can cause 
tension between the object of emotional desire and the intelligible good.  A proposed 
choice can possibly provide “some sense of inner harmony through tension-
reduction” (Grisez, 1983, p. 208).  To settle for a choice of mere emotional 
satisfaction is at odds with a will directed “toward integral human fulfillment” 
(Grisez, 1983, p. 208).  Grisez notes that this is different from a person who 
spontaneously does reasonable things or of gaining emotional satisfaction in acting 
for a true, intelligible value (1983, p. 208).  The virtue corresponding to this mode of 
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responsibility is traditionally called “self-control.”  It indicates that one has the 
discipline of a virtuous disposition “free from positive nonrational motivation” 
(Grisez, 1983, p. 209).  It includes aspects of traditional virtues such as modesty, 
chastity, temperance etc.         
    
Fortitude is encapsulated in the fourth mode of responsibility.  “One should not 
choose to act out of an emotional aversion except as part of one’s avoidance of some 
intelligible evil other than the inner tension experienced in enduring the aversion” 
(Grisez, 1983, p. 210).  This mode is violated when one chooses not to act or to cease 
acting or one changes a reasonable course of action because of repugnance, fear (of 
pain) “or other concerns about obstacles that involve nothing intelligibly bad” (1983, 
p. 210).  The emotion aroused is not commensurate with the evil to justify avoidance, 
i.e., intelligible.  For instance, someone may feel unreasonably fearful and, in order 
to resolve the inner conflict they experience, refrains from action.  This is not the 
same as a person spontaneously avoiding “what reasonably should be avoided” 
(1983, p. 210).  Nor is it to be confused with the instance where “an upright person is 
restrained from moral sensitivity from doing things which someone less morally 
sensitive would do boldly and with moral recklessness” (Grisez, 1983, p. 210).        
     
         1.2.3.3.2:  A renewed Moral Theology: Peschke and Häring 
 
There are no entries for “Fortitude” and “Temperance” in the indices of Peschke’s 
Vol. I (both editions) and one only on “Temperance” in Vol. 2 (both editions).  In the 
contents, there is no section on either of these two virtues.  In both the indices and 
contents of all three volumes of Free and Faithful in Christ there is no reference to 
either Fortitude or Temperance.66  If one examines the texts of both authors, 
Temperance appears to have been subsumed under the section “Responsibility for 
                                                 
66
  This is also the case in Lobo (1989) and O’Connell (1990). 
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health” (Peschke, 1978, p. 307ff; 1993, p. 243ff) or “Health and Healing” (Häring, 
1981, p. 42ff).  Peschke points out that health is not just bodily well-being.  Health of 
mind and soul are crucial.  A person is also “responsible for his psychological 
health” (1978, p. 309; 1993, p. 245).  He then elaborates responsibility concerning 
food, clothing, housing, recreation, spirits, stimulants and drugs.  Fortitude, 
conversely, seems to have been incorporated in the section on the virtue of Hope as 
part of its fruits (endurance in adversity or suffering) or vices opposed to it (despair, 
presumption, faint-heartedness) (Peschke, 1978, p. 57ff; 1993, p. 65ff; also Häring, 
1979, p. 380 ff).       
 
The structure and content of the later Häring’s work indicate the shift from his earlier 
view of the affective virtues in The Law of Christ.  This is not the case with Peschke. 
However, in both authors there is an evident shift in perspective about Moral 
Theology as such that is reflected in the particular structure and content of their 
work.  Having laid the foundation of General Moral Theology (Biblical foundations, 
nature of Morality, Moral law, Conscience, Human acts, Sin), they complete their 
first volumes with Conversion, Virtue and Perfection in holiness (Peschke, 1979, 
1986; Häring, 1978).  This is the springboard for Special Moral Theology whose 
theme is that of Christian Responsibility.  This is exercised, firstly, in the religious 
realm (through the Theological virtues and the virtue of Religion).  In this area, 
Häring, unlike Peschke, is more conscious of ecumenism and the modern ambience 
of criticism and unbelief.  Secondly, responsibility is towards the created world 
(through Healing of Life and Public Life (Häring) namely in Justice, Bodily Life and 
Health, Community Life, Work, Poverty and Social Economy, Political and Cultural 
Life and finally Responsible care of Creation (Peschke, 1978, 1993; Häring, 1979, 
1981).  This design has a centrifugal direction that is complemented by its content.  
The affective virtues are not seen as immanent qualities of the moral subject, as 
perfections of faculties or powers.  They are modes of response and responsibility of 
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the person within the context of relationships with society and nature.   
 
It has already been noted that, for both Peschke and Häring, the foundation of virtue 
is the Fundamental Option and conversion.  Both give an extensive  treatment to this 
topic. However, the mature Häring’s Moral Theology goes further than Peschke.  As 
the foundational response to value, the basic option and intentions penetrate “the 
desires, intuitions, and imagination of the individual...(and) ..they become those 
fundamental attitudes of responsiveness to value which are called virtues” (Crossin, 
1985, p. 30).  For Häring, these virtues are not attempts at self-fulfilment or self-
realisation (Häring, 1981, p. 235f) but are “responses in faith to God” (Crossin, 1985, 
p. 30).  They are eschatological in focus and are gifts of the Spirit, the fount of virtue.    
 
The Fundamental Option that generates certain attitudes, virtues and life-style shapes 
the structure and content of Häring’s work.  It provides the grounding for Häring’s 
theology of the eschatological virtues which he considers more characteristic of 
Biblical ethics than the Cardinal virtues.  Crossin considers Häring’s emphasis here 
is his distinctive contribution to understanding the virtues (1985, p. 30).  The 
eschatological virtues (with the gifts and fruits of the Spirit) are, in many ways, 
dispositions towards time-humility and gratitude (grateful memory for the past and 
God’s deeds), hope (clear orientation and purpose in being open to horizons of the 
future) and vigilance, serenity, joy (attentiveness to the present) (Häring, 1978, p. 
201ff).  Growth, understood as entering more deeply into the Paschal Mystery, is 
characterised by a certain serenity, joy, peace and reconciliation-gifts of the Spirit. 
These virtues embody the basic option, point to the future and provide the impetus 
for cooperating with God in Christ in redemptive action in the world. 
 
The influence of the Fundamental Option on the content of Häring’s vision is 
apparent in the second volume of Free and Faithful in Christ, “The Truth will set you 
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free.”  For Häring, the human person is a relational and responding being who 
combines the human search for truth with the awe generated by the experience of 
beauty.  The innate human thrust towards transcendent values and religious response 
moves the affective response of awe to one of adoration.  This is the precise point on 
which Häring constructs his moral vision of response to a divine summons embodied 
in faith, hope and love from which emerges responsibility in and for the world.  The 
locus of Häring’s moral subject is the world and the focus is on the coming reign of 
God.  Häring and Peschke do not see the moral task principally as centred on the 
moral subject, on response leading to growth that is immanent and personal.  The 
vision is of response and responsibility of the person to God, society and nature.  For 
both authors, the momentum of the Christian moral life is outwards and inclusive, if 
one is to arrive at moral integration. The goal of Christian living, of conversion and 
the exercise of the virtues is not only personal but social and cosmic transformation.  
 
In both these authors, the traditional affective virtues have been assimilated into the 
modes of response and responsibility whether religious, personal or social.  Peschke 
recognises the need for “the critical scales of the eschatological realities...” (which) 
“...informs man about the goal to be achieved, the kind of person he should be and 
the work he should do” (1993, p. 8).  But he does not pursue this by developing the 
nature and role of the eschatological virtues.  This is the unique contribution of 
Häring.  
 
If one considers the eschatological virtues as gifts of the Spirit (as infused), as they 
are described they have emotional reverberations.  Gratitude, hope, joy, serenity, 
peace are both emotions and on-going affective states.  They can be seen as the fruits 
of Fortitude and Temperance, those virtues that provide the necessary psychological 
and moral substructure for the presence and influence of their eschatological 
counterparts. Häring has not neglected the affective virtues and their significance.  
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Rather, he has emphasised forms of those virtues that distinguish the Spirit-guided 
character of the individual Christian but also of the Christian community. These 
virtues become more evident as a person comes to deeper self-possession and love 
reflected in an increasing inner and outer harmony that is embodied in emotions and 
the affective life.  Moreover, to be grateful, humble, vigilant, hopeful, joyful, 
peaceful are the qualities not only of the integrated person but also of the loving 
community.  They are the signs of the reign of God, of God’s reconciliation at work 
within persons, between them and with the created world.  There is something about 
this that is like coming full circle and meeting Aquinas nodding (and smiling) in 
agreement.    
 
1.2.4:  Summary 
 
This section can aptly be summarised around the notion of Response.  The idea is 
central to the three principal authors examined.  It has five aspects. 
(i)    Fundamental response (option) to the good or God or conversion is seen by all 
authors to be the linchpin of the moral life; 
(ii)   Virtues emerging from this are patterns of response manifest in attitudes, 
desires, emotions and life-style; 
(iii)  affective virtues (in the traditional sense of Fortitude and Temperance) are re-
interpreted by Grisez in terms of response to or between values as modes of 
responsibility;  
(iv)   The traditional affective virtues are subsumed by Peschke and Häring in the call 
to respond and to be responsible to God and the world.  The same virtues are 
assumed by Häring in giving prominence to the eschatological virtues.  These are 
gifts of the Spirit through which the fullness of God’s reign in the future begins to be 
realised in the present in persons and communities who are grateful, humble, 
hopeful, vigilant, joyful and peaceful;    
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(v)  Moral response, particularly in Peschke and Häring, looks outwards and is 
inclusive.  It brings expanding horizons of understanding and love for people, 
cultures, societies and nature.   
 
2.  Theological Anthropology in the Selected post-conciliar Authors 
 
The second research question now to be addressed is “What is the vision of the 
human person manifest or inferred in these authors?”  This will entail an examination 
of the context and content of the Theological Anthropology underlying the moral 
significance of the emotions found in the selected post-conciliar authors.      
 
2.1:  Context 
 
The remote context from which the works of authors such as Häring and Peschke 
emerged is a world disturbed by change.  These authors either stimulate or reflect the 
Church’s summons to renew Moral Theology and to enrich its vision from Sacred 
Scripture, Theology and the human sciences.  This indicates a more receptive stance 
towards contemporary culture and scholarship.  Häring is representative of the 
engagement with, and influence of, the intellectual currents of Europe, of the 
nouvelle Théologie, transcendental Thomism and the rise of alternatives to the 
monopoly of  neo-Thomism.  The breadth and depth of the reservoir of 
philosophical, theological and scientific resources is apparent in the bibliographies of 
both Peschke and Häring.  “Moral Theology for Clergy and Laity” is the subheading 
of each of the six volumes of Häring.  The change of setting from that of the 
seminary to that of the university and the world is indicative of a shift in attitude.  
This is mirrored in the structure and content of the Moral Theology of these authors.         
 
The proximate context or the structure surrounding the treatment of the human 
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person in these authors has already been mentioned, mainly with reference to 
Peschke and Häring.  Grisez’ arrangement of his material follows most 
approximately the neo-Thomist manuals.  Unlike Peschke and Häring, he does not 
commence with Scriptural sources and categories.  Rather, he starts with the human 
functions of freedom, conscience, a modern interpretation of Natural Law, Moral 
norms, Law and finally with integration modelled in Jesus Christ and its setting in 
the community of the Church.  Grisez’ account is essentially teleological in that it is 
constructed on the goal of integral human fulfilment.  Peschke, also, begins with a 
teleological basis and explores the place of Natural Law.  However, he both 
integrates and modifies this by the overall direction he provides from Biblical 
sources, the place of Christ, the process of conversion and the need for an 
eschatological perspective.  Overall, Peschke is synthetic, concise and analytically 
more rigorous than the innovative, visionary and inspirational style and tone of 
Häring.   
 
2.2:  Content 
 
In contrast with Aquinas and the Manualists, the Theological Anthropology of 
Häring and Peschke is not organised around the categories in Aquinas’ Philosophical 
Psychology of body and soul, faculties and purposes, nor from a metaphysical 
approach to nature and grace, or nature and supernature.  The starting point is God’s 
initiative and invitation, human response and Conversion.  It is the whole person who 
is formed in God’s image and called to develop in God’s likeness in eternal 
community of love with God (Gallagher, 1990, p. 171).  It is not human nature but 
the human person who, in these authors, is the centre of  Theological Anthropology 
and the subject of Christian ethics.  It is a view of the person shaped by being “men 
and women in both their individuality and sociality, their body and soul, their 
instincts and spirit, their historicity and sense of the present” (Gallagher, 1990, p. 
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171).   
 
The human person, so understood, is the outcome of philosophical movements such 
as Existentialism, Phenomenology and Personalism.  Häring, and to some extent, 
Peschke, are shaped by developments in the understanding of the “self,” the move to 
the subject together with insights gained from various analyses of the structure of 
consciousness and of human experience.  It is especially the person as a presence to 
the self that is significant.  As Kennedy says  
 
The person is at once immanent to the subject and simultaneously transcends it.  
That presence is the mysterious appeal of another.  The response to this appeal 
brings about both an incarnation and a deeper interiority.  Through this 
incarnation one becomes present to the other and this opens the door to 
communion (1996, p. 74f).    
 
What has emerged is the view of the person as a being in relationship, called to 
response and dialogue.  When this is viewed in terms of God’s call to relationship 
and response, it gives rise to a different view of moral agency.  The spotlight is less 
on final beatitude or happiness in God and is more on the human person responding 
to values, to the transcendent and to the inviting God.  The person is an inherently 
religious being and the moral life is, at the same time, religious.  Morality and 
Religion, the morally good and the holy are inseparable (Gallagher, 1990, p. 170).    
 
When considered as the underpinning to the treatment of the emotions, such an 
understanding of the human person has four implications.  Firstly, emotions, as found 
in Häring, are part of an holistic view of the person.  There is a move away from a 
setting of faculties and hierarchy of powers to one in which emotions are “modes” of 
being or of relationship mentioned earlier by Keenan.  Seen as such, emotions are 
forms of response in a dynamic continuum ranging from bodily reflexes through 
involuntary emotions to consciously willed value-responses with virtue as the 
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moderating factor.  In such a construal, there is less danger of viewing emotions 
dualistically, i.e., as always in need of control.  They are more readily amenable to an 
intelligible and necessary significance in overall human functioning and growth.   
 
Secondly, the capacity of the human person to respond to values and persons means 
that the nature/grace distinction is susceptible to a more satisfactory interpretation.  
The static model of grace building on nature (the two-tier model), is replaced by one 
that is dynamic.  The radical capacity to respond impels the subject to a widening 
horizon of values, including those that are transcendent and to the transcendent God.  
Without resorting to evolution or self-elevation in order to share in the supernatural 
realm, such a momentum in the person is the aptitude (obedientia potentialis) to 
respond to any person, even to the divine personal being who chooses to be self-
revealing, inviting humans to participate in God’s inner life through grace.  By using 
the notion of value, Häring is able “...not just to relate the choice of particular moral 
values to the order of goods, but also to identify such choices as central elements 
within the Christian response to the divine summons and invitation” (Gallagher, 
1990, p. 175).            
 
Thirdly, Natural Law is not a central concern in the General Moral Theology of 
Häring.  Moral norms principally take the form of God’s summons in Christ.  This is 
partly through the new law of the grace of the Holy Spirit “knocking at the door of 
man’s heart” (1963, p. 257).  It is partly through the various forms of Law in 
Revelation, Tradition and human experience.  Natural Law has a role as the rational 
capacity to see norms for human acts discernible “through insight into the nature of 
man in the world” (Gallagher, 1990, p. 175).  For the later Häring, in particular, 
Natural Law is a theological doctrine stemming from creation.  Nevertheless, as 
Gallagher points out, for Häring the new law of grace is under threat if law is 
confined to eternal prohibitions of universal law and not built on a personal 
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relationship with God in Christ (Gallagher, 1990, p. 171; Häring, 1963, p. 260).  The 
new law of grace and the Natural Law should combine to articulate appropriate 
Christian responses (Gallagher, 1990, p. 175).   
 
Fourthly, one must emphasise the importance of the role given to value, incorporated 
in Peschke, but originating in Häring.  It distinguishes Häring from the neo-Thomists 
and is the unique contribution he makes in relating a moral theory to Tillman’s 
theology (Gallagher, 1990, p. 178).  For Häring, the person is the bearer and the 
revealer of value.  Awareness of value is a dynamic awareness, an appreciation 
involving the whole person-mind, will, heart, emotions.  Since a person is made for 
relationships, and has a personal attraction to the ground of all value and law 
(Gallagher, 1990, p. 178).  Häring expands the nature of emotions as value responses 
so that, for him, they are the platform of religious morality.  The appreciation of 
values is inseparable from the appreciation of the ultimate value (God).  Such an 
awareness grounds primordial moral awareness, reveals moral norms, engenders 
virtue and guides practical reasoning.  The shape of Häring’s Theological 
Anthropology has its base in emotions as responses to value.  
 
Finally, while the Theological Anthropologies of Häring, Peschke and Grisez may 
differ in emphasis and, at times, in content, each has a basic coherence and 
consistency.  From the textual evidence there does not appear to be any conflict 
between an “espoused” theory of the human person and a theory “in use.”   
 
3.  Comparisons and Contrasts amongst Authors, with Manualists and Aquinas 
 
“What is the significance of the different understandings and treatments of the 
emotions and of the human person in these authors?”  This question is the next 
concern. 
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3.1:  Comparison and Contrast amongst Selected Contemporary Authors 
 
The language used in Peschke through Grisez to Häring conveys an increasingly 
affirmative understanding of the emotions.  While acknowledging the responsibility 
for any Moral Theology to account for the destructive potential of the emotions and 
their need of control and guidance, in these authors there is not the pejorative 
terminology and tone that pervades the Manualists.  Grisez’ retrieval of the political 
image of Aquinas (“deliberative assembly”) indicates an awareness of the delicate 
yet necessary interrelationship of emotion, intellect and will. 
 
In examining emotions and the human act, the affective grasp of moral value central 
to Häring is also affirmed by Peschke, particularly when he acknowledges the 
contribution of axiological ethics.  The same awareness of moral value, but in 
relation to primordial moral consciousness, is reclaimed by Maguire from the 
Catholic tradition after Aquinas.   
 
The role of emotions in practical reasoning is elaborated in some detail by Grisez.  
He essentially reworks Aquinas’ treatment of the role and moral significance of the 
emotions.  This is evident in his treatment of the manner in which emotions present 
the object to the will by attention, and in their relational character, within and beyond 
the person.  Häring’s treatment is more consistently phenomenological in style, 
centred on the correlation of emotions as responses to value or disvalue and their 
contribution to the psychological and moral aspects of human life.  Unlike Aquinas, 
the later Häring does not investigate the place of negative emotions such as sadness, 
anger and fear for their interpersonal significance and as propellents in the moral life.          
 
Affective virtues and character have the common foundation of conversion which, 
for Häring and Peschke, is as much a religious as a moral event.  Virtues emerge 
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from the Fundamental Option and originate in, and lead to, Christ.  For Grisez, 
alternatively, the virtue embody the modes of responsibility.  The role of the ruling 
passion and of the heart are significant, particularly for Häring.  As has been 
explained, for Häring and Peschke, conversion as response generating responsibility 
shapes the structure of their work.   
 
The traditional affective virtues of Fortitude and Temperance are acknowledged and 
briefly explored in the early Häring.  They are reformulated by Grisez, drawing on 
Aquinas, using the setting of modes of responsibility.  In Peschke and the later 
Häring, these virtues are absorbed in the process of  conversion and in forms of 
responsibility.  Häring highlights the eschatological virtues which, in fact, are 
indicators of affective equilibrium and well-being.  In these and other modern 
authors, the thrust towards redemption and transformation of the world is consonant 
with the relational nature of the person apparent in the social repercussions of 
emotions and of the affective virtues. 
 
Overall, these authors represent positions that range from the predominantly 
teleological, to a modified teleology to a dominantly eschatological thrust. Grisez is 
most dependent on Aquinas while there is a decreasing appeal to Aquinas in Peschke 
and Häring, especially in the later writing of Häring. Emotions receive minimal 
coverage in Peschke, are more detailed in Grisez (from a reinterpreted Thomistic 
perspective) and also in Häring where he employs a phenomenological and 
axiological methodology.  Conversion and Fundamental Option are the hub of the 
moral life in Peschke and the early Häring but are given greater emphasis and 
exposition in the later Häring.   
 
3.2:  Comparison and Contrast of these authors with Manualists and Aquinas 
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Three headings seem to emerge that encapsulate the different understandings of the 
emotions and the human person and their significance.   
 
3.2.1:  Dynamics of human subjectivity 
 
The first aspect here is self-awareness.  The post-Enlightenment vision of the 
optimistic, autonomous human being was expanded with the Darwinian proposition 
that man “rode forth on the crest of evolution’s advance” (Tarnas, 1991, p. 327).  
Consciousness of the self was both deepened and questioned by Freud when he 
applied the tools of rational investigation to the conscious and, in particular, to the 
unconscious.  This development merged with the tradition from Bergson, Husserl, 
Heidegger and the Christian personalism of Mounier.  Experiential analysis focused 
on “being” itself, “on the lived world of human experience, on its increasing 
ambiguity, its spontaneity and autonomy, its uncontainable dimensions, its ever-
deepening complexity” (Tarnas, 1990, p. 374).  There was also the turn to the subject 
from theologians such as Rahner and Lonergan.  All these exemplify what Kennedy 
notes earlier, the awareness by the self of the person as “a secret guest”, at once 
immanent yet transcending the subject (1996, p. 74).   
 
Overall, these are some of the factors that created what Taylor refers to as “modern 
inwardness, the sense of ourselves as beings of inner depths, and the connected 
notion that we are ‘selves’ ” (1989, p. x).  These sources provide the instruments for 
the detailed analysis of consciousness and of the emotions evident in Häring and, to a 
lesser extent, in  Grisez but which is absent in the Manualists.  This expands the 
coherent yet, by modern standards, inadequate account of Aquinas.  This is 
exemplified in Grisez and Häring who advance on Aquinas by recognising the moral 
ramifications of unconscious emotions and affective states on conscious attitudes and 
behaviour.   
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Self-awareness was not only of the personal self but also of the self-in-relationship.  
The dark side of human personhood is uncovered by Marx in the social unconscious 
leading to a determinism from hidden political, economic and social forces.  
Conversely, there is the positive evolution of understandings of the person as a 
political/social subject of human rights, particularly in the face of totalitarian 
ideologies and institutions.  The heritage of Locke, revolutionary Europe and 
emerging social theory finds its voice in Catholic Social Teaching from 1891 and 
Rerum Novarum.  These are complemented by approaches to the person in writers 
such as Buber.  The person develops as a self-in-relationship through intimacy, 
dialogue, response.  This is reflected in H. Richard Niebuhr’s ethic of the responsible 
self.  The person in society and the world is one of the dominant concerns of the 
second Vatican Council.  Social and structural injustice becomes be an increasing 
theme over the past thirty years.  
 
These are important considerations if one is to grasp the significance of how these 
authors understand the emotions and the person. The social context and the overall 
thrust of Peschke and Häring emerge from the confluence of these factors.  There is a 
strong emphasis in Häring on the historical, social and interpersonal nature of the 
person and, hence, of response and  responsibility (Gallagher, 1990, p. 206).  In such 
a setting, emotions as value-responses have a social origin and goal that is more 
clearly delineated.  The affective dimensions of the self contribute to the vision and 
the realisation of God’s reign.   
 
This standpoint has a more cultivated awareness of the communitarian aspect of 
personhood.  As has been suggested above, the moral significance and interpersonal 
connotations of emotions such as anger, sadness or fear evident in Aquinas seem to 
have been disregarded by these authors.  Having said that, this stance in these authors 
also forms a marked contrast with what appears as a self-concerned, almost self-
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absorbed portrayal of the person and the moral life in the Manualists.  One author 
goes so far as to say how he was “appalled by the egocentricity which dominated so 
much pre-Vatican II Catholic ethics” (Vacek, 1994, p. xvi).  Is this also true of 
Aquinas?  Mention has already been made of Porter’s reservations about the social 
dimension of the person in Aquinas (1990, p. 176) and of Clarke’s counter argument 
(Clarke, 1986).  A recent discussion points out that Aquinas’ essentialist metaphysics 
of the person tends to accord “priority to categories of substance over categories of 
relation” (Hunt, 1998, p. 198).   
 
What can be said in the light of this project?  Words such as “egocentric” and “self-
absorbed” seems too strong to use of Aquinas’ Moral Theology.  Is there any truth in 
the observation  that it is difficult for Aquinas to avoid portraying the human person 
as “finally a self-contained individual” (Porter, 1990, p. 176).  Two observations may 
help.  Firstly, a distinction should be made.  If by “social” one means “relational,” 
i.e., between persons, the evidence indicates that Aquinas does pursue some 
interpersonal implications of the affective virtues and of some emotions while not 
adverting to their potential as tools for social change.  If “social” connotes 
relationships in the public sphere, i.e., economic, societal, political, environmental, 
structural, then this domain, while not absent, is not the dominant context of 
Aquinas’ moral vision as it is for these modern writers.   
 
Secondly, both Aquinas and these modern authors are concerned with growth in 
Christian discipleship.  But, as Keenan points out recently, for Aquinas the virtues 
are perfections of the emotions that enable a person to develop and realise the in-
built potentialities of human affectivity (Keenan, 1998, p. 139ff).  The main context 
is the harmony and integration of the moral subject through the exercise of the 
virtues.  In Peschke and Häring, we see early indications of the more relational 
dimension of the virtues (both interpersonal and social/structural) and on the goal of 
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fellowship and unity of the Kingdom.  The context is now the world-human and 
natural-and the vision of harmony and peace which emerges from human moral 
response and co-responsibility with God.  It is through responding virtuously in such 
relationships that the moral subject comes to maturity in Christ. 
         
3.2.2:  Aspects of morality 
 
The understandings of the emotions and the person shape the views of moral 
epistemology.  The affective appreciation of value as the foundation of moral 
consciousness is shared by Peschke, Grisez and Häring.  The contribution and moral 
significance of emotions in practical reasoning is elaborated by Grisez and Häring.  
These provide a marked contrast with the ambivalent and, at times, negative 
approach in the Manualists.  It also counteracts the dualism lurking in the Manualists.  
In a way, this type of affective knowing is an initial form of the participatory 
epistemology mentioned by Tarnas (1990, p. 423) and explained in the first chapter 
of this study.   
 
There is also a contrast in moral theory.  Nowhere in any of the volumes of Häring 
and Peschke (nor Grisez) is there a section on the Canon Law of the Sacraments.  
More significantly, the structure and content of their works indicate a shift from the 
legal, voluntarist, externally-directed theory of moral life that underlies the 
Manualists.  There is, simultaneously, a return to interiorisation begun in conversion, 
to the place of intentionality and the virtue-based ethics of Aquinas combined with 
the emergence of an emphasis on social responsibility and eschatological 
considerations.  
Thirdly, moral agency has a different focus than that found in the Manuals, even 
those shaped by the neo-Thomists.  Peschke and Grisez give greater weight to 
teleological categories.  For Häring, fundamental end and happiness are realities.  
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However, they are not understood in terms of ontology, teleology or of human nature 
as a metaphysical essence with certain needs, potentialities and requirements.  For 
Häring, as for Peschke and Grisez, moral agency is exercised and achieved in 
relation to the imitation of Christ.  For Häring, in particular, final and efficient 
causality are not organising categories as in Aquinas.  Gallagher points out that, for 
Häring, “exemplary causality tends to replace final causality” (1990, p. 205).  
Moreover, the contours of pastoral ministry precisely as the work of healing are 
different when the setting is not juridical but is rather the response to the invitation to 
follow Christ.      
 
3.2.3:  Moral Vision and Vocation 
 
The Christocentric nature of the moral life is a key element in the three authors.  The 
Biblical basis of morality is not given the place in Grisez that it receives in Peschke 
and Häring.  In the later Häring, the need for the right vision has priority over 
normative ethics in Moral Theology (1978, p. 6 and p. 317).  For all three authors, 
the Christian vocation is to follow Jesus Christ and to cooperate in responsibility in 
the religious realm and in and for the world.  Growth in the affective virtues is not 
aimed at self-fulfilment.  Highlighting the eschatological virtues shifts the gaze to 
love for and with God.  We are partners with God- “God’s co-workers” (1 Cor. 3:9).  
As Vacek says neatly, citing de Chardin, “In cooperating with God’s love for the 
world, we want not only to affirm and promote the fulfillment of creation, but also to 
increase ‘Christ’s blessed hold on the universe’ ” (1994, p. 140).     
 
This chapter can be summed up by in this manner.  In looking back over the passage 
of this study on the moral significance of the emotions, one can observe a pattern.  
The three sets of soundings (Aquinas, Manualists, post-conciliar authors) have 
generated contrasting “world-views” or “sensibilities” that are as much cultural and 
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philosophical as they are religious and theological.  While these may, at times, 
converge or, at times, conflict and, often, may diverge, this is as it should be.  Their 
relationship should be one that is mutually critical.  Nevertheless, such an evaluation 
is generally done from inside the Catholic tradition.  It may be helpful, even 
necessary, to engage in a critical appraisal using benchmarks external to that 
tradition.  This will be the next and final task of this project.     
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Chapter 7 
 
 
 
Contemporary Soundings and Benchmarks   
 
 
In arriving at the final research chapter of this thesis, the focus remains the same but 
the tilling is done in different soil.  The three research questions will be applied to 
writings from Moral Philosophy (Oakley), Psychology (Callahan) and 
Developmental Psychology (Gilligan, Shelton).  Other sources, e.g., theological 
writing, will also be considered as influenced by, or converging with, these authors.   
 
The first task is to address the research question “How do these authors portray the 
moral significance of the emotions in the (Christian) moral life in relation to human 
acts, virtue and character?”  The bracketing of “Christian” indicates that this does not 
provide the context for the discussion of the topic in the specific authors mentioned 
(with the exception of Shelton).  This chapter will entail an examination of key 
elements in their writings together with a correlation and evaluation of these and the 
authors discussed earlier in relation to each other, i.e., Aquinas, Manualists and post-
Manualists. 
 
 
1.  The Moral Significance of the Emotions   
 
 
 
1.1: Emotions and the Human Act  
 
 
1.1.1: Emotions and morality:  A view from Moral Philosophy 
 
 
Justin Oakley’s Morality and the Emotions (1992) is one of the few comprehensive 
treatments of the topic published in English.  His aim is to counter the view that 
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emotions just happen to us, that they are beyond our power or control.  Oakley’s 
argument is that emotions play a fundamental role in the moral life and are necessary 
for the humanly flourishing life.  They are “essential and enduring features of our 
moral character” (1992, p. 5).  Oakley takes Aristotle’s claim that moral virtue 
demands not only acting well “but also having the right emotions in the right way 
towards the appropriate objects and to the right degree” (1992, p. 2).  A proper 
appreciation of the moral significance of emotions requires an adequate account of 
the nature of an emotion which he attempts in Chapter one.  He views emotions as  
“complex phenomena involving dynamically related elements of cognition, desire 
and affectivity” (1992, p. 2).  This has already been discussed in Chapter 2 of this 
project.  Suffice to say that, for Oakley, only such a model is sufficient to explain, 
firstly, the moral significance of emotions (through the balancing of the three 
elements) and, secondly, the characteristics of the right emotions entailed in moral 
virtue.           
 
The remainder of the book revolves around three questions.  Firstly, does one have 
obligations to have and to cultivate certain emotions?  Oakley’s second chapter 
attempts to answer this affirmatively by examining the moral significance of 
emotions.  He argues that emotions can help facilitate or impede the achieving of 
certain human goods or values, e.g., strength of will, psychic harmony, love and 
friendship, a sense of self-worth.  Emotions such as sympathy, care, compassion, 
concern, courage assist in attaining such goods.  Conversely, emotions such as envy, 
fear, self-pity, resentment undermine or oppose the realisation of these values.          
 
Secondly, Oakley asks whether emotions can be appropriate moral motivations.  
After dealing with the Kantian arguments against emotions as moral motives, Oakley 
again gives an affirmative answer by demonstrating the moral values of certain 
emotions independent of the motivation they may provide for right action.  The final 
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question concerns whether one can be held responsible for having or not having 
certain emotions.  This is taken up in Chapter four where Oakley examines the nature 
and extent of one’s control of emotions.  He then proceeds to elaborate a person’s 
responsibility to exercise control over emotions at a deeper level by endeavouring to 
develop, shape or modify emotional capacities over a period of time.  A person has 
the responsibility to cultivate moral sensitivity because one has the power to do so 
and because moral sensitivity makes a notable difference in one’s actions.  In the 
final chapter, Oakley examines the forms of moral assessments made in relation to 
the emotions and to the configuration of one’s emotional life (praise/blame, 
esteem/disesteem).           
 
This study will discuss two aspects of Oakley’s treatment, firstly, his understanding 
of the moral significance of emotions and, secondly, his discussion of moral 
reasoning.   
 
     1.1.1.1:  Moral significance of emotions 
 
Oakley has an extended and valuable analysis of the moral significance of emotions.  
His overall emphasis is on emotions in terms of their goodness (rather than as 
impediments to moral growth).  Mention has already been made of the need, in 
Oakley’s view, to explain the moral significance of an emotion in terms of all of its 
three components, i.e., cognition, affection, desire.  For instance, if one sees an 
emotion’s moral significance only in terms of cognition and desire what is the 
outcome?  It means that when John knows that someone needs help and desires to do 
something though he is not actually moved affectively (e.g., by compassion) it is, 
morally speaking, no different from Bill who has the knowledge, desire and is 
emotionally moved by the person’s plight.  In fact, there is far less chance that John 
will act merely on the knowledge and/or the desire.  Further, he may do so but fail to 
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give the help that is really needed, e.g., a sympathetic ear or shoulder, because he has 
no emotional involvement.  Conversely, Harry may know this person needs help, is 
moved emotionally but has no desire to assist or act.  One cannot attribute 
compassion to him in the same moral sense as that of Anne who knows, is 
sympathetic and desires to help the one in need.  Finally, Mary may be genuinely 
moved with sympathy, have a desire to assist but, because of inadequate knowledge, 
can act in ways that are misguided or irresponsible.  Her emotion of compassion is 
hardly the moral equivalent of Sophie’s who, beyond the sympathy and desire to 
help, endeavours to gain a fuller picture of this situation so as to provide more 
adequate assistance.                            
 
Oakley’s main, and considerable, contribution is his effort to demonstrate the moral 
significance of emotions through their necessary involvement in achieving certain 
goods.  The main elements in this process will be highlighted briefly. 
 
For Oakley, clear perception, keen judgement, insight and understanding are 
essential to a good person both as values in themselves and in contributing to good 
actions.  Certain emotions, e.g., care, interest, can deepen and expand one’s 
perception and understanding of the world (1992, p. 50).  Emotions such as 
sympathy and compassion may be necessary to notice certain realities or situations in 
the world.  More importantly, they are needed to enter another person’s world 
imaginatively so that one can feel for and with them in their need.  Without these 
emotions, one’s perceptions, even desires, are constrained and blunted.  Oakley also 
uses the example of the emotion of love expanding one’s perception and 
understanding of others.  Love leads one to contemplate another’s well-being, to 
adopt the viewpoint of the beloved, see the world through their eyes, to experience 
“with them” (Oakley, 1992, p. 52).  Overall, it is emotions such as these that, through 
art, literature and film, one’s insight and understanding are expanded by identifying 
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with the characters in pity, fear, admiration, sympathy.  For such reasons they are 
important and, hence, morally significant. 
 
Another value, according to Oakley, is strength of will-the transforming of values 
into action that is persevering.  Emotions such as care, sympathy and courage are 
important in preserving action.  Further, Oakley argues that when what a person 
values is in accord with what is morally good “we may be morally better if in 
carrying out what we believe good, our emotions harmonise with our values, than if 
our emotions and values are in disharmony” (1992, p. 54).  He suggests four reasons 
for this.  Firstly, emotional involvement will often help a person be more ready and 
reliable in successfully carrying out what they value.  Secondly, such a harmony 
between emotions and values indicates “a certain moral integrity or wholeness” 
(1992, p. 54).  There is a psychic harmony associated with human flourishing and 
moral integration.  Thirdly, and crucially, “ a person who values the right things and 
is emotionally moved to act on them seems morally better than someone who has and 
acts on these values in the face of conflicting inclinations, because the former 
person’s emotions are an indication that these values are really his” (1992, p. 55).  
This is nothing other than appropriation, internalisation and growth in affective 
virtues.  Fourthly, psychic harmony associated with action in cooperation with 
emotions provides the necessary foundation for achieving goods such as love and 
friendship (Oakley, 1992, p. 55).  A lover may act out of love (motive) for the sake 
of the beloved (reason for action).  If it is a true act of love, there is a necessary 
connection between the motive and the reason for the action.  This would not be the 
case if one were to act for the beloved’s good because it maximised self-interest 
(1992, p. 55).   
 
Psychic harmony and strength of will, notes Oakley, can also be evil ends.  One may 
believe something to be good which, in fact, is evil and one is moved emotionally to 
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morally wrong action with accompanying inner equilibrium and strength of purpose.  
These are instances of the influence of bias, prejudice, malice, even of corrupted 
consciousness.  They will involve emotionally wrong responses.  Conversely, 
psychic disharmony and emotional disturbance through remorse or guilt are 
indicators of the need for moral change to regain harmony and equilibrium.  These 
are further confirmations of the moral significance of emotions.   
 
Love and friendship involve relationships that require mutual understanding, shared 
interests, a desire to promote the other’s welfare and, importantly here, certain 
emotions towards and about each other.  A friend or a lover is affected and motivated 
by whatever fosters or impedes the other’s good-an emotional valuing of their good 
(Oakley, 1992, p. 58).  Love and friendship are worth achieving, valuable in 
themselves and in relation to other goods in life.  They are necessary for a person to 
flourish.  Emotions are morally significant because of the important role they play in 
such basic relationships in terms of continuity, sense of purpose, knowledge of life 
(1992, p. 60).  The absence of these and of friendship and love from a person’s life 
“could be a grave loss” and indicators that, in those respects, a person’s life is 
“morally lacking” (1992, p. 62).  The appreciation of the other, the concern for their 
well-being, can develop a deeper awareness of human needs and desires, of oneself 
and particularly of the qualities of one’s life “...as itself unified and continuous, in a 
manner that is unavailable to a person whose life lacks love and friendship” (1992, p. 
62).                     
 
Emotions also have an important connection with self-worth whether it be one’s own 
and that of others.  Oakley cites Solomon, Sartre, Heidegger in pointing out that it is  
 
through our emotions that we constitute ourselves-i.e. through our emotions we 
bestow meaning to the circumstances of our lives and invest ourselves in the 
world, providing opportunities for fulfilment and frustration, and it is in such 
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constitution and involvement that an appreciation of our self-worth is reached 
(1992, p. 64).    
 
Emotions create interests, purposes, attachments which are important in shaping 
one’s identity, self-concept and self-esteem.  So certain emotions are involved in 
attachments (to oneself, others, projects, goals, values) all of which are “essential to 
our reaching an appreciation of our own worth” (Oakley, 1992, p. 65).  As will be 
explained later, the psychological foundations of self-esteem are found in the 
emotions, especially in basic trust.  Self-esteem, self-care and self-concern are 
needed conditions for seeing and responding to the needs and worth of others.  The 
moral significance of emotions emerges from their association with self-worth since 
the appreciation of the worth of the person is “of unquestionable moral significance” 
(Oakley, 1992, p. 68). 
 
Finally, Oakley recognises that emotional deficiency has an important bearing on the 
moral actions and development of a person (1992, p. 46f).  It could be due to a lack 
of appropriate cognitions, e.g., superficial understanding of others and of situations.  
It could result from lack of desire in having no motivation or direction in life.  There 
may be absence of affective response in a person.  All three of these affect a person’s 
perceptions, insight, sensitivity, self-esteem, respect for others, strength of will, 
psychic harmony, and the capacity for love and friendship.  These qualities and the 
emotions associated with them, such as sympathy and compassion, are morally 
important for a person’s character.  Their lack may indicate certain moral defects in a 
person.       
 
     1.1.1.2:  Emotions and moral reasoning 
 
Oakley has a helpful discussion on moral reasoning-that process for determining the 
moral rightness and wrongness of human acts.  In discussing whether all emotions 
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are morally significant, Oakley suggest a helpful two-part test.  Firstly, to ask 
whether this is “an instance of an emotion-type which helps constitute or undermine 
one of the goods central to human flourishing” (1992, p.79).  The emotions he 
emphasises (e.g., compassion, courage, fear, envy etc.) fulfill these conditions.   
 
Those such as awe, embarrassment, nostalgia, do not.67  Oakley refers to this test as 
“first-level moral significance” (1992, p. 79).   
 
The second question concerns whether this emotion is morally appropriate in a 
particular situation or, in other words, are there some emotions always right or 
always wrong?  For instance, is compassion for a thief engaging in illegal activities 
morally wrong?  Is the possessive love of a parent for a child always a wrong 
emotion?  Right or wrong in these contexts entails “second-level moral significance” 
(1992, p. 80).  This is Oakley’s particular concern now.  Oakley’s position is that 
one’s particular emotional response  
 
 
is right if what we take it to be directed at is in fact morally good, whereas an 
emotional response of ours is wrong if what we take it to be directed at is in 
fact morally bad, where ‘goodness’ and ‘badness’ are understood here 
according to virtue ethics: i.e. in terms of what contributes to or detracts from a 
flourishing life (1992, p. 80f).   
 
 
How can one determine what is the right or wrong object of an emotion in an 
individual case?  It is through practical reason or phronesis, says Oakley.  “The 
rightness or wrongness of a particular emotional response is dependent on whether it 
is in fact  aligned with an appropriate object, in the manner of a practically wise 
person” (1992, p. 81).  If the object and the emotional response are consistent with 
                                                 
67
  This author disagrees with Oakley in his view of “awe.”  An emotion such as awe (and wonder) 
has an especially self-transcending quality that reveals an openness and sensitivity to values or 
realities that draw a person out of themselves in responding to such experiences as beauty or love.  
From that perspective, they are central to human flourishing and, therefore, to moral growth.  
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those had by a practically wise person (phronimos), then one’s “emotional response 
is right in this situation” (Oakley, 1992, p. 83).      
 
Phronesis, then, integrates the “perceptual, deliberative, affective, and practical 
faculties so that they operate well together” (Oakley, 1992, p. 81).  It disposes a 
person to respond emotionally and act in certain ways.  More importantly, certain 
emotions are indispensable in making one sensitive to values by directing one’s 
perceptions to “certain ethically salient features of situations” (1992, p. 82).  Oakley 
cites the words of Nancy Sherman who says  
 
...a sense of indignation makes us sensitive to those who suffer unwarranted 
insult or injury, just as a sense of pity and compassion opens our eyes to the 
pains of sudden and cruel misfortune...We notice through feeling what might 
otherwise go unheeded by a cool and detached intellect.  To see dispassionately 
without engaging the emotions is often to be at peril of missing what is relevant 
(1992, p. 82).   
   
 
To sum up:  Oakley’s position is quite clear.  There are emotions that are morally 
significant in themselves.  Further, emotions and their corresponding virtues are 
integral to ethical reasoning.  Without them, we cannot be moral beings and, hence, 
truly human.  More comment will be made on Oakley later in this chapter.  It is time 
to move on to the next task.   
 
 
1.1.2.  Moral reasoning:  the alternative of “seeing” differently 
 
Morality is concerned with the human purposes considered necessary to preserve 
certain qualities of life.  There are divergent views on the amalgam of goals desired 
important and necessary for human flourishing.  Oakley’s aretaic conception of the 
moral life does not hold a monopoly position.  Different forms of moral reasoning 
emerge from the sets of standards employed to achieve human purposes and from the 
  283 
ordering of priorities in human action. 
 
Kennedy notes that “all human actions involve reason in reaching a decision” (1996, 
p. 152).  He then proceeds to make an important distinction.  Practical or moral 
reasoning involves (amongst others) two steps that are crucial.  Deliberation 
identifies “the means needed to achieve an end” (1996, p. 152).  From this emerges 
the judgement.  Decision is concerned with saying “yes” or “no” to one of the 
alternative courses made clear by deliberation.  There is an on-going debate about the 
factors needed to contribute to and facilitate the activity of moral reasoning.  This 
thesis has been concerned with the significance of the emotions in this process.   
 
Kennedy points out that moral reasoning “is a unique mode of knowing that does not 
correspond to any of our theoretic ways of knowing for knowing’s sake” (1990, p. 
399).  Aristotle (as Aquinas) appreciated this in his distinction between episteme  and 
phronesis and the differences between them in terms of their grasp of facts and 
certainty concerning truth.  Kennedy, reviewing a recent book of Jean Porter, draws 
attention to her argument that the development of mathematical reasoning as the 
paradigm for moral reasoning since Kant has influenced the deontological, utilitarian 
and consequentialist approaches.  In Porter’s words “On this view, moral rules are to 
be understood as functioning, in the realm of practical reason, in the same way as 
mathematical functions work in the realm of speculative reason” (1995, p. 568).     
 
This provides the context for examining briefly the work in Developmental 
Psychology of Gilligan (1982) and others.  The theory of moral development of 
Kohlberg was subjected to a radical criticism by Gilligan.  She considered Kohlberg 
a child of the Enlightenment in “representing a typically formalistic view of moral 
criteria” (Philibert, 197, p. 105).  He sees moral reasoning and moral development in 
terms that are ideal, universal, abstract and impersonal.  Hepburn, citing Friedman, 
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notes that both Moral Psychology and Moral Philosophy have been preoccupied 
“...with universal and impartial conceptions of justice and rights and the relative 
disregard for particular, interpersonal relationships based on partiality and affective 
ties” (1993, p. 35).      
 
Kohlberg is representative of such an approach.  Feeling and caring as dynamic 
factors in moral reasoning cease at stage three in Kohlberg’s model.  Affective and 
relational concerns, rather than having a place in further stages of moral maturity, 
are, in fact, impediments to it.  This perspective mirrors the major approaches in 
ethics which stress values such as justice, personal autonomy, rationality and 
dispassionate enquiry.  Gilligan argues that Kohlberg’s work confines his 
examination of moral development to males and proceeded to make his findings 
normative for men and women.  Gilligan endeavours to understand women and their 
experience within their own frame of reference rather than through masculine 
categories.  Her research highlights the different perspective women adopt in moral 
reasoning which is also reflected in the trajectory of their moral development.  It can 
be formulated thus: contemporary moral theory emphasises the question “what is 
just?”  Gilligan suggests as an alternative “how to respond?”        
 
Gilligan’s core insight is summed up in one sentence, “...women not only define 
themselves in a context of human relationship but also judge themselves in terms of 
their ability to care” (1982, p. 17).  Moral reasoning in the form of “how do I 
respond?” is, according to Gilligan, a “problem of care and responsibility in 
relationships rather than as one of rights and rules” and links the development their 
moral thinking “to changes in their understanding of responsibility and relationships” 
(1982, p.73).  Care, as the typical preoccupation in moral concerns of women, has its 
roots in the experience of connectedness and the need to tend this “as a feminine 
duty,” rather than achieve separation and “dominative authority as a male duty” 
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(Philibert, 1987, p. 108).  Care is therefore attached, relational and contextual, i.e., 
built on an owned experience of the self and of one’s context (particular relationships 
and one’s attachments).  Feminine experience and the corresponding manner of 
construing reality is reflected in the different perspectives women employ in 
constructing and resolving moral conflicts.       
 
Gilligan builds on the earlier work of Chodorow (1975) who attempted to counter the 
masculine bias of psychoanalytic theory.  The thesis advanced by Chodorow 
concerns the different dynamics of gender identity formation for boys and girls.  In 
shaping their masculine identity, boys separate their mothers from themselves and 
hence curtail their “primary love and sense of empathic tie” (Gilligan, 1982, p. 8).  
Girls, on the other hands, identify themselves as female in the context of ongoing 
relationships, especially with their mother.  The experience of being female is fused 
with the experience of attachment.  Women’s sense of identity has a built-in basis for 
empathy, for experiencing the needs and feelings of others as one’s own.  
 
Gilligan’s uncovering of the role of response and relationships underscores the role 
of emotions (especially care and empathy), of personal commitments and affective 
dispositions in moral reasoning.  There is a questioning of the Kantian view that 
moral action involves control over, even disengagement from, the emotions.  For 
many women, deliberate detachment from feelings seems to “cloud rather than 
clarify thinking about moral action” (Hepburn, 1993, p. 28).  There is the need to 
integrate, in some manner, the two forms of moral reasoning described by Gilligan.  
Hepburn points out that Gilligan and other feminist authors (e.g., Baier) underline the 
moral significance of emotions in that “deliberate attention to them may heighten 
moral sensitivity” (Hepburn, 1993, p. 27).  This different way of “seeing” means that 
moral deliberation, decision, action and growth require the cultivation of “desirable 
forms of emotional response, such as loving” (Hepburn, 1993, p. 28).   
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One implication of this is that perhaps the central moral problem for women is the 
conflict between self and the other.  This way of perceiving the ethical dilemma 
requires the reconciliation between being feminine and being adult, between 
compassion and autonomy, between virtue and personal power.  Preserving a sense 
of self-in-relationship as a factor integral to resolving the moral problem will emerge 
in an outcome where no one gets hurt (Jackson, 1989, p. 226).    
 
While a thorough critique of Gilligan and others is not within the parameters of this 
thesis, some observations are appropriate.  Firstly, the detachment of Rawls’ “veil of 
ignorance”68 dominant in modern descriptions of moral reasoning (and assumed in 
Kohlberg) needs the balance of a perspective that appreciates the importance of 
personal meanings and relationships.  The need for this is even reflected in 
contemporary shifts in language where people are portrayed in impersonal terms and 
appear to be alienated from each other.  Babies as “products of conception,” people 
as “clients,” loss of a job as “retrenching,” or “downsizing,” suggest a trend where 
life and people are seen as commodities.  Such language is a symptom of emotional 
disengagement for the sake of more “objective” judgements.  As Hepburn remarks 
“In doing so we are able to justify our actions but by relegating the subjective and the 
person to the private arena we risk losing the insight born of experience and often 
regret the action taken” (1993, p. 28).           
 
Secondly, there has been a reclaiming of the fuller understanding of rationality that is 
found in Aquinas (and in modern thinkers such as MacMurray).  Emotions are 
responses to values embodied in people, events and the world around us.  If human 
beings have the capacity to know and understand with the help of non-rational 
elements (emotions) “then it must be possible to admit such potentially morally 
significant insights to our consideration of ethical dilemmas” (Hepburn, 1993, p. 31).  
                                                 
68
  The term originates in John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971). 
  287 
Human beings are qualitatively different from other species through their ability to 
experience a plethora of insights and emotions that can inspire and transform at the 
deepest personal level.  Art, in all its forms, testifies to that (Hepburn, 1993, p. 31).   
 
Thirdly, a major criticism of Kohlberg is his reliance upon hypothetical moral 
dilemmas.  Such tests in moral acumen foster a view of moral reasoning as an 
analytical exercise in problem solving.  For the sake of impartiality, much 
information is omitted concerning the person’s life, context and relationships 
(Hepburn, 1993, p. 29).  In the type of problems selected and the process used to 
address them, moral reasoning appears as out touch with everyday life.  It seems to 
be unrelated, and even opposed, to the narrative continuity of a person’s life.  It is not 
considered to be the constant presence of prudence or phronesis (perhaps in a richer 
sense than that understood by Aristotle and Aquinas) directing concrete judgements 
and effective action in that life.          
 
Fourthly, as Philibert points out, despite socialisation and culture, “men too must 
learn to be caring, responsible in relation, and compassionate” (1987, p. 105).  This 
entails the task of re-education and raising of consciousness.  Further, Gilligan has 
been criticised for failing to give attention to the way attachment functions in men’s 
experience (Conn, 1989, p. 47).  In other words, one needs to ask of Gilligan whether 
the alternative way of “seeing” is gender specific, i.e., only found in women?  How, 
for instance, do her findings correlate with the Myers-Briggs Type Inventory?  This 
psychological typology meets the requires scientific standards of validity and 
reliability.  It is estimated that 12% of the general population has the N and F 
functions as their dominant preference where N = Intuition and F = Feeling (Keirsey 
& Bates, 1978, p. 60).  Due to the influence of socialisation and cultural bias, 
allowance is made for a distribution of 60% women and 40% men in this figure 
(Myers & McCaulley, 1985, p. 45ff).  This means that there are 7.2% of women and, 
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significantly, 4.8% of men whose perception, organisation and evaluation of reality 
together with their decision-making functions are characterised by intuition, feeling, 
and concern for relationships?  One has to wonder whether care, concern and 
compassion as the form of moral reasoning is confined to women. 
 
Fifthly, Gilligan and others are proposing a relational rather than a formal account of 
moral theory.  Further, this account is a moral anthropology that is prior to moral 
casuistry.  It broadens the understanding of the resources required to approach moral 
questions. “For Gilligan, this means that both male formalism and feminine 
contextualism are essential to an adequate account of morality” (Philibert, 1987, p. 
113).   
 
Finally, in the notion of “interconnectedness” there is a recovering of a more holistic, 
historical, relational and social understanding of the human subject.  This notion also 
implies the interrelation of human values and of a person’s “anthropological 
endowments” (Philibert, 1987, p. 111).  Body, mind, will and emotions are 
interdependent and meant to work in collaboration.    
 
1.1.3:  Mutual tutoring of reason and emotion :  the psychological dynamic 
 
Sidney Callahan approaches the question of ethical decisionmaking predominantly 
from the perspective of Psychology (1988, 1991).  She offers a model of a mutual 
interaction of thinking and feeling.  Reason should monitor and tutor emotions while 
“emotions should tutor reason and...emotions should monitor emotions (1988, p. 9).  
The goal is that a moral decision should emerge “through a personal equilibrium in 
which emotion and reason are both activated and in accord “ (1988, p. 9).  Callahan’s 
specific contribution in the present project is twofold.  Firstly, she explains in 
empirical terms the psychological basis for the moral significance of emotions.  
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Secondly, she provides a detailed account of the psychological mechanisms that 
activate and sustain the collaboration of thinking and emotion in moral reasoning.   
 
     1.1.3.1: Psychological foundations  
 
It has already been noted in Chapter two how emotions are interpreted differently by 
various  theories whether cognitive, evolutionary or social constructionist.  Callahan 
tends to the psychoevolutionary view which sees the “emotions, like human 
cognitive capacities, to have been selected through evolution to ensure the survival of 
individuals and the group.  Emotions are energizing and adaptive, and serve 
communicating, bonding and motivating functions” (1988, p. 10).  Without emotions 
to enrich physiological drives and the processes of knowing, human beings would 
lack the incentive and care to live, mate, procreate, make friends and pursue art, 
literature and thought (1988, p. 10).  There is cross-cultural evidence of a limited set 
of basic or “primary” emotions, e.g., interest/ excitement etc. (as discussed in 
Chapter two of this thesis).   
 
At the psychological level, humans have “emotional and cognitive capacities that 
operate interactively” (1988, p. 10).  The human organism has subsystems that 
balance each other.  Within this context, reason understood as a verbal, knowing 
process can operate with greater speed, mobility and detachment than emotions.  
Whereas, “the emotional system...seems to respond to and encode in memory 
nonverbal, qualitative dimensions of experience” (1988, p. 10).  Emotions and 
thinking are complementary, parallel processes, “constantly blending and interacting 
as a person functions” (1988, p. 10).   
 
Callahan makes the important point that, in the human flow of consciousness, 
emotions interact in intricate ways in which memory has a distinctive role.  As a 
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person thinks through a situation or a problem, a call is made on memory.  The 
networks of memory may be triggered by “either a feeling or an idea; calling up one 
part of a scenario may activate the feelings or ideas stored with it” (1988, p. 10; 
1991, p. 81ff).  For instance, thinking of a dead parent may activate feelings of anger 
or sadness: feeling angry or sad may trigger thoughts of the deceased parent.  
Emotional states can affect a range of cognitive processes, for instance, the filtering 
and selective ability of memory, evaluations of oneself or of others, even the 
perception and evaluation of physical stimuli (1988, p. 10; 1991, p. 81ff).  
Researchers into the emotional development of children have supplemented linear 
models (i.e., emotions cause thinking or vice-versa) with the image of a musical 
fugue.  The cognitive-emotional relationship is an “interweaving process (that) goes 
on in human beings throughout life: emotions induce thoughts that may induce 
emotion” (1988, p. 10).  This interplay in personal consciousness emerges in art, 
poetry, music etc. and “can become open to introspection” (1988, p. 10). 
 
From a psychological standpoint, why are emotions important in moral functioning?  
Callahan begins by offering a cross-cultural argument.  The emotions of guilt and 
shame develop in children in every culture and do so at the same age.  Where there is 
lack of emotional response, for instance, of empathy, guilt, love, anxiety, this 
undermines or impedes a person’s moral responsiveness.  Such a person “cannot feel 
the inner force of moral obligation (1988, p. 10; 1991, p. 39f).           
 
Secondly, emotions animate and “energize the ethical quest” (1988, p. 10).  A person 
must have a sufficient degree of interest and care to both struggle with moral issues 
and to persevere in discerning the truth despite difficulties and distractions.  Callahan 
even suggests that perhaps what gives moral thinking “its imperative ‘oughtness’ is 
personal emotional investment.  When emotion infuses an evaluative judgment, it is 
transformed into a prescriptive moral judgment of what ought to be done” (1988, p. 
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10).      
 
Thirdly, and importantly, the very underpinnings of moral thinking appear to be 
“imbued with emotion” according to Callahan (1988, p. 10).  The long-term memory 
seems to store thoughts and emotions that have been fused together.  These 
“cognitive-affective constructs, the thing and the feeling-about-the-thing, appear to 
be complex or extensive enough to be called narratives, ‘scripts,’ ‘scenes,’ or 
‘scenarios’ ” (1988, p. 11; also 1991, p. 105f).  Moral sentiments are made up of the 
“fusions of things joined with feelings about the thing, as for instance, ‘torture = 
wrong, disgusting’ or ‘truthtelling = good’ ” (1988, p. 11).  In thinking through a 
moral question, stores within the memory are called on and, through the linked 
associations, shape one’s thinking (1988, p. 11).  For example, a person’s initial 
emotional response to a situation may be anger/ indignation (‘that’s not fair!’).  
There follows a testing against scenes, memories, paradigms to interpret the events 
(‘this is just like what happened when...’).  One is then prompted by the emotion to 
“experience the scenario of characteristic action (‘Someone’s going to pay for this’)” 
(Spohn, 1991, p. 75).     
 
Fourthly, selective attention and filtering are shaped by a person’s emotional 
commitments.  The process of moral decision-making is influenced by one’s past 
experiences and, as has already been noted, by long-term memory.  There is growing 
evidence that what appear to be spontaneous thoughts or emotions are not at all 
random.  “Extensive preconscious selection and filtering interact with long-term 
memory to determine what reaches conscious awareness” (Callahan, 1988, p. 11).  
This activity will have personal significance.  Further, emotional responses, 
especially in the form of moral sentiments, require that a person has the habits 
developed through past effort that “indicate the achievement of self-development and 
those ‘habits of the heart’ known as moral character” (1988, p. 11; 1991, p. 207f).   
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    1.1.3.2:  Thinking and emotion in collaboration 
 
What, then, is the interrelationship of emotion and reason (thinking) in moral 
reasoning according to Callahan?  Firstly, reason judges and tutors emotions.  As one 
can be  conscious of the ebb and flow of emotions during moral discernment, one can 
also “rationally judge, assess, and shape these emotions while being affected by them 
during the moral decision-making process” (1991, p. 127).  Developing, according to 
rational criteria, proper desires and motivations together with justified and 
appropriate emotions is integral to moral agency.  Assessment of emotional response 
to a particular course of action must also be consistent “with our larger moral 
purposes, or integrated with our other personal moral goals and emotional 
commitments” (1991, p. 128).  Inducing, enacting and educating emotions is possible 
through personal strategies, for example, thinking of certain images or beliefs, 
recalling certain remembered states of feeling and the scenarios associated with 
them.  If necessary, cognitive therapy can be used for this purpose in psychotherapy 
(Callahan, 1991, p. 129).           
 
The rational assessment of emotions, as summarily noted above, has been valued and 
developed for a long time.  One aspect that is usefully clarified by Callahan is the 
psychology of self-deception.  Human beings desire to seek pleasure and avoid pain.  
They will engage in the most subtle manoeuvres or ‘defenses’ to protect themselves 
from pain.  People will resort to ‘selective attention’ to “deploy attention away from 
painful reality, or if that fails, to distort what is perceived and felt” (1988, p. 11).  
The constant and inflexible activating of these cognitive-affective structures ends up 
by crippling their emotional capacities.  Other psychological mechanisms such as 
mania, depression and regression can lead to a childish manner of thinking and 
feeling that produces irrational emotions and thinking.   
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Callahan helpfully points out the implication of this for moral reasoning.  Often, 
emotion at war with reason has been portrayed as the dominant characteristic of 
moral conflict.  In the light of the above considerations, especially the phenomenon 
of regression, the conflict is more often “a case of one immature thinking-emotive 
moral scenario in conflict with another more wholly owned and appropriately mature 
moral scenario” (1988, p. 12).  Attending to these emotions, to their associated 
images, memories, prejudices, using strategies to engage with them, changing 
perspectives and beliefs-all these can assist in cultivating appropriate emotions 
responses and affective integration.   
   
Secondly, emotion tests and tutors reason-a more controversial claim, according to 
Callahan (1988, p. 12; 1991, p. 129).  The preconscious prefiltering process required 
by consciousness allied with the capacity of emotions to respond to reality means 
that “even momentary emotions can be seen as a message to myself, from myself and 
all that has shaped me: (1988, p. 12).  They are personal signals or ‘vital signs’ that 
inform us “of inner processes or of interactions with the environment” (1988, p. 12).     
 
Emotions tutor and monitor reason, firstly, in negative ways.  In thinking through 
moral difficulties and arguments, negative emotions such as aversion or repugnance 
can be warning flares.  The rational arguments may be logical and flawless, but one 
feels persistently that something is wrong but cannot say why exactly.  One is 
morally restrained by the emotion and impelled to search for a morally acceptable 
solution.  There are times when “pure logic can run amok” (1991, p. 130; 1988, p. 
12).   
 
Emotions can also have a positive function in prompting someone to go beyond 
“their habitual moral framework” (1988, p. 12).  Emotions can activate the networks 
of memory, can evoke the scenarios and ideas stored with or near these emotions and 
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is able to produce new reverberations and possibilities (1991. p. 131 f).  For example, 
one may have, at times, felt anger in being wronged which, combined with a desire 
for fairness, can trigger moral indignation when any person is mistreated that moves 
one to try to change social conditions.  Anger and empathy in regard to the excluded 
and neglected can kindle revolutions in moral sensitivity.  History provides evidence 
of this in changed attitude to slaves, women, children, the handicapped and other 
minority groups (1988, p. 12).  From a positive emotional response such as empathy, 
one may be compelled to “confront a conflicting moral attitude concerning the 
group” (1988, p. 12; 1991, p. 132).  The ensuing discrepancy and dissonance then 
prompts an expansion of one’s moral vision and response.  Love, as had already be 
remarked, also expands one’s focus, perspective and commitments. 
 
Thirdly, one emotion can monitor or tutor another.  Love and sympathy can 
neutralise negative emotions.  For instance, when a person cares for someone who is 
diseased or handicapped, sympathy overcomes disgust (1988, p. 12; 1991, p. 133).  
Anger can modulate sadness, depression, or apathy, converting them into “active 
assertiveness or aspiration” (1991, p. 133).  Love can cast out fear, can subjugate and 
disperse anger, can transform hurt and emerge as forgiveness.   
 
Finally, Callahan affirms the long-term effect of virtue on this mutual tutoring.  The 
good and wise person (phronimos), properly formed, has emotions and intuitive 
reactions that are morally trustworthy.  She points out that new psychological 
insights into the mind indicate that  
 
...these appropriate emotions emerge because the good person’s past 
deployments of attention and previous moral decisions ensure a good 
preconscious self-filtering system in the present.  The person of good character 
has built up values in long-term memory and so possesses a pattern of 
preconscious processing of information that will produce proper emotions.  
The nonconscious functionings of the mind, which we do not have access to, 
could constitute what has been called “the heart’s reasons which reason cannot 
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know.” (Callahan, 1991, p. 131).   
 
Overall, Callahan’s contribution provides, in this one area, a psychological 
groundwork for what has been discussed with Oakley, Gilligan etc.  So far, this 
chapter has uncovered three different perspectives on emotions and the human act-
the morally virtuous person (Oakley), two complementary forms of moral reasoning 
(Gilligan and others), the inner workings of the psyche (Callahan).  There is a 
confluence of their thought in that, for each author, “the most adequate moral 
decision making of conscience must achieve a congruence or a fusion of thinking, 
feeling, and willing into a unified whole” (Callahan, 1991, p. 134).     
 
1.2:  Emotions in Relation to Virtue and Character  
 
The next task is to address the first research question in terms of virtue and character.  
Firstly, there will be a brief discussion of the function of self-esteem in moral 
capability and character.  This leads into an examination of Shelton’s theory on the 
role of empathy in moral development.  Finally, this section of the chapter will close 
with an investigation into recent advances in the area of affective conversion.      
 
1.2.1:  Self-Esteem:  foundations of identity 
 
The need for self-esteem as a condition for seeing and responding to the needs and 
worth of others is treated in Oakley (1992, p. 68f).  He also discusses the capacity to 
notice situations and realities and the ability to enter another person’s world 
imaginatively to feel for and with them in their needs (1992, p. 50ff).  Callahan 
emphasises the need of self-esteem for the moral life and for sustaining relationships 
with others (1991, p. 201).  The correlation between self-esteem and empathy is 
discussed by Callahan (1991, p. 187ff), as also by Gill (1981) and Dominian (1975, 
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1988)     
 
Self-esteem is an appreciation of one’s own worth.  Self-image answers the question 
“How do you see yourself?”  Self-esteem’s question is “Do you like and value 
yourself?”  One’s attitude to oneself will influence relations with others, with God, 
one’s desires, hopes, expectations, feeling and actions.  Dominian points out that “the 
whole of our childhood was based on receiving love from our parents and relatives, 
which made us feel lovable and made it possible to link appreciation to our bodies, 
minds and feelings” (1998, p. 131; also 1975, p. 158ff).  Self-esteem is another way 
of naming the emergence of primal trust (or psychological faith).  This is the 
foundation of the sense of the self and, as McDargh points out, is crucial for religious 
faith (1983, p. 70).  How does the self develop?  An individual needs a set of 
relationships or people who are perceived to be trustworthy, who genuinely love this 
unique individual and who can, in turn, be loved and esteemed by the infant as it 
grows.  The infant values, loves and gives loyalty to those persons or realities by 
whom it hopes to be recognised, appreciated and loved.  Meaning and value to the 
self or ‘self-esteem’ emerges from this process.       
 
Significant insights into this dynamic have been provided by Object Relations 
Theory (Winnicott, Klein) as interpreted and developed by McDargh.  This approach 
attempts to explain the importance of images in the development of the self and of 
faith (psychological and religious).  This theory starts with those personal 
relationships that “constitute the matrix within which the human person is formed 
and comes to be” (Jackson, 1989, p. 119).  It then proposes that the child’s 
interaction with significant others “is internalized and codified, later to be retrieved 
as representations out of which the infant perceives itself and relates to others” 
(Jackson, 1989, p. 120).  At the same time, the child forms memories of how it felt, 
of its sense of what it was like and how it reacted in those relationships.  These 
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images or representations provide the “conscious or unconscious constellation of 
values, feelings, impressions, and memories which constitute the basis of the 
individual’s posture of trust or mistrust to the world” (Jackson, 1989, p. 120).  These 
“images” are the potent influences by which “persons make emotional sense of their 
lives, of their existence as selves” (McDargh, 1983, p. 106). 
 
What is the relevance of these ideas to this project?  Firstly, the building blocks of 
identity, the sense of the self, are in the realm of emotions and affectivity.  How the 
infant emotionally responds to significant relationships shapes how it feels about 
itself as a child and as an adult.  This is crucial to the psychological, spiritual and 
moral growth of the person.  Secondly, when a person has a body, a mind and 
feelings that feel good, then one will try to reach out to others.  The person has the 
requisite self-esteem to love so that “when others make demands on our own 
personality, there will be something positive to give them” (Dominian, 1998, p. 131).  
Thirdly, the core awareness of the self  (self-esteem) and of each other (empathy) is 
inherently affective.  From this emerges self-love and other-love and the emotional 
responses they generate.  Loving others flows from an awareness of others in which 
“we feel their existence” (Dominian, 1998, p. 122).  This is empathy-a “capacity to 
feel the inner world of others and to respond accurately to it” (Dominian, 1998, p. 
132). We cannot be human without empathy.  We cannot be moral beings without 
empathy.  This is the concern of Shelton (1990) when he examines the role of 
empathy in the moral life.  This is the next task.   
 
1.2.2:  Empathy and the moral life:  The Shelton model    
 
What are the two questions that occupy Charles Shelton?  “What is it about being 
human that allowed us to care for and be concerned for one another?” (Shelton, 
1990, p. 1).  From the Christian perspective, what is the “constitutive element within 
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our own human experience” that can be transformed by grace and enable a person to 
respond to the message of Jesus Christ (1990, p. 1f).  Shelton argues that some level 
of empathy is crucial, even indispensable, for one to experience oneself as a moral 
being, to live the moral life and to accept the call of the Gospel to love.  Shelton then 
probes “the essential importance of an affective component for any theory of moral 
development” (1990, p. 3).         
 
     1.2.2.1:  Psychological foundations 
 
Using psychological research, Shelton attempts to describe a “psychological view of 
morality that establishes the unity of human experience with the Christian moral 
vision” (1990, p. 7).  He starts with a critique of Kohlberg’s theory in which moral 
growth occurs through “increasingly moral structural transformations” or movements 
to a higher stage (1990, p. 14).  Shelton recognises that Kohlberg does acknowledge 
that emotions play an initial part in moral development while not having a specific, 
significant or long-term role.  Shelton’s concerns, as Gilligan’s, are the narrowly 
cognitive nature of Kohlberg’s theory and the need to incorporate an affective 
dimension in morality and moral reasoning.    
 
Shelton’s disquiet emerges from his experience in pastoral or clinical contexts.  In 
such settings, he found individuals’ understanding of themselves as moral persons 
centres on questions of attachment, care, self-sacrifice rather than on abstract justice 
that defines rights and duties.  Instances would be the son or daughter struggling with 
the decision to send a frail parent to a nursing home, or a husband and wife adjusting 
their expectations and their relationship, or someone trying to reconcile the 
disclosure of a confidence by a friend.  These are forms of significant relationships-
parent, child, spouse, friend.  These “investments in varying relational 
commitments...express our deepest affections and offer the groundwork for our 
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experience of being moral” (Shelton, 1990, p. 28).  Shelton attempts to blend 
developmental theory and empirical research to provide a psychological basis for 
both moral experience and a developed orientation to care that resonates with the 
Christian moral vision (1990, p. 31f).   
 
Shelton cites studies that indicate that when people think about morality and moral 
dilemmas, they tend to think in terms of relationships (1990, p. 34).  There is an 
essential bondedness between human beings that generates empathy, an existential 
solidarity “with another’s life and struggle” (1990, p. 35).  From the twenty or so 
definitions of empathy, Shelton suggests that it has one or more of three components-
emotional, cognitive, and/or the communicating of a person’s feeling state to another 
(1990, p. 40).   
 
Shelton’s discussion of the natural capacity for empathy as the psychological basis of 
morality draws on the research of others.  He notes work on the biological foundation 
for the empathic experience in the presence of advanced neurocortical development 
as also of the nervous system (1990, p. 41f).  Shelton particularly draws on the work 
of Martin Hoffman.  Hoffman argues that anthropological evidence indicates that 
human survival and the adaptability needed for it rests on two motives-the egoistic 
(self-protective) and the altruistic (promotion of other’s welfare).  The validity of an 
independent altruistic motive emerges from research that documents individuals 
(particularly those satisfied with their own social approval) spontaneously helping 
others (Shelton, 1990, p. 41).        
 
Hoffman defines empathy as “an affective response more appropriate to someone 
else’s situation than to one’s own” (Shelton, 1990, p. 42).  “Appropriate” captures 
the cognitive dimension in the accurate interpretation of the state of the other person.  
Emotional arousal in the empathizer is the “actual experience of empathy” (1990, p. 
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43).  Thirdly,  motivational empathy appears to be closely linked “to a naturally 
induced state to respond altruistically to another’s distress” (1990, p. 43).  Shelton 
details the large amount of empirical evidence and research gathered since 1980 to 
point to the critical role of empathy as a basis for altruistic action (1990, p. 47).  
Nevertheless, Hoffman and others do not consider that empathy alone explains how 
people “formulate complex moral ideologies” and respond in caring behaviour 
(Shelton, 1990, p. 47f).        
 
The cognitive and affective aspects of a person’s inner reaction to the plight of 
another (empathic distress) is also accompanied by a “feeling of sympathetic 
distress” (or ‘compassion’).  Beyond feeling uncomfortable and upset for another, 
there is the inclination of concern and the desire to help the other person.  This arises 
because “they feel sorry for the person and not just to relieve their own empathic 
distress” (Shelton, 1990, p. 50).  In some ways, compassion defies rational 
explanation.  Yet its incidence is a powerful testimony to the human spirit.  Despite 
the instinct to avoid pain, there is “natural capacity inherent in the human species to 
suffer with another and to render aid” (1990, p. 51).  Shelton, with Hoffman, 
acknowledges that, while having empathic distress does not guarantee compassion, 
“without the experience of empathy, the very experience of compassion would be 
impossible” (1990, p. 51).  Compassionate acts, often of great beauty and nobility, 
emerge from the movements of the heart, penetrating consciousness and expanding 
one’s moral sensibilities. 
 
Shelton and Hoffman maintain that empathy develops through the transformation of 
the affective response by cognitive processes, i.e., the child’s maturing ability to 
differentiate self from others (Shelton, 1990, p. 48).  For instance, Shelton notes that 
Hoffman cites an example of the twelve month old child who has obtained “person 
permanence” (a basic sense of self). Such a child will be aware of, and respond to, 
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another’s distress by, for instance, offering the person (even an adult) its favourite 
toy, even if it is only to relieve its own distress.  Through infancy into adolescence, 
the child becomes more adept at differentiating the feelings of others and at 
responding empathically to a widening domain of people.  The advance in cognitive 
levels is accompanied by more sophisticated guilt processes concerning the effects of 
one’s actions on others (Shelton, 1990, p. 52).          
 
Shelton expands his thought on morality of the heart by citing the work of 
psychologist Robert Kegan who sees morality as originating in the experience of 
emotion rather than in cognition (Shelton, 1990, p. 74; Conn, 1989, p. 50f)).  Shelton 
also draws on Jerome Kagan.  Countering the argument that universal moral 
standards are not possible because of cultural differences, Kagan contends that there 
is a link between universal standards and emotion.  Beneath the variety of ideals and 
behaviours, there “is a set of emotional states that form the bases for a limited 
number of universal moral categories that transcend time and locality” (Shelton, 
1990, p. 74).  Virtues are actions that promote those feeling states or prevent or 
remove unpleasant feelings (Shelton, 1990, p. 74f).   
 
Shelton reiterates the contribution of emotion to the moral life.  People tend to 
evaluate judgements of right or wrong in their guilt, hurt or uncertainty in failing to 
live up to standards through the intensity of feelings.  Where empathy, says Shelton, 
provides the basic soil, emotions nourish “one’s growing moral sensitivity and 
sustain moral growth and expanding moral vision” (1990, p. 77).  A person’s moral 
life will embrace a range of emotions that reflect personal values and the objects of 
attachment claimed through affective knowledge.   
 
Shelton acknowledges the other side of the heart.  Where empathy can make one 
sensitive to others’ needs and rights, it can also lead to bias.  Emotions have the 
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capacity to blunt sensitivity, to distort perspective and to “warp the heart’s 
commitment to loving sacrifice” (Shelton, 1990, p. 86).  Moreover, morality of the 
heart and associated emotions such as love, guilt and anger can be blind and need an 
adequate vision.  Human beings need a frame of reference that grounds empathy and 
emotions, transforms them and gives a clear, directional focus (1990, p. 102, p. 58).  
For that reason, Shelton acknowledges that there are situations in which the use of an 
impartial method, as in an ethics of justice, is required.  This can be seen in questions 
concerning the fair use of limited resources where rights of access have to be 
determined (1990, p. 57).   
 
Shelton also raises the question of the adequacy of his case for an empathic morality.  
It is a variant of the question confronting Gilligan.  According to Shelton, early 
research seems to indicate that females are more empathically inclined than males 
(1990, p. 56).  Self-report measures indicate that socialisation encourages a female to 
be empathic in their caring, to be sensitive as women.  Males, conversely, are 
encouraged to be more assertive and oriented to action (1990, p. 56).  Differences 
here seem to be the result of upbringing rather than from natural inclination.  Shelton 
draws on the work of Eisenberg and Lennon who in 1983 conclude that the reporting 
of empathic experiences by men and women depended on the instruments and 
methods of experiment.  In 1987 they are still of the view that any conclusions from 
the existing empirical research to be “circumscribed and tentative.”  In their opinion, 
the question of the real differences in empathy in men and women has not been 
resolved by research (Shelton, 1990, p. 56).           
 
Shelton’s thesis, then, is that empathy is a constitutive element of the sense of the 
self, of being human.  It emerges at the earliest stages of life and is arguably the basis 
of morality.  This raises Shelton’s second question-the relation of psychological 
empathy to Christian morality. 
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     1.2.2.2:  Empathy, morality of the heart and christian vision 
 
Shelton seeks a metaphor that encapsulates the psychological dynamics of empathy, 
the morality of care, moral sensitivity and character together with a moral vision. He 
proposes the metaphor of the ‘heart.’   
 
Shelton makes the point, mentioned elsewhere in this project, that moral evaluations 
of people are often articulated in terms of the heart.  He moves on to cite Rahner’s 
understanding of the heart.  It is the core experience of who we are as persons-related 
to others, to God, with “one’s most authentic desires...as tied to a sense of loving 
care for another” (Shelton, 1990, p. 63).   Again, in the Bible, the word for the heart 
occurs over 850 times and has a variety of meanings.  These range from the depth of 
one’s desires, the catalyst for understanding and insight, the source of feelings, the 
origin of ethical judgment and a way of describing a person’s very self (Shelton, 
1990, p. 62).  Elsewhere, McKenzie makes the point that when ‘heart’ is made the 
subject of vital acts (as are the eye, hand, loins etc.) “the total person is identified 
with the organ, in which the sum of psychic energy comes to focus” (1990, p. 1295).  
Further, in Hebrew idiom, the ‘heart’ is not the seat of the emotions but is closer to 
the modern usage of ‘mind.’  Nevertheless, the ‘heart’ is emphasised as being the 
principle of morality.  Actions and words shape moral character but they must have 
their roots in morality that is interior, imbedded in conviction and desire (McKenzie, 
1990, p. 1305).   
 
Shelton offers the person of Jesus Christ as the model of the morality of the heart.  
The vision is embodied in Jesus as the compassionate High priest portrayed in the 
Letter to the Hebrews (2:18; 4:15; 5:2).  Not only has God in Jesus identified with 
humanness, he has transformed it “with the piercing power of his own compassionate 
stance through the act of complete self-donation” (1990, p. 102).  The dynamic of 
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empathic experience is manifest in Jesus’ sympathetic distress or compassion during 
his ministry where he is moved to pity (Luke 10:33) and is later confirmed in the 
theology of Hebrews. This reveals the inner life of God.  If the very core of divine 
life is compassionate love, then in God there exists, in eminent form, the dynamic of 
the emotion of empathic response.  In Jesus, then, we find a convergence of 
theological and psychological truth.  An empathic Jesus who offers both a theology 
of the human and an anthropology of God also finds validation in social 
psychological research.  People respond to others with greater empathy when they 
have had similar experiences (1990, p. 103).  In the Jesus who ‘lives in the 
limitations of weakness’ we have a God who suffers and empathises with human 
struggles, pain and suffering.    
 
Yet there is more to the Christian vision.  God’s Reign calls for the personal and 
social transformation of the world, to continue the work of Christ’s reconciliation.  
Empathy not only promotes an openness to the hurts of others, it moves one to 
behaviour that advances God’s Reign.  The specific Christian direction of this vision 
is modelled in the person of Jesus Christ.  It is also nourished and guided by images 
in Scripture, for instance, the body image of first Corinthians, or the parable of the 
Good Samaritan in Luke’s Gospel.                 
 
Shelton draws together his reflections on Christian empathy when he describes it as  
 
 
the human capacity, transformed by grace, that leads to experiencing to some 
degree on an affective level another’s situation; meaning is given to this 
experiencing through a personal relationship with Jesus Christ, thus 
motivating one to offer willingly his or her gifts, nurtured in a believing 
community of faith, for the building of God’s Reign.  (1990, p. 107). (Italics in 
original text)    
 
These considerations of Shelton’s work bring into prominence the difference 
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between Christian and psychological or therapeutic empathy.  Firstly, Christian 
empathy finds its true meaning in following the self-emptying Jesus.  Secondly, 
Christian empathy does not stop at emotional response to another’s situation.  It also 
prompts the person aroused by empathy to probe the meaning of and to evaluate 
one’s internal state in terms of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus.  Empathy is 
shaped by and, in turn, shapes the relationship one has with Jesus Christ and, through 
him, with others.  Christian empathy, then, needs the on-going sustenance of 
worship, prayer and a believing community.  Finally, Christian empathy is more than 
understanding and sensitive co-feeling for another’s pain.  It is part of the call to 
redeem the world in and with Jesus Christ.  It is inseparable from the summons to 
change whatever contributes to misery, oppression and suffering.  Empathy fostering 
altruism blends with the goal of the Christian life-loving self-donation in Jesus 
through service of others (Shelton, 1990. p. 106f).           
 
1.2.3:  Affective conversion: an emerging understanding 
 
Emotions in relation to character involve integration.  The word “conversion” has 
been mentioned many times in this project, especially in discussing Peschke and  
Häring.  In the Christian context it entails radical change of mind, heart, behaviour in 
the deepening response to God’s merciful love.  The term has a variety of meanings 
in the Christian tradition particularly in the twentieth century.  It has also taken on a 
secular connotation.   
 
Most authors would agree that conversion involves a personal and social 
transformation.  It is personal in the radical reorientation of the conscious operations 
of the person (desires, thought processes, choices, actions).  It is social in the 
transformation of society’s structures and, more recently, in the human relationship 
with the natural world.  Conversion is a developmental reality that needs the 
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sustenance of a community of faith.  Conn sees it as “the radical drive for self-
transcendence realized in creative understanding, critical judging, responsible 
deciding, and generous loving” (1986, p. 1).  
 
In surveying the literature on conversion, it is evident that its theological 
explanations are informed by various psychological theories found in, for instance, 
Piaget, Erikson, Kohlberg, Freud, Jung and others.  For the purpose of this project, 
the model developed by Lonergan will be briefly explained.  Special attention will 
then be given to subsequent interpretations developed concerning affective 
conversion.  
 
Conn’s definition above captures the essence of one model of conversion.  Lonergan  
begins with the operations of consciousness and attempts to set up categories that 
explain its functioning.  He sees conversion as “a set of judgments and decisions that 
move the human person from an established horizon into a new horizon of knowing, 
valuing, acting” (Fragomeni, 1993, p. 234).  Each form of conversion involves a 
transition from a conventional wisdom or morality to a more responsible,  
self-critical, adult level of autonomy in some realm of human experience (Gelpi, 
1998, p. 39).  Lonergan has three categories of Conversion.  Intellectual conversion 
is concerned with the clarification of perception and meaning so that one actively and 
critically appropriates the truth about reality.  It entails the need “to advance beyond 
ideologies, prejudices, and oversights that blind one to the truth” (Gelpi, 1998, p. 34).  
In Moral conversion there is a move from satisfying the self or being influenced by 
bias in oneself or the culture to the pursuit of true value, of the truly good as 
providing the criteria for moral decisions.  Gelpi makes a further distinction.  
Personal moral conversion “evaluates interpersonal relationships in the light of 
individual rights and duties.”  Socio-political conversion “evaluates the justice or 
injustice of social institutions in the light of the common good” (Gelpi, 1998, p. 32).  
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In Religious conversion a person is radically grasped by ultimate concern or love.  “It 
is a falling in love unconditionally, leading to surrender to the transcendent, and a 
gracious being-in-wholeness” (Fragomeni, 1993, p. 234).  Faith in a self-revealing 
God differentiates this form of conversion.  Christian conversion for Lonergan is the 
phenomenon of God’s love being poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit 
given in Christ.  It is possible for a person to experience this without naming or 
“thematizing the phenomenon in Christian categories” (Fragomeni, 1993, p. 234f).   
 
The purpose here is to outline briefly the emerging interpretation of Lonergan 
advanced initially by Robert Doran, S.J. and elaborated by Gelpi.  Drawing on the 
work of Jung, Gelpi (1988) argues that Lonergan’s model of conversion should be 
modified to include ‘affective’ or ‘psychic’ conversion.  Here, a person takes 
responsibility for their emotional development along lines that are psychologically 
sound.  Affective conversion, then, involves identifying and rejecting biased 
archetypes, scenarios or paradigms that distort one’s emotional responses and 
affective life.  The ‘raising of consciousness’ concerning, for instance, racism or  
sexism, is an effort to reconfigure one’s perception and to restructure one’s emotions 
(Spohn, 1991, p. 80).   
 
In a recent work, Gelpi expands this idea of the responsibility to promote personal 
emotional health.  He examines affective conversion in relation to the negative 
emotions.  These emotions contribute positively to one’s emotional life and growth 
when they lead a person to perceive and respond to reality in a realistic manner.  In 
other words, there are times when we should feel shame and guilt, or situations that 
should arouse fear and anger.  When there is systematic suppression of these 
emotions, there results a “predictable degree of personality dysfunction (Gelpi, 1998, 
p. 34ff).       
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Gelpi suggests that mid-life provides the material for another level of affective 
conversion.  In the first half of life, the creation of the adult ego demands that one 
repress and ignore a range of unconscious negative emotions.  Nevertheless, they 
remain on the back-burner in the unconscious.  In mid-life, a new stage in the 
emotional structure of the personality demands conscious attention to these emotions.  
This can become manifest in various forms of dysfunctional, even destructive, 
behaviour (Gelpi, 1998, p. 36).  The negative states in the unconscious use various 
devices to gain attention.  For instance, overwhelming and seemingly spontaneous 
surges of emotion may be prompted by emotions associated with past memories and 
events or by aspects of the contra-sexual self.  These emotions can also emerge 
through projection onto others.   
 
Gelpi argues that affective conversion involves the decision to consciously attend to, 
to understand, to learn from, and hence to integrate these negative emotions into 
one’s conscious personality as life-giving forces (1998, p. 37).  d’Apice makes the 
same point.  The re-experience of pain or of intense rage for something minor 
indicates that its true source lies in the past.    
 
 
To permit oneself to feel these emotions and to sit with them will often bring to 
mind a time of hurt or unjust treatment in the past, possibly even in childhood.  
This memory, like a deep-festering wound, may have lain hidden for many 
years.  As it comes back now, it is crying out to be remembered and reconciled 
(d’Apice, 1995, p. 160).  
 
 
Adult growth requires conscious appropriation.  Hence, reflection and, as d’Apice 
notes, the prayer of healing can play “a vital part in the spirituality of midlife” (1995, 
p. 161).   
 
From this emerges a final consideration on the education and shaping of emotions 
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and character.  The social nature of the person means that example, models, symbols, 
images and stories transform and shape us on the affective level.  Worship and prayer 
are central in shaping personal and social identity, fostering relationships, renewing 
consecration, and in deepening and activating values and motivation.  Specific 
religious objects evoke and habituate the value responses that characterise one’s 
emotions.  What one knows, love and values one identifies with, wishes to imitate 
and to share in its goodness.  This is particularly facilitated by the processes of 
memory and active imagination in relation to the values and attitudes of significant 
persons (saints) and especially the person of Jesus Christ.  Story, image and tradition 
have the power “to reveal, constellate and prioritize values and disvalues” (Vacek, 
1985, p. 297.  Also Spohn, 1983, p. 30ff). The transforming and elevating power of 
religious emotions and of Grace, mediated through cognition, affective response, 
conscious awareness, identification, imitation and deliberate cultivation, develop the 
ease of exercise that is characteristic of virtue. 
 
Overall, by exercising one’s responsibility to develop a healthy emotional life, one is 
growing in the affective virtues and in the capacity both to respond appropriately and 
to make good moral decisions guided by one’s emotions. 
 
1.2.4:  Overview 
 
In surveying this section, key insights have surfaced concerning the moral 
significance of emotions in relation to virtue and character.  Recent psychological 
theory and research offer persuasive evidence for the presence of two constituents in 
the emergence of the human person.  Firstly, the very basis of psychological and 
moral life seems to rest on the constellation of primitive emotional responses 
whereby a child arrives at a sufficient level of trust and value of itself and others that 
is embodied in self-esteem.  Secondly, there are strong indications that these feelings 
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of self-appreciation provide the necessary condition for the correlative emotion of 
empathy-the capacity to appreciate, identify with, and respond to, others.  A healthy 
self-esteem also enables a person to deal constructively with negative emotions and, 
in particular, their presence in mid-life.  Self-esteem and empathy are integral not 
only to “being healthy’ but also to “being moral.”  This can be understood either in 
the sense of primordial moral awareness (“do good and avoid evil”), or as moral 
reasoning (“this is right or wrong to do”) or as the momentum, especially in one’s 
affectivity, towards moral integration (“this is the appropriate emotional response to 
cultivate”).  These two components of human identity also offer the platform on 
which one can construct a theological vision that views self-esteem, empathy and 
other emotions as necessary ingredients of Christian morality.  Underlying these 
factors, nevertheless, are certain assumptions concerning the human person.  That is 
the next topic. 
 
2.  Theological Anthropology in Selected Contemporary Writing 
 
“What is the vision of the human person manifest or inferred in these authors?” The 
limits of this study has entailed a partial, even cursory examination of the human 
person.  Having acknowledged that fact, there do not appear to be discrepancies in 
these authors between “theory in use” and any “espoused view” of the person.  
Nevertheless, there is not a univocal view of the person in the authors just examined. 
The similarities and variations occur in five main areas-three concern the person, two 
concern method. 
 
Firstly, there is the matter of perspective and assumptions.  In these authors, the 
human person is portrayed either from a philosophical standpoint (Oakley), or from a 
psychological point of view (Gilligan, Dominian, Jackson, McDargh) or a blend of 
these (Callahan).  Their dominant concern is either the human flourishing through 
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virtue or the healthy functioning and psychological development of the human being.  
Religious considerations or theological argumentation is either not a concern or not 
in the foreground.  Such sources, nevertheless, “may be used as examples of inner 
human experience, expressions of self-conscious persons” (Callahan, 1991, p. 7).  
The psychological foundations of self-esteem and the role of empathy in relation to 
religious faith and Christian moral development is part of the broader canvas of some 
(Dominian, Jackson, McDargh) and a specific issue for Shelton and Gelpi.  There is 
also the desire to address the deficiencies of cognitive-structural models of human 
growth and the need to incorporate the affective dimension (Callaghan, Gilligan, 
Shelton).    
 
Secondly, the person as a moral self is common to these authors, though with diverse 
emphases.  Some give greater weight to the self-as-individual.  For Oakley, it is the 
search for the full human life through a vision, the practice of virtues and the 
development of character.  Callahan’s spotlight is on the individual self as a moral 
agent and the “operating processes of conscience as moral decision making” (1991, 
p. 6).  Rather than being a retreat into narcissism, it underlines the truth that the 
strength of a community’s life rests on the strength of the moral functioning of 
individual members (1991, p. 10).   Gelpi’s concern is the personal responsibility for 
the shape of one’s emotional life.      
 
Balancing these are authors who place more emphasis on the self-in-relationship.  
Personhood and identity is inherently and essentially relational.  This is true of the 
treatment of the origins of self-esteem (Dominian, Jackson, McDargh).  It is also 
apparent in the role of empathy as the condition for healthy human interaction and as 
the necessary soil for human and Christian moral living within the social context of 
God’s Reign (Shelton).  A more restricted account of the relational nature of the 
moral self in terms of moral reasoning and development is offered by Gilligan.  The 
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self-in- relationship for these authors is a being for whom response to values (in 
people, relationships, the world) is integral to moral life.          
 
The third aspect of the person is awareness or consciousness of the self.  This is the 
domain of Callahan’s work in that she explores the psychological structure of the 
person, the “foundations, architecture, and inner ecology of conscience” as a human 
phenomenon (1991, p. 6).  This form of concentrated self-awareness provides the 
setting for the detailed analysis of the interactions of memory, scenarios, scripts, 
intellect and the emotions.  Gilligan’s has a stronger mix of theory, empirical 
research and the phenomenon of self-awareness.  Gilligan’s approach to self- -
awareness is not so much with its internal workings but in its relationships with the 
outer world.  It centres on the way of perceiving and evaluating moral situations in so 
far as it is related to gender and moral development.  The core sense of the self as 
appreciation or self-esteem in a person is elaborated by Dominian, Jackson and 
McDargh.  The correlation between this and empathy as a consciousness of others is 
taken up by Shelton.  Present, too, is the Lonergan model of the different structures 
of consciousness in which one is present to oneself and one’s acts experientially.  
This appears as a blend of philosophical and phenomenological method.  The unique 
forms of human self-presence and the human capacity for self-transcendence are 
embodied in the various forms of conversion.  The influence of unconscious 
emotions and negative states, their emergence into awareness and the need for their 
conscious acknowledgment and appropriation in affective Conversion is pursued by 
Gelpi.                
 
The fourth element that emerges is the multidisciplinary character of the writing.  
Shelton and Gelpi have the mutual enrichment of Psychology, Morality and 
Theology as a working basis.  Oakley draws on other disciplines and tests his 
philosophical arguments against human experience.  Callahan is unapologetic about 
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the interdisciplinary nature of her work.  She refers to the increasing number of 
books that appear as “blurred genres” in which “social science and the humanities 
blend-and in which personal knowledge and private experience are explicitly called 
upon to contribute to the study” (1991, p. 7).  One can also see reflected in these 
authors the variety of approaches in Psychology, their differing normative views of 
the human and something of their techniques and methods.  In these authors one can 
discern the influence of the major therapeutic schools of Freud, Jung, Winnicott and 
of the developmental theories of Kohlberg, Gilligan and Erikson.   
 
The fifth topic is methodology.  In addition to the cross-disciplinary dimension, there 
is a blend of theory, research and empirical verification.  Increasingly, Psychology is 
not tied to a narrow view of science and of empirical method.  There is validity and 
reliability in methods that seek to analyse and interpret inner psychic experience, 
personal narratives and which recognise the importance of “meaning and symbolism 
in human life” (Barnes, 1990, p. 31).  For instance, qualitative research has become 
an acceptable instrument in the behavioural sciences.  Running through these authors 
is a thread symptomatic of a broader trend.  The behavioural sciences, in being open 
to other disciplines, are open to other perspectives and possibilities, i.e., the place of 
the transcendent, of religion, of the spiritual dimension in the integrated person.  
Conversely, Theological Anthropology has incorporated (and should continue to do 
so) many valid insights about human self-understanding from Psychology and the 
other behavioural sciences.      
 
3.  Comparison and Contrast with Aquinas, Manualists, Post-Manualists   
 
The third research question is the final concern of this chapter. “What is the 
significance of the different understandings and treatments of the emotions and of 
human person in these contemporary authors compared with Aquinas, the Manualists 
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and post-Manualist authors?”  The discussion will be under three headings- -
convergences, divergences, evaluative overview.  
 
3.1:  Convergences 
 
3.1.1:  An affirmative view of the emotions is shared by Aquinas, writers such as 
Häring Grisez, Peschke and the contemporary authors above.  Emotions have a value 
in themselves, not just as moral motives.  Whether positive or negative, emotions can 
have a constructive or destructive role in personal life.  Emotions and affective 
virtues are integral to one’s character. 
 
3.1.2:  The construal of an emotion suggested by Oakley concurs, in his view, with 
that of Aquinas (Oakley, 1992, p. 200f, footnote 67).  Aquinas’ view of emotions as 
“interactive value-responses” is developed, from another standpoint, by Häring.  This 
aspect receives little or no attention in Oakley, Callahan or Gilligan.  Further, Oakley 
tends to see emotions as accompanying values already embraced rather than as 
presenting a specific object to the will precisely as a response to value or disvalue.   
 
3.1.3:  The mutual interaction of emotion and intellect in moral reasoning is 
intricately probed by Callahan in the framework of modern Psychology.  Oakley’s 
treatment of emotions in phronesis is closer to Aquinas in method and context.  This 
line is also pursued by Grisez.  It is intriguing to find Callahan talking of emotions 
providing a filter or of Shelton and Oakley seeing them as indicating “salience.”  
Emotions direct one’s attention to the specific features of a situation-what to notice, 
what to enquire about, the “relevant cues” (Shelton, 1990, p. 47; Oakley, 1992. p. 
202; also Spohn, 1991, p. 79).  This is a more refined version of Aquinas’ notion of 
“fittingness” (conveniens, consonans) where emotions indicate to the intellect and 
will what is suited, pertinent, in-tune with this situation and is the appropriate moral 
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object.  
 
3.1.4:  Self-esteem and a sense of inner goodness is crucial to psychological and 
moral functioning for these modern writers.  This elaborates, in contemporary 
psychological terms, the place of self-love as the condition on which the moral life is 
possible for Aquinas, as for Häring, Peschke, Grisez and Maguire. 
 
3.1.5:  The constructive potential in moral growth of negative emotions especially 
their unconscious form in negative states is the concern of Gelpi.  His treatment is 
consistent with the views of Aquinas on fear, anger, sadness etc. and with the 
attitudes of Häring and Grisez. 
 
3.1.6:  Self-awareness and skills in attending to psychic movements is not a modern 
invention.  It is the modern advances in psychological knowledge that offer tools, 
language and a framework for its exercise to be more probing, accurate and fruitful.  
The authors in this chapter are a testimony to this.  Something of a more 
philosophical phenomenological method runs through Häring.  For all that, this study 
has earlier uncovered evidence of self-awareness influencing Aquinas’s work, e.g., 
his insights into the dynamics of love, anger and sadness.   
3.1.7:  The safeguarding and strengthening of character is a concern common to 
Oakley, Callahan, Shelton, Aquinas, Peschke, Häring, Grisez and the Manualists (at 
least in principle).  Moral agency is broader than what one does: it reflects and 
shapes who one has and who one has become.  So much so, as Callahan has noted, 
this can even incorporate the workings of the unconscious mind and affections.  
Oakley uses similar language of interiorisation when he says that a “person’s 
emotions are indicators that these values are really his” (Oakley, 1992, p. 55).        
 
3.2:  Divergences 
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3.2.1:  The predominant area of contrast is the of the perspective and assumptions 
concerning the human person.  All the authors examined do agree that the human 
person has a psychological and moral dimension.  However, on the one hand, the 
authors studied in this chapter restrict themselves to a psychological or to an aretaic 
understanding of the human person.  On the other hand, what binds together 
Aquinas, the Manualist and post-Manualists is their Christian Anthropology.  They 
also see the person as, importantly, a religious being with a radical receptivity for 
divine revelation and relationship.  Aquinas’ treatment of the person is within a 
synthesis whereby the moral journey is seen with the overall plan of Creation, 
Providence and Salvation.  Its content and configuration is teleological.  This is the 
framework continued in the Manualists and forms the backdrop to the work of 
Grisez, Maguire and Peschke.  Häring’s setting places greater weight to interpersonal 
invitation and response where the human person “is constitutionally receptive to and 
capable of response to the divine initiative” (Ruffing, 1993, p. 47).          
 
A consequence of this concerns the Philosophical Psychology used by Aquinas.  
While he sees the human moral agent in developmental terms (i.e., as growing in 
virtue), there is a shift in the understanding of the person in terms of faculties and 
powers.  This has its roots in Kant, Transcendental Thomism, Existentialism and 
psychological theory.  The teleological model has been superseded by a redefining of 
the human person “who is a ‘subject’ of consciousness, one who is autonomous, 
historical, and self-constituting rather than the static human ‘nature’ of the classic 
formulation” (Ruffing, 1993, p. 48).  There is an accompanying expansion of self-
awareness, of being-in- relationship and of human faculties understood as modes of 
being or relating to the world.  Such a portrayal has a strong presence in Häring, is 
more muted in Grisez, but animates and pervades the sample of contemporary 
authors already discussed.       
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3.2.2:  The authors from these various periods differ in their treatment of the virtues.  
The contemporary sample share a concern for the formation of character and an 
adequate model of moral development.  In contrast with Aquinas, Manualists and 
post-Manualists, overall, there is no attempt, even in Oakley, to address specifically 
the nature and role of the affective virtues.  The closest would be the Christian moral 
life seen as grounded in affective dispositions built on self-esteem and empathy 
(Dominian, Jackson and Shelton).    
 
3.2.3:  A third point of divergence is the matter of foundational moral awareness.  
While it is acknowledged that self-esteem and empathy are the building-blocks of 
ethical consciousness, none of the contemporary authors examined pursue the 
epistemological question of “affective connaturality.”  The only exception is 
Callahan who acknowledges the innate, intuitive appreciation of moral goods (1991, 
p. 28).  It has already be shown that this notion, found incipiently in Aquinas, was 
developed by John of St. Thomas, neglected by the Manualists, preserved by 
Maritain then retrieved by Maguire.  It is elaborated by Häring and acknowledged by 
Peschke in terms of the ethics of value.  While Oakley and Gilligan address the 
affective dimension to moral reasoning, they do not examine the appreciative basis of 
primordial moral experience nor draw on axiological ethics.            
 
3.2.4:  The matter of the influence of the emotions on moral imputability also 
differentiates these various authors.  Where this issue is articulated in terms of 
“impediments to freedom”, it takes centre stage in the Manualists, is one character in 
a larger cast for Aquinas, Häring, Grisez, Peschke but has a relatively minor role in 
the contemporary authors already discussed.  But if emotions in relation to moral 
responsibility are seen as facilitating and enhancing freedom and moral development, 
this is a consistent presence in the contemporary texts as it is in Häring, Grisez, and, 
earlier, in Aquinas (within the limits of his psychological theory).  Allied to this is 
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the very helpful distinction between Antecedent and Consequent emotions.  It 
persists from Aquinas through the Manuals to the present day as a useful measure for 
assessing the moral significance of emotions.  It is neither acknowledged nor used in 
any of the writers from the discipline of Psychology nor, surprisingly by Oakley.  It 
should be noted, however, that the four qualities of strength of will enumerated by 
Oakley do have some resonances with Aquinas’ account of the Consequent emotions 
and his overall understanding of emotions in the moral life.  Overall, then, all authors 
agree, from Aquinas to the present (the Manualists with some ambivalence), that a 
person is morally better if actions are done with the right emotion, about the right 
objects and to the right degree.  This is sound psychologically, morally and 
theologically.        
 
3.2.5:  There is a contrast among these authors in their perception of moral goodness.  
There is a significant difference between “good” seen in terms of psychological well-
being and healthy functioning, or of aretaic descriptions (as in Oakley) when these 
are compared with a theological description of responding in love to grace.  Vacek 
argues that one’s relationship with God does not just provide extra motivation. It 
“makes a difference in the very meaning of what an agent is going” (1994, p. 3).  
When the same virtuous action of a Christian is compared with that of a non-
religious person, it is a different moral act because of the relationship with God.  This 
leaves unresolved the status of moral acts done by someone who is responding from 
grace whose presence and influence is not consciously appreciated or named in 
Christian terms.   
 
Two considerations emerge from this.  Firstly, Christian authors will tend to give 
greater attention to the need to reorient and transform the emotions away from 
egocentricity (Spohn, 1991, p. 84).  Hence, the emphasis given to Conversion.  
Secondly, philosophers and psychologists may have a more detailed insight into the 
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psychological mechanisms for modifying one’s perceptions, scenarios, emotions.  
Nevertheless, they do not have the resources, available in a religious tradition, for 
tutoring and shaping the affections.  Paradigm scenarios found in Scripture stories, 
images, parables, stories of saints and heroes provide the means which, combined 
with worship and ritual, expand one’s horizon, school the emotions and indicate 
appropriate feelings responses (Spohn, 1991, p. 84).  This is especially the case in the 
Christian eucharist and the Sacrament of Reconciliation where there is a constant 
renewal of appropriate emotional dispositions such as sorrow, gratitude, compassion 
and generosity (Spohn, 1991, p. 84).  Particular emotions are ‘schooled’ “by the 
images of God and Christ, as well as by the language of prayer and liturgical actions” 
(Spohn, 1991, p. 85f).           
 
3.3:  Evaluative Overview 
 
If one surveys Chapters four to seven of this project, a pattern can be seen to emerge.  
At each stage there has been a deliberate correlation with previous stages.  In 
employing the third research question for each of the four soundings, the correlation 
has also entailed a process of evaluation.  The comparison and contrast between 
authors inevitably entails an assessment of strengths and weaknesses in relation to 
each other.  Critical assessment is also at work when one attempts to show the 
meaning or importance (“significance”) of the different understandings of emotions 
or of the human person.  This pattern of cumulative evaluation includes the present 
chapter.  For this reason, this section has the heading “evaluative overview.”  Such 
an approach will avoid the unnecessary repetition of material already presented as it 
will avoid anticipating the tasks of the final chapter.   
 
This study has been an exercise in both mapping and mining.  There has been the 
search for suitable terrain together with the establishing of landmarks and 
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boundaries.  Then followed the digging into suitable territory in order to expose and 
extract the hidden resources, some of which were predictable, some of which were 
unexpected.  In general terms, what has this search brought to light ?   
 
Firstly, the venture has shown a positive correlation between contemporary writing 
and Aquinas’ understanding and treatment of the moral significance of the emotions.  
This is particularly the case in Aquinas’ detailed analysis of the affective virtues and 
their immanent character as habits of emotional response.  Within the confines of his 
moral psychology which he attempts to transcend through metaphor and styles of 
language, Aquinas has a balanced and affirmative view of the constructive role of 
human emotions (negative and positive) in the Christian moral life.     
 
Secondly, there is an overall negative correlation between modern studies and 
Aquinas, on the one hand, and, on the other, the Manualists’ understanding and 
treatment of the moral significance of the emotions.  The Manualists portray a 
deterioration towards a stance that is, at times, uncomfortable with, at times, hostile 
to, the emotions.  On the other hand, the Manualists convey a more affirmative 
approach to the affective virtues as sources of energy and direction in moral activity.  
There is, consequently, an unresolved tension in the Manualists that emerges as 
ambivalence towards the emotions in the moral life of the Christian.   
 
Thirdly, amongst authors attempting to renew Catholic Moral Theology 1960-1990, 
there is a palpable shift to an accepting tone and attitude towards the emotions.  
Overall, one finds a positive correlation between these and contemporary authors.  In 
Maguire, there is the rediscovery of the rich insight of “affective connaturality” with 
its roots in Aquinas but unfolded by John of St. Thomas.  In Grisez, and, the a lesser 
extent, in Peschke, there is the recovery of some of Aquinas’ material on emotions in 
relation to practical reason.  In Häring, one discovers (for his time) the most 
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extensive treatment of the emotions in a theological work since Aquinas.  He 
presents an amalgam of modern philosophical insights, an alternative methodology to 
that of neo-Thomism, and especially highlights emotions as responses to value.  The 
human person is a responding being.  Further, moral response carries within it 
openness to the transcendent, to the religious horizon.   
 
Fourthly, there is an expansion of the understanding of the human person.  Aquinas 
builds his synthesis on the truth of grace building on, or working through, nature.  He 
sees the human person and powers as having a fundamental orientation and capacity 
for God.  Integral to this are human desires, emotions and affectivity.  The static, 
essentialist and metaphysical categories used by Aquinas tend to portray the person 
(rather, “human nature”) in an ahistorical manner.  Contemporary Theological 
Anthropology has been influenced by social and physical sciences together with 
modern Philosophy.  There has been a shift to a position that is more historical, 
evolving, contextual, subject-oriented where the human person is characterised by 
self-awareness and self-direction.  There is a better appreciation of the multi-faceted 
makeup of the person-as spiritual, corporeal, mental, psychological, social.  Two 
aspects impinge insistently on the emotions-the bodily and the relational.  While 
these are part of Aquinas’ construal of the person, modern Psychology has enriched 
human self-understanding, particularly in the psychosomatic area of human living.  It 
has also enabled human beings to discern more confidently the experiential 
dimension of grace and of God’s activity.           
 
Finally, what has the selected (and other) contemporary scholarship to offer these 
various understandings within the Catholic tradition?  Perhaps, as been suggested, 
the most influential contribution is from Psychology.  It provides a model (or 
models) to interpret the relationship between the conscious and the unconscious, to 
analyse inner psychic activity, to understand psychological defense mechanisms, to 
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modify emotional responses and behaviour.  In particular, it offers techniques for 
claiming and naming negative emotions and states so that they can become 
constructive elements in one’s life.  These resources were just not available to 
Aquinas and to Moral Theologians only in this century.  For all that, this study has 
offered a glimpse of how Aquinas, despite his limited Psychology, is able to probe 
human experience carefully and critically .   
 
The soundings into modern scholarship in this area, then, have shown a noticeable 
level of mutual confirmation and many points of convergence with Aquinas and 
Catholic Moral Theology.  One must, nevertheless, be conscious of the danger of 
reductionism.  Psychological reductionism can assimilate the spiritual to the natural, 
i.e., a need for God’s forgiveness is just infantile regression.  Or its spiritual 
counterpart, e.g., illness is due to lack of faith.  Psychological reductionism can also 
reduce being “good” morally to being psychologically “whole” or healthy.  Holiness 
is conformity the Christ the perfect human being.  Goodness is moral excellence in 
imitation of Christ that results from a person’s choices and manner of living 
virtuously. To adapt Jackson, both holiness and moral goodness “anticipate and seek 
wholeness” (1989, p. 57).    
 
One could go even further and suggest that wholeness “anticipates and seeks 
goodness.”  Psychological approaches to emotions and human affectivity offer a 
descriptive account of the person that underpins the moral life.  More importantly, it 
is argued by some (e.g., Kagan) that emotions reveal both the need for, and the shape 
of, a normative structure to human existence if one is to develop as a human being in 
oneself and in relationships.  Emotions as value responses affirm the need for 
morality and for the need of a personal moral code that balances the subjective with 
the objective.   
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The investigative work of this study is now completed.  There only remains the task 
of drawing together the various threads.  That is the purpose of the next and final 
chapter.  
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Chapter 8  
 
 
Findings, Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, Postscript 
 
 
This chapter aims to do five things:  to recapitulate the main details of the study’s 
problem, methodology and textual analysis; to provide a summary of the findings 
within the three research questions used in this study; to list the conclusions that 
emerge from the findings; to note some significant implications of the findings and 
conclusions; finally, to propose some recommendations in the light of the study.      
 
The problem 
 
The problem addressed in this study is in the form of the question: 
 
How adequate is the treatment of the moral significance of the emotions in 
Catholic Moral Theology 1960-1990 when measured against the work of 
Aquinas and some contemporary authors?  
 
After offering a working definition of an emotion (Chapter two), the study has four 
focal points: Aquinas’ Treatise on the Passions and his work on the affective virtues 
(Chapters three and four); representative Moral Manualists just prior to Vatican II 
(Chapter five); selected Catholic Theologians between 1960 and 1990 (Chapter six); 
a sample of contemporary writing from Moral Philosophy, Developmental 
Psychology, Psychology as also from recent theological writing within the Catholic 
tradition (Chapter seven).   
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The textual analysis 
 
The study has involved an examination and analysis of these sources using three 
categories: the moral significance of emotions as human acts; the moral significance 
of emotions in relation to virtue and character; the understanding of the human 
person manifest or inferred in the various authors.  In the light of this analysis, the 
study compared, contrasted and evaluated the presentation of these categories in the 
selected authors.  The following three research questions, based on the three selected 
categories, have been applied to each author as an investigative structure in this 
study: 
     1.  How do these authors portray the moral significance of the emotions 
          in the Christian moral life in relation to human acts, virtue and character? 
     2.  What is the vision of the human person manifest or inferred in these authors? 
     3.  What is the significance of the different understandings and treatments of the  
          emotions and the human person in these authors? 
These questions have been the probes used by the researcher to gain access to the 
material required to answer the question that encapsulates the central problem of the 
study.    
 
1.  Summary of the Findings in the Study 
 
1.1:  The Moral Significance of Emotions as Human Acts 
 
1.1.1:  Aquinas: Foundational principles 
(i)     Emotions have a positive, even indispensable, role in human life. 
(ii)    Emotions are, to some degree and carefully understood, rational and hence, to a     
certain extent, are voluntary, viz., they are moral acts.   
(iii)  Emotions can be disposed to be consonant with right reason (i.e., fitting) and  
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thus provide the moral object for the will through the positive mutual causality  
between emotions and the intellect. 
(iv)  Not all emotions are rational, i.e., in the sense of morally good/right.  Some are,   
in themselves and carefully understood, consonant with right reason (intrinsically  
good/ right, e.g., shame), just as some are, in themselves and carefully defined, 
opposed to right reason (intrinsically evil/wrong, e.g., some forms of envy).   
(v)   The governing metaphor used by Aquinas to capture the teleological  
interdependence of intellect, will and emotions in the workings of practical   
reason is the polis where power is exercised within a community of free  
subjects. The standard mode of relationship of emotions to mind and will is  
characterised by collaboration rather than domination (whose appropriate exercise 
cannot, at times, be excluded).   
(vi)  In Aquinas’ account of the emotions, evidence emerges of his endeavours to  
overcome the constraints of language, his mental horizons, his Moral Psychology and 
his philosophical system.  He does this by the use of images, especially the use of a 
central  metaphor, by phenomenological analysis of certain emotions, and by his 
persistent interest in the bodily resonance of emotions.      
 
1.1.2:  Aquinas: specific emotions (positive and negative) 
(i)    It is possible and profitable to investigate Aquinas by using the modern  
distinction between positive and negative emotions as a hermeneutical tool.      
(ii)   The moral significance of love lies in its attraction to the good, especially in the  
form of the dominant attraction that unites a person’s life and orders other emotions 
and desires.  Love also provides the paradigm for the transcendent dimension of 
certain emotions.  
(iii)  Pleasure (happiness) as the goal of love through medium of desire, emerges in  
delight and joy in achieving one’s goal in life.  The moral qualities of right and 
wrong are measured against what promotes or impedes true inner harmony, delight, 
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joy through the principle of ‘fittingness.’   
(iv)  Sadness, hatred, fear, and anger can all have an affirmative, even necessary role  
in moral activity, especially in the realm of self-care.   
(v)   Aquinas employs a phenomenological method in analysing some emotions, cf.,  
love, sadness, anger. 
(vi)  Aquinas, while acknowledging their potential to be destructive, sees emotions,  
whether positive or negative, as having, in principle, a necessary and constructive 
role in a person’s moral life.  
 
1.1.3:  The Manualists 
(i)    The dominant concern for these authors is the emotions considered as 
impediments to, even enemies of, the human act or voluntarium. 
(ii)   The moral significance of emotions in relation to the human act is confined to 
the discussion of antecedent and consequent emotions, to the influence of various 
forms of fear as also of habitual impediments and pathological states.  
(iii)  The restricted context and focus of the Manualists’ treatment results in an  
ambivalent view of the emotions and their moral significance as human acts.  At 
times, the attitude appears positive, more often is uncomfortable, occasionally is 
hostile.  Overall, the Manualists convey a distorted perception of the emotions and, 
consequently, of their moral significance in relation to human acts.      
 
1.1.4:  Renewing Catholic Theology 1960-1990 
(i)   There is the maintenance of the traditional treatment (as in the Manualists) of  
the emotions and their influence on the voluntarium (Peschke, early Häring, Grisez). 
(ii)   Rediscovery is apparent in reclaiming the affective component in moral  
reasoning and in foundational moral awareness and the governing metaphor used by 
Aquinas to describe the relationship between the intellect and emotions  
in practical reason (Maguire, Grisez).   
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(iii)  Innovation is evident in the detailed phenomenology of the emotions as 
responses to value both in basic moral consciousness and in moral reasoning (early 
Häring). 
(iv)  There is some degree of commonality in moral epistemology from the shared  
understanding of connatural knowledge (Peschke, Maguire, Häring, Grisez). 
(v)   There is an observable lack of development of the normative account of  
consequent emotions (found in Aquinas) by drawing on Häring’s phenomenological 
analysis. 
(vi)  An attitudinal shift to the emotions is apparent in these authors ranging from the  
muted tone in Peschke, through an audible harmonic in Maguire and Grisez to the 
dominant motif in Häring.   
 
1.4:  Selected contemporary authors 
(i)   From Moral Philosophy, Oakley attempts to demonstrate the moral significance 
of emotions through their necessary involvement in achieving certain goods.  These  
values are clear perception, keen judgement, insight and understanding, strength of  
will, love and friendship and self-worth.  All these are characteristics of the  
practically wise person (phronimos).  Oakley also analyses the role of emotions in  
moral reasoning by using the phronimos as the benchmark for the rightness of a  
moral response (in terms of its object and/or intensity).  It is the person developed in  
practical wisdom who has sufficiently habituated affective virtues to perceive  
ethically salient features in a situation and to respond emotionally to the right  
objects and to the right degree.    
(ii)  From Developmental Psychology, Gilligan, in contrast to the masculine, 
objective, emotionally detached approach of Kohlberg, defends an alternative and  
complementary form of moral reasoning.  She argues that care and responsibility in  
relationships is the feminine manner of construing reality and in constructing and  
resolving moral conflicts.  This entails cultivating certain forms of emotional  
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response, e.g., loving, care, compassion.  Moral reasoning and moral development  
are understood in a more holistic and collaborative sense, i.e., between the cognitive,  
affective and corporeal aspects of the person and in a setting of relationships.     
(iii)  The psychological dynamic of reason and emotions is probed by Callahan.   
Psychologically, emotions are crucial in establishing basic moral responsiveness as  
they are in animating moral life and shaping one’s moral perspective.  Further,  
embedded as habits and emotional commitments, emotions influence the selection  
and filtering processes concerning what is ethically salient in particular situations.   
Morally, thinking and emotion have a collaborative and congruent relationship.   
Reason judges and tutors emotions; emotions test and tutor reason; emotions can  
monitor and tutor each other.     
 
1.2:  The Moral Significance of Emotions in Relation to Virtue and Character 
 
1.2.1:  Aquinas 
(i)   For Aquinas, participation in Trinitarian life through grace is the existential 
reality from which the virtues receive their impulse and capacity to seek and respond 
to God and so arrive at human fulfilment. 
(ii)  The affective virtues (Fortitude and Temperance), from which emerge emotions  
morally good in themselves which provide proper objects to the will, are necessary  
for moral action, growth and integration. 
(iii)  Affective virtues are immanent as opposed to transitive. They are forms of  
habituation that modify human affectivity.  Their proper function and perfection is  
to provide the habitual dispositions for a person to make well-ordered, appropriate 
emotional responses (which may or may not lead to action).   
(iv)  The mean of the affective virtues is contextual, namely, shaped by a person’s  
temperament, circumstances and overall moral development.  For this reason, 
Aquinas does not offer a normative account of moderate emotions that emerge from  
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the affective virtues. 
(v)   Love, in the form of transforming Charity, gives the affective (and all) virtues 
their unity, meaning and direction.  Virtues for Aquinas are principally strategies and  
different expressions of love. 
(vi)  Consonant with his historical context, Aquinas has inadequacies concerning the  
domain of subjective experience, the psychological structure of the human person,  
and of the effects of social and cultural conditioning on patterns of evaluation and  
emotional response.  Nevertheless, there are instances of psychological insight and  
of his affective awareness in his discussion of emotions and the affective virtues.    
(vii)  Aquinas’ treatment of the emotions mirrors, both in its content and language, 
the strand in his work where he conveys a more positive view of women as made in 
the image of God.   
(viii)  In discussing the emotions and their associated virtues, Aquinas shows an 
increasing emphasis on the role of human affectivity in his Theological 
Anthropology while betraying elements of his own refined sensitivity.   
 
1.2.2:  Manualists 
(i)   Their presentation of the affective virtues (nature, divisions, parts of Fortitude 
and Temperance) replicates, in compressed form, the treatment found in Aquinas. 
(ii)  While the affective virtues, compared to the emotions, are portrayed in a more  
positive light, the perception of their principal role as one of restraining the emotions 
indicates a lingering unease in their regard. 
(iii)  Such traces of ambivalence, when combined with the summary treatment of the 
affective virtues, seems to preclude the development of the relationship between  
emotions, virtue and character in these authors.   
 
1.2.3: Renewing Catholic Theology 1960-1990 
(i)   Fundamental response, understood as conversion, is the centrepoint of the moral 
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life in the selected authors.  
(ii)  Virtues emerge from this foundational conversion as patterns of response 
embodied in attitudes, desires, emotions and life-style. 
(iii)  The traditional affective virtues are re-interpreted as modes of response/  
responsibility to or between values (Grisez). 
(iv)  The traditional affective virtues are recast by Peschke and Häring in the form of 
the call to respond and to be responsible to God and the world. 
(v)   The later Häring assumes the traditional affective virtues but highlights the  
eschatological virtues (with their affective components).  These manifest the   
realisation of God’s Reign in persons and communities who are grateful, humble,  
hopeful, vigilant, joyful and peaceful.  
(vi)  Moral response, for Peschke and Häring, is centrifugal and inclusive, actualised 
in a person’s character through expanding horizons of understanding and love for  
people, cultures and nature.   
 
1.2.4:  Selected contemporary authors 
(i)   The building blocks of the sense of self, self-esteem and of awareness of another 
(empathy) are in the realm of emotions and affectivity.  Without a basic self-esteem 
and empathy, a human being cannot be moral-either in basic moral awareness or in 
ongoing moral reasoning (Dominian, Jackson). 
(ii)  Empathy, as the psychological basis of morality, is the constitutive element in  
human experience that can be transformed by grace, can receive a new meaning  
through a personal relationship with Jesus Christ, and can enable a person to   
respond to Jesus Christ (Shelton). 
(iii)  Where empathy provides the basic soil, emotions nourish a person’s moral  
sensitivity, expand moral vision and sustain moral growth (Shelton). 
(iv)  A morality of the heart is modelled by Jesus Christ in his kenosis.  Its goal is to  
share in the work of Christ’s reconciliation and the personal and social 
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transformation of the world and creation (Shelton). 
(v)  Affective conversion entails a measure of responsibility for one’s emotional 
health.  It involves the decision to listen to, learn from, and understand negative 
states and emotions so that their conscious appropriation can lead to deeper personal  
integration (Gelpi).    
 
 
1.3:  Theological Anthropology:  Understandings of the Human Person 
 
1.3.1:  Aquinas 
(i)   The overall teleological structure of the Summa Theologiae around the poles of 
Exitus/Reditus takes a sharper focus in the Prima Secundae in a theological   
perspective built on a philosophical anthropology of the human person. 
(ii)  Aquinas’ metaphysical categories, his cosmic and immanent teleology and his  
reliance on the various forms of causality provide the analytical structure for his  
view of the human person and for his division and account of human emotions. 
(iii)  For Aquinas, the human person, created in the image of God, is self-directing, 
free and responsible for his/her actions. 
(iv)  The teleological character of creation is replicated in the immanent teleology of 
the human powers, in their relationship as distinct yet interdependent.  This pattern is  
exemplified in the emotions in relation to intellect and will. 
(v)  The human person is a body/spirit reality-captured in the theory of 
hylomorphism.  It is particularly embodied in the structure of human affectivity.  
(vi)  The human person is a being of desire (orexis), drawn to happiness as life’s goal 
(found in God alone). 
(vii)  For Aquinas, the human person is called to participate in the divine life through  
grace.  Human acts (including emotions), the virtues, the gifts of the Holy Spirit  
emerge from this transformed state, animating and facilitating the momentum  
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towards full human flourishing through the achievement of human destiny in union  
with God.  Aquinas offers an integrated anthropological vision.  
(viii)  Aquinas’ view of the human person is internally consistent and coherent.  The 
person is the focal point on which converge a range of complementary interpretative 
models, i.e., theological, cosmological, organic, moral, social/political.  
 
 
1.3.2:  The Manualists 
(i)   These authors follow Aquinas’ overall structural design of the Exitus/Reditus and 
draw, in summary form, on his ontological and teleological framework (as outlined 
above).    
(ii)  In examining the more immediate context, the displacement and recording of  
material by the Manualists, combined with their pastoral concerns, betray a  
restricted approach to the human person.  Conscience, Law, Sin and Vice take the  
spotlight.  The human subject, designed to develop from interiorised resources, is  
replaced by the moral agent called to conformity to external benchmarks.   
(iii) This shift in understanding of human person is evident in the Manualists’  
preoccupation with the morality of acts and, consequently, of the emotions as  
inhibiting rather than promoting freedom and moral growth.  It can also be  
detected in the Manualists’ style of language, in forms of argument resting heavily  
on authority and on a self-authenticating tradition.  It is especially encapsulated in  
the move from an organic to a mechanical image to act as the governing metaphor  
representing the relationship between emotions and the deliberative powers in  
practical reasoning.   
(iv)  In the Manualists, one can detect an unresolved tension, even conflict, between 
the residual presence of Aquinas’ organic and developmental understanding of the  
human person and a subsequent approach that is juridical, mechanical and  
conformist.  There are, arguably, two Theological Anthropologies that seem to be  
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incompatible.   
     
1.3.3:  Renewing Catholic Theology 1960-1990 
(i)   The backdrop for these authors’ treatment of the human person is one of change 
and of the summons to renew Moral Theology from Vatican II.  This is accompanied 
by a greater openness to, and enrichment from, modern Philosophy and the  
behavioural sciences together with move from a seminary to a university context. 
(ii)  The human being is now understood as a ‘person’ rather than as ‘human nature.’ 
There is no longer a methodology that leans heavily on the metaphysical  
categories and teleological structures found in Aquinas and the Manualists.  For  
Peschke and Häring, it is the person (individual, social, corporeal, affective,  
historically grounded) who is the subject of Theological Anthropology.   
(iii)  The human person has a sense of a self, gives greater weight to experience, is a  
being-in-relationship, is called to response and dialogue, while being a bearer and  
revealer of value through various levels of affective awareness (Häring, Maguire).       
(iv)  The moral life begins with God’s initiative and invitation, calling human beings 
to respond to values, especially to God as transcendent value and lover and is  
epitomised in Jesus Christ (Häring, Peschke, Grisez). 
(v)   This understanding of the person as one who responds to value(s) results in  
emotions being more readily susceptible to an intelligible and necessary  
significance in human life, moral reasoning and growth in the affective virtues.    
(vi)  These selected authors, while differing in emphasis and, at times, in content, do 
not betray a lack of congruence between their ‘espoused’ theory and their theory ‘in  
use.’ 
 
1.3.4:  Selected contemporary authors  
(i)   These authors differ from the previous authors in this study in their perspective 
and assumptions concerning the human person.  Their concern is not Theological  
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Anthropology but moral growth through virtue (Moral Philosophy) or psychological  
health and development (Psychology, Developmental Psychology).  Authors such as  
Dominian, Jackson, McDargh, Shelton, Gelpi incorporate insights from these  
disciplines in their accounts of religious faith and Christian moral growth. 
(ii)   The human person as a ‘moral self’ receives different emphases in these 
authors.  Some give greater stress to the self-as-individual (Oakley, Callahan, Gelpi).  
Others pursue the self-in-relationship (Dominian, Jackson, McDargh, Shelton) 
especially in the origins of self-esteem and the role of empathy.   
(iii)  ‘Awareness of the self’ is another characteristic of the person assumed by, or  
apparent in, these authors.  It is seen at work in the detailed mechanism of moral 
reasoning offered by Callahan, in the emergence of basic self-esteem (Dominian, 
Jackson, McDargh), in its relationship to empathy (Shelton) and in the self-presence 
required for on-going conversion (Gelpi).   
(iv)  The various perspectives on the human person in these authors are illuminated 
by the interdisciplinary nature of their writing.  
(v)   In investigating the human person, the behavioural sciences are increasingly 
open to other disciplines, perspectives and new methodologies, e.g., qualitative 
research. 
 
1.4:  Significance of the Different Understandings and Treatments  
of the Emotions and of the Human Person 
 
1.4.1:  Aquinas and the Manualists 
 
The examination of the Manualists indicates a substantial unanimity amongst them in 
their understanding of the human person, of the emotions as human acts and of the 
affective virtues.  There are four points of contrast between Aquinas and the 
Manualists that are important for this study. 
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Firstly, the restricted context, combined with the selective use of certain aspects of  
emotions, i.e., as affecting the voluntarium, results in the Manualist authors   
misrepresenting and distorting Aquinas’ understanding of the moral significance of  
emotions and of the human person.  The author of this study detects an internal 
conflict in the Manualists.  This is evident in the terminology, e.g., consequent 
emotions are seen not as increasing moral goodness but as impediments to the human 
act.  Again, the working assumption of the Manualists is that emotions are obstacles 
to human and moral well-being.  They have difficulty reconciling this with Aquinas’ 
overall treatment and with human experience.  Finally, the Manualists,  
with their uncomfortable stance to emotions and a comfortable attitude towards 
affective virtues, seem unable to weave these contrasting strands into a consistent 
whole.  These three considerations are significant indicators of the, at times, 
incoherent and hence inadequate understanding of the moral significance of the 
emotions and of the human person in their work.       
 
Secondly, the shift in the dominant metaphor (in Davis) from the organic to the 
mechanical, from political to despotic rule, is both symptomatic and crucial.  From 
Aquinas’ vision of an harmonious human composite where intellect, will and 
emotions are designed to collaborate with each other, there is a move to a more 
dualistic understanding of higher powers whose purpose is to dominate the emotions. 
 
Thirdly, the fear of emotions apparent in the Manualists represents a deeper distrust 
of the human body.  This is associated with a more anxious and pessimistic 
spirituality emerging from the later medieval period and prevalent up until the 
middle of the twentieth century.    
 
Fourthly, the conflicting views concerning the emotions and the human person, 
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especially captured in the change in the governing metaphor, has particular relevance 
for moral theory.  While the Manualists’ preoccupation with individual acts does 
have its analytical and pastoral benefits, these come at a price.  Morality tends to 
become more nominalistic, a question of obligation and of the divine will rather than 
a response to, and the intelligible investigation about, the question of happiness.  
Practical reason inclines more towards Kant’s rational will rather than being the 
cooperation of intellect, will and emotions through the guidance of the virtues, 
especially the affective virtues.      
 
1.4.2:  Renewing Catholic Theology, Aquinas and Manualists 
 
In the theologians studied, there emerges a confluence of positive attitudes 
concerning the emotions and the moral life.  It revolves around conversion, 
fundamental option, value, response and the virtues (affective or eschatological).  
The points of contrast between these authors, Aquinas and the Manualists are 
encapsulated in three headings. 
 
The first point of contrast is human subjectivity and its dynamics, the role of the 
unconscious, the place of self-awareness, personal inwardness and depth.  These 
distinguish the selected authors, particularly Häring, from Aquinas and the 
Manualists.  There is an accompanying awareness of the self-in-relationship, both in 
interpersonal terms and as a participant, with rights and duties, in the social and 
political world.  This provides the foundation for more deliberate accounts of the 
interpersonal, communitarian, social and environmental contexts within which the 
human subject lives and develops, a point of contrast with Aquinas and the 
Manualists.  
 
A second point of divergence concerns aspects of morality.  There is a significant 
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difference between the moral epistemologies found in the selected modern Moral 
Theologians and in the Manualists.  This centres on the role of emotions in 
foundational moral awareness and in on-going practical reasoning.  Further, the 
modern authors exhibit a shift in moral theory from the legal and voluntarist 
approach in the Manuals to one based on conversion, interiorisation and virtue.  This 
is both a rediscovery of Aquinas and an advance on him through the added stress on 
social responsibility and on eschatological considerations.  Again, moral agency is an 
important point of divergence.  All the modern Moralists studied in this project see 
moral agency as focussed on the person and on the imitation of Christ.  Peschke and 
Grisez do this while incorporating teleological categories and final and efficient 
causality.  Conversely,  Häring pursues the same perspective through the categories 
of invitation, response and exemplary causality.    
 
Finally, moral vision and vocation are another consideration.  The modern account is 
Christocentric, with the Christian vocation understood as the following of Christ and 
the cooperation with Him in responsibility in the religious realm and in and for the 
world.  Growth in affective virtue is not primarily for self-fulfilment.  It is an 
eschatological goal of being God’s co-workers in affirming and promoting God’s 
reign and the fulfilment of creation.  This is a significant advance on Aquinas and the 
Manualists. 
 
1.4.3:  Selected contemporary authors, renewing Catholic Theology, Aquinas, and  
           the Manualists 
 
This investigation has uncovered important points of convergence amongst the 
various authors from different periods.  All, except the Manualists, share an 
unambiguously affirmative view of the emotions (both positive and negative) and 
their constructive potential in moral living.  The construal of an emotion is common 
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to Oakley and Aquinas, is further developed by Häring, but is not the concern of the 
other contemporary authors.  The mutual interaction of emotions and intellect in 
moral reasoning is explained, in initial form, by Aquinas, is elaborated by Oakley 
and receives intricate probing from Callahan.  Contemporary Psychology, Aquinas 
and modern theologians agree on the importance of self-esteem, a sense of inner 
goodness and the place of self-love as the necessary conditions for the moral life.  
The psychological context of some authors shows the  presence of a more finely 
honed self-awareness and skills in attending to psychic movements.  This is evident 
in a phenomenological form in Häring and even, at times, in Aquinas.  The 
constructive potential of negative emotions in moral integration is acknowledged and 
elaborated by Gelpi while being consistent with the views of Aquinas, Häring and 
Grisez.  Finally, all authors, from Aquinas through the Manualists to representative 
theologians and contemporary authors, see the safeguarding and strengthening of 
character as crucial in the moral life.     
 
Conversely, there are five areas of divergence within this sweep of authors.  
Perspectives about the human person range from the psychological, the aretaic to the 
Christian  Anthropology that binds together Aquinas, the Manualists and Catholic 
theological writing.  Again, while all authors share a concern for the formation of  
character, there is no attempt in the selected contemporary authors to pursue the 
Catholic tradition’s concern for the nature and role of the affective virtues.  Thirdly, 
the matter of foundational moral awareness and of affective connaturality is more 
evident in Catholic theological discussion than in the selected contemporary works.  
Fourthly, the impact of emotions on moral imputability differentiates the authors.  
Emotions as impediments to freedom is central for the Manualists.  Emotions as 
facilitating freedom and moral goodness is a working assumption of the modern 
texts, as it is of Häring, Grisez and Aquinas.  The helpful distinction between 
antecedent and consequent emotions is overlooked by the contemporary authors.  
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Finally, moral goodness has different connotations when seen from a psychological 
perspective, or from that of virtue theory and lastly from the point of view of a 
theologian where it is responding to love under the influence of grace.   
 
Overall, the significance of these varied understandings of the moral significance of 
the emotions can be summed up in three observations.  There is a positive correlation 
between contemporary writing and the understanding and treatment of the emotions 
and their moral significance found in Aquinas and renewing Catholic Theology 
1960-1990.  Secondly, modern studies (within and beyond the Catholic tradition) 
together with Aquinas have an overall negative correlation with the Manualists’ view 
of the moral significance of the emotions.  Finally, this project has uncovered, in 
these authors, the trajectory of an expanding understanding of the human person.  It 
is a movement from the essentialist, metaphysical categories used to describe human 
nature to those more oriented to the person as subject, a being who is historical, 
developing, self-aware, psychosomatic, relational, social and cosmic.           
         
2.  Conclusions of the Study 
 
The conclusions that emerge from the findings of this study can be formulated in the 
light of the principal research question.  What is the response to the focal question of 
this study, namely: 
How adequate is the treatment of the moral significance of the emotions in 
Catholic Moral Theology 1960-1990 when measured against the work of 
Aquinas and some contemporary authors?   
 
The response is fourfold and is based on certain distinctions within Catholic Moral 
Theology 1960-1990.      
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1.  The Manualists c. 1960 display an understanding of the moral significance of the 
emotions that lacks coherence and adequacy when assessed in the light of Aquinas’ 
account and of contemporary writing within and beyond the Catholic tradition. 
 
2.  From the investigation of representative authors, it can be said that renewing 
Catholic Theology 1960-1990 contains an understanding of the moral significance of 
the emotions that has a substantial degree of coherence and adequacy.  By collating 
the material dispersed amongst these authors, it can also be argued that it needs to be 
supplemented by insights from contemporary authors from other disciplines. 
 
3.  This study has brought to light the quality of Aquinas’ treatment and 
understanding of the moral significance of the emotions.  His account is internally 
consistent and coherent.  Measured within that framework, it is substantially 
adequate.  Measured against contemporary writing, its deficiencies, though not 
substantive, are more conspicuous yet understandable.       
 
4.   Closer examination reveals that regrettably, within the period 1960-1990, 
Catholic Moral Theology, in general, seems to have failed to recognise or failed to 
have capitalised on the expanding understanding and appreciation of the moral 
significance of the emotions.  This untapped resource has emerged through a 
rediscovery of Aquinas and through investigations in modern scholarship within and 
beyond the Catholic theological tradition.       
 
3.  Implications of the Study 
 
1.  This study has uncovered a significant level of mutual confirmation and many 
important points of convergence between Aquinas, modern theologians and 
contemporary writing in adjacent disciplines on the moral significance of emotions 
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and human affectivity.  The various treatments need to be blended into a more 
systematic and integrated account of the emotions in the Christian moral life.  This 
should be buttressed by a Theological Anthropology that combines contemporary 
understandings of the human person, a congruent Moral Psychology and a Theology 
of the emotions and of human affectivity.   
 
2.  Aquinas attempts to portray the task of Fortitude and Temperance as virtues 
meant to assist a person to include, in an appropriate manner, emotional experience 
in moral life and moral reasoning.  He sees the function of the affective virtues not as 
checking one’s emotions but as integrating them for one’s happiness.  The contextual 
nature of Aquinas’ account has repercussions for contemporary life.  With a greater 
emphasis on human relationships in recent times, a re-interpretation has been 
proposed for the cardinal virtues.  It has been suggested that the virtues are meant to 
develop relationships rather than individual powers or faculties.  Hence, as a 
relational being, one is called to fidelity to others (Fortitude) and, in relation to 
oneself, to exercise self-care (Temperance) (Keenan, 1995, p. 709ff); 1998, p. 139ff).  
This use of language and categories reflecting advances in human self-understanding 
fosters a creative interaction between enduring insights from the past and 
contemporary experience.   
 
3.  This study has highlighted the necessary interdependence of Psychology, 
Morality, Spirituality and Theology in understanding the human person and in 
promoting authentic development.  One aspect of this is the need for ongoing 
interdisciplinary dialogue and mutual criticism.  Solid underpinnings from the 
behavioural sciences are needed for theological understandings of the person and for 
any Moral Psychology.  Conversely, one needs to be aware of the limits of 
therapeutic and developmental theories in Psychology which cannot fully account for 
moral and affective response, especially of a religious character, as in the process of 
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conversion.  Nor can they account for the person who is psychologically flawed or 
underdeveloped on the cognitive-structural scale but who, by responding in love to 
God’s love to the best of their ability, is advancing in moral goodness and holiness.    
 
4.  This investigation has underlined the central place of Jesus Christ, particularly the 
role of his human affectivity, empathy and emotional responses in revealing the inner 
life of God.  Jesus’ self-appropriation means that there is no part of himself 
(including negative emotions and states) that he has not faced and embraced.  The 
goal of Christian moral integration is, having been created in God’s image, that we 
grow in the likeness of Christ, especially of his affectivity and compassionate love.        
 
5.  It is clearer from this project that Christian morality, by acknowledging and 
incorporating the emotions and affectivity, confirms and nourishes the relational 
aspects of human existence.  Emotions, self-esteem, basic trust, empathy are the 
building blocks of what MacMurray describes as the “...capacity for communion, that 
capacity for entering into free and equal personal relations (which) is the thing that 
makes us human” (McDargh, 1983, p. 358).  They are also crucial in providing the 
possibility of moral response and in initiating and sustaining the movement of the 
human person as a relational being from self-absorption to self-transcendence.   
 
6.  Emotions provide a point of convergence for the moral and spiritual dimensions 
of human experience.  They encapsulate what Taylor refers to as the “affirmation of 
ordinary life” (Taylor, 1989, p. 211ff) and give sharper focus and grounding to 
morality considered as the daily task of transformation and integration of the total 
person. 
 
7.  The relationship between Spirituality and Morality is further highlighted by the 
interconnection of moral action and spiritual disposition, particularly by the 
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significance of emotions, perception and enduring dispositions to respond and act in 
certain ways.  Further work needs to be done on how emotions sustain a spirituality, 
support moral commitment, are “socially formed through language and custom” 
(Spohn, 1991, p. 85) and especially how specifically Christian emotions are formed 
within the Christian community. 
 
4.  Recommendations of the Study 
 
1.  There is an evident need for the cultivation and interchange of interdisciplinary 
perspectives on the psychological, moral and spiritual significance of emotions both 
at level of conferences, journals and books.   
 
2.  There is the need for Moral Theologians to develop a synthesis of the largely 
untapped resources concerning emotions and the moral life.   
 
3.  Greater attention needs to be given to the moral significance of the emotions and 
the affective life in the teaching of Moral Theology.   
 
Postscript 
 
It is with the heart that one sees rightly; what is essential is invisible to the eye 
                                                               The Little Prince:  Antoine de Saint-Exupéry 
 
Daniel Goleman opens Emotional Intelligence (1995) with the story of Gary and 
Mary Jane Chauncey and their 11 year old daughter Andrea, confined to a 
wheelchair by cerebral palsy.  They are all passengers on a train that crashed in a 
river in Louisiana. The Chauncey’s first thought was for their daughter.  As waters 
engulfed the train, they managed to push Andrea through a window to rescuers.  
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They then perished.   
 
Such accounts of parental or family sacrifice are repeated often, as in tragedies such 
as the killings at Port Arthur in Tasmania.  There, a man threw himself across his 
wife during the hail of bullets.  He died, she survived.  Goleman sees such acts of 
altruistic love, overriding the powerful impulse for personal survival, as testimonies 
to the purpose and potency of emotions in human life.  “It suggests that our deepest 
feelings, our passions and longings, are essential guides, and that our species owes 
much of its existence to their power in human affairs” (1995, p. 3f).   Emotions 
guide, strengthen and animate us to face situations and tasks “too important to leave 
to intellect alone-danger, painful loss, persisting towards a goal despite frustrations, 
bonding with a mate, building a family” (Goleman, 1995, p. 4).   
 
Schopenhauer probes this phenomenon further in his paper “The Foundations of 
Morality.”  “How is it that a human being can so participate in the danger of another, 
that forgetting his own self-protection, he moves spontaneously to the other’s 
rescue?”  (Campbell, 1990, p. 41).  Schopehnauer’s reply is that this instinctive 
response wells up from the very core of our being.  “It is a metaphysical impulse that 
is deeper than the experience of separateness.  You realize you and the other are one” 
(Campbell, 1990, p. 41).   
 
These two insights seem to encapsulate the moral significance of the emotions.  It is 
one’s emotions that express and ensure the essential relationships that make a person 
human through responding to and for each other and one’s world.  Further, these 
instantaneous reactions, often without deliberation, are, at certain key moments, 
moral statements-about one’s true character, values and fundamental attitudes.  This 
is behaviour by which one cannot help but be inspired, and warrants admiration, 
praise and imitation.  Such self-transcending emotional responses, defining a person 
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and engaging one’s deepest freedom, are arguably the most profoundly human acts a 
person can perform.  Could one even say that human beings are most rational, most 
moral when they seek what is true and good by acting spontaneously, without 
deliberation, even without conscious choice?  Whether one sees this as a mystery or a 
paradox it marks an appropriate point at which to close this study.      
 
***************************** 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This is a comparative study of the moral significance of emotions in Catholic Moral 
Theology.  It is done with reference to Thomas Aquinas, to selected Manualist 
authors immediately prior to Vatican II, to representative Catholic theologians 1960-
1990 and to a sample of contemporary writers from other disciplines.  The project 
argues five points. 
 
Firstly, Aquinas sees emotions as designed to have a necessary and constructive 
significance in moral reasoning and moral development.  In their habituated form as 
affective virtues, they enable a person to have the right emotional responses in terms 
of their object and intensity.   
 
Secondly, the Manualists, by a selective use of Aquinas’ material and by restricting 
their discussion to emotions considered as impediments to the human act, distort 
Aquinas’ treatment.  Despite a positive approach to the affective virtues, the 
Manualists’ ambivalent attitude to the emotions (ranging from uncomfortable to 
hostile) results in an inconsistent and, at times, incoherent account. 
 
Thirdly, authors such as Haring, Peschke, Grisez and Maguire, representing 
renewing Catholic Moral Theology after Vatican II, combine two strands.  One is 
retrieval, from within the Catholic tradition, of the positive moral significance of 
emotions together with the affective character of primordial moral awareness.  The 
other strand is discovery, from within modern thought, particularly of insights from 
personalism and axiological ethics.  This is especially evident in Haring, for whom 
the human person is a relational being whose emotions are responses to value (in its 
various forms) and have social and religious significance.     
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Fourthly, contemporary Moral Philosophy (Oakley), Psychology and Developmental 
Psychology (Callahan, Gilligan, Dominian, McDargh) generally confirm and, at 
times, supplement the understanding of emotions found in Aquinas and renewing 
Catholic Theology.  Shelton and Gelpi (from within the Catholic tradition) use such 
sources to examine the place of empathy and affective Conversion in moral 
existence.   
 
Finally, closer investigation reveals that regrettably, within the period 1960-1990, 
Catholic Moral Theology, in general, seems to have failed to recognise or failed to 
have capitalised on the expanding understanding and appreciation of the moral 
significance of the emotions retrieved from Aquinas or developed by modern 
scholarship within and beyond the Catholic theological tradition.    
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